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HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW



Poor Scholarship in College

U. E. WHITEIS

History, Historians, and the Secondary School Curriculum

ARTHUR S. BOLSTER, JR.

History in Soviet Education Since 1958

MARIN PUNDEFF

A Concept of Critical Thinking

ROBERT H. ENNIS

VOLUME THIRTY-TWO

WINTER

NUMBER ONE

1962



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Contributions should be addressed to: The Editorial Board, *Harvard Educational Review*, Lawrence Hall, Kirkland St., Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

THE HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW is published quarterly—Winter, Spring, Summer and Fall—for the Graduate School of Education, Harvard University. Subscription rates: United States and Canada, 1 Yr., \$4; 3 Yrs., \$10; single copies, \$1.25. Foreign, 1 Yr., \$4.50; 3 Yrs., \$11.50; single copies, \$1.35. Second class postage paid in Montpelier, Vermont and at additional mailing office. Subscribers must notify a change of address six weeks in advance to assure delivery. Address communication to: Circulation Manager, Lawrence Hall, Kirkland Street, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

THE HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW is indexed in the *Education Index*, *Psychological Abstracts*, and *Sociological Abstracts*.

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Poor Scholarship in College

Two Interpretations and an Experimental Test

The author's inter-disciplinary approach to the implications of the behavioral sciences for technologies is manifested in this article. He examines two interpretations of the observed poverty of scholarship among many undergraduates, and describes how these interpretations were subjected to an experimental test in which therapeutic techniques were used selectively in two freshman psychology classes. The results of the test are surprising—even startling—and provocative.

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INTRODUCTION

THE POOR SCHOLARSHIP of undergraduate students presents a major unresolved problem in higher education. Among the proposed resolutions are two which, though alike in the projection of a needed reform in the schools, are unlike in the inferences of causation and in the nature of the recommended change. Neither interpretation is sustained or negated by evidence from experimental tests of one against the other.

The problem is posed by various types of poor scholastic record. Some students rank among the highest in scores from pre-admission tests of intelligence and achievement, yet they are asked to withdraw for reasons of academic failure. Other students attain superior or satisfactory grades in most areas of the curriculum, but they get unsatisfactory grades in many if not all of the courses within a certain subject-matter area. Still other students receive good grades up to a certain semester. Then they get a failing grade. Thereafter,

*"Punishment's Influence on Fear and Avoidance," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXVI, 360-373.

they are caught in a spiral of increasingly more failures until the time of compulsory withdrawal. In more frequent cases there is a consistently mediocre performance. These students may graduate from college, but their average grade is lower than would be expected from measures of capability.

The performance of students who get low grades is described and assayed by professional observers from different vantage points. Professors, observing the products of students' behavior in the form of term papers and examinations, may refer to a poor quality of writing. They decry the lack of organization and the dearth of well developed materials, especially in the work of Freshmen. One professor contends that "... increasing numbers of matriculating students" are unable to use or even to name the tools of simplest intellectual work (21). Psychiatrists, working with students who are in trouble, cite the scholastic failures, the apathy, the neglect of assignments, the cheating on examinations, the plagiarism, and still other behavioral phenomena as symptoms of students' problems. Farnworth says that the consensus of workers in this area is that such problems are "definitely increasing" in severity if not also in extent (16, p. 43). Administrators and researchers, studying trends in undergraduate populations, point to an excessively high incidence of probation and to a high rate of attrition in which scholastic failure is a critical factor (6; 26, pp. 89-99).

According to one of the two interpretations to be tested in this study, the behavioral phenomena in a poor scholastic record are symptoms of maladjustive or neurotogenic tendencies. The exponents of this position are certain mental hygienists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, psychological counselors, guidance personnel, and some educators.

According to the other interpretation, the poor academic work is a sign that students lack a disciplined intelligence. The authors of this second position are critics, but still champions, of American public education. Among them, there are professional writers and certain university professors.

The assumptions in these interpretations lead to testable deductions with which the experimental problem is concerned.

THE "INTERFERENCE-EFFECT" INTERPRETATION

The first of the two interpretations is derived from the observation that, when a student has a history of poor scholarship, it commonly reveals the presence of behavior which is self-defeating yet repetitive. The student's actions are such that they earn low marks. His conduct deservedly elicits the correctional and remedial comments from professors, or the disciplinary action of deans. But his behavior does not benefit from these customary educational devices. Even more strange is the fact that the behavior may persist, or become more evident, when another way of acting is possible and would lead to success rather than to further failure. The quality of perform-

ance may deteriorate to the point where the student is placed on probation and finally is asked to withdraw from college.

This type of behavior shows marked deviations from adjustive action; it is aptly termed, *mal-adjustive*.¹ Adjustive behavior is amenable to modification by reality factors such as signs of disapproval; it ordinarily changes from an activity which holds a threat of further failure to action which holds a greater promise of success. Adjustive behavior is flexible; it shows that various alternative routes to a goal are contemplated or tried until a task is completed and the problem is resolved. Adjustive behavior becomes increasingly efficient or economical; it carries the individual progressively and more skillfully to successive goals.

Although the interpretation of maladjustive behavior in poor academic work is stated somewhat differently by various writers, the primary assumption is virtually the same: that this kind of response is a manifestation of immature emotional reactions and unresolved problems which are a brake, a block, or an interference to the attainment of academic goals. These immature reactions and unresolved problems may impede, distort, divert, delay, or stop the intellectual problem-solving activities which might have led more satisfactorily to the completion of academic tasks (5; 16, p. 43; 17; 18; 30, p. 58; 42, p. 6; 43; 45; 47, pp. 62, 89).

An illustration is provided by students who engage in maladjustive avoidance behavior.² One student, instead of approaching and working on the assigned readings for a course, may show avoidance in the postponement and accumulation of unread chapters. Or his avoidance tendencies may be reflected in unfinished and abandoned projects, in tardiness to class, in "cuts" (absences) from class, and in resistances which are shown in the presence of the instructor. Although this behavior leads to poor acquisition or to no acquisition, and although it defeats the avowed purposes of the student in obtaining a satisfactory scholastic record, he may continue to act in the same self-defeating manner. A second student similarly may show avoidance of materials which are assigned for learning but he exerts the necessary effort to acquire them, despite his avoidance tendencies. Then he "forgets" these materials at the time of writing an examination. Whether the avoidance behavior

¹ The maladjustive behavior in a poor academic performance may occur in conjunction with symptoms of more serious disorders in certain students. Farnsworth estimates that at least 10 per cent of a population in a certain college year show complications in excessive anxiety, depression, physical symptoms, and poorly integrated character structure (16, p. 43; 17, p. 362). The behavior of these students is regarded as sufficiently serious to warrant help from psychiatrists or other professional clinicians.

² An avoidance response may or may not be maladjustive. In an adjustive avoidance response, the organism shows initial variability and a subsequent instrumental act in which it removes itself from a potentially dangerous or lethal place. In the maladjustive avoidance response, the individual's behavior is rigidly stereotyped and inflexible, carrying him into the place of injury. This latter kind of avoidance behavior is sometimes termed "self-punishing," or "masochistic." It also is called an "abnormal fixation" or a "vicious circle" (12, pp. 75-76, 188, 384; 23; 32; 37, pp. 260-265, 351-357, 460; 61).

is at work in not learning the materials, as in the first case, or in "forgetting" them as in the second case, it is a block to the attainment of academic goals; it is a factor which seemingly is critical in obtaining a poor scholastic record.

A second illustration is observed in unresolved conflict behavior. A student may show an approach tendency toward an instructor from whom assistance is needed to complete a project for a course. But this approach behavior is inhibited or stopped in an incompatible avoidance tendency in which the instructor is shunned. The vacillation between the two competing tendencies may persist with the result that the student never obtains the necessary assistance to complete the task. The approach-avoidance conflict, when explored in the counseling situation, may reveal the presence of a persistent unresolved emotional and social problem in which a professor—an authority figure—presents certain cues which elicit the contradictory responses without the awareness of the student as to how and why he acts as he does (29; 30; 60).

A third illustrative case is the student in whom immaturities and mechanisms of defense are at work. He may not prepare adequately for an examination, receiving a poor record. Then he "explains" his scholastic failure by placing the blame on what he calls the "ambiguous items" in an examination, the "curve breakers" (the top-ranking students in the class), the "unclear assignments" in the course, the "poor teaching" of the professor, or his "poor background" from the secondary school in the subject-matter area. This student uses mechanisms in which he absolves himself of responsibility for the behavior which gets him into trouble. His deceptions may be an important factor in an eventual scholastic downfall.

This perspective suggests that a fundamental ingredient for scholastic success is freedom from the interference of maladjustive behavior and unrecognized neurotogenic processes. The student who becomes free from the interference should learn better the subject matter and the skills of the classroom. Kubie contends that a "masked neurotic component" is the "major obstacle to progress" (30, p. 59). He emphasizes that education must come to accept "... the fact that the free creative velocity of our thinking apparatus is continually being braked and driven off course by the play of unconscious forces." His prediction is that, until the time that this fact is accepted, educational procedures "... will continue to increase this interference from masked and unrecognized neurotogenic processes" (30, p. 58).

The proponents of this interpretation lead us to believe that freedom from handicapping maladjustive tendencies is almost impossible under present conditions of education. They hold that the conventional conditions of learning in pre-college and higher education are such that maladjustive behavior is likely to begin early and, when once begun, is all but certain to be reinforced or strengthened as the student progresses from the home to the elementary school, to the secondary school, and through college (5; 13; 16; 17; 29; 30). They cite the pre-school situation in which parents become the first

authority figures for a child, sometimes providing the conditions for learning maladjustive tendencies and unresolved parent-child conflicts. Then they point to the same behavior when it is precipitated in the school situation by teachers who are "substitute parents" and hence also authority figures (16, p. 43; 30, p. 59; 60, p. 280). They contend that the conditions for learning neurotogenic behavior are so widespread that maladjustive action, in one form or another, is at work at some time in the lives of most students at all levels on the educational ladder (30, p. 58). Their writings suggest that the hypothesized interference effect of neurotogenic processes does not involve just the students who fail but also those who rank as average, brilliant, bright, and genius. "Indeed, the neurotogenic rigidity is so universal that it is frequently accepted as normal (even by some psychiatrists) . . ." (30, p. 59).

According to this interpretation, a resolution for the problem of maladjustive behavior and poor achievement will come, not through the straight program of traditional education, nor through the usual social agencies of education, but through the introduction or the greater use of ancillary preventive and corrective means (14, p. 184; 42, p. 6). Kubie's position on this matter is best expressed in his words:

The great cultural institutions of human society, including art and literature, science, education in general, the humanities and religion, have three essential missions; namely, to enable human nature itself to change; to enable each generation to transmit to the next whatever wisdom it has gained about living; to free the enormous untapped creative potential which is latent in varying degrees in all men.

It is my belief that in all of these respects our great cultural efforts and institutions have failed, and will continue to fail until new techniques of education are developed (30, p. 59).

The adaptation of psychotherapeutic techniques in education is proposed as one possible approach to a resolution of the problem (30, p. 62). Kubie emphasizes that educators must find some way "to remake the life of the student" so that it will be more of a maturing experience.

The necessary research for this adaptation is regarded by Kubie to be the task of the educator. Kubie says that his function, as a psychiatrist, is ". . . to define what is wrong in terms of the crippling influence on the creative process of much of what now occurs in school." Then he hopes that, after educators acknowledge that "something is amiss" they will derive the essential operations for change.

This projected use of therapeutic techniques in education is interpreted to mean that the objective would be to counteract the effects of prior mal-education. These techniques should present conditions for the unlearning of maladjustive tendencies, for the encouragement of flexible problem-solving activities, and for the emergence from these activities of self-realizing instru-

mental acts. For the purposes of this paper, the adaptation of therapeutic operations to the educational situation in both group work and individual counseling will be termed "therapeutic education." This term serves to delineate these therapeutic functions from those of re-education in the more serious behavior disorders of clinical psychology and psychiatry.

The possibility of using therapy in education suggests one alternative approach to the resolution of the present problem of poor scholarship. If students have been taught maladjustive or neurotogenic tendencies in earlier years, we might unteach these tendencies through the conditions of therapeutic education. If we were successful, then students should be freer to attain their academic goals. They should demonstrate a better academic performance. Their scholastic records should show an improvement.

THE "LACK-OF-DISCIPLINED-INTELLIGENCE" INTERPRETATION

The therapeutic approach to a resolution of the problem is a dubious one, however, if we may judge from the critical comments of writers who present the second interpretation for poor scholarship. The position of the critics about counseling and guidance services is illustrated in the following excerpt from the *CBE Bulletin*.

We regret to note that in the recent Congressional hearings on aid-to-education bills, there was little testimony about proposals to use Federal money for training additional personnel in guidance and counseling. . . . CBE is all for proper guidance but we are far from being convinced that the phenomenal growth of this educational gimmick has been an unmixed blessing. . . .

Before we allocate several million dollars for 'additional personnel' in this field, we ought to decide if we want to buy more of what we have been getting. As a slightly irate friend of CBE said the other day, to turn over the reform of the schools to the kind of guidance people we now have is like forming a posse made up of the horse thieves.

While we're on the subject we might as well add that we are not very happy about the counseling side of guidance, either. We mean that branch of guidance which purports to deal with the maladjustments and personality problems of young people. A recent book on guidance suggests that over 50 percent of the cases referred to the guidance department in some high schools deal with 'personality' and 'home' problems. We wonder how many of these problems are real and how many are dreamed up by the amateur psychologists who largely staff the guidance offices. Despite juvenile delinquency and the high divorce rate and other signs of social illhealth, we are not convinced that any large percentage of American parents and their children are clinically neurotic or maladjusted. One way to make children neurotic is excessive and unnecessary poking around in their psyches by cut-rate Freuds; if you ask a normal child often

enough whether he feels disliked and misunderstood, and does he sometimes feel shaky and nervous, and does his mother tend to dominate the home (all questions found on currently used questionnaires), he may soon imagine problems where none existed before.

Among students, as among other classes of persons, there are some who have serious personality problems, but these need the attention of qualified experts. As for the problems of normal young people, we wonder if these are not better met by a sympathetic teacher of intelligence and common sense than by the counselor, with his paraphernalia of personality and youth inventories, sociograms, problem check lists, behavior preference records, and all the rest. . . (11, pp. 5-6).

According to the critics, the introduction of therapy in education will dilute the purpose of the school; and, through the dilution, the school is certain to be the worse. They conjecture that the use of therapeutic techniques is likely to be abortive for the student who has a poor record of learning. Their contention is that, when a student has attained the age of 16, ". . . his talent for absorbing education and his attitude toward work is usually established with a high degree of certainty." This contention leads them to believe that, "If he is one of the small minority who cannot or will not learn, or make a decent effort to learn, the school should not attempt to increase its 'holding power' by substituting for education a program in social therapeutics" (10, p. 4).

One critic, Bestor, contends that the incidental concern of educators about the personal problems of students, though well intentioned, has become "so excessive as to push into the background what should be the school's central concern, the intellectual development of students." His position is that the schools exist to offer a liberal education and this ". . . is not a course in first aid." He says that, "When education becomes completely enmeshed in the petty, surface details of a student's everyday life," an opportunity is lost to equip him ". . . with the intellectual powers that he will need to resolve the deeper problems that lie beneath the surface." He argues that, "By frittering time away on 'felt needs' of adolescents," there is a risk that students will be "helpless in the presence of real 'real life' needs" (3, pp. 76-77).

The position of the critics suggests, in fact, that the introduction or greater use of therapeutic techniques in education may not be necessary if their remedy for poor scholarship is applied. Their position says that a liberal education will teach students the self-reliance and the maturity to resolve the problems of life (4; 21); the axiom, "Know thyself," is said to come to fruition through a liberal education (3, p. 191). Bestor holds that a liberal education "is designed to produce self-reliance." He maintains that it teaches the way to use general intelligence ". . . to find the answers to all kinds of problems, especially those without precedent . . ." (4, p. 7).

In contrast to the interpretation of poor scholarship which is offered by psychiatrists and others of the first position, the critics refer to the poor quality of undergraduate work and then hypothesize a lack of disciplined intelligence. Their observations of poor quality are a basis for the inference that students do not think and therefore are unable to think or to use the tools of thought.

The hypothesized absence or lack of power to think is related attributively by the critics to what they call an educational hoax in the elementary and secondary schools; the students are said to have been presented with a shoddy substitute for a sound pre-college education (3; 21). One professor cites the poor quality of work, contending that there has been "a deterioration in the contemporary training of students," that this deterioration "... has been accelerating during the past 15 years..." and that professors generally are aware of it (21). His assertions are consonant with those in Bestor's book, *Educational Wastelands*. Bestor says that, among the members of faculties in colleges and universities, "Discontent with the training which public schools provide is all but unanimous..." (3, p. 4).

The critics therefore project a reform. The thesis is that "... schools exist to teach something, and that this something is the power to think..." (3, p. 10). The contention is that, "Liberal education is training in thinking" (3, p. 166). The proposal is that a "basic education" would serve as the means of reform. By a "basic education" is meant "adequate instruction" in the "basic intellectual disciplines"; in particular, the subject-matter areas and the way of thinking in English, mathematics, science, history, and the foreign languages (3, pp. 128-129; 9, p. 3; 10). Since the poor quality of academic work in college is assumed to be related to conditions of pre-college education, the reform should occur in pre-college learning situations. Bestor says that, "The situation must be corrected in the elementary and secondary schools which are, with devastating success, killing off every budding intellectual interest by refusing to carry forward any disciplined study to the point where the student passes the threshold into confidence and enjoyment..." (3, p. 172).

This position leads to the expectancy that students would begin to acquire a disciplined intelligence if they were to be presented with the conditions which are recommended for a reformed elementary school. As they progress through it and a reformed secondary school, they would become more and more capable of demonstrating the power to think and the tools of thought. The prediction follows that, in some future decade, the graduates from these reformed schools should enter college with the essential ingredients for success in higher education. Then the problem of poor scholarship among undergraduates should be largely if not entirely resolved.

This second interpretation also leads to the prediction that, until the time that the students of some future generation obtain their training in such reformed schools, we will continue to have poor scholarship in the colleges and

universities. If undergraduates of this decade and the next are like those of the last 20 or 30 years in that they have been subjected to an educational hoax in pre-college education, and if this hoax is causative for poor scholarship in college, there is no basis for an expectation of improvement.

RATIONALE FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL TEST

A comparison of the first interpretation (the "interference-effect" interpretation) and the second interpretation (the "lack-of-disciplined-intelligence" interpretation) indicates that, according to each, a record of poor scholarship in higher education is related to the kind of behavior in which the student engages; and this behavior, in turn, is related to conditions of pre-college education. The interpretations are alike in that they point to the need for a change in the behavior of the student; and this need indicates the necessity for a change in the schools. The interpretations are different in the kind of behavior which is cited, in the inferences of causal relationship, and in the implications for the schools. The interference-effect interpretation refers to maladjustive behavior, positing that it blocks thinking and the attainment of academic goals; therefore, the conditions of therapy might be used in the schools as a means of freeing the student to obtain a better record. Implicit in this interpretation is an assumption that students have the power to think, even though the evidence of thought may not be present in their work. Kubie presents the thesis that "... we do not need to be taught to think, indeed that thinking is something that cannot be taught. . ." (30, p. 58). In contrast, the lack-of-disciplined-intelligence interpretation cites evidence of poor quality in academic performances, hypothesizing that the power to think does not exist or is seriously lacking. Implicit in this interpretation is an assumption that, in the absence of evidence of thought in the student's work, the student lacks the power to think. A related assumption is that if students do not think, they have not been taught to think. A third assumption in this chain of related assumptions is that if students have not been taught to think, they have not been provided with the proper conditions of education. The reasoning, here, leads to the proposition that a basic education should be offered. The authors of the interpretation believe that a basic education will induce the power to think and the tools of thought.

The contrast in the two interpretations suggests the rationale for an experimental test. If maladjustive behavior interferes with intellectual problem-solving activities, impeding the attainment of academic goals, and if therapeutic education is instrumental in unteaching the maladjustive tendencies, we may predict that, when a population of undergraduate students is given the same program of higher education except that one group among them is presented with the conditions of therapy (Therapy Group) whereas a second

group is not (No Therapy Group), the former group should become freer from the interference and then should show a better academic performance. The Therapy Group should obtain the better scholastic record. If, on the other hand, maladjustive behavior is not the critical factor in poor academic work, or if therapeutic techniques are abortive, then these predicted differences would not necessarily occur. Indeed, if the most important factor is the lack of a disciplined intelligence, and if it is lacking in students in both groups as graduates of non-reformed elementary and secondary schools, the scholastic records should be similar or the same; the use of therapy in one but not in the other of the two groups would be of little or no significance. However, if the use of therapy dilutes the purpose of education, making a school the worse, then the record of the Therapy Group might be poorer than that of the No Therapy Group.

METHOD

To test for the influence of therapeutic education, an experiment was conducted while E (the experimenter) was teaching an introductory course in psychology. All of the students were freshmen who had completed their pre-college education before the time of the reform which is proposed in either the interference-effect interpretation or the lack-of-disciplined-intelligence interpretation; they were a population to which each interpretation was applicable. Their scores from pre-admission tests of intelligence (56), of reading abilities (39), and of achievement in mathematics, English, history, and science (55) were major determinants for matriculation. Out of 20 sections, one section (25 students) was the Therapy Group; a second section (24 students) was the No Therapy Group. The membership in these two groups, and the assignment of the two sections to E, were not determined by any known selective principle or factor.

The materials of learning were as nearly alike for both groups as could be hoped for; all students were registered for the same program of higher education. In each section, the students had been assigned to the same classes in mathematics, history, English, science, and the arts through block-registration procedures; they therefore were presented with the same subject-matter areas. In psychology, the subject-matter objectives, the references, and the textbook (31) were the same.

To obtain pre-acquisition data, a series of instruments was employed during a part of the class periods in the first and second weeks: a teacher-constructed objective-type test of knowledge about psychology; a mental-health analysis form (59); a measure of the presence and magnitude of introspectively reported emotional reactions to cues in the college situation; and a sociometric device. The same instruments were re-administered at the midpoint and at the termination of the semester.

The operations of therapeutic education were eclectic,³ stemming from learning and behavior theory (12; 34; 37; 38; 48) and from the writings of Rogers (42), Sullivan (57; 58), Shoben (50; 51; 52), and Margaret (33). The theory provided the basis for an interpretation of maladjustive tendencies and thereby served to guide the selection of therapeutic operations.

A NOTE ON THE DERIVATION OF THERAPEUTIC OPERATIONS

Learning and Behavior Theory

Behavior theory indicates that, when a maladjustive response is learned in one place, such as a pre-college educational situation, and when, later, the same behavior "transfers," occurring in another place such as the college situation, the principle of generalization is demonstrated (12, pp. 260-280; 51, p. 136; 60, p. 280). The critical factor in *generalization* is the similarity of cues (stimulus events) in the two situations. The more similar the cues of pre-college and college situations, the greater is the probability for maladjustive behavior (or any other learned behavior) to occur as a transference phenomenon.⁴ The cues might be language signs which are associated with a certain subject-matter area, they might be objects and conditions such as the sight of a textbook or the materials of an unfinished project, or they might be stimuli which emanate from a teacher. Among the more important cues are stimulus events which the teacher produces by his appearance and his operations of instruction.

Behavior theory indicates that, when a response continues to occur, or when it becomes more evident, *reinforcement* is demonstrated (12, pp. 187-190). A maladjustive act, occurring in the college situation as a transference phenomenon, may be attended or followed by conditions in the college which act upon the student in the manner of reinforcers, increasing the probability for the behavior to recur (12, pp. 54-55). At the time that a student enters college, the cues in a situation may elicit aversive emotional reactions which are at work in avoidance behavior. Later, if the student is the recipient of what are for him noxious stimuli or "negative reinforcers," these cues may gain an even greater

³ For an examination of the literature on the use of therapeutic techniques in group work and in teaching, see: 1; 2; 14, p. 186; 19; 20, pp. 423-435; 22; 24, p. 2; 27, pp. 150-153; 28; 35; 41; 42, pp. 111-112; 46; 49; 54; 63, pp. 58, 129; 64, pp. 39-42.

⁴ Although the students may not be consciously aware of why they act as they do in the college situation, and although at first they may relate their troublesome conduct only to the college situation, they may reconstruct the conditions under which the behavior was originally learned in the operations of counseling or psychotherapy. They "discover" the "forgotten" stimulus events under which their maladjustive tendencies were originally acquired; the causative antecedents and related cues become identified. This kind of evidence, when gathered and analyzed from protocols of therapeutic education in group work and individual counseling, should provide some important clues for a possible answer to the question as to how students are taught their maladjustive behavior and how it gets reinforced as they progress from elementary schools to secondary schools and through college.

capacity to elicit the same emotional reactions.⁵ This is but one example of what is meant by reinforcement, however. When maladjustive avoidance behavior and resistances occur, they may be followed by a reduction in the intensity of the underlying emotional reaction and motivation. This reduction in intensity is a condition of reinforcement. Thereafter, the student is likely to show further avoidance and more resistances. This is especially so when the avoidance and resistances take the student away from aversion-arousing situations into other situations which are more rewarding. This analysis suggests, therefore, that in college both the underlying aversive emotional reaction and the observable resistant behavior may be reinforced.

The theory suggests, however, that maladjustive behavior need not persist if certain other concepts are invoked and applied. This behavior might extinguish or disappear in favor of more self-realizing action if the concepts of *discrimination* and *response differentiation* were to be employed. If students in the Therapy Group were presented with conditions in which a discriminative function might occur (if they were presented with conditions in which to identify, label, clarify, and differentiate cues, and if they were to be presented with the conditions of nonreinforcement for maladjustive tendencies while at the same time they were presented with conditions of reinforcement for initially feeble but increasingly stronger reality-testing or problem-solving behavior), the old maladjustive tendencies should gradually disappear in favor of new and more efficient instrumental acts (12, pp. 305-320; 48, pp. 535-536; 51). The prediction would be that the cues in college would lose their capacity to elicit the maladjustive tendencies; they then should regain the capacity to elicit problem-solving tendencies. Following this, the cues should gain the capacity not only to elicit but also to channel and to reinforce a more intelligent and more self-realizing kind of behavior (51, p. 138)—the instrumental behavior which would be freer from interference and therefore should more successfully attain the academic goals. The improved academic performance, occurring first in the situation of therapeutic education, should generalize or transfer later into other teaching and out-of-class situations of the college (12, pp. 332-334; 48, pp. 535-536; 51, p. 135).

The same concepts of discrimination and differentiation should be applicable not only to the maladjustive avoidance tendencies and resistances in school tasks but also to the hostility and unresolved conflict in relation to

⁵ When noxious events such as criticisms or low marks occur in college situations, they may serve as reinforcers for fear, anxiety, hostility, and other aversive reactions, raising the level of motivation in maladjustive behavior for some students. The same noxious events may serve as reinforcers for the same emotional reactions in other students, but they "mend their ways"; these students may change, showing adjustive rather than further maladjustive behavior. This difference is interpreted to be largely a function of pre-college conditions of acquisition, though a change from maladjustive to adjustive behavior seemingly might occur through the influence of fortunate circumstances in the college situation. The purpose of therapeutic education would be, in part, to plan deliberately for conditions under which such changes may occur in a larger number of cases.

authority figures. If cues which emanate from a professor initially elicit unprovoked (displaced) hostility and conflict behavior in certain students, the professor (E) might present conditions of nonreinforcement for the underlying aversive emotional reactions and the observable avoidant behavior (Therapy Group). Then the cues should change in "meaning"; the students should discover that, in the college situation of therapeutic education, there are certain cues in the presence of the professor which are like those cues of authority figures whom they have known in the past, but there are other cues and related conditions of learning which are different from those of earlier situations. The students therefore should acquire a discriminative function. The prediction would be for an increasingly stronger approach response to outcompete a progressively weakening avoidance response; the formerly unresolved approach-avoidance conflict should become resolved.

According to this analysis from learning and behavior theory, there are three critical factors at work in the initial occurrence and the recurrence of maladjustive behavior in a college situation. One of these variables is the presence of aversive emotional reactions such as fear and anxiety (12, pp. 12-16, 69-78, 300-301, 367-368; 36, p. 451; 45; 51, pp. 132, 135). The aversive emotion is (or produces) the motivation in each of the various maladjustive avoidance tendencies. A second critical factor is generalization. Through generalization, the aversive emotion and motivation as well as the maladjustive behavior first occur in the college situation. A third crucial factor is the presence of reinforcers in the college situation. The reinforcers maintain or strengthen the behavior. Though "negative reinforcers," an aversive emotion is maintained. Through "positive reinforcers," the maladjustive behavior is kept alive.

From this analysis, the deduction follows that the operations of therapy should counteract the influence of generalization and reinforcement in neurotogenic processes. These operations should provide the basis for discrimination where otherwise generalization among cues would continue to occur. The techniques should provide for the nonreinforcement of formerly reinforced maladjustive tendencies. They also should provide for the reinforcement of flexible problem-solving behavior and more self-realizing instrumental acts.

Counseling and Psychotherapy

Counseling and Psychotherapy

The literature on counseling and psychotherapy, when related to this perspective, indicates that, to meet the objectives of therapy in this study, there are operations which should *not* be used as well as those which should be used. There are certain techniques which, though used in the control of behavior by some authority figures in home and school situations, would defeat the purposes of therapeutic education.

The questionable and discredited therapeutic operations include the following familiar methods of controlling behavior: cajoling, coercing, ordering,

forbidding, threatening, belittling, condemning, advising, moralizing, exhorting, wheedling, coaxing, daring, reassuring, sympathizing, and intellectualizing. To cajole, coerce, forbid, and threaten are techniques in which an authority figure presents the noxious stimuli or the "negative reinforcers" for fear and anxiety in transference phenomena of many individuals. To moralize about immaturity and deception, to exhort about the values of other ways of acting, to talk about one's own experiences or the experiences of others, to proffer advice, and to prescribe, all are techniques which have been found to increase the level of hostility in some cases. To reassure an individual that things are not so bad as they may seem to him is a way of bypassing the person's problems. To sympathize with him and his troubles may serve as a "positive reinforcer" for the defenses and deceptions which get him into trouble. In the use of these techniques in pre-college situations of child-rearing, teaching, and advising, the intentions of the authority figure may be good and the outcomes often may be good, but the same techniques might be abortive or make matters worse if they were to be used as operations of therapeutic education in the experiment for this study.

Some systems of counseling refrain from making a diagnosis and from offering interpretations for a problem. To diagnose and to offer interpretations are operations in which a problem is worked through, not by the student, but by the person who offers the diagnosis and explanation. These operations are not likely to provide a student with the conditions under which he may initiate and exercise variability; they are not likely to encourage self-responsible hypothesizing functions in cue-discrimination and response-differentiation. According to learning and behavior theory, the learning and unlearning of behavior require that the processes occur in the learner; not in some other person such as a teacher or counselor who might assume responsibility for the student's behavior and then conceive an interpretation which is intellectualized to him.

Some counselors ask no questions of the kind which would indicate that they are probing, exercising pressure, or taking a role of prescriptive responsibility in the resolution of problems. They may answer no questions when these are asked as a means of getting the counselor to assume a role of authoritative judgment. To ask and to answer questions are regarded as operations in which the teacher or counselor is likely "to take over" for the student. These techniques may defeat the purposes of assisting a student to assume the responsibility for his behavior and for his own problems. They are not likely to provide a condition under which a student becomes progressively a better problem-solver.

These various questionable or discredited operations were not used in the situation for the Therapy Group. According to the theoretical analysis from learning and behavior theory, none of these techniques would be essential for the unlearning of maladjustive tendencies.

In contrast to these operations, there are others which would be expected to assist students to identify, accept, label, define, and work through the behavior tendencies in maladjustive transference phenomena. Among these techniques are the well-known operations of *acceptance* and *understanding* (1; 12, pp. 240-241; 19; 42). To illustrate: if a student were to express fear and then show maladjustive avoidance in some form, or if a student were to show unprovoked (displaced) aggression in formerly masked hostility, the behavior as well as the expressed aversive emotional reaction would be accepted understandingly. The feeling or emotional content in his utterances would be recognized through a verbal reflection of it. This operation often serves to identify and to label the underlying emotional and motivational properties in avoidant and resistant behavior. If guilt reactions were to be expressed, these too would be identified, defined, and accepted through understanding in the absence of any signs of reprisal, recrimination, retaliation, or retribution. Under these conditions, the student should begin to learn that, in the college situation of therapeutic education, he may safely express and freely examine the formerly concealed tendencies in neurotogenic processes. The prediction would be that the aversive emotional reactions as well as the need for defensiveness and deception would "weaken" and possibly assume a less dominant position in a hierarchy of emotional and motivational tendencies.

To present the conditions for a discriminative function, the above techniques might be used conjointly with the operation of *clarification*. If, for example, a student were to express fear or anxiety, verbally associating it with college cues, and if, at some later time, this emotional reaction were introspectively related to pre-college conditions of acquisition, the operations of reflecting these feelings in conjunction with both college and pre-college situations might serve to provide a basis for discrimination. Through the operations of clarification, the similarities and differences between the precipitative college cues and the pre-college cues of acquisition should be identified. The prediction would be for discrimination learning.

To provide the conditions for response differentiation, an essential operation would be to provide a rewarding state of affairs for the change from the initially repetitive and rigid behavior in neurotogenic processes to the more flexible exploratory behavior in problem-solving activities. If students were to engage in an "hypothesizing function"—if they were to seek out the cause-effect relationships among variables in problem situations—this behavior, though intrinsically satisfying, might be extrinsically reinforced through signs of approval. If students then were to engage in "consensual validation"—if they were to weigh alternative interpretations and responses in relation to possible feedback effects of a problem situation—this kind of behavior might be followed by further "positive reinforcers." The prediction would be for the self-defeating maladjustive behavior to weaken as the more self-realizing instrumental behavior became more evident. This change would be measured

in lessening amounts of avoidance behavior and in an increase in the amount of approach behavior. The change would be expected to lessen the interference effect of prior maladjustive tendencies; the students should become freer to attain their academic goals.

The Therapy Group and the No Therapy Group

These various techniques to facilitate discrimination learning and response differentiation were employed in the Therapy Group.

Because the textbook and reference materials of psychology were used by the students and E in the Therapy Group as tools in the action of working through problems, these materials were acquired by them as means to the attainment of goals rather than as an end of memorizing topics to meet the requirements of a course in psychology. As the relationships in the therapeutic situations progressed, the relevant terms and the principles of psychology were cited and used. The introduction of these materials was not directed by E, but rather was a participative action at the time of the students' requests for information in the hypothesizing function. This meant that the acquisition of knowledge about psychology occurred in the absence of formal lecture and other more conventional methods of teaching.

The method employed in the No Therapy Group was lecture and the occasional analysis of illustrative cases in a book or in films. The materials for reading were organized by topics. The topics were presented in the same day in which they had been used in the Therapy Group. If a student in the No Therapy Group introspectively reported a problem, E directed the relationship away from the problem. The entire procedure was initiated and directed by E. The operations were intended to facilitate the acquisition of subject matter under conditions which would be as free as possible from the operations of therapy.

RESULTS

Qualitative Characteristics of Behavior

One of the experimental outcomes was an increasingly greater difference between the two groups in certain qualitative characteristics of behavior.

At the onset of the semester, the presence of E elicited the same kinds of behavior in students of both groups. Since none of the students had met E before the beginning of the semester, and since none had previously been in this college situation, their various initial responses were unearned transference phenomena.

In the beginning weeks of the semester, the most common response in both groups was avoidance behavior: the quiet, withdrawing, submissive, nonparticipative action which is sometimes termed "shyness." In subsequent weeks there was a marked difference among members in the Therapy Group in the rate at which this behavior changed. One especially inhibited student, blushing and withdrawing from all interpersonal relationships at the beginning of

the semester, did not once volunteer so much as a single word throughout the entire 16 weeks. This student provided E with little basis for an inference of change. In most cases of avoidance behavior, however, there was a gradual change in the direction of stronger approach tendencies. In a few cases, the change was rapid. The change in all cases was evident in modifications of interpersonal response. Some students who sat at the rear of the room in the first weeks moved forward in later weeks. Other students, instead of continuing to evade, came gradually into the working relationships of the group. The change to a "warmer" social response became evident not only in the situation of therapeutic education but also in out-of-class situations; the students would hail one another and E across the campus. They introspectively reported an increasingly greater liking for the college, for events and situations in it. These observations were consistent with the predicted generalization of approach tendencies from the therapeutic situation to other situations in the college.

In the No Therapy Group, the effects of teaching were dramatically different. The avoidance behavior persisted. These lectured students were more "distant" or "remote" throughout the semester. Although the interpersonal response became "warmer" in some students, it was more formal. The introspectively reported reactions to cues in the college situation did not show the same amount of progressive change in a positive direction. Indeed, there was an increase in the amount of introspectively reported aversive reaction in some students.

One measure of the difference in the amount of approach and avoidance behavior in the two groups was obtained from the records of self-initiated requests for conferences. In the Therapy Group, E was approached for individual counseling by 9 students (36 per cent) during the first semester; by 11 students (46 per cent) during the four-year period in which the students attended the college. The total time for these conferences in the first semester was 1,070 minutes; the average time for a student was 119 minutes. The total number of conferences was 12; the average time for a conference was 89 minutes. In the No Therapy Group, there was not a single self-initiated request for individual counseling during the first semester; one student asked for conferences in a later semester. This contrast in the amount of counseling with individuals is interpreted to confirm the prediction that, through therapy, there would be a change from initial resistances and avoidance tendencies to increasingly stronger approach behavior; this change, in turn, would be attended by an increase in the capability of students to identify, accept, and work through formerly unresolved conflicts which occur in the presence of an authority figure.

The Attendance Record

For the purposes of comparative analysis, the attendance record was used as one of the objective measures of change in behavior. The "cuts" were regarded to be an index of aversively motivated tendencies. The absences for illness or

some other factor beyond the control of the student were not regarded as cuts; they were not instances of avoidance behavior.

The perspective for this study suggested that aversive tendencies, as manifest in cuts, would be present in students of both groups at the time of entrance to college; therefore the number of absences might be predicted to be about the same at the beginning of the semester. If, however, as the perspective also suggested, the aversive tendencies were unlearned in the Therapy Group, there should be a decrease in the tendency to cut classes with an attendant increase in approach tendencies; as a consequence, the attendance record for this group should be good. If, at the same time, the aversive tendencies were not unlearned in the No Therapy Group, and if, as indicated in the perspective, these tendencies are sometimes reinforced in the college situation, there should be no decrease in the tendency to cut classes; in fact, the attendance record would be predicted to become increasingly worse as the semester progressed. These predictions indicate what actually occurred (cf. Fig. 1; Table 1; Table 2).

The Amount of "Forgetting"

Another objective measure of avoidance tendencies was the amount of "forgetting." According to the perspective for this study, we would expect that, after the materials in psychology for the first eight-week period had been learned, the amount of these materials to be forgotten during the next eight-week period would be greater in the No Therapy Group. The reasoning here

TABLE 1
A SUMMARY OF A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPUTED BETWEEN
MEANS FOR ALL ABSENCES DURING THE FIRST SEMESTER

Groups	N	Total	Mean	S.D.	$\overline{X}_1 - \overline{X}_2$	t	P (two-tail test)
Therapy	25	14	.56	.96	1.52	3.23	< .01
No Therapy	24	50	2.08	2.06			

TABLE 2
A SUMMARY OF A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPUTED BETWEEN
MEANS FOR CUTS DURING THE FIRST SEMESTER

Groups	N	Total	Mean	S.D.	$\overline{X}_1 - \overline{X}_2$	t	P (two-tail test)
Therapy	25	2	.08	.28	1.80	4.08	< .01
No Therapy	24	45	1.88	2.11			




Fig. 1. Curves which represent cuts (absences) from a class in psychology during 16 weeks in the Therapy Group ($N = 25$) and the No Therapy Group ($N = 24$). Each point in a curve refers to the *mean* for the total number of cuts up to that point in the semester. This record does not include absences for reasons such as illness or other factors which were beyond the control of the students.

is that, as the materials for a subject matter are presented to learners in a situation in which cues already elicit aversive emotional reactions, these aversive tendencies become attached to the subject-matter materials and to the thoughts associated with them. Thereafter, the thought of these materials, or the cues associated with them, may elicit the aversive reactions; and these aversive emotional reactions are the motive (or produce the motive) in the action which is called "forgetting." According to this reasoning, the action in

"forgetting" is another instance of avoidance behavior. This behavior would be less likely to occur in the Therapy Group since the aversive emotional reactions should extinguish through the conditions of therapeutic education. Then approach behavior should occur. The approach tendency should lead to "remembering" and to better learning, rather than to "forgetting." Therefore the prediction would be for approach-motivated "remembering" and an improvement in performance in the Therapy Group; for aversively motivated "forgetting" in the No Therapy Group.⁷ This prediction was tested by using the scores from 85 objective-type items which were administered twice: as a part of the mid-semester examination in the eighth week and as a part of the final examination in the sixteenth week. The items were based on knowledge in psychology which had been taught in both groups. The difference between means at the eighth week, when analyzed statistically, was not significant (cf. Table 3). The mean scores at the sixteenth week were more widely disparate; the difference, in favor of the Therapy Group, was significant (Table 4). To test whether the predicted contrast in incremental and decremental functions occurred at each of various levels of intellectual capability, the scores from the pre-admission test of intelligence and the scores from the psychology test at the eighth week were used to match students in subgroups; the subgroups then were compared by using scores from the psychology test at the sixteenth week.

TABLE 3
A SUMMARY OF A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPUTED BETWEEN
MEANS FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY EXAMINATION AT THE EIGHTH WEEK

Groups	N	Mean	S.D.	$\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2$	t*	P (two-tail test)
Therapy	25	55.48	5.64	.89	.45	>.92
No Therapy	22	54.59	7.45			

* To determine which *t*-test to employ in this analysis, the pre-admission scores from a test of intelligence and from a test of pre-college acquisition in history, English, mathematics, and science were employed in an *F*-test. The results of the *F*-test sustained the null hypothesis, indicating that the variances were the same. With this information, the following *t*-test was selected:

$$t = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{S_p \sqrt{\frac{1}{N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2}}}, \text{ where } S_p^2 = \frac{(N_1 + 1)S_1^2 + (N_2 + 1)S_2^2}{N_1 + N_2 - 2}, \text{ and}$$

where $S = \sqrt{\frac{N(\sum X^2) - (\sum X)^2}{N(N - 1)}}$. The same *t*-test was used in other analyses of data from post-acquisition tests in the college situation.

⁷ For a more complete statement of the theoretical framework for these predictions, and for a record of evidence obtained under the conditions of a laboratory experiment, see: "Evidence Concerning Repression," "Selective Forgetting" (48, pp. 228-240), and "Secondary Motivation and Secondary Reinforcement in Forgetting and Remembering" (62).

The results, which show an incremental function in both groups when expressed in means, show a greater gain in the Therapy Group with a decremental function in four out of six subgroups in the No Therapy Group (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Curves which represent the results from tests of acquisition (eighth week) and retention (sixteenth week) for materials in psychology. The broken line, referring to the record of the Therapy Group, shows an incremental function for all of the subgroups. This record of the Therapy Group, shows an incremental function for all of the subgroups. This outcome is consistent with the prediction for approach tendencies, remembering, and an improved performance as the semester progressed under the conditions of therapeutic education. The solid line, referring to the record of the No Therapy Group, indicates a decremental function in 4 out of the 6 subgroups. These comparisons, when related to the statistical test of significance of the difference between means (Table 3, Table 4), sustain the prediction for better academic goal-attainment in the Therapy Group at each level of capability.

TABLE 4
A SUMMARY OF A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPUTED BETWEEN
MEANS FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY EXAMINATION AT THE SIXTEENTH WEEK

Groups	N	Mean	S.D.	$\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2$	t	P (two-tail test)
Therapy	25	60.6	7.19	5.5	2.41	<.02
No Therapy	18	55.1	6.24			

The Sociometric Device and the Mental-Health Analysis

These various comparisons are congruent in result; they consistently sustain the prediction that students in the Therapy Group would become freer than students in the No Therapy Group from tendencies which might interfere with the attainment of academic goals. They also are consonant with data obtained from other instruments. The scores from the sociometric device show that, as the semester progressed, a significantly greater amount of intro-




Fig. 3. Curves which represent a change in the approach response as the first semester progressed.

TABLE 5
A SUMMARY OF A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPUTED BETWEEN
MEANS FOR APPROACH BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIOMETRIC DEVICE*

Groups	N	Mean	S.D.	$\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2$	t	P (two-tail test)
Therapy	24	17.58	4.84	3.86	2.23	< .03
No Therapy	18	13.72	5.82			

* In this analysis (sixteenth week) and in Fig. 3 the raw scores were obtained from an item in which each member of a group was asked to list the students in his class with whom he would like to work on a project in psychology. The size of the list for the individual and the mean for the group were regarded to be a measure of the introspectively reported approach tendency. Although other items were employed in the instrument, they were not used for comparative analysis; they presented difficulties in the determination of reliability and validity.




Fig. 4. Curves which represent a change in mental-health scores during the first semester. In each diagram, the broken line refers to the Therapy Group; the solid line, to the No Therapy Group. The rise in a curve represents a change in a positive direction; the increment in mental-health characteristics. The I-A Record ("behavioral immaturity") refers to such action as not assuming responsibility for one's own conduct and the outcomes of it. The I-B Record ("emotional instability") refers to action such as making excuses rather than giving the real reasons for one's own immaturities and failures. It also includes the action of blaming other people; the projection of fault upon others for one's own intentions and attendant maladjustive behavior. The Section I Record is a composite of the A, B, C, D, and E records.

TABLE 6
A SUMMARY OF A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPUTED BETWEEN
MEANS FOR MENTAL-HEALTH SCORES*

Groups	N	Mean	S.D.	$\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2$	t	P (two-tail test)
Therapy	25	86.76	8.13	3.54	1.3	< .2 > .1
No Therapy	18	83.22	8.89			

* In this analysis, the raw scores were obtained from Section I (Parts A, B, C, D, and E) of the Mental-Health Analysis Form.

spectively reported approach tendency developed in the Therapy Group (Fig. 3; Table 5). The evidence from the mental-health analysis revealed a greater incremental function in the Therapy Group (Fig. 4), although the difference between means was not significant (Table 6).

The Level of Scholarship

To determine whether a difference in level of scholarship had occurred in the first semester, the *c.p.a.* (the credit point average) for all courses was obtained for each student after the sixteenth week. Among the 25 students in the Therapy Group, nineteen (76 per cent) obtained a *c.p.a.* of 2.00 ("C") or better. Five out of the 19 students (20 per cent of the entire group) received a *c.p.a.* of 3.00 ("B") or better. In contrast, 7 out of 24 students (29 per cent) of the No Therapy Group obtained a *c.p.a.* of 2.00 or better; one student (4 per cent) received a *c.p.a.* of 3.00 or better. The difference between means is shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7
A SUMMARY OF A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPUTED BETWEEN
MEANS FOR SCHOLARSHIP (*c.p.a.*) IN THE FIRST SEMESTER

Groups	N	Mean	S.D.	$\overline{X}_1 - \overline{X}_2$	t	P (two-tail test)
Therapy	25	2.41	.60	.33	1.8	<.08>.07
No Therapy	18	2.08	.56			

To test whether a difference in level of scholarship had occurred in the four-year program, the *c.c.p.a.* (the cumulative credit point average) was obtained for each student in his final semester at the college. Then the mean *c.c.p.a.* was obtained for each group. The direction of the difference between means was in favor of the Therapy Group (cf. Table 8).

TABLE 8
A SUMMARY OF A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPUTED BETWEEN
MEANS FOR SCHOLARSHIP (*c.c.p.a.*) IN THE FOUR-YEAR PROGRAM*

Groups	N	Mean	S.D.	$\overline{X}_1 - \overline{X}_2$	t	P (two-tail test)
Therapy	25	2.45	.20	.38	2.4	<.02>.01
No Therapy	18	2.07	.75			

* Because 6 students had become dropouts in the No Therapy Group before the first marking period, the *c.c.p.a.* was available for only 18 out of the original 24 students.

TABLE 9

COMPARISONS OF SCHOLARSHIP (c.c.p.a.) IN THE THERAPY GROUP (X SCORES) AND NO THERAPY GROUP (Y SCORES)

Subgroup ₁		Subgroup ₂		Subgroup ₃		Subgroup ₄		Subgroup ₅		Subgroup ₆		Totals
X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	
2.47	2.88	2.61	2.44	2.06	3.04	2.24	1.53	2.56	1.03	2.34	1.56	
3.33	3.02			2.55	1.29	1.91	1.29	2.55		1.41	3.41	
2.54	2.35			2.67	1.55	2.78	1.19			2.09	1.86	
3.22							2.76				1.33	
3.08											2.14	
2.36												
2.25												
2.14												
Sum	21.39 8.25	2.61 2.44		7.28 5.88		6.93 6.77		5.11 1.03		5.84 10.30		
	29.64	5.05		13.16		13.70		6.14		16.14		
Sum of Squares	58.71 22.94	6.81 5.95		17.88 13.31		16.39 13.04		13.06 1.06		11.83 23.87		204.85
No. of Scores	8 3	1 1	3 3	3 3	4 4	3 4	2 1	2 1	3 5	3 5		37
Mean	2.67 2.75	2.61 2.44	2.43 1.96		2.31 1.69		2.56 1.03		1.95 2.06			
$\bar{X} - \bar{Y}$	-0.08	0.17	0.47		0.62		1.53		-0.11			
$\frac{N_x N_y}{N_x + N_y}$	2.18	.50	1.50		1.71		.67		1.88			8.44
$\frac{(\sum X - \sum Y)^2}{N_x + N_y}$	79.87	12.75	28.86		26.81		12.57		32.56			193.42
$\frac{(\bar{X} - \bar{Y}) \frac{N_x N_y}{N_x + N_y}}{N_x + N_y}$	-0.17	0.08	0.71		1.06		1.02		-0.21			2.50

N = Number of Scores

S = Number of Subgroups

R = Number of Relations Tested
which in this Case is, 1.

F .95 ≥ 4.17

$$S_b^2 = \frac{\left[\sum (\bar{X} - \bar{Y}) \frac{N_x N_y}{N_x + N_y} \right]^2}{\sum \frac{N_x N_y}{N_x + N_y}}$$

$$S_a^2 = \sum \left[\sum X^2 + \sum Y^2 - \frac{(\sum X + \sum Y)^2}{N_x + N_y} \right] - S_b^2$$

$$S_a^2 = 10.71$$

$$F = 2.06$$

* For the origin of this statistical analysis, see: Johnson, P.O. and Neyman, J. "Tests of Certain Linear Hypotheses and Their Applications to Some Educational Problems." *Statistical Research Memoirs*, Vol. I, June, 1936. For an introduction and demonstration of this test in relation to the present study, the writer is indebted to Dr. George A. Spooner.

To determine whether the superior scholarship occurred at all levels of intellectual capacity and ability in the Therapy Group, the scores from the pre-admission tests of intelligence (56) and of achievement in pre-college mathematics, science, history, and English (55) were employed to match the subjects of both groups in nine subgroups. Because dropouts had occurred, however, there were only 6 subgroups available for comparative analysis. The mean *c.c.p.a.* was obtained for each subgroup; then the means of matched subgroups were compared. In four out of six comparisons, the difference was in favor of the Therapy Group. But the statistical test raised a doubt about the significance of the difference (cf. Table 9).⁸

The Attrition Rate

Out of 24 students in the No Therapy Group, six (25 per cent) had become dropouts before the first semester had terminated. At the end of the Freshman year, the attrition rate had reached 29 per cent. This record is virtually the same as that of the first-year classes in the prior decade (30 per cent). Out of the remaining 18 students in the class, ten (41 per cent of the entire group at the beginning of the semester) were potential dropouts. A "potential dropout" was defined as a student who obtained a *c.p.a.* of less than 2.00. Among the 10 potential dropouts, seven had been asked to leave the college before the midpoint of the Sophomore year because their scholastic records had deteriorated

⁸ This comparative analysis presented a difficulty which should be mentioned. The statistical test, derived by Johnson and Neyman, rests on three major assumptions: (1) that, within each of the compared groups of a subgroup or category, all variates are from a population which has a normal distribution; (2) that, in all of the subgroups, the variances are equal; and (3) that, for the two matched groups within a subgroup, the difference between means is the same as that in matched groups of any other subgroup. In the test, there are two estimates of variance: the variation between groups S_b^2 , which is compared with the variation within groups,

$$\frac{S_a^2}{N-5-1}$$

In this study, the pre-admission tests of intelligence and pre-college acquisition had been used to match the subjects in accordance with the Johnson-Neyman test; therefore, the trait characteristics within each of the 6 subgroups ordinarily would be expected to be consistent with the Johnson-Neyman assumptions. But there seemingly was an exception in this particular application. This is illustrated by one student in the Y category of the sixth subgroup (Table 9). This student, according to pre-admission tests, would be regarded as one of the least capable of all students to be matriculated in the population of which she was a member; yet, this student obtained a *c.c.p.a.* in the final semester which was one of the highest in the entire population. This *c.c.p.a.* of 3.41 is conspicuously incongruent with the other scores in the Y category of the sixth subgroup. These observations suggest that the pre-admission test scores were spuriously low. If this inference is sound, the matching of this student in the lowest subgroup introduced a factor which runs contrary to the Johnson-Neyman assumptions. The use of the Johnson-Neyman test might therefore be questioned. Or the resultant "F" may be doubted as an index of the significance of difference in the comparisons. The reasoning here is consistent with the fact that, when this one student's score is deleted, the remaining scores in the Y category of the sixth subgroups are more consistent with the Johnson-Neyman assumptions; and the statistical test, when again computed in the absence of the 3.41, yields an F of 4.18. At the five per cent level of significance,

$$F \geq 4.17.$$

to the point at which compulsory withdrawal was required.⁹ In the four-year period, nine had become dropouts (Fig. 5). The deterioration in academic performance is shown in Table 10.




Fig. 5. Curves which represent the incidence of compulsory withdrawal for reasons of poor scholarship.

TABLE 10
THE RECORD OF SCHOLASTIC DETERIORATION AND OF COMPULSORY
WITHDRAWAL FOR "ACADEMIC DEFICIENCY" *

Semester	Students in the No Therapy Group									Therapy Group	
	B	D	I	K	M	P	Q	T	V	P	U
1	1.56	1.60	1.60	1.94	1.19	1.50	1.78	1.81	1.59	1.88	1.65
2	1.56	1.69	1.00	1.81	1.00	.56	.75	1.50	1.60	.93	1.87
3		1.33		1.81					1.00		2.29
4				2.31					1.00		2.16
5				1.41							1.38

* Each entry in this table refers to the *c.p.a.* (the credit point average) for all courses which were taken by a student in a particular semester. The record of dropout in the No Therapy Group is consistent with the reports of withdrawal in colleges and universities in a survey throughout the United States (26); the incidence of dropout is found to be highest in the first and second semesters.

The performance of Student U in the Therapy Group is illustrative of the kind of record which was cited in an introductory paragraph of this study. It shows an incremental function through the first three semesters. Then it reveals an increasingly larger number of poor and failing grades until the time that the student's performance deteriorates to the point where compulsory withdrawal is requested by the college for reasons of "academic deficiency."

⁹ The increment in compulsory withdrawal for poor scholarship in the No Therapy Group is congruent with not only the perspective and predictions for this study but also the observa-

Out of 25 students in the Therapy Group, none had become dropouts in the first semester. This record, when compared with that of the No Therapy Group, reveals a difference of 25 per cent in the rate of dropout in the first semester.

At the termination of the first semester, six students in the Therapy Group were potential dropouts. Only one (4 per cent) had been asked to leave the college for "academic deficiency" by the midpoint of the Sophomore year; two had been asked to withdraw in the four-year period. The incidence of compulsory withdrawal for reasons of unsatisfactory scholarship in the four-year program therefore was markedly different in the two groups: 38 per cent in the No Therapy Group; 8 per cent in the Therapy Group.

A Tentative Conclusion

A reexamination of the statistical analyses for cuts, approach behavior, retention in psychology, and scholarship (*c.c.p.a.*) in the four-year program reveals that, in each comparison, there is a negation of the idea that the difference between groups was a function of chance factors. Since the students in the experiment had graduated from elementary and secondary schools before the time of a reform as proposed in either the lack-of-disciplined-intelligence interpretation or the interference-effect interpretation, the obtained differences are not a function of reform. Since an F test revealed no difference in variances for scores from pre-admission tests of intellectual capacity and pre-college acquisition in mathematics, history, English, and science, the difference between groups may be attributed to some factor other than intellectual capabilities. In brief, the differences in level of scholarship and the differences in these other measures of behavioral change were not found to be related to major variables such as chance, reform, intelligence, pre-college achievement, or the college program.

Because the behavior of the students in both groups was the same at the beginning of the first semester, and because an unmistakable change in behavior in a positive direction was greater in the Therapy Group, the conclusion seems warranted that this better performance was a consequent for which therapeutic education was an important antecedent.¹⁰ Because this

tions of the attrition rate throughout the United States (6; 7; 16; 25; 26; 29; 30; 49; 53; 65). Farnsworth states that "The drop-out rate in colleges in the United States, although varying sharply from one institution to another, runs from a college which graduates one out of four students who matriculate to an institution in which nine of 10 who enter receive a degree. No reliable statistics are available as to how many of those who leave college do so because of emotional conflicts. However, we have good reason to believe that in some institutions the proportion is considerably more than half" (16, p. 42). A survey of colleges and universities throughout the United States reports that, "The first year of college is the most critical dropout period." This study found that 273 out of 1,000 left school within the first year (26, p. 100).

¹⁰ For the purposes of future research there are certain incidental observations which should be mentioned about the nature of therapeutic education in this experiment. One observation stems from the use of group work and individual counseling as a unitary system of therapeutic

record of greater positive change in behavior was followed by a significantly superior scholastic record, the latter variable is interpreted to be related attributively to the former. This conclusion is held as tentative.¹¹ There is a need for replication¹² with systematic investigation of parameters such as the theoretical framework, the system of therapeutic operations, the duration of the therapeutic education, the use of individual and group counseling separately as well as conjointly, the time at which the conditions of therapeutic education are begun, the size of the group in the therapeutic relationship, the amount of time in a conference, the characteristics of the college population, and still others.

DISCUSSION

In the control situation of the No Therapy Group, the results of the experiment are remarkably consistent with the observations of the authors of the

operations. In the group situation, there occurred results which could not have been achieved if individual counseling had been the only kind of therapeutic situation to be employed. But the group situation, alone, would not have produced the obtained results of this study; there were students whose problems would have been worked through only in the situation of individual counseling. Each kind of situation therefore contributed to the overall effects in a unique way, yet there was a complementary relationship. In the group situation, the students could relate to each other; the contributions of peers were different from what an adult counselor or teacher might offer. The basis was provided for identification, for introjection, and for participatively working through problems. Through the combined efforts of all members, each student benefited through a broader range of situations and conditions than would be possible otherwise. In the group, there was the added advantage of a mutual supportive role. Each student, with the assistance of others, gained support in tentatively but gradually exploring problem situations and then testing new alternative approaches to a goal. In the individual counseling, the problems which had been identified by a student as a member of the group might be privately worked through. Here, the students revealed extensions upon class-work problems. They indicated that the group situation was helpful up to a certain point, but they were resistant to carrying the group work on certain problems beyond that point. In most cases, the problems of individual counseling involved a syndrome of conflicts which, though related to the problems of the group situation, were idiosyncratic; they involved a particular set of circumstances such as those in a certain home background, community background, or educational background. The problems involved factors such as long-term parental conflict; economic and personal independence; culture clash in social mobility; heterosexual relationships; and still others.

¹¹ The need for further research is indicated by the fact that, although this study and others show a larger amount of positive gain in behavior through the use of therapeutic techniques, the difference in level of scholarship may not always be in favor of the group in which the therapeutic operations were employed (1; 19; 35; 44). The divergent outcomes in records of scholarship may not always be a function of factors such as therapy, however. In one study, for example, the subjects were students who had a history of scholastic failure whereas, in the present study, the subjects were students who entered college with a satisfactory record in secondary schools and had not yet obtained a poor record in the college situation. The latter students were accepted for matriculation through the use of a selective system and none had experienced failure in the college situation at the time that the experiment began.

¹² Since the time that the experiment for this study was conducted, the writer has employed the same theoretical approach and related operations in other classes in psychology with essentially the same results as measured in rate of attrition. Out of 79 students in three sections of psychology in one semester, one student became a dropout (1 per cent). Out of 159 students in four sections in another semester, 3 students became dropouts (2 per cent). In still another semester, 3 students out of 65 became dropouts (5 per cent). These outcomes are consonant with the results of therapeutic education in the Therapy Group of the present study.

two interpretations which were under test; the poor academic performances, the high incidence of dropout in the first semester, the large number of potential dropouts, and the high rate of actual compulsory withdrawal for reasons of poor scholarship, all are congruent with the facts about undergraduate work at colleges and universities throughout the United States in the prior decade. At the same time that the poor academic performances and records of poor scholarship were occurring, there were symptoms of maladjustive behavior which persisted and sometimes became even more self-defeating; the spiralling effect of increasingly worse scholastic records was observed to occur in conjunction with immaturities and the interference of maladjustive behavior. From these facts the conclusion seems justified that, as professional observers have contended, the quality of performance was substandard; the students were unable to attain the academic goals which had been set for them by their professors.

The evidence in this nontherapeutic situation therefore is consonant with the major assumptions in each of the two interpretations of poor scholarship. According to the poor record of the No Therapy Group, the inference is tenable that the power to think was absent or seriously lacking. The inference also is tenable that maladjustive behavior interfered with thought and hence also interfered with the attainment of academic goals.

But the results from the situation of therapeutic education are markedly different in their implications for the two interpretations. The record of 76 per cent of the students obtaining a *c.p.a.* of "C" or better is strikingly discordant with the usual performance of first-semester students. The record of only one student becoming a dropout through compulsory withdrawal before the midpoint of the Sophomore year is equally incongruent with the ordinary record.

These results suggest that, although the standards of professors were not satisfactorily met in the courses of the usual program of education in the control situation, their standards were particularly well met when the same program of courses occurred in conjunction with the condition of therapy. This outcome is interpreted to sustain Kubie's contention that, to better attain the objectives of education, the traditional program in the school may require therapy as an ancillary service.

A comparison of the scholastic records in the Therapy Group and No Therapy Group raises a serious question about the generality, if not also the tenability, of the major tenet in the lack-of-disciplined-intelligence interpretation. If the assumption is sound that students show a poor quality of academic work because the power to think is absent or importantly lacking, and if the assumption pertains to students in colleges and universities throughout the United States, it should pertain to the first-year students in which both the Therapy Group and No Therapy Group were samples; the assumption should hold for the Therapy Group as well as the No Therapy Group. But the assumption, although consistent with data from the No Therapy Group, is not

so consistent with the record of the Therapy Group. In the latter group, the essential characteristics for satisfactory academic work apparently were present: *if this were not so, the standards of professors would not have been so satisfactorily met.* The conclusion seems warranted that, contrary to the major tenet in the lack-of-disciplined-intelligence interpretation, the power to think was not absent nor so seriously lacking as assumed.

A comparison of the direction and amount of change in avoidance and approach behavior in the two groups tends to support an inference of causation in the interference-effect interpretation. If students enter college with transference phenomena of aversively motivated tendencies and maladjustive reactions, if this behavior occurs in cuts, in the abandonment of assignments and projects, in resistances in the presence of authority figures, and in problem-evading immaturities rather than in problem-solving action, and if the students are presented with therapeutic conditions in which such behavior might be modified in a positive direction, there should be a gain in a positive direction in measures of the tendencies in the group therapeutic situation. The better record of the Therapy Group is consistent with the deduction.

The fact that the mean *c.c.p.a.* was significantly higher in the Therapy Group is congruent with a second inference in the same interpretation. If students obtain a poor scholastic record because maladjustive tendencies interfere with the attainment of academic goals, and if the interference were to be reduced or eliminated through the operations of therapy, the students in the therapeutic situation should become freer than those in a nontherapeutic situation to attain the goals of higher education. The superior scholastic record of the Therapy Group sustains this deduction.

These results negate various deductions which were derived from the critical comments about therapy in education as offered by authors of the lack-of-disciplined-intelligence interpretation. If therapy were abortive, as the writings of these authors suggest, the results should have shown no significant difference in behavior or in the level of scholarship in favor of the Therapy Group. If the introduction of therapy were to produce a dilution of purpose, making the school the worse, or if the addition of therapy to a program of education were to deprive students of the time and the essential conditions with which to learn to be self-reliant, the outcomes of therapy might have been a poorer record in the Therapy Group than in the No Therapy Group. But these effects were not obtained.

Thus far the evidence from the experiment consistently confirms the assumptions in the interference-effect interpretation; it consistently negates deductions from the lack-of-disciplined-intelligence interpretation. These limits are

But there are some important limits in this conclusion. These limits are defined by incidental observations.

In the Therapy Group, some of the problems of students were not identified until late in the semester. These problems commonly involved behavior in

which resistances were most evident at an earlier point in the semester. The amount of time in the therapeutic situation seemed to be a critical factor in the "emergence" of the problems into the working relationships. This observation leads to the conjecture that some problems were never brought into the situation.

As the weeks progressed, there was a recurrence of certain problems. A problem might recur in somewhat modified form. It might involve tendencies which, at first, were not identified. It might occur in different individuals. Or the problem might be worked through under divergent cue conditions in somewhat the same kind of problem situation. This process of recurrently working through problems seemed to be essential in the extinction or "weakening" of certain maladjustive tendencies. It also seemed to be important in the discrimination learning. This observation suggests that if more than one semester of time had been available, the process of working through certain problems would possibly have continued to a point where there would have been less necessity for assistance in the process.

Another observation was that students differed in the rate at which behavioral change occurred. Although the change occurred rapidly and soon in some students, it was slow to occur in others. In one student, it was especially slow. The fact that there was change was encouraging, but the extent of the change in this student was disappointing. This observation points to one of the most serious limitations in the influence of the one-semester program of therapeutic education in this study.

The students also differed in the extent or complexity of the problems in maladjustive behavior. As the therapeutic education progressed, especially in individual counseling, the presence of certain symptoms of more aberrant behavior became evident. In one case, the need was indicated for referral to the clinical situation.

These various observations indicate that, although the results of the experiment sustain the prediction for a change through therapeutic education from maladjustive to more self-realizing tendencies and therefore to a better scholastic record, there were limits in the extent of the change. This conclusion is consonant with the fact that, in the psychological laboratory, in the clinical situation, and in everyday situations, there are known to be great differences in the rate at which learned behavior is "unlearned." The conclusion is also consistent with common sense: a maladjustive tendency, when originally acquired in pre-school and elementary-school years, and when intermittently and possibly aperiodically reinforced for a decade or more before entering college, would be expected to be persistent.

Although the results from the experiment more often negate than confirm deductions from the lack-of-disciplined-intelligence interpretation, an incidental observation of the study is congruent with the observations of the authors of this interpretation. In some students, a problem involved, among

other factors, the absence or an inadequacy of pre-college training in certain subject-matter areas. If a student entered college without a background of knowledge and acquirable skills for a certain course, he often was markedly at a disadvantage in the competition for good grades. He had a real reason to be fearful or anxious. His aversive emotional reactions were realistic. The attendant behavioral tendencies might or might not be neurotogenic. This observation suggests that, although the independent variable of therapy was demonstrated to effect a higher level of scholarship, the level should have been even higher in the Therapy Group if all students had entered college with the prerequisites for each course in the college program.

SUMMARY

The problem in this study originated from the observation that there is a need to improve the quality of scholarship in higher education. According to professional observers, this need is widespread. The incidence of probation and compulsory withdrawal for reasons of scholastic failure is excessively high in colleges and universities throughout the United States. The perspective led to the questions: Do students obtain poor scholastic records because maladjustive behavior interferes with thought and the attainment of academic goals? Or do they show a poor quality of performance because the power to think is absent, or seriously lacking? An experimental test was conducted with two groups of first-semester undergraduate students. The conditions of higher education were the same except that the factor of therapy was employed as a corrective for the maladjustive behavior in one but not in the other of two groups. The results sustained a prediction that the students in the therapeutic situation would become freer from the interference of maladjustive behavior and hence would obtain a significantly superior scholastic record than that of students in the nontherapeutic situation. The evidence raised a doubt about the generality and tenability of the assumption that the students lacked the power to think, although some were observed to lack the tools of thought. The outcomes were interpreted to refute the conjectures of critics who say that the effects of therapy would be abortive or make the school the worse.

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History, Historians, and the Secondary School Curriculum

Why does history deserve study in the secondary school? Is it by virtue of its quality as a mental discipline? Because in it are found the springs of patriotism? Because history is a guide to the politics of the future? The author discusses these and other problems in the light of both the early influences on the social studies curriculum and the influences which historians like Bestor, Burlie Brown, and Billington are attempting to exert on it today.

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AMID THE EVER-INCREASING LITERATURE on the secondary school curriculum recently appearing in the professional and popular press are found several essays on the social studies program by professors of history at major universities. Some of these scholars have concentrated on suggesting in what regard the present courses of study are inadequate;¹ some have gone further and proposed alternate content and methodology;² a few have been sufficiently concerned to take time to join their colleagues in the secondary school in the writing and teaching of revitalized courses in history.³

¹ Cf. Arthur Bestor, *The Restoration of Learning* (New York: Knopf, 1955) especially chapters 10 and 28; Carlton J. H. Hayes, "European and World History" and Ray Allen Billington, "American History," in James D. Koerner (ed.), *The Case for Basic Education* (Boston: Little Brown, 1959), pp. 27-61.

² Cf. W. Burlie Brown, *United States History: A Bridge to the World of Ideas*, pamphlet published by the American Historical Association Service Center for Teachers of History.

³ For example Edwin Fenton and his colleagues at Carnegie Institute of Technology are conducting such a program in the Taylor-Allderdice High School in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Regardless of their form, however, the public utterances of the professional historians have shown, not unexpectedly, a considerable uniformity. Since they have stemmed from similar basic assumptions about the nature and function of history, they have not only indicated alarm at the same qualities of the social studies program, but they have also suggested similar revisions. In the mind of the layman and the secondary school teacher the uniformity of the criticism has tended to add force to the arguments. Moreover, the generalizations with which the scholars have defended their reform proposals appear to have a simple logic that may well be seductive to history teacher and citizen alike. In any case, both the criticism and the proposed revision would seem to merit a more careful analysis than they have yet received.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Committee of Seven

The post Korean War period is not the first in which historical scholars have become alarmed about the secondary school curriculum. The recent pronouncements are, in fact, a renaissance of active interest, for in the first two decades of the present century the content of the history courses in the nation's secondary schools was largely determined by the decrees of two committees of the American Historical Association. Of the two, the Committee of Seven, whose report appeared in 1899 and was reprinted nine times by 1915, was the more influential.⁴ It prescribed the four-block program which dominated the teaching of history in the high school until after World War I.⁵ History of the ancient and early medieval periods was to be taught in grade nine, medieval and modern European history since 800 A.D. in grade ten, English history in grade eleven, and American history and civil government in grade twelve. Nearly as influential on the content of the elementary school history program was the report of the Committee of Eight published in 1909 which advocated the chronological treatment of American history and a study of national and state governments as separate courses in grades seven and eight.⁶

The history curriculum of 1900 was undergirded with a carefully drawn rationale which validated the content. The Committee of Seven stressed citizenship education as the most important goal.

⁴ American Historical Association, *Report of the Committee of Seven* (Boston, 1915).

⁵ My sampling of the courses of study of high schools published between 1900 and 1920 bears out this generalization. It is also supported by research reported in Rollo M. Tryon, *The Social Sciences as School Subjects* (New York: C. Scribner's, 1935), pp. 22ff., and by the data compiled by William G. Kimmel, *Instruction in the Social Studies*, Office of Education, Bulletin 1932, No. 17, monograph No. 21 (Washington, 1933).

⁶ Grades seven and eight were part of the elementary school in most communities until the 1920's which witnessed the spread of the junior high school. American Historical Association, *Report of the Committee of Eight* (Boston, 1909).

The most essential result of secondary education is acquaintance with political and social environment, some appreciation of the nature of the state and society, some sense of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. . . .⁷

This end was to be achieved by teaching the discipline of history which contained, by virtue of its traditional content and methodology, the learnings essential for competence in civic affairs. The Committee of Seven proclaimed that "the chief object of every experienced teacher is to get pupils to think properly after the method adopted in his particular line of work."⁸ In the discipline of history the correct method of thinking was referred to as "historical mindedness."⁹

Historical mindedness should in some slight measure be bred with them [the students] and . . . they should be given the habit, or the beginnings of a habit of considering what has been when they discuss what is or what should be.¹⁰

History had two other virtues. It cultivated judgment by leading youth to deal with cause and effect, by teaching them how to acquire facts and arrange them logically, and by developing in them the scientific method of thinking.¹¹ Moreover, history imparted a sense of values. It led students to realize that what they saw about them was not eternal but transient, and that in the process of change "virtue must be militant if it is to be triumphant."¹²

Neither the influence of the Committee of Seven nor the content it recommended was surprising in terms of the social context in which the report appeared. In 1900 only about ten per cent of the nation's adolescents between fourteen and seventeen years of age were enrolled in school.¹³ The high school was principally a college preparatory institution and it was logical to look to the university as the arbiter of content for the curriculum.¹⁴ Moreover, quantification had not yet made its impact upon the social sciences, and history and government were the disciplines chiefly recognized as basic to the study of society. It was not difficult, in the relatively homogeneous community of 1900, to believe that the permanent values of mankind would emerge from a study of western history. In an age when social Darwinism motivated businessmen and Presidents, even scholars could understandably see in the

⁷ *Report of the Committee of Seven*, p. 17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹³ Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1941* (Washington, 1941), table 127.

¹⁴ The Committee of Seven was originally appointed "to consider the subject of history in the secondary school and to draw up a scheme of college entrance requirements in history." *Report of the Committee of Seven*, v.

story of western civilization the slow but steady progress toward a universally democratic world. That the scholar of history at the university was the person most qualified to prescribe the content of that portion of the secondary school curriculum dealing with man and society was thus patently obvious.

These conditions were not to last, however. By the end of World War I a new social context provided the impetus under which the university historian's control was in large part surrendered. Of primary importance were changes in both the size and the nature of the student population of the secondary school. From a total of 518,251 in 1900, the year following the appearance of the Report of the Committee of Seven, the enrollment of the nation's public high schools jumped to 915,061 in 1910, 2,200,389 in 1920, 4,399,422 in 1930, and 6,601,444 in 1940.¹⁵ In contrast to the ten per cent figure for 1900, eighty-two per cent of the nation's youth ages fourteen to seventeen were enrolled in school in 1950.¹⁶ By mid-century the high school had changed from an essentially college preparatory institution to the modern comprehensive school. Simultaneously the nature of the content of collegiate fields dealing with man in organized society was broadening and diversifying. Alongside the traditional courses in history, government, and economics were appearing an increasing number of offerings in social sciences, anthropology, sociology, and statistics.¹⁷ Furthermore, changes in the larger pattern of American life outside the school seemed to render the study of the history of western civilization and American government inadequate in themselves for fulfilling the purposes of citizenship education. In the more complex urban environment from which growing proportions of the high school population were drawn, new knowledges were increasingly necessary; knowledges so specialized and complex that the informal educative agencies—the home, the church, the shop—were unable to supply them. The need was most obvious in the technical information and skill demanded by industrial vocations, but it also reached into the civic and political area where, especially after the early thirties, the ever-extending power of government into economic and international affairs meant more perplexing issues for the voter to fathom; into economic relationships where the individual was submerged in ever more complex unions and corporations; into interpersonal relationships which the sheer closeness of urban life complicated and intensified. In such an environment it seemed increasingly doubtful that courses adequate to prepare students for advanced study at a liberal arts college were equally useful to youth terminating their formal training in high school. Courses in ancient,

¹⁵ Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1955* (Washington, 1955), table 145.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, table 127.

¹⁷ Cf. *Harvard University Catalogue 1907-8 to 1930*; Report of a Faculty Committee, *The Behavioral Sciences at Harvard* (privately printed, 1954), pp. 18-24; Catalogues of Columbia University, Delaware University, University of Georgia, Iowa State University, University of Michigan, University of California, Temple University, University of Texas, 1915-1940.

medieval, and European history, subjects far removed in space and time, appeared inappropriate for an adolescent about to take his place in the demanding urban present.

The effect of the new environment on the high school course of study was first conspicuously evident in the changed character of the reports of national professional organizations on the subject of curriculum. In 1913 the National Education Association which had originally requested the appointment of the Committee of Seven, set up a new group, the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education. By 1918 this body was responsible for the publication of seventeen documents, thirteen of which dealt with individual subject areas, and four with the more general matters of vocational guidance, physical education, moral values, and cardinal principles of education.¹⁸

The 1916 Commission

Both the composition of the subcommittee on social studies in the secondary school and the specific content of its report reflected what was happening to the influence of the university historian on the high school curriculum. In contrast to the Committee of Seven which was composed of six professors of history and a private school headmaster, the 1916 committee contained among its twenty-one members only two university professors of history.¹⁹ Two other members were college teachers, one in home economics and one in rural sociology. The remaining were secondary school teachers and administrators or employees of government education departments. Clearly the report on the reorganization of the social studies was largely the work of a rapidly growing occupational group of professional educators who, though they would consult scholars in the individual disciplines on matters of course content, were neither by training nor commitment specialists in a traditional collegiate discipline, but rather were regarded as experts in school administration, instruction, and supervision.

The content which the committee suggested reflected the trend even more strikingly. Alternate programs were drawn up for grades seven, eight, and nine, which were now, because of administrative rearrangement, part of the new junior high school.²⁰ In place of American history and government which

¹⁸ Bureau of Education, *Seven Cardinal Principles of Education*, Bulletin 1918, No. 35 (Washington, 1918); Bureau of Education, *The Social Studies in Secondary Education*, Bulletin 1916, No. 28 (Washington, 1916).

¹⁹ The historians were William Mace of Syracuse and James Harvey Robinson of Columbia. Robinson had recently published his revisionary *The New History*: see James Harvey Robinson, *The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook* (New York: Macmillan, 1922 [first published March, 1912]). In an essay published in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* he had taken a firm stand in favor of rewriting history to shed new light on current issues: see James Harvey Robinson, "The New History," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. L (Philadelphia, Penn.: May-June, 1911), pp. 179-190.

²⁰ The Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education had recommended the junior high school movement highly. *Seven Cardinal Principles*, p. 18.

the Committee of Seven had prescribed for grade seven, the 1916 group proposed either a half-year of geography and a half-year of European history or a full year of European history correlated with geography. In either case civics of the local community was to be taught either as a separate study or integrated with the other subjects.²¹ United States history and civics were to be retained in grade eight but they were to be closely coordinated so that the story of the growth of the "national community" would be seen as involving "all the elements of welfare."²² In this grade geography was to be correlated with the United States history and civics. In place of ancient history in grade nine, a choice was again suggested: either a half-year of civics emphasizing state, national, and world interests, and a half-year of vocational and economic civics with history taught incidentally, or a full year of economic and vocational civics taught in conjunction with economic history.²³ For the high school (now grades ten, eleven, and twelve) a single sequence was proposed, paralleling the cycle offered in grades seven, eight, and nine.²⁴ Grade ten was to offer a survey of European history, half of which was to concentrate on "modern" Europe since 1700. Grade eleven would provide a study of American history since the end of the seventeenth century, and grade twelve a course in Problems of Democracy, stressing comprehension and analysis of contemporary social, political, and economic issues.²⁵

The key to the difference between the proposals of the Committee of Seven and the 1916 Commission lay in their contrasting rationales. The distinction was not one of ends. Like their historian predecessors, the members of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Social Studies were unequivocal in their support of citizenship education. The aims of the social studies should be "an appreciation of the nature and laws of social life . . . a sense of responsibility of the individual as a member of social groups . . . the intelligence and will to participate effectively in the promotion of social well-being. More specifically social studies in the American high school should have as their conscious and constant purpose the cultivation of good citizenship."²⁶ But there was a fundamental difference in the means by which the 1916 group sought to accomplish its ends.

From the standpoint of the purpose of secondary education it is far less important that adolescent youth should acquire a comprehensive

²¹ *The Social Studies in Secondary Education*, pp. 15-20.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-25.

²⁴ The rationale for this repetition was apparently that in 1916 a great many youths still ended their formal education in the ninth grade. It was thus felt advisable to give them as thorough a survey of American institutions and problems as was possible at their age and repeat the program at greater depth and with greater analysis for those who did go on to high school. Bureau of Education, *The Public School System of San Francisco, California*, Bulletin 1917, No. 46 (Washington, 1917), p. 335.

²⁵ *The Social Studies in Secondary Education*, pp. 35, 52-56.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

knowledge of any or all of the social sciences than it is that he should be given experience and practice in the observation of social phenomena as he encounters them; that he should be brought to understand that every social problem is many sided and complex; and that he should acquire the habit of forming social judgements only on the basis of dispassionate consideration of all the facts available. *This this committee believes can best be accomplished by dealing with actual situations as they occur and by drafting into service the materials of all the social sciences as occasion demands for a thorough understanding of the situations in question.*²⁷

No longer, the committee proclaimed, should the focal point of the curriculum which deals with man and society be the discipline of history, because such a focus was inadequate to the key purpose of secondary education—enabling American youth to deal with the complex phenomena of modern society. Even where history courses were to remain as part of the curriculum, they should aim *not* at providing the student with the traditionally accepted knowledges and skills of an ancient and honorable discipline, but at understanding the vital problems of the present world.²⁸ The change in orientation is clearly illustrated in the name the commission gave to the field of study. It was no longer *history*, but *social studies*.

We need not be centrally concerned here with the originality of the ideas expressed by the 1916 committee. Actually there is evidence that the recommendations were to a considerable extent patterned after practices already in existence in certain "advanced" city school systems, and there are some data to confirm the hypothesis that the communities influential in curriculum reform at least in the 1920's were not the fashionable middle class suburbs, but certain of the nation's large cities.²⁹ It would appear from this same data that the commission functioned more as a channel of communication for spreading changes already in progress than as the originator of a movement.

Of great importance to our present purpose, however, is an evaluation of the extent of the influence of the 1916 report, or at least of the kind of program it proposed. Several generalizations would seem to be supported by the data available on this subject. Generally speaking the courses of study which it advocated were the principal models followed in approximately a third of the nation's secondary schools in 1924 and by at least a majority of them in 1948.³⁰ Its most extensive influence was in the emerging junior high school where the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 56. The italics are mine.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ My own research into the published courses of such cities as Los Angeles, Indianapolis, Newark, Cincinnati, and Chicago bears out this contention. The Commission's report also claims to be based on "a definite trend in actual practice." *The Social Studies in Secondary Education*, p. 6.

³⁰ Edgar Dawson, "The History Inquiry," *Historical Outlook*, XV (June, 1924), 19. Tryon, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21; U. S. Office of Education, "Offerings and Enrollments in High School Subjects," Chapter V, *Biennial Survey of Education, 1948-50* (Washington, 1951), pp. 31-32.

present-centered rationale and the emphasis on community civics were widely adopted, and fusion or correlation of content was undertaken by approximately one fourth of the schools by 1930.³¹ On the senior high school level a large number of schools adopted the Problems of Democracy course in the early 1930's. Elective twelfth grade courses in social science, economics, sociology, and less frequently psychology, were offered by many schools,³² but by and large topical chronological courses in history have retained a dominant position in the high school social studies curriculum until the present day. Even within the history courses, however, the rationale represented by the commission was not without effect. Though the traditional form of the discipline has remained, the selection of content has been heavily influenced by its supposed contemporaneous importance.

At any rate it seems safe to state that rigorous courses in academic history are less frequently required of secondary school students today than was the case fifty years ago, and that the influence of the university professor of history on the secondary school curriculum is less strong now than it was then.³³ It is against this situation that the historians have directed their recent essays on curriculum and they should be seen within this historical framework.

DEFINING THE CENTRAL ISSUE

It is not the function of this essay to evaluate the present social studies curriculum of the secondary school, but rather to analyze in some detail the changes in it which are being proposed by university professors of history who have expressed their views in writing. It would be helpful in defining the basic issues raised by the historians to summarize the general assumptions upon which they rest their arguments.

The basic tenet which underlies every criticism and proposed revision is that the discipline of history has unique characteristics which make its study indispensable to any individual who would be a competent member of contemporary democratic society. Since this is so, any valid analysis of the recent essays would seem to require us to consider two separate questions: (1) what purposes do the historian-critics see history as achieving in the secondary school? (2) what unique features of historical content and methodology do

³¹ Tryon, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-237; Howard E. Wilson, *The Fusion of Social Studies in the Junior High Schools* ("Harvard Studies in Education," Vol. XXI; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933), Chapters 1 and 2; Kimmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-16.

³² U. S. Office of Education, *Offerings and Registrations in High School Subjects*, Bulletin 1938, No. 6 (Washington, 1938), p. 16. Where the Problems of Democracy course was adopted the course in American history was moved to the eleventh grade, its most common location today. The World History course was apparently the product of administrative desire to save curriculum time by compressing ancient, medieval, and modern history into a single year's course.

³³ The conclusion would seem to be borne out by the apparent minimum influence of the 17 volume report of the American Historical Association's Commission on the Social Studies published in the 1930's.

they claim fit it for the fulfillment of these purposes? To rephrase them as a single question, given the proposition that the human mind is incapable of conceiving of reality as a whole but must always organize its perceptions around certain concepts, what in the nature of history makes it peculiarly useful as a means of construing social reality?

The answers which the historian-critics have given to these questions are fundamentally those which were part of the rationale of the Committee of Seven. "Historical-mindedness" should be bred with our young people first, because only history allows man to examine social issues in the perspective of time; second, because the historical method involves the use of critical judgment in the drawing of conclusions and is therefore valuable training for the responsibilities of democratic citizenship; and third, because the study of the cultural heritage, particularly that of western civilization, increases the student's commitment to democratic values. Moreover, contemporary historians maintain that the usefulness of history in achieving these ends is not impaired by the great difference between the social contexts of 1960 and 1900. On the contrary, they contend that the quickened pace of change and the greater complexity of modern society make the study of history more important than ever and as vital for the terminal student as for the college-bound.³⁴

ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORIANS' CLAIMS: (1)

There can be little quarrel with the assumption that among the disciplines oriented to a study of man and society only history attempts to construe reality across any considerable dimension of time. Nor can it reasonably be denied that human institutions are continually modified in response to new events and that the individual can be made aware of both continuity and change through a knowledge of past society. History, as Louis Namier points out, enables us to see what is and what is not typical of our own period in time.³⁵ It would thus seem logical to conclude that in so far as it is deemed important for members of society to have knowledge of what past institutions were like and how they differ from our own, to be aware of the change that has taken place in human society over any period of time, to that extent will some study of history be required in the public schools.

But having admitted this we have not solved, but rather created, a curriculum problem; that of selection of content. What is desirable that present-day citizens should know about past societies? Given the six thousand years of recorded history, the amount of description of the human past to which one *could* expose the oncoming generation is almost infinite. No matter what curriculum is constructed for six years of secondary schooling, the great mass

³⁴ Cf. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Bestor, *op. cit.*, Chapters 19 and 21.

³⁵ L. B. Namier, "History and Political Culture," in Fritz Richard Stern (ed.), *Varieties of History* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 372.

of history must be omitted, and some means must be employed to separate what is to be included from what is to be excluded.

The Committee of Seven attempted to solve this problem by outlining in their four blocs the basic *minimum* knowledge of past society that any adequately educated citizen must possess. It prescribed a description of what the university historians deemed to be the major political and economic institutions and events in western civilization prior to 1900. It did not focus on the history of Asia or Africa, and it could include but a minimum of social history because not much in this area had been written by 1900. Nevertheless, the committee did feel that no part of its program could be omitted without a serious gap occurring in the student's knowledge. "The whole field gives a meaning to each portion that it cannot have by itself."³⁶

The modern university historian faces this same problem of selection of content and though he has not explicitly indicated his solution, it can be inferred from his proposals that he employs the system used by the Committee of Seven—the prescription of minimum content adequate to a survey of all relevant past history. What he has failed to recognize, however, are the immense complications created for the curriculum maker by the phenomenal increase in historical knowledge since 1900.

Take, for example, the minimum knowledge which Carlton J. H. Hayes feels requisite to prevent American youth of 1960 from being "a lost generation, a generation isolated in time and space, a generation unstable and insecure."³⁷ Like the Committee of Seven, Professor Hayes would require a full year's course in ancient history, including deep enough coverage to secure an "appreciation" of the ancient empires of Egypt, Mesopotamia, China, India, and Persia, but centering on Greece and Rome. A second year he would devote to medieval and modern European history to 1750, and a third to European and world history from the mid-eighteenth century to the present day. A fourth year would be devoted to American history.³⁸

At first glance such a program sounds reasonable, but if one juxtaposes Mr. Hayes's course of study with that recommended by his predecessors on the Committee of Seven, a basic difficulty becomes immediately evident. The new program includes all of the content of the older and a great deal more besides. If four full years of study were required to acquaint the student with the knowledge prescribed in the curriculum of 1900, how can the same amount of school time be adequate to the study of the same content plus a reasonable survey of all the key developments since 1900 together with significant information about the earlier period uncovered by modern historians?

Professor Hayes's solution is apparently to crowd each year with more material. The year's work which he recommends in European and world

³⁶ *Report of the Committee of Seven*, p. 35.

³⁷ Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-61.

history since 1750 would include: "a running account of the major events of the period in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the Balkans, etc. . . . the English and American Revolutions, the Great French Revolution, the Russian Bolshevik Revolution . . . the industrial revolution, with its bases in technology and science, with its spread from England to the European Continent and the United States and eventually throughout the world . . . a clear idea of the meaning of such terms as 'liberalism,' 'democracy,' 'socialism,' 'Marxism,' 'Communism' . . . historical study of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and, in greater detail of the U.S.S.R. and its satellite empire . . . basic knowledge of modern Japan, China, India, the Moslem countries, Latin America, the British Commonwealth [and their relation to] knowledge of modern Europe and the United States . . . acquaintance with internationalism as well as with nationalism and imperialism . . . the peace movements of the last century . . . the concert of Europe . . . the League of Nations, the United Nations, etc. . . ." ³⁹ This course proposes, it is true, a lesser amount of knowledge than that presently doled out in the much-criticized world history course. It may thus alleviate but certainly does not obviate the primary reason for the latter's inadequacy. The only way to acquaint a student with such a vast amount of content in a single year's course is at a level of gross generalization, and if the purpose of the knowledge is to allow the student to orient himself in time and space, to know what is typical of his own generation and what is not, to be aware of change and continuity, there are two serious difficulties. The more gross the generalization (i.e., the more specific events are encompassed in a single historical concept) the less accurate it is as a description of past reality (i.e., the more specific exceptions there are to it) and therefore the less useful it is for orientation. And the more gross the generalization, the more abstract it is apt to be, and the less the student will be able to identify with it, that is, see it in terms of an event within his own realm of experience and thus comprehend it.

There are two alternatives to crowding each school year with more content. One is to take more time to cover the same amount of material, thus enabling more careful consideration of more specific events. The difficulty here is that there are other knowledges than historical ones which society deems it important for the school to pass on, and in an increasingly complex and technological culture their number is growing, as is their demand for curricular time relative to history. ⁴⁰ The other alternative is to practice more rigid selection—to limit the total amount of historical generalization which is deemed necessary to equip students adequately for social living. What is

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59. The influence of the present international situation on Mr. Hayes's selection of content should be noted.

⁴⁰ This force has apparently been largely responsible for the increasing tendency to require less history study of modern high school students. The world history course was developed as an administrative device to save time for other subjects and even this course is less frequently required than was the case twenty years ago.

required in this case is not adding content to the already crowded curriculum of 1900 but finding justifiable means of limiting it still further.

It is here that the modern university historian-critic has been most remiss. He is either ignorant of, or has refused to face, an educational reality. It is very doubtful now, and it will be increasingly so as the future adds its share to recorded history, that it will be possible in six secondary school years to make meaningful to the average adolescent the major portion of the history of the world. A more rigorous selection of content will thus have to be practiced and this will require the construction of philosophically and pedagogically sound criteria by which choices of material may be made. Rather than attempting to summarize at a high level of generalization for the secondary school student the content conventionally covered in all the major courses in a collegiate history department (a process that may have been feasible in 1899 but is certainly not so in 1960), the modern university historian, if he desires to be of help to his secondary school colleagues, should devote his intellectual talent to the construction of these criteria.

ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORIANS' CLAIMS: (2)

The second major element in the rationale given by contemporary historians is the argument that the historical method involves the use of critical judgment in drawing conclusions on social issues and is therefore valuable training in democratic citizenship. This assumption, too, has been adopted from the Committee of Seven. If it can be validated, it would likely provide one criterion for the selection of content; that is, one could select that content best suited to train the student to use critical judgment in dealing with social issues. An analysis of the essays on curriculum being published by modern collegiate historians, however, indicates that before history can be used to teach critical judgment there are problems to be solved which are more complex than the authors of the essays have generally realized.

The Committee of Seven's case for history's value in enhancing the critical factor rested heavily on the now discredited theory of general mental discipline. History, they maintained, cultivates the judgment by developing the pupil's capacity to deal with cause and effect relationships,⁴¹ by training him to gather and systematize ideas from many books thereby increasing his ability to make use of knowledge,⁴² and by developing in him "the scientific habit of mind."⁴³ Modern historians, though they have abandoned the concept of mental gymnastics, rest their case heavily on the contention that the study of history acquaints the student with the historical process and that this process is basically the *same* process that should be used in critically analyzing any contemporary social situation. Both claims need modification.

⁴¹ *Report of the Committee of Seven*, pp. 7-21.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

Professor Brown's View

Let us take, for example, one attempt to construct an American history course which deals with historical process: *United States History: A Bridge to the World of Ideas*, written by W. Burlie Brown of Tulane University and widely circulated to secondary school teachers through the American Historical Association's Service Center for Teachers of History. Professor Brown in his introduction expresses his disappointment in visiting history classes in some forty American high schools at finding them all patterned after "what Arnold Toynbee has described as the 'one damn thing after another school of history'."⁴⁴ Present high school history courses, he notes, are just teaching students to memorize and regurgitate facts. Mr. Brown does not contend that solid knowledge of the facts of American history is unimportant. "One must know *what* happened before he can grapple with the problems of *how* and *why* it happened."⁴⁵ But he does want an effort made to do something more than just teach facts. With this in mind he has created a new high school course in American history, a job which he sees as being within the competence of only the university history instructor.⁴⁶

Mr. Brown's course attempts to form a bridge between the simple narrative factual approach and the analytic approach to history which he develops with his classes at Tulane.⁴⁷ It is designed to require a full year's study and is divided into two sections. The first consists of seven topics arranged chronologically to cover the period from the founding of the English colonies in America to the end of the Civil War. The purpose of the first semester's work is not so much chronological coverage as to teach the student "the process of critical thought, historical understanding, the analytic method."⁴⁸ The topics are thus arranged to point up cause and effect relationships (e.g., "The Reasons for English Colonization of North America," "The Causes of the American Revolution"), and the teacher is to attempt to consider only three or at best four of the topics in the sixteen week semester.⁴⁹ The second half of the course deals with the process of historical synthesis—"the attempt to impose order upon a multiplicity of phenomena, a search for a kind of common denominator that will explain our contemporary civilization in most of its significant aspects."⁵⁰ Its purpose is to stress "the *relationship* among many forces and events, the *discovery of a pattern* of arrangement of these phenomena that makes them meaningful."⁵¹ This part of the course consequently abandons the chronological narrative and organizes the data around a single theme, "the emergence of an urban-industrial way of life and

⁴⁴ Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

the resulting dislocations, problems, and changes that its advent brought to the practices, ideas, institutions and patterns of belief in the major areas of American life."⁵²

Professor Brown's course represents a commendable example of the way in which justifiable criteria can be used to select content. He avoids the difficulties implicit in Professor Hayes's world history course by not trying to teach the major part of recognized content in his subject but rather by using a manageable portion of that content as the data for teaching the unique processes of the discipline. Presumably if the student can get from the course facility in the use of the processes, he can at any later time apply them to any historical content.

However, we must examine more closely the method by which he seeks to teach the two elements which he conceives as basic to the historical method—analysis and synthesis. In this connection Mr. Brown sees for the teacher a most active role. "He must lecture and conduct classroom discussions," for listening and note-taking is a very important intellectual exercise.⁵³ Furthermore, Professor Brown provides for both halves of the course a complete syllabus which "outlines each topic in detail, provides annotations that indicate direction and emphases to be given [to the content] and supplies a bibliography that will enable the teacher to go to the precise chapter and page of a large number of scholarly works selected from the vast literature on United States history to bolster his [the teacher's] *presentation*."⁵⁴ In short, the teacher is to teach historical analysis by pointing out to the student the analyses of contemporary scholars and to develop skills in historical synthesis by acquainting his pupils with *one* synthesis made by a professional historian of a selected number of events from the period from 1865 to the present.

It would seem at best problematical that such a technique will accomplish the ends intended for it. Indeed, excellent as the content of Professor Brown's course is (and I think it is superior in this regard even to the typical college survey of American history) it seems to differ from the run-of-the-mill high school courses he dislikes more in degree than in kind. Instead of being taught a simple chronological narrative, the student is now to be given a more sophisticated analytic view in the first semester, and a more elaborate synthesis in the second. In either case the student is being acquainted with the results of an historical process performed by someone else and I doubt if this will teach the critical judgment of the historian any more than memorizing Euclidean proofs, no matter how carefully laid out, teaches youngsters to think like geometers.

Such a program may help young people to see our society within desirable

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6. The italics are mine.

perspectives. It may also teach the basic *structure* of history as a discipline.⁵⁵ But even if the objective of the course is limited to students' comprehension of analysis and synthesis as elements of historical structure, these elements must be emphasized *explicitly* in the classroom and not left *implicit* in the content itself. Understanding the nature of synthesis and analysis is far different from being able to perform the critical judgements necessary to use these processes. The latter skills can be taught only by explaining to the student the specific steps in the processes and leading him to reach his own conclusions by their use.

It may be argued that such a practice requires having the students write their own history and that this is impractical in view of the average adolescent's lack of intellectual sophistication. The Committee of Seven, in fact, used this argument against the document-centered course sometimes found in the 1890's.⁵⁶ My own experience as a secondary school teacher would also lead me to predict that it will be necessary to limit the students' direct experience with historical method to smaller topics within a larger framework provided by the instructor. But this does not invalidate my major contention that the critical skills of the historian can only be effectively taught by having students use them directly.

Professor Bestor's View

Professor Arthur Bestor apparently bases his belief in history's value as citizenship education partly upon this same premise:

The contribution that history can make to the discussion of contemporary affairs is not limited to the data it can furnish. Historians can assist in improving the *quality* [*sic*] as well as the content of public discussion if only they will point out more *explicitly* [*my italics*] than they have usually done the procedures upon which they rely for safeguarding the exercise of judgment against abuse and for testing its final results.⁵⁷

Professor Bestor, like Professor Brown, conceives of the historian's task as either analysis or synthesis. The former process is apparently applied when he deals with single discrete historical episodes, that is, generalizations based upon a limited number of events. The method here is to examine the documents which previous historians have found crucial and then to check their generalizations against a large sample of other pertinent documents. As the historian continues to examine other evidence, "a more or less conclusive

⁵⁵ For a psychologist's discussion of this objective of teaching cf. Jerome S. Bruner, *The Processes of Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 17-32.

⁵⁶ *Report of the Committee of Seven*, p. 23.

⁵⁷ Bestor, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

interpretation will have been taking provisional shape in his mind."⁵⁸ He must go on as long as feasible checking this interpretation in the light of new evidence, always guarding against his personal bias. "At some point, finally, he must make up his mind and put in final form the interpretation that appears to him to accord with the weight of all the evidence he has been able to examine."⁵⁹

The process of synthesis is used when the historian, rather than dealing with interpretation of discrete episodes, is "treating the large and inclusive context of an event or when offering interpretations of broad scope."⁶⁰ In this case he is not writing after a painstaking treatment of a finite number of documents relating to a single event, but is selecting a small number of events from a myriad of happenings "to illustrate the play of historical forces as he sees and understands them."⁶¹ Though the selectivity of evidence is different from that employed in the analytic procedure, the intellectual skill required to produce the final product is much the same, "setting forth, in all its complexity and with all the necessary critical reservations, his [the historian's] own final conception of the inclusive historical development with which he has concerned himself."⁶²

Crucial in both processes are the "acts of judgment" which the historian performs in selecting, ordering, and assigning varying degrees of importance to the data upon which he relies for his interpretation.

What is called historical criticism or historical method is little else than the process of weighing and considering carried to a fairly high degree of refinement and subtlety.⁶³

The establishment of this quality of "good judgment as a recognized ingredient of sound and serious thinking" is one of the great contributions of the teaching of history in the secondary school.⁶⁴

We never learn from Professor Bestor precisely what this "act of judgment" is nor how it is performed. He explains with great firmness what it is *not*. It is not the process of quantifying one's data and determining a statistical mean of all the events and statements in a given space of time.⁶⁵ But what it *is* is

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 440.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 441.

⁶² *Ibid.* Richard Hofstadter has distinguished these two roles of the historian differently and more accurately, I think, as the difference between writing an historical monograph and a traditional historical narrative. Richard Hofstadter, "History and the Social Sciences," Stern, *op cit.*, pp. 359 ff.

⁶³ Bestor, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 452.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 441, 445-449. Professor Bestor's conception of the use of statistical verification is at best naive. No competent social scientist would ever argue that the most important generalization in a document could be discovered by counting the number of specific references to it in the document.

never more specifically described than the process of making up one's mind after "an endless series of acts of judgment."⁶⁶

Mr. Bestor has not analyzed the historian's craft with sufficient discrimination to isolate the various intellectual operations it encompasses. He has not carefully defined the methods used to authenticate data, conventionally referred to as internal and external criticism.⁶⁷ What is more important he has also failed to distinguish between the two parts of the method used by the historian as scientist in arriving at his explanations, that of *forming* hypotheses, and that of *validating* hypotheses. The former, involving primarily an *intuition*, is indeed an "act of judgment" that resists exact description. The latter, involving the determination of the amount and direction of relationship postulated in the hypothesis (Mr. Bestor's "process of weighing"), is a much more precise "act of judgment" to which it might pay historians to consider applying statistical methodology rather than ridiculing it by misapplication as Professor Bestor has done.⁶⁸

In any case, though the public school teacher may be willing to accept the claim that the intellectual processes which the historian uses in arriving at his construction of reality involve the use of critical judgment which can be applied to contemporary social issues, he will hardly be able to teach them to his students unless he knows what they are. If the professional historians, therefore, are anxious to have the oncoming generation apply the historical process to present-day problems, they would be well-advised to devote more thought to a lucid explanation of its exact nature.

Professor Billington's View

Even if we assume, however, that the critical processes of the historian can be adequately defined, the assumption that history is uniquely adequate to the solution of current issues raises three problems. All are evident in Professor Ray Allen Billington's essay on "American History" in a volume entitled *The Case for Basic Education*.⁶⁹

The first involves the method of approach to problems. Contemporary university historians frequently criticize the modern social studies curriculum because it falls prey to "the menace of excessive contemporaneity" in its attempt to equip students to deal with the problems of the world in which they live;⁷⁰ that is, the course of study overemphasizes the present and underemphasizes the past. The historical approach is more sound, to quote Professor Billington, because it adds the perspective of time and because today's prob-

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 442.

⁶⁷ Cf. for such a description Homer C. Hockett, *The Critical Method in Historical Research and Writing* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 13-62.

⁶⁸ Cf. footnote 65.

⁶⁹ Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-48.

⁷⁰ Bestor, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10.

lems "are deeply rooted in the . . . past [and] can be understood only against that background."⁷¹

There is in this argument, however, a potential contradiction. We may grant that adequate solutions to all contemporary problems require knowledge of their historical antecedents; nevertheless, if the *purpose* of our study of man and society is to help deal with *present-day* problems then pedagogically it would be most logical to start with present-day problems and not, as historical narratives do, at some professionally pre-determined point in the past. It is undoubtedly true that students cannot comprehend today's struggle over integration without some knowledge of the history of slavery in the United States, the sectional conflicts of the thirties, forties, and fifties, and the Civil War and reconstruction.⁷² But if the central intent is to understand the integration issue, and if one is committed also to the scientific method, it is proper to start not with the history of Negro slavery but with a definition of the problem of integration today. Having isolated the elements of the problem, one would then proceed to gather evidence—historical, sociological, economic, ethnological—whatever is necessary to the generation and validation of relevant hypotheses.

The second difficulty in using history to aid in the solution of contemporary problems concerns the nature of historical content. Again Professor Billington's essay may be of help to us. "History, after all," he tells us, "is an art as much as a science; writing it is an art, teaching it is an art. . . ."⁷³ The appreciation of history he sees as "directly comparable . . . to looking at a painting, listening to a symphony, or watching a play." It involves "aesthetic and emotional experience."⁷⁴

This is on the whole a helpful distinction. History has evolved as a discipline over a long period of time and thus the qualities which define it have the force of tradition. The historian is a scientist in so far as part of his task is to determine explanations of past reality which are validated by specific evidence; he is an artist in so far as part of his task is to present his explanations within the context of a "living, human, story."⁷⁵ Such a definition of history, however, raises a potential liability of its use in solving contemporary problems: its description of past reality is subject to distortion by the traditional requirement that the historian "humanize" his presentation. This is not to say that there is no difference between reality and perceived reality, or that the generalizations of other sciences—natural or social—are unaffected

⁷¹ Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

⁷⁵ The words are those of Paul Ward, former chairman of the Department of History at Carnegie Institute of Technology in his pamphlet *A Style of History for Beginners* (Washington, 1959), p. 15. The pamphlet was circulated to teachers of history by the American Historical Association's Service Center for Teachers of History.

by the "frame of reference" of the scientist who conceived them. It is to say that history as a traditional discipline, as well as facing the subjective limitations of any science, is peculiarly subject to "the tyranny of written models."⁷⁶ Professor Billington's essay furnishes an example. Having begun with the usual claim that history is valuable to secondary school students because it teaches them critical judgment and objectivity,⁷⁷ he summarizes in a later section a portion of the historical data necessary to understand one of the problems facing the United States today. (The italics in the passage are mine.)

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was designed to *seal off* the American continent from Europe's *aggressors*, but no mere declaration could *curb the spirit of aggression* on either side. Americans, convinced that their duty was the *democratization of the world*, continuously gave aid to European peoples *struggling against tyranny*, even at the risk of war; Europe's monarchs, as *fearful of democracy as today's free world is of communism*, *persisted in meddling* in hemisphere affairs as they had before. Then as now the *sense of mission* so strong on both sides of the Atlantic posed *explosive* problems: How far could the United States reconcile its desire to win self-government for all peoples with the limitations of its own strength and the horrors of war? How could it *shrewdly gauge* the future course of *antagonist* nations in determining its own line of action?⁷⁸

One problem in applying the criterion of objectivity to this passage is the gross generalizations it contains. It would be unfair not to recognize the difficulties which limitations of space have placed upon Professor Billington. But more significant for our present purposes is the emotive tone of the language which he uses to enliven his narrative. The italicized phrases do indeed make his description vivid, even exciting. But what about the objectivity with which the study of history is to equip the younger generation to face today's complex issues? If unbiased critical judgment is the primary objective, it seems impossible that construing these past problems as Mr. Billington does here can, in his own words, "guide today's statesmen and voters toward an honorable solution of their own."⁷⁹

Finally, any evaluation of the university historian's claim on the indispensability of history to the solving of contemporary problems must reckon with the question of the predictability value of history. If we claim that school children should be taught the record of the past chiefly as a *means* of solving current social problems, or at least a way of construing these problems so that they may be more easily solved, we mean that the problems are to be solved not at this instant, but in the future—tomorrow, next year, or, more logically,

⁷⁶ Thomas C. Cochran, "The 'Presidential Synthesis' in American History," *The American Historical Review*, LIII (July, 1948), 750.

⁷⁷ Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 31.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

ten years from now when today's adolescent becomes a voter. This being so, we must also concede that historical knowledge will not help to solve these problems unless it has predictability value. Unless we agree that there is enough consistency in human behavior so that, knowing the results of man's actions in regard to a myriad of past conditions (what happened and why), we are in a better position to know how he should act in the present and the future, then we have no need for history in dealing with contemporary issues. If knowledge of how Rooseveltian New Nationalism and Wilsonian New Freedom attempted to preserve the balance between liberty and authority in our society is of any use in maintaining this balance today (as Mr. Billington says it is),⁸⁰ then it is because there is enough commonality in the problem and in the humans facing it so that knowledge of past involvements with the issue will allow us to predict in some helpful way the probable consequences of future behavior toward it. Any value of history as the "memory of the race" rests ultimately on its utility in prediction.⁸¹

Yet the professional historians who extol the value of their discipline in preparing students to face contemporary issues often are unwilling to claim that historical content is of any use as a basis for prediction. Professor Billington, for example, ends his discussion of the desirability of students knowing about the past attempts to solve the liberty versus authority dilemma with the following sentence:

History has no final answers for these problems or any others, for mankind's behavior is both variable and unpredictable, but today's citizens will be able to act more intelligently in their decision-making if they are familiar with the lessons it can teach.⁸²

The sentence contains an obvious contradiction. Either history has at least limited predictability value and therefore some lessons to teach or it has no predictability value, in which case it is useless as a guide to appropriate action on contemporary problems.

In summary, if the professional historian in his attempt to win more curricular consideration for his discipline in the secondary school is going to place any substantial reliance on its utility as a means of equipping the oncoming generation to deal with social issues, then he must present a more convincing case than he has yet been able to. He must strive to describe his methodology more precisely and demonstrate how it can be directly applied to current problems. He must frankly analyze the nature of his content field in order to evaluate it objectively. Finally, he may have to be willing to use

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁸¹ Historians, among them Professor Hayes, often use this precise metaphor in defending the social utility of their specialty. Cf. Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁸² Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

his skill as a social scientist to predict what present problems are likely to remain crucial in the immediate future and center both his content and his methodology on their solution.

ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORIANS' CLAIMS: (3)

There remains a consideration of the third argument which is used to support the teaching of history in the public schools—that the study of the past, particularly of western culture, will increase the student's commitment to the basic values of our civilization. In the history of history as a school subject this has been its most frequently mentioned virtue. In the 19th century elementary school courses were largely devoted to this aim and they remain so in large part today. In defending its secondary school program the Committee of Seven considered the reaffirmation of militant virtue high on its list of criteria for citizenship education,⁸³ and the National Education Association's 1916 Commission on the Reorganization of the Social Studies assigned great importance to the creation of intelligent national loyalties.⁸⁴

The rationales of the contemporary historians have frequently reiterated these arguments. Professor Hayes maintains that "particularly our schools should teach and inculcate in American youth a knowledge and appreciation of Western Civilization as a whole."⁸⁵ Professor Billington in his defense of a more thorough teaching of American history has been even more specific:

By familiarizing us with past instances of heroism and past examples of wise leadership, history ennoble us, and quickens our faith in our heritage. By revealing the deficiencies of statesmen of former generations, it inclines us to be more tolerant toward the mistakes of today's leaders. By laying bare the record of man's slow struggle for liberty and security it convinces us of the inevitability of progress toward those goals, and innures us to the momentary setbacks caused by the rise of totalitarian systems. No one truly familiar with the history of the United States can adopt a defeatist attitude when facing the continuing crises of the Cold War, or surrender to doubt that democratic institutions will prevail. Only the study of history engenders such faith and assures such hope for the future.⁸⁶

The basic premise seems reasonable. Social cohesion is a requisite for the survival of any culture. Commitment of the masses of our people to at least the same central values is particularly necessary in a democracy which allows such tremendous diversity of value allegiance outside of the basic core. More-

⁸³ *Report of the Committee of Seven*, p. 19.

⁸⁴ *The Social Studies in Secondary Education*, pp. 9-10.

⁸⁵ Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁸⁶ Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

over, in our own age when our society is threatened by a powerful external enemy it is unusually crucial that the oncoming generation have strong loyalty to the ideals which undergird our civilization.

Nor can it be doubted that history is a potentially effective way to create such loyalty. There is anthropological evidence that tales of folk heroes are means of effecting social cohesion. History itself—particularly that of the nations against whom we fought in World War II—confirms the power of the skillfully constructed chronicle in generating a sense of national purpose. The Soviet Union is apparently making efficient use of history to inculcate faith in Russian and Marxian ideals.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, if we are to use history as a means of building allegiance to our cultural value system and simultaneously to employ it to teach critical judgment and to enable our children to deal objectively with contemporary problems, we face a difficulty which somehow must be reconciled. It can be illustrated strikingly by juxtaposing to Professor Billington's previously quoted statement (on the value of the study of the American past in quickening the student's faith in his national heritage) a declaration made earlier in the same essay on the subject of objectivity.

Through the study of the past they [the secondary school students] learn that human affairs can never be simple—that there are no pat heroes and villains, no "bads" and "goods," no simple cause and effect relationships, in human behavior. . . . If a student emerges from his schooling with an awareness of history's underlying complexity, he will realize that large issues of all sorts seldom have a "right" or "wrong" answer, but must be appraised objectively in historical perspective.⁸⁸

Mr. Billington's apparent contradiction can be explained only by realizing that the two uses to which he proposes to put history are in some sense antithetical. In the first instance he is arguing for value inculcation. The study of history will show students the inevitability of progress toward democratic institutions. Why? Because a critical examination of historical evidence indicates that democratic societies are longer-lived than totalitarian societies? Because a greater proportion of the world's peoples live under democratic institutions today than one hundred years ago? Because non-democratic regimes can only be maintained by military force? It would be possible to arrange a historical narrative to substantiate these contentions, but it would also be possible to construct one to cast doubt upon them. It seems likely therefore that Mr. Billington is arguing for the use of history to show the *desirability*

⁸⁷ George S. Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), pp. 94-103. For a provocative interpretation of the role of the school in transmitting cultural heritage, cf. Ruth Benedict, "Transmitting our Democratic Heritage in the Schools," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVIII (May, 1943), 722.

⁸⁸ Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

of democratic institutions, their *value*, not their *inevitability*. For if the history teacher desires to prove the value of democracy then he must select his data and write his generalizations with this end in mind. Though he may argue with logic for certain values, he cannot prove them by a scientific method because values are not scientifically provable.

Critical judgment, however, for which Professor Billington argues in the second instance, is a different matter. If by critical judgment is meant the scientific method, then it is crucial to realize that the only value accepted is the worth of the scientific procedure itself as a means of arriving at truth. Indeed, science begins in skepticism. No generalization is to be accepted unless the great preponderance of evidence clearly validates it (Mr. Billington's objectivity). Though in practice it is impossible, the ideal of the scientific method requires the scientist to select his data without reference to his personal value commitments.

For this reason the attempt to employ the same historical material to achieve the ends both of value commitment and of critical judgment creates a difficult curriculum problem. If history is to be used to promote faith in our unique heritage, our western political value system, then there are some generalizations which it is obviously pedagogically unsound to question. What Mr. Jefferson called "self-evident truths" had best be left self-evident. In fact the history teacher concerned chiefly with inculcating allegiance to these values could most efficiently achieve his goal by arranging his content in such a way as always to cast favorable light upon them: that is, the rationalization of certain values becomes the criterion for the careful selection of content, and the line between history and myth is blurred. If, on the other hand, the teacher is concerned about the use of historical content and method as an aid to teaching critical judgment, he must continually encourage skepticism. No truth should be accepted as self-evident, and Mr. Jefferson's whole philosophy should be subjected to a rigorous proof process.

A familiar content example may make the dilemma clear. How does the public school history teacher deal with Abraham Lincoln? Does he portray him as the exemplar of democratic humanism; the railsplitter and scrupulously fair backwoods lawyer; the humanitarian in the White House singularly dedicated to the rule of law; the Great Emancipator centrally concerned with human equality? Or does the teacher present Lincoln in Richard Hofstadter's terms as the "self-made myth": the shrewd man who deliberately built a public image of himself; the expedient candidate who in his quest for votes told a southern audience that the white race should be socially and politically superior to the negro; the chief executive who violated the lawful decisions of the Supreme Court and reluctantly freed the slaves more as a matter of military expedience than of moral rectitude?⁸⁹ Or does the teacher

⁸⁹ Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York: Knopf, 1948), pp. 92 ff.

support neither interpretation, but merely raise the question what kind of man was Abraham Lincoln, introduce evidence on both sides, the speech on white superiority as well as the Gettysburg Address, *ex parte* Merryman as well as the Second Inaugural, and then say to the student, "make up your own mind, either way, but just be sure you use critical judgment."

There are ways of coping with this dilemma, but they are not without pedagogical difficulties. It is possible to use certain selected texts for value inculcation and confine critical judgment to different content or to plot one's teaching so that certain generalizations like the progress of democracy are not open to criticism. Either process, however, would seem to violate the canons of scientific methodology. One may also follow what I take to be the presently favored procedure in the public schools, separate the two objectives by covering the material at two different times in the child's school career. Thus the current elementary school courses in American history are used to inculcate values, and critical analysis is reserved for high school or more often college. But there is considerable doubt that many high school courses can be expected to teach students to apply critical judgment to a significant number of historical generalizations, partly because of lack of availability of data with which to make such judgments and partly because of the insistence of pressure groups that certain viewpoints be maintained. Even if it were possible to convince a publisher, one can imagine the opposition of major patriotic organizations to allowing a textbook to raise the open-ended question, was Lincoln a great humanitarian or a self-made myth?

Nevertheless, the potential conflict between using history for critical judgment and history for imbuing loyalty to our cultural values is an issue to which some kind of resolution must be made if the teaching of social studies in the public school is to be substantially improved. It is thus an issue which the professional historian should not merely perpetuate by arguing at a high level of generality for both objectives simultaneously, but one to whose resolution he should turn his intellectual talent and effort.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

What then can finally be said of the recent attempts of university historians to emulate their predecessors on the Committee of Seven and exert a salutary influence on the secondary school curriculum? If the essays reviewed in this critique are a valid sampling of professional opinion, they would seem to indicate the need for some specific words of caution.

First, if the contemporary historian is sincere in his desire to win for history a more careful and widespread treatment than it now receives in the curriculum, he should think and write more carefully about both its nature and its social utility. It is commendable, even essential, that scholars be deeply committed to their subject and desire others to share their enthusiasm. But

scholars must beware that their ardor does not lead them to make loose claims for their specialty that do not stand the test of rational analysis. It is convincing for historians to proclaim that they are committed to history as are thousands of their fellow-men, that theirs is a discipline universally taught in colleges and one which millions of educated people have valued. But they risk doing their discipline a disservice if they rest their case on shallow generalizations: that no one who is unfamiliar with all major world developments since 4000 B.C. can be a competent citizen; or that a study of the past is uniquely and simultaneously able to produce lifelong commitment to certain values and consistent use of the skill of critical judgment.

Secondly, if university historians expect their thoughts on curriculum to elicit from those responsible for the secondary school the careful consideration they deserve, they must be willing to consider their subject within the context of the complicated curriculum problems facing the public educator today. They must be aware, for example, that in an increasingly complex culture, the public schools are being asked to pass on ever enlarging numbers of knowledges and skills which the community deems vital but which the other educational institutions are incompetent to teach; that the amount of knowledge it is possible to teach to young people is accruing with amazing rapidity; and that history is not the only branch of learning demanding more curricular attention.

Finally, if his suggestions are to be helpful to the social studies teacher, the university historian must seek to understand more accurately how the role of the secondary school teacher differs from his own. He must realize that a public school teacher is a public employee maintained in his position by all the people of the community to educate all of their children. This raises the familiar curriculum difficulty of having to teach students of varying abilities and interests—those who study because they *want* to, as well as those who attend class because they *have* to.⁸⁰ Equally important, the teacher's role as a *public* servant means that he is obligated to consider primarily the social utility of his subject. In the secondary school as in the college it is of vital pedagogical importance that the instructor be well-trained in his content field and personally committed to it. But for the public school teacher commitment and competence are not enough. He must also ask himself: what, in terms of society's goals, justifies my teaching this that I love?

It is this issue of the social utility of his discipline which is so difficult for the university scholar. It puts him in the uncomfortable and unusual position of trying to rationalize a branch of learning in terms of a higher goal. At the university the professor's position may be justified by his increasing the amount of knowledge in his field. But if he is to write about the public school curriculum he must push a step further. He cannot argue any knowledge,

⁸⁰ Arthur Bestor has analyzed this problem in considerable detail. Bestor, *op. cit.*, Chapters 19 to 21.

any discipline for its sake alone. He must join his secondary school colleague in coming to grips with the gnawing question: why *this* knowledge and *this* discipline?

It is a query he must approach with great caution, for the wrong kind of answer may nullify his contribution to the secondary school. On the one hand, he must find a response that is both specific and genuine. He must resist the temptation to utter generalizations so broad as to be meaningless. He must avoid the sham of disguising his personal commitment to history beneath a cloak of social platitudes. At the same time, he must guard the integrity of his discipline by not placing it in the service of some other end, thus depriving it of its effectiveness.

There is another crucial dimension which the university historian should recognize as distinguishing the secondary school teacher's role from his own, and that is the public school instructor's total involvement in the classroom. The high school history teacher cannot be an historian because he does not have time to be.⁹¹ In the great majority of cases he must face a class five or six periods a day, five days per week—a total of thirty clock hours of teaching each five days. Added to this are the supervisory requirements in relation to extra-curricular activities and the time necessary to read whatever he requires his students to write. My own experience as a public school teacher convinced me that superior high school social studies teachers spend around fifty hours per week merely staying abreast of their teaching duties, and the majority of this time is used in energy-sapping direct personal contact with adolescents.

There remains neither time nor strength for creative scholarship. Consequently there is an inevitable tendency to become further and further removed not only from new knowledge being unearthed within the subject-field but also from the intellectual process which distinguishes the discipline. The natural result is for the teaching to become largely the communication of historical generalizations—either those learned in the teacher's collegiate training, or those found in the textbook, or a combination thereof. Thus, to a great extent the conditions which dominate the American public secondary school make the achievement of any substantial intellectual objectives difficult if not impossible.

It is for this reason that the active interest of the university historians is desirable, perhaps even vital, to improvement of secondary school social studies curriculum. But if it is to be effective, it must be carefully and thoughtfully applied. The situation is far too complex to be altered by chauvinistic essays which merely repeat the ideas of the Committee of Seven. At minimum what is needed is a sympathetic understanding of the limitations which the public school environment places on the teacher and whatever influence the prestige of the university may exert to lessen them. More specifically the

⁹¹ Professor Brown's visits to forty high schools apparently made him aware of this limitation. Cf. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

professional historian can be of service by producing realistic answers to the central curriculum problems: what historical content is it important for the oncoming generation to know and at the same time possible to teach them in the limited time available in the secondary school; what exactly is the historical process, should it be taught to adolescents, and if so, how; what means can be used to reconcile the conflict between history as value inculcation and the desired objectivity of social science?

Nothing short of the careful attention of the best historical scholarship is likely to have much influence.

History in Soviet Education Since 1958

In the reorganized Soviet education system the history curriculum is especially prominent, being regarded as the principal means of inculcating the values of the regime. Yet it is likely that the proper study of history will wither under the ideological pressure of the new school reforms. This is one of the author's conclusions after his examination of the new curriculum in its context of educational, political, and economic change.

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I

AS A CENTRAL COMPONENT of the curriculum of Soviet schools, history has been affected in significant ways by Khrushchev's reorganization of the Soviet educational system. The reorganization, as it is well known, was initiated by Khrushchev's theses "On strengthening the relationship of the school with life and the further development of the system of public education in the country" of November 12, 1958, and by the subsequent Supreme Soviet law of December 24, 1958.¹ The new party program has reaffirmed the objectives of the reorganization by calling for an education "closely bound up with life

¹ Texts in M. S. Zenow, (ed.), *Dokumenty i materialy po perestroike shkoly* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe uchebno-pedagogicheskoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Prosveshcheniia RSFSR, 1960), pp. 53-102; translations of the theses in George S. Counts, *Khrushchev and the Central Committee Speak on Education* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959) and of the law in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter CDSP), XI, No. 4 (March 4, 1959), pp. 12-16. Each union republic enacted an appropriate law. To apply the RSFSR law, extensive regulations were issued on December 29, 1959 (text in *Narodnoe Obrazovanie*, No. 3, 1960, supplement). Initiation of the reforms was intimated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress; preparatory work had been done since 1957 in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR, the principal Soviet agency concerned with methodological, administrative, and curricular problems.

and productive labor" and for "polytechnical training in accordance with the rising level of science and engineering" in order to prepare the young generations for the new technological age and to solve "a cardinal social problem, namely, the elimination of substantial distinctions between mental and physical labor."²

At present the educational reform at the secondary level is transforming the ten-year school into an eleven-year program with two phases (grades 1-8 and 9-11) and an overall emphasis upon psychological and practical preparation of the pupils for work, replacement of "bookishness" with skills, and inculcation of a healthy respect for physical labor to minimize the gulf between mental and manual workers which worries the Soviet leadership. The conversion is allowed to take a good deal of time: its completion is expected in 1963 and the local schools are given until 1965 to provide the workshops and facilities needed for polytechnical training. One major reason for the rather slow pace is the fact that the content of education is being substantially altered.³

The history curriculum of the previous ten-year school was built in the 1930's on the assumptions that the ten-year education was in the offing for most if not all Soviet children, that it was an academically-oriented "mastery of knowledge" school, and that the students would complete a "linear" sequence of history courses from the fifth grade to the tenth. Thus, passing through an interest-stimulating episodic course in USSR history in the fourth grade, the pupils went through ancient history in the fifth and the first half of the sixth grade (99 hours), medieval history in the second half of the sixth grade and the entire seventh grade (also 99 hours), systematically presented USSR history from the earliest times to the present (including local republic history) in the eighth, ninth, and tenth grade (255 hours), and modern history since the French Revolution⁴ in the same three grades (164 hours). In addition, a history-related course in the Soviet constitution was

² Translation of the draft in *The New York Times*, August 1, 1961. The program was adopted by the Twenty-second Congress on October 31, 1961.

³ E. I. Monoszon, "Soderzhanie obrazovaniia v vos'miletnei shkole," *Sovetskaiia Pedagogika*, No. 6, 1960, p. 15. On the reforms in general see William K. Medlin, "Soviet Educational Reorganizations for 1959-1963," in *Soviet Commitment to Education: Report of the First Official U. S. Education Mission to the USSR* (U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bulletin 1959, No. 16), pp. 126-35; George Z. F. Bereday, William W. Brickman, and Gerald H. Read (eds.), *The Changing Soviet School: The Comparative Education Society Field Study in the USSR* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960); R. Schlesinger, "The Educational Reform," *Soviet Studies*, X, No. 4 (April, 1959), pp. 432-44; Oskar Anweiler, "Die Reform des sowjetischen Bildungswesens," *Osteuropa*, IX, Nos. 2-3 (February-March, 1959), pp. 128-43, and "Neue Wege des Geschichtsunterrichts in der Sowjetunion," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, XI, No. 11 (November, 1960), pp. 681-92; N. S. Timasheff, "Lomka sovetskoi shkoly," *Novyi Zhurnal* (New York), Vol. 62 (1960), pp. 217-27; and Effie Ambler, "The Soviet Boarding School," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XX, No. 2 (April, 1961), pp. 240-52.

⁴ It was Stalin who imposed the French Revolution as the watershed between the feudal and the capitalist periods and the starting point for modern history. Cf. *Pravda*, January 27, 1936.

taught in the tenth grade (introduced in 1937 and taught in the seventh grade until 1955 but found too difficult for children of that age).

Although it was propagandized as bringing secondary education to the masses, the ten-year school was an experience reserved in practice for only a portion of the Soviet youth. For many education ended with the seventh grade.⁵ The result was that a very large number of young Soviet citizens, on whose loyalty and enthusiasm the regime counted, had only a vague idea of their country's history acquired from the episodes taught in the fourth grade.⁶ One of the main features of the current changes in the history curriculum is the attempt to remedy this weakness. The new approach is not based on the assumption that complete secondary education would soon be the universal experience, and the new party program itself indicates that such education would not be available until the 1970's. Proceeding on the more realistic premise that for many Soviet youngsters education will still be ending early, the Soviet reformers frankly speak of two stages—the first eight grades as Stage One and the final three grades as Stage Two—and regard only the first stage as the education compulsory for every child in the country. By adding an extra year to the so-called "incomplete secondary education" (the grades exclusive of the last three), the new approach makes it possible to provide a basic education that has in its history curriculum a measure of both completeness and unity.⁷

II

The structuring of the history curriculum for the two stages of the new eleven-year school has received greater attention and wider discussion than that of any other subject taught. The fact that history and history-related courses are the principal tool for embedding regime values and the communist world view at the secondary level of education makes this understandable. Khrushchev himself set the tone when, speaking before the Twenty-First Congress in January 1959, he called for a solid grounding in history for the young generation: "Our younger generation has not gone through the great school of life and struggle that fell to the lot of the older generation. Young people do not know the horrors and hardships of prerevolutionary times, and

⁵ In 1959, there were 28,955,000 pupils enrolled in grades 1 to 7 and only 4,285,000 in the final three grades. In other figures, there were 35,386,000 citizens educated to the seventh grade and 23,322,000 above it. *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSR v 1959 godu* (Moscow Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1960), pp. 21, 727. Universal compulsory education to the seventh grade was decreed in 1949. From 1930 to 1949 the statutory requirement was the first four grades.

⁶ N. A. Nikolaev, "O postanovske istoricheskogo obrazovaniia v srednei shcole," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 5, 1959, p. 209.

⁷ *Uchitel'skaia Gazeta*, January 22, 1959. The time is to be distributed as follows: humanities, including history, 39.5 per cent; natural sciences, 32.5 per cent; labor, 15.3 per cent; physical education, 6.5 per cent; arts, 6.2 per cent (Monoszon, *op. cit.*, p. 18). The official position is that an unspecified proportion of the eight-year school graduates will continue their education in evening and correspondence programs without interrupting their employment. These programs are to become the main link in the system of secondary education.

only from books can they obtain an idea of the exploitation of the toilers. It is therefore quite important for our young generation to know the history of the country, of the working people's struggle for their liberation, the heroic history of the Communist Party; it is quite important to raise this generation on the revolutionary traditions of our party, our working class."⁸

The main source of controversy in the discussions of the new history curriculum was the question of the place and time to be allocated to USSR history. To start the discussions, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences circulated two alternative draft plans for the history curriculum of the eleven-year school. The first eliminated ancient and medieval history altogether and proposed that USSR history be taught from the fifth grade to the tenth. Speaking for this approach, Professor T. Shabalin argued that "the main thing" was to teach national history as the pivot of the entire program and that USSR history "gives the students rich material to explain the basic characteristics of all social formations through which mankind passes in its evolution."⁹ These views were opposed by leading professors and teachers who came out in favor of the second plan envisaging 70 hours for ancient history in the fifth grade and an equal amount of time for medieval history in the sixth. Specialists in these two fields even protested the thirty per cent reduction in time in the second plan as bringing about the "liquidation" of this knowledge in secondary education,¹⁰ but the Academy endorsed it with the reasoning that the exposure to ancient and medieval history, reduced as it must be, was "essential for providing the pupils with a correct understanding of the history of the evolution of society and for raising the young people's general cultural level." The pattern of history instruction in the eight-year general school would thus begin with an entertaining set of stories from USSR history, move through abridged courses in ancient and medieval history, and end with "an elementary course in USSR history together with essential facts from modern and contemporary history of foreign countries in a form accessible to adolescents" and designed to "provide graduates of the eight-year schools with a certain degree of completeness of historical knowledge and a better understanding of our country's role in world history and of contemporary historical events."¹¹

The public discussions having taken enough time, on October 8, 1959, the

⁸ CDSP, XI, No. 3 (February 25, 1959), p. 9.

⁹ *Uchitel'skaia Gazeta*, March 14, 1959.

¹⁰ E. g., academician V. V. Struve, *ibid.*, October 8, 1959. See also A. M. Sinitsin, "O strukture i soderzhanie istoricheskogo obrazovaniia v srednei shkole," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 8, 1959, pp. 193-200. For the various views expressed in the discussions see R. S., "The New Secondary School History Curriculum," *Soviet Studies*, XI, No. 3 (January, 1960), pp. 341-48.

¹¹ Quotations drawn from the academy statement "On the teaching of history in the schools," September 16, 1959, in CDSP, XI, No. 37 (October 14, 1959), pp. 14-15. See also N. K. Goncharov and F. F. Korolev, (eds.), *Novaia sistema narodnogo obrazovaniia v SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov i statei* (Moscow: Akademiia pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR, 1960), pp. 280-82.

Central Committee and the Council of Ministers issued the customary joint decree entitled "On certain changes in the teaching of history in the schools."¹² Not since 1934 had such an edict been issued. On May 16 of that year Stalin decreed that the existing history textbooks and instruction had become barren, abstract, and schematic and that "instead of teaching civic history in a lively and engaging way with statement of the most important events and facts in their chronological sequence and with characterizations of historical personalities, the students are given abstract definitions of socio-economic formations, thus replacing the well-connected presentation of civic history with abstract sociological schemes." To remedy the situation, he ordered the introduction of quite conventional history of facts, personalities, and dates; in the words of the decree, "The decisive condition for enduring mastery of a history course by students is the observance of historical and chronological sequence in the statement of historical events, with strict implantation in the students' memory of the important historical events, historical personalities, and chronological dates."¹³

Without explicitly mentioning Mikhail N. Pokrovsky, the boss of Soviet historiography from 1918 to his death in 1932, the decree aimed at liquidating him posthumously and putting an end to his influence. Pokrovsky and his disciples had used a broad sociological approach emphasizing impersonal forces, stating the past in abstract schemes, molding the historical account to suit the requirements of current politics (or, as Pokrovsky liked to put it, "history is politics retrojected into the past"), and deprecating the Russian national past, achievements, and heroes. Unlike Lenin who had endorsed Pokrovsky, Stalin found this type of history unsuited to his purposes of rousing Russian patriotism and creating a hero-worship atmosphere for his own glorification. In subsequent documents published in 1936 Stalin specifically condemned Pokrovsky for "erroneous historical views" and "injurious tendencies and attempts to liquidate history as a science."¹⁴

Compared with the 1934 decree, that of 1959 steers a middle course between Pokrovsky's sociological schematicism and Stalin's stress on the great man. History in the secondary schools must produce in the students "a scientific understanding of the laws of the history of evolution of society, form in the students a conviction of the inevitability of the perdition of capitalism and the victory of communism, and consistently disclose the role of the popular masses as the real makers of history and creators of material and spiritual values as well as the role of the individual in history." It is, furthermore, "of particular importance at the present time" to foster "the study of the problems of the contemporary stage of communist construction

¹² Text in *Dokumenty i materialy po perestroike shkoly*, pp. 166-68.

¹³ Text in *Istoriik-Marksist*, Vol. 37 (1934), pp. 83-84.

¹⁴ "On the front of historical science," statement by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee, January 27, 1936, in N. I. Boldyrev (ed.), *Sbornik rukovodiashchikh materialov o shkole* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Pedagogicheskikh Nauk RSFSR, 1952), pp. 82-89.

and the elucidation of the role of the Communist Party as the leading, directing, and guiding force of Soviet society" and, through history and other general education subjects, "to rear the youth in the spirit of communist dedication to ideas and morality, intolerance toward bourgeois ideology, socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, and deep respect for labor." The decree, in the interpretations of Soviet historians, calls for "increase in the role of history in the formation of the dialectical-materialistic world view" and making the "content of the history instruction subordinate to the fundamental task of profound disclosure of the laws of social development and demonstration of the inexorable movement of society toward communism."¹⁵

III

Under the new curriculum which the decree enacted there are two "concentric" patterns for the two stages (grades 4-8 and 9-11), differentiated by elementary treatment of the subject matter in the first stage and systematic development in the second and tied together by continuity and dependence of the second upon the first. The first stage pattern provides a set of stories from USSR history in the fourth grade (about 70 hours, treated more lightly than before in recognition of the cognitive ability of fourth-graders), elementary ancient history in the fifth grade (70 hours),¹⁶ elementary medieval history in the sixth grade (70 hours), and elementary USSR history in the seventh and eighth grades (110 hours), supplemented by "the most important data on the social and governmental structure of the Soviet Union" (20 hours) and by "data on the modern and contemporary history of foreign countries" (50 hours).

The second stage pattern provides a systematic course in USSR history (170 hours) and a parallel systematic course in the modern and contemporary history of foreign countries (160 hours), both taught in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh grades. The USSR history course will set aside only 30 hours for the period to 1700 and will focus the effort on the 19th and 20th centuries, and the decisions of the Twenty-First Congress in particular.¹⁷ The course in

¹⁵ A. T. Kinkul'kin and I. Ia. Lerner, "Novyi etap v razvitii shkol'nogo istoricheskogo obrazovaniia," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 7, 1961, pp. 6-20. As to the place of facts, the prevailing view is that, "The history instruction must contain a system of facts sufficient to assure relating them to one another, establishing the changes that have occurred, disclosing the cause-effect connections between phenomena, comparing phenomena, and the like. Only with a system of facts it is possible to lead the pupils to the understanding of the causal predetermination of historical events. Without it instruction would break down into separate poorly interconnected pictures of the past and would not be able to create in the pupils a sense of the historical process and its laws." *Novaia sistema*, p. 289.

¹⁶ Actually 72 hours, or 2 hours per week for 36 weeks. Details of course organization in A. I. Kairov *et al.* (eds.), *Pedagogicheskii slovar'* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Pedagogicheskikh Nauk RSFSR, 1960), Vol. I, pp. 466-67, 470-72. See also A. T. Kinkul'kin, "Sovershenstvovat' istoricheskoe obrazovanie v shkole," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 2, 1960, pp. 22-33; *Prepodavanie Istorii v Shkole*, No. 6, 1959, p. 48; No. 4, 1960, pp. 59-66.

¹⁷ Details of course organization in *Pedagogicheskii slovar'*, Vol. I, pp. 472-76. USSR history to 1936 and modern history to 1939 will be studied in the ninth and tenth grades.

modern history will begin more realistically than before with the English revolution of the 1640's and will deal extensively with China, India, and the Arab countries in order to make understandable current Soviet relations with these areas and to check the existing Europocentrism. In addition, a course in the Soviet constitution with data on civil, criminal, labor, collective farm, and other law as well as on the constitution of the local union republic is to be taught in the eleventh grade (70 hours). Provision is also made to teach local union republic history, either as an independent course or as part of the USSR history course, in accordance with the so-called principle of local area study (*kraevedenie*) under which instruction is to relate as much as possible to subjects pertaining to the local environment.¹⁸ The programs for such courses are to be worked out by the individual republics.

Basic reorganization of curriculum requires new textbooks in any case, if the rearrangement of data and shift of emphasis are to be effectively communicated to the students. The transition to new history textbooks which the curriculum changes necessitate is, however, further complicated by the radical alterations in data and interpretations of the Soviet period which the denunciations of Stalin have rendered imperative. Existing history textbooks, commissioned by Stalin's decree of 1934 and for the most part prepared in the late 1930's and early 1940's, have been not only stilted in language, methodologically backward, or obsolete in scholarship, as Soviet historians have pointed out for some time, but are now out of line with the historical truth the party currently endorses.¹⁹ In view of the canonical function Soviet education assigns to the textbook, the period of transition to the new truth statements is bound to be especially difficult for both teachers and students.

Under the provisions of the 1959 decree, further detailed by a decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers of February 23, 1960, the RSFSR Ministry of Education is conducting an open competition for the preparation of new textbooks for all courses. The deadline for submission to the Ministry's jury of manuscripts for grades 4-8 was October 1, 1960 (later extended to March 1, 1961) so as to publish the winners by June 1, 1961; those for grades 9-11 were to be submitted by June 1, 1961, so as to publish them by June 1, 1962.²⁰ The

contemporary history since those years in the eleventh. The overall emphasis is on study of recent history in line with the official dictum that "the closer to us in time the period, the more extensively it should be studied." *Novaia sistema*, p. 281.

¹⁸ *Uchitel'skaia Gazeta*, January 7, 1960.

¹⁹ For an analysis and evaluation of the old textbooks see *Teaching in the Social Sciences and the Humanities in the USSR* (U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, 1959), pp. 1-29.

²⁰ "O konkurse na luchshie uchebniki istorii dlia shkol," *Prepodavanie Istorii v Shkole*, No. 3, 1960, pp. 52-53. The 9-11 grade USSR history textbook is to be published in two parts (to 1917, and since 1917); that for modern history, in three (1640-1870, 1870-1918, 1918-). They are to be issued in limited trial editions so as to make possible revisions and emendations. Local republic history textbooks were also to be published by June 1, 1961, but in at least one republic a great delay is occurring; the deadline for submitting manuscripts for the Turkmen SSR history textbook is now February 10, 1962. *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 7, 1961, p. 182.

terms of the competition provide that "the textbooks must be written in conformity with the contemporary requirements of historical and pedagogical sciences, in a graphic and persuasive manner, and in a language accessible to the pupils. They must aid the rearing of the youth in the spirit of dedication to communist ideas and morality, intolerance to bourgeois ideology, socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, and deep respect for labor, and must further aid the preparation of the pupils for active public life. The textbooks must conform to the draft programs for history prepared by the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR."²¹ The new textbooks were originally promised for 1962-63 (grades 4-8) and 1963-64 (grades 9-11) at the latest, but signs of delays were evident even before the Twenty-Second Congress.²² The eviction of Stalin from Lenin's tomb and Soviet geography foreshadows his complete eviction from the pages of Soviet history books and a massive job of rewriting which may make it impossible to meet the announced deadlines. While Soviet youngsters have been taught ever since the Twentieth Congress that Stalin was "excessively rude, showing his intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power" (a condemnation first voiced by Lenin in 1922) and that his actions led to "the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality,"²³ a large amount of credit continued to be given to him for a number of "correct" positions in domestic and foreign policy. The denunciations at the Twenty-Second Congress and Khrushchev's intention to erect a monument to Stalin's victims suggest that even such remnants of recognition are to be withdrawn and that the history of the Soviet period is to be thoroughly recast.

The emphasis on political and ideological indoctrination in the new programs found further expression in the Central Committee decree "On the tasks of party propaganda in present-day conditions" of January 9, 1960, which called, among other things, for the introduction of a "popular course on the fundamentals of political knowledge in the senior grades of the secondary schools and of specialized secondary educational institutions in the 1961-1962 school year."²⁴ The course was intended to present to eleventh grade

²¹ Announcement in *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 4, 1960, pp. 221-22. Methodological requirements for the new textbook follow rather conventional criteria. Cf. F. P. Korovkin, "O metodicheskikh trebovaniia k novomu shkol'nomu uchebniku istorii," *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, No. 12, 1960, pp. 60-69.

²² *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 7, 1961, p. 15. The only new textbook issued is Part I of the history of the USSR for the seventh grade (with data on the modern history of foreign countries) by M. V. Nechkina and A. V. Fadeev, *Istoriia SSSR so svedeniami po novoi istorii zarubezhnykh stran* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe uchebno-pedagogicheskoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Prosveshcheniia RSFSR, 1961). For all other grades the old textbooks are still being used in reprintings.

²³ George Z. F. Bereday, "Education: Organization and Values since 1917," in Cyril E. Black (ed.), *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 369, note 47.

²⁴ Translation in *CDSP*, XII, No. 2 (February 10, 1960), pp. 17-23. See also V. I. Mazurenko, "O soderzhanie populiarnogo kursa 'Osnovy Politicheskikh Znani' v srednei shkole,'" *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, No. 5, 1960, pp. 128-33.

students the essentials of Marxism-Leninism, characteristics of the socialist society, transition to communism, and the makings of the new Soviet man fitting the requirements of communist society. The time for the course was planned to come from that for USSR history (2 hours per week) and Soviet constitution and law (also 2 hours per week). Experimental work was conducted in a number of schools in 1959-60 and 1960-61 and an open competition for preparation of a textbook was announced, with April 15, 1961, as deadline for presentation of manuscripts. Arrangements were also announced for 15-day courses in July and August 1961, to train the teachers assigned to handle the course; a prior 10-day seminar, scheduled for May 15-25, 1961, in Moscow was to prepare the instructors for the 15-day courses.²⁵ Rather abruptly, on April 4, 1961, the arrangements were called off until 1962.²⁶

Due to the fact that the majority of the eight-year school students are expected after graduation to go into full-time employment, the authorities are pressing the expansion of evening and correspondence programs which are to provide the avenue to further education for the working masses. However, education in these programs is, by the frank admission of the authorities, a watered-down version of the day programs; for example, the hours set aside for USSR history in grades 9-11 are 105 and those for modern history, 93, as compared with 170 and 160 in the regular day programs.²⁷ The evening and correspondence programs will also have their own, considerably abridged, history textbooks.²⁸

As to the overall tone in history instruction, it has been repeatedly stressed that "the study of the historical past is not an end in itself. The teaching of history and other subjects of general education is called upon to make certain that the school youth is brought up in the spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and is prepared for immediate participation in the building of the communist society. In the study of USSR history as well as contemporary history of foreign countries, it is very important that parallels are constantly used, showing in graphic and persuasive examples to the youngsters the superiority of our socialist system over the capitalist system and thereby inculcating in the students a conviction that the doom of capitalism and the victory of communism are inevitable."²⁹

²⁵ Text of the 84-hour program for the 15-day course in *Prepodavanie Istorii v Shkole*, No. 2, 1961, pp. 65-66. Terms of the textbook competition in *Narodnoe Obrazovanie*, No. 6, 1960, pp. 123-24.

²⁶ *Uchitel'skaia Gazeta*, April 4, 1961. Instead, the course in Soviet constitution and law will be taught as previously planned. With the introduction of the new course in 1962-63, Soviet constitution and law will no longer be taught as an independent subject. *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 7, 1961, p. 10, note 9.

²⁷ The entire evening history curriculum is in *Prepodavanie Istorii v Shkole*, No. 1, 1961, pp. 4-11.

²⁸ Terms of the textbook competition, *ibid.*, No. 1, 1961, pp. 12-13. The deadline for submitting manuscripts was September 1, 1961, for publication by August 1, 1962.

²⁹ Editorial on the tasks faced in 1960-61, *ibid.*, No. 4, 1960, pp. 8-9.

IV

In higher education, history is also undergoing a transformation. In varying degrees history is part of the training of all students, whether nonhistory majors, history majors aiming at secondary school teaching careers, or students aiming at careers as history scholars (professors and research workers).³⁰ Furthermore, history instruction for students aiming at teaching the various grades of the schools also varies. In the past, the training of teachers for grades 1-7 was done in pedagogical schools and teachers' institutes where the academic preparation was rather meager, while teachers for the upper grades were trained in the so-called pedagogical institutes and, to a lesser extent, in the various faculties of the universities under a five-year pattern of studies based on tenth-grade education and allowing for considerable specialization.³¹ Recently, however, Khrushchev and other spokesmen have voiced the demand that "in the very near future only persons with higher education should be admitted to teaching in the eight-year and complete secondary schools." To ensure this, the pedagogical institutes have been required to establish separate departments for the training of 1-8 grade teachers under a four-year pattern of studies, while the training of 9-11 grade teachers is to follow the established five-year pattern.³² The programs have three main groups of subjects: socio-economic (or subjects of theoretical and political indoctrination), specialty (history subjects, in the case of future history teachers), and pedagogical; the time allocation for the three groups of subjects varies so as to observe what Soviet educators call the "law of pedagogy," namely, that the younger the pupils, the more methods training the teacher should have. The history instruction in the four-year program for 1-8 grade teachers involves 150 hours of party history, 90 hours of political economy, 140 hours of dialectical and historical materialism, 24 hours of fundamentals of atheism, and 34 hours of methods of teaching history.³³

In the five-year pattern of studies for history majors, four new courses have been added to those already required: history of culture, historiography of

³⁰ *Administration of Teaching in Social Sciences in the USSR: Syllabi for Three Required Courses* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, 1960). All students regardless of major are required to take party history (224 hours), political economy (300 hours), and dialectical and historical materialism (140 hours). History and other social sciences instruction in Soviet higher education before the reforms is described by Soviet authors in "Teaching of the Social Sciences in the Higher Educational Establishments of the USSR," *UNESCO International Social Science Journal*, XI, No. 2 (1959), pp. 151-217.

³¹ E. N. Medynskii, *Prosveshchenie v SSSR* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe uchebno-pedagogicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1955), pp. 177-85.

³² A. T. Kinkul'kin, "Za novyi pod'em istoricheskogo obrazovaniia v Sovetskoj shcole," *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, No. 1, 1960, pp. 24-34. Graduation from the five-year program has long been a requirement for teaching in the upper grades. There have been complaints that the new four-year programs are not producing the number of teachers needed. *Narodnoe Obrazovanie*, No. 12, 1960, p. 2.

³³ *Narodnoe Obrazovanie*, No. 5, 1961, p. 22. The four-year teacher training program has been handicapped by lack of appropriate textbooks.

as self-policing in behavior and needs, the transition to communism is deemed impossible.⁴¹

In historic function the Khrushchev reforms compare with the Stalin reforms of the 1930's which they are intended to supersede. Just as the initiation of the Five-Year Plans to move the country into the phase of socialism required basic educational changes (to eliminate the revolutionary aberrations of the "activity" school, theories of the "withering away of the school," and slogans like "Down with the textbook") and establish a new "mastery of knowledge" education, the present projections to move into the phase of communism require an education that can prepare the young generations for the new age. However, it is fully recognized that moving into the phase of communism demands individuals who not only can handle the technology of the incipient age of automation, chemistry, atomic energy, and space exploration, but who possess new moral and social characteristics and that something in the order of a character breakthrough to convert selfishness into selflessness (or "high collectivism," as Soviet educators prefer to put it) is to come from the educational system. Soviet political leaders, and under them the educators, are committed to the propositions that human nature can be changed in its essence and that physical labor has high educative value in this respect, and believe that the goals of character reformation can be reached.⁴² Whether the goals are realistic or not, the human material with which they are to be pursued is, as recorded in the Soviet press, much less than near-paragons of selflessness and "just as subject to the pull of self-interest, to laziness and to the desire for easy, sometimes illicit, gain" as people in other lands.⁴³ Moreover, the production of practically trained, non-speculative individuals for immediate industrial, agricultural, or military tasks will further reduce the number of those in monopoly of mental activity in Soviet society and tend to widen the gulf between elite and masses.

Within this political, economic, and educational context, history is to have the leading role among the social sciences in inculcating the materialistic outlook, the "communist strength of conviction," and the overriding historical lesson that "the doom of capitalism and the victory of communism are

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 47, 159-60.

⁴² Specifically, manual work is to take 2 hours per week in grades 1 to 4 (plus 2 hours per week of "socially useful labor" on school grounds in grades 3 and 4), 3 hours in grades 5 to 8 (plus 2 hours of socially useful labor, usually off school grounds), and one-third of the entire instructional time in grades 9 to 11 (spent in industrial and agricultural production); *ibid.*, pp. 179-83. This "labor in production" verges on unpaid child labor; instances of using school children to pick cotton in Central Asia under the guise of educational "work on the farm" were reported with severe criticism by *Izvestiia*, April 18, 1961. The question of paying students for actual contribution to output has been raised but not resolved. There is much waste of time and effort; factory and farm managers complain that the children are in their way, and teachers grumble about lags in classroom studies. *CDSP*, XIII, No. 22 (June 28, 1961), p. 30.

⁴³ Harry Schwartz, "What's Communism? Does Russia Have It?" *The New York Times Magazine*, October 15, 1961, p. 112.

inevitable." To perform its function, history is to give less attention to factual information and more to Marxist philosophical and ideological generalizations. For example, the study of world history must show the students that it has merely been the prologue to communism. Thus, the increase in the number of hours available for history instruction at both the secondary and higher education level would not entail a rise in the historical knowledge of the students but primarily an expansion of their indoctrination. In fact, the heavy work involvements at all levels, the wide use of watered-down evening, split-session, and correspondence forms of education, the reduction of formal classroom work in favor of "practice" and "experience," and the orientation toward quasi-historical "local area study" are certain to imperil if not eliminate any opportunity for concentrated and carefully phased history study.

VI

Prognostication in Soviet affairs is ill-advised, as the surprises of the Twenty-Second Congress have once again shown, but one is impelled to doubt that it will be possible to maintain the existing standards in the new circumstances. There is greater realism than before in the construction of the two-stage secondary school history curriculum, especially in the self-contained history cycle of the eight-year general school, and it is an improvement to abandon Stalin's verdict on the beginnings of modern history and to curb the Europocentrism of the previous program. However, even in this last aspect the changes have been dictated not by considerations of academic balance but by the current directions of the Soviet interests. On the whole, impelled by reasons of curbing the social differentiation and contempt for manual labor in Soviet society, preparing the new generations for the nascent technology, and perhaps coping with the labor shortage, which rises from the extremely heavy war losses, Khrushchev is reforming Soviet education in ways which dilute the learning process with transitory political and doctrinal formulations and extramural involvements of dubious educative value.

Dynamic undertakings can be blundering undertakings, and Khrushchev has certainly produced his share of these in various spheres of policy. In education, his reforms can be seen, as Professor Timasheff sees them, as the dismantling of a system which Stalin put together and which has worked well, and the undoing of the high standards attained since the 1930's.⁴⁴ With his all-out attack on Stalin at the Twenty-Second Congress Khrushchev has initiated yet another dismantling job of massive proportions and opened a Pandora's box of questions of historical fact and assessment concerning not only the liquidation of Pokrovsky's school, but also Stalin's policies and role in Soviet development, the meaning of the purges, Trotsky's role in them,

⁴⁴ Timasheff, *loc. cit.*

and inevitably, Khrushchev's own role in the Stalin era.⁴⁵ Since Communist China and other countries of the bloc have refused to condemn Stalin, no one can predict where this conflict of historical and ideological views will end and whether Khrushchev will survive it. One thing is quite certain: should he founder in the conflict he has generated, the charges against him will include the wrecking of the Soviet educational system and of the embedded version of the recent Soviet past.

⁴⁵ It may be symptomatic that Pokrovsky's work is again discussed in quite balanced fashion in the Soviet Union; cf. A. M. Sakharov, "Problema obrazovaniia russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v sovetskoi istoriografii," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 9, 1961, pp. 72-73. Certainly Pokrovsky's dictum that history is politics retrojected into the past is being vindicated by Khrushchev's incorporation of current politics against Stalin into the history of the Soviet period.

A Concept of *Critical Thinking*

A Proposed Basis for Research in the Teaching and Evaluation of Critical Thinking Ability*

The author has attempted to fill a gap which he perceives to exist in the literature on thinking. He has identified twelve aspects of critical thinking (construed as "the correct assessing of statements") and elaborated a system of criteria to be applied in it. The relevance of his enquiry for the schools is implied in the title and is close to the author's attention throughout the article.

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INTRODUCTION

RESEARCH IN THINKING has frequently been conducted in the fields of psychology and education, but in both fields there is a significant gap. There has been a lack of careful attention to the concept, *critical thinking*. Furthermore no comprehensive, thorough, up-to-date treatment of this concept is available.

Psychologists have been concerned with associative thinking, concept formation, problem solving, and creative thinking, all of which are important aspects of thinking. But psychologists have not chosen to go any deeper into the evaluation of the products of thought than John Dewey's analysis of reflective thinking. This is understandable. Until psychologists can establish predictable, theoretically-explainable regularities between their variables (set, motivation, aspiration, ego-involvement, flexibility, direction, drive-reduction, etc.) and the successful solution of simple problems, they are reluctant to

* The preparation of this work was facilitated by the Cornell Social Science Research Center through a grant from the Ford Foundation.

investigate the relationships between their variables and the acquisition of the knowledge and mental skills needed for judging solutions to complex problems. Thus they have not felt the need for a careful study of the knowledge and mental skills involved in making such judgments. Somewhat of an exception to this general pattern is the report of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (6), which did deal with such knowledge and skills in the rather restricted area in which a subject judges whether an hypothesized selection from a small number of given values of given variables is the one that the experimenter has picked.

Research in education, directed toward thinking, has often followed the concerns of research in psychology, since most educational researchers use this discipline as their base. There have, however, been a number of efforts aimed at the teaching of critical thinking. This is to be expected since such teaching is thought to be one of the educator's main jobs. But even in education such efforts have for the most part been deficient in an important respect: they have not been based on a comprehensive and detailed examination of what is involved in making judgments about the worth of statements or answers to problems. Propaganda analysis has amounted to an indiscriminate condemnation of attempts to influence people. Problem solving has been essentially a combination of a plausible method of motivation and a sensible but very general way of organizing an attack on a question. Some statements, including Dewey's (14, pp. 107, 109, 114), unfortunately suggest that the problem is solved when the solver thinks it is solved, thus providing a psychological instead of a logical criterion for the solution of a problem.

Though efforts in the field of education concerned with critical thinking have generally used a hasty conception of what is involved in judging statements, there are exceptions. Notable are the works of Henderson and Smith (27), Dressel and Mayhew (16), Hood (28), and Conant (10, 11). But even these efforts have not produced to a degree that is desirable an explicit comprehensive consideration of what is involved in judging statements.

A number of works in philosophy have dealt successfully with specific parts of what is involved (1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49), but no one of them is as comprehensive as the present effort. Some books on logic are about as comprehensive but no one of them takes adequate account of the recent philosophical insights in a number of the works to which reference was just made. Furthermore no logic book attempts the dimensional simplification of the concept, *critical thinking*, which simplification is desirable as a basis for research. The present effort attempts such a simplification.

The program for developing this concept of *critical thinking* was as follows: (1) to examine the literature on the goals of the schools and the literature on the criteria of good thinking; (2) to select from this literature those aspects which come under the following basic notion of *critical thinking*: 'critical

thinking' as 'the correct assessing of statements';¹ (3) to elaborate the criteria to apply in making such assessments—to the extent that there are criteria; (4) to simplify the rather elaborate result by classifying some aspects under others that are logically more basic; (5) then to simplify further by logically analyzing them into basic factors or dimensions of *critical thinking*.

What follows is an attempt to describe the results of this program. First there will be a list of twelve aspects which come under the basic notion of *critical thinking* as the correct assessing of statements, and which commonly appear on lists of aspects of critical thinking. Some of these overlap or utilize others. Next comes a proposed analysis of *critical thinking* in a three-dimensional scheme composed of logical, criterial, and pragmatic dimensions. Third, the main body of this paper is a detailed consideration of each aspect showing (with sufficient detail to serve as a guide for instruction and evaluation) criteria that are appropriate for judging statements of the type covered by it, explaining its dimensional analysis, and showing the interrelationships between aspects. In the last section, possible research steps will be suggested.

To argue fully the claim that this is a defensible concept of *critical thinking* would take more time and space than is here available. A defense will be sketched in only at a few crucial points. The main task of this paper is to present a clear and detailed account of a concept of *critical thinking*. This account can be judged for its defensibility, and, if found defensible, can serve as a basis for research in the teaching of and testing for critical thinking ability.

A LIST OF ASPECTS OF CRITICAL THINKING

As a root notion *critical thinking* is taken to be *the correct assessing of statements*. Since there are various kinds of statements, various relations between statements and their grounds, and various stages in the process of assessment, we can expect that there will be various ways of going wrong when one attempts to think critically. The following list may be looked upon as a list of specific ways to avoid the pitfalls in assessment.

As indicated before, this list is not intended to provide mutually exclusive categories. Instead it shows common pitfalls, and items about which people are concerned. Criteria of classification are sacrificed in the interest of plausibility and intelligibility. The dimensional categories meet the criteria of classification, but sacrifice initial intuitiveness in order to do so.

¹ This basic notion was suggested by B. Othanel Smith (39, p. 130): "Now if we set about to find out what . . . [a] statement means and to determine whether to accept or reject it, we would be engaged in thinking which, for lack of a better term, we shall call critical thinking." Since Smith's definition does not use any words like 'correct,' his notion is slightly different.

Smith's concept of *critical thinking* permits us to speak of 'good critical thinking' and 'poor critical thinking' without redundancy or contradiction. Though this is an accepted manner of speaking, the predominant manner of speaking presumably builds the notion of correct thinking into the notion of critical thinking. Though the latter interpretation is used in this paper, it would be easy to restructure what follows and use Smith's concept. 'Good critical thinking' in Smith's sense means 'critical thinking' as used in this paper.

Twelve aspects of critical thinking are:

1. Grasping the meaning of a statement.
2. Judging whether there is ambiguity in a line of reasoning.
3. Judging whether certain statements contradict each other.
4. Judging whether a conclusion follows necessarily.
5. Judging whether a statement is specific enough.
6. Judging whether a statement is actually the application of a certain principle.
7. Judging whether an observation statement is reliable.
8. Judging whether an inductive conclusion is warranted.
9. Judging whether the problem has been identified.
10. Judging whether something is an assumption.
11. Judging whether a definition is adequate.
12. Judging whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable.

Although the root notion calls for its inclusion, the judging of value statements is deliberately excluded from the above list. This exclusion admittedly weakens the attractiveness of the presented concept, but makes it more manageable. So long as we remember that this exclusion has occurred, we should not be confused by the truncated concept. Perhaps this gap can at some future time be at least partially filled.

The exclusion of other important kinds of thinking (creative thinking, for example) from this basic concept of *critical thinking* does not imply that the others are unimportant, nor does it imply that they are separable from it in practice. This exclusion is simply the result of an attempt to focus attention on one important kind of thinking.

THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF CRITICAL THINKING

There are three basic analytically distinguishable dimensions of the proposed concept of *critical thinking*: a logical dimension, a criterial dimension,² and a pragmatic dimension.

The *logical dimension*, roughly speaking, covers judging alleged relationships between meanings of words and statements. A person who is competent in this dimension knows what follows from a statement or a group of statements, by virtue of their meaning. He particularly knows how to use the logical operators, 'all,' 'some,' 'none,' 'not,' 'and,' 'if . . . then,' 'or,' 'unless,' etc. He knows what it is for something to be a member of a class of things. Further-

² For those who are interested in comparing this analysis with Charles Morris' analysis of the dimensions of language (32) this logical dimension includes Morris' syntactic and semantic dimensions. And it includes more than these, since many terms do not refer to objects, but serve other functions. Morris' pragmatic dimension is quite different from this pragmatic dimension.

more he knows the meaning of the basic terms in the field in which the statement under consideration is made.³

The *criterial dimension* covers knowledge of the criteria for judging statements (soon to be presented), except for the logical criteria, which are covered by the logical dimension.

The *pragmatic dimension* covers the impression of the background purpose on the judgment, and it covers the decision as to whether the statement is good enough for the purpose. Including this dimension does not constitute endorsement of the doctrine often attributed to pragmatism: "a statement is true if it fulfills the purpose of the speaker." But the inclusion of this dimension does constitute recognition of the legitimate function played by the background purpose in making decisions about the acceptability of statements. It does constitute recognition of the necessity for the balancing of factors preceding the judgment, "This is enough evidence." Furthermore, inclusion of this dimension requires the admission that complete criteria can not be established for critical thinking. An element of intelligent judgment is usually required in addition to applying criteria and knowing the meaning.

To clarify what is meant by the function of the background purpose, let us consider two examples. In the first, the purpose helps us judge how important it is to be right, how strict must be our standards, and when there is enough evidence; in the second, the purpose enables us to judge how precise a statement must be.

Consider the problem in educational experimentation of deciding on the level of statistical significance to be demanded of the data. In making this decision about the level of significance, the background purpose of the investigation must be considered. Is the purpose to gather information on which to base a decision about how to teach reading in a large school system? Or is the purpose to gather information on the optimum time to keep a school bus? Certainly the first purpose imposes more stringent requirements on the data since much more is at stake. We have higher standards for assenting to a proposition in the first area than in the second. The judgment, "That's enough evidence to settle the matter," requires stronger evidence in the first area than in the second.

The importance of this point is generally recognized by statisticians. Guilford (21) remarks, "An investigator may choose any level of confidence he prefers. But he must defend it. It may depend upon the kind of problem being

³ The requirement, 'knows the meaning of the basic terms in the field,' might better be partly thought of as a presupposition of critical thinking since, if a person does not understand a statement at all, the question of whether he can think critically about it does not arise. However, knowing the meaning of a statement involves knowing the implications of the statement; the latter is directly a part of the assessing of statements. Since a line between bare understanding and knowing implications is a difficult one to draw, the former is also included in critical thinking via the logical dimension, for simplicity's sake.

investigated and upon the seriousness of being wrong in concluding either for or against the null hypothesis."

In our second example a teacher is evaluating homework papers. She is trying to figure out who studied together. She says, "*John and Frank have the same answers to question four and they are both way off.*" In that situation with her purpose, what she has said is all right even if John and Frank arranged the ideas in different order and used different words.

But suppose that she is interested in seeing if any of her students blindly copied from another. In that situation she should say, "*John and Frank do not have the same answer.*" Greater precision is demanded by the second purpose. When faced with the same objective facts, we can justifiably make statements at different levels of precision, depending on the background purpose.⁴

The next section elaborates the list of twelve aspects and presents the dimensional makeup of each.

CLARIFICATION OF THE TWELVE ASPECTS OF CRITICAL THINKING

1. *Grasping the meaning of a statement.*

If a person knows the meaning of a statement, he should know what would count as evidence for and against it. He should know what, if anything, it would imply in a situation and what would imply it. And he should know what statements contradict it.

The things to be known should, of course, not be expected to be more sophisticated than the statement in question, nor should they be expected to include things that are distantly removed. For example, it should not be required that in order to know the meaning of, "Wood floats on water," a person be able to recognize that this statement is implied by Archimedes' Principle together with certain facts about the densities of wood and water. These things are more sophisticated than the sentence about the floating wood and are a bit distant from it, logically speaking.

But a person should, if he claims to know the meaning of, "Wood floats on water," be able to recognize that it is implied by the combination: "Wood is lighter than water" and, "Whatever is lighter than water floats on it."

This aspect is the core of the other logical aspects, but they differ insofar as each distinguishes a different particular phase of the concept of *critical thinking*.

2. *Judging whether there is ambiguity in a line of reasoning.*

This aspect is a more complicated form of the first, since it requires two distinct apprehensions of the meaning of a statement—one as it is proved and

⁴ Rupert Crawshaw-Williams (12) has insightfully discussed this role of the background purpose.

one as it is applied. The two meanings are compared to see if they are the same. If not, the appropriate judgment is that there is an ambiguity.

There is an ambiguity in the following line of reasoning:

There are people who sincerely believe on religious grounds that medication is wrong. They believe this because they believe that any treatment of human beings with medicine is a violation of their religious principles. 'Medication' means 'anything intended for the prevention, cure, or alleviation of disease.' Since the chlorination of water is intended for the prevention of disease, it is medication. To chlorinate water is thus to violate their religious principles.

The statement, "Chlorination is medication," is proven when the statement has one meaning: "Chlorination is something intended for the prevention, cure, or alleviation of disease." And it is applied with a different meaning: "Chlorination is treatment of human beings with medicine."

This aspect as exemplified has primarily a logical dimension since it requires grasp and comparison of meanings. Often, however, the ambiguity is not so blatant and one or both meanings must be inferred inductively. In such cases, all three dimensions are involved. The dimensional analysis of inductive reasoning will be explained later.

3. *Judging whether certain statements contradict each other.*

Judging contradictions is useful in making decisions about alleged deductions and in making decisions to reject the contradictory of an acceptable statement. Since contradiction is a matter of incompatible meanings, this aspect is on the logical dimension.

4. *Judging whether a conclusion follows necessarily.*

This is the one most often referred to when 'logical reasoning' is mentioned. It is the judging of deduction. Reasoning in mathematics, "if-then" reasoning, and syllogistic reasoning all exemplify deduction.

The basic criterion is this: "A conclusion follows necessarily, if its denial contradicts the assertion of the premises." Various rules have been developed for different types of deduction, but all see to it that this requirement is fulfilled. Well-developed sets of rules include:

- 4.1 The rules for handling equations and inequalities.
- 4.2 The rules of "if-then" reasoning:
 - 4.21 Denial of the "then-part" requires denial of the "if-part," but not necessarily vice versa.
 - 4.22 Acceptance of the "if-part" requires acceptance of the "then-part," but not necessarily vice versa.
 - 4.23 Instances of an "if-then" statement are implied by the "if-then" statement.
- 4.3 The rules for categorical reasoning. These rules may be sum-

marized by the following: "Whatever is included in a general class is included also in whatever that general class is included in, and is excluded from whatever the general class is excluded from."

This aspect extends along the logical dimension only. There are no extenuating circumstances. Either a conclusion follows necessarily or it does not. It is partly because these decisions can be carefully and neatly systematized that deductive logic is given so much attention in logic courses.

5. *Judging whether a statement is specific enough.*

For the purposes of a given situation, a particular statement might be too vague to provide guidance. In such situations the statement should be rejected or inquired into, since in its condition its truth or falsity is irrelevant.

The statement, "Education has disappeared from the schools" (or, "There is more education in the schools than ever before") is useless in decision-making about curriculum and school finance until the terms, 'education,' 'disappeared,' and, 'the schools,' are clarified. The statements are not specific enough to be tested and applied.

On the other hand, in a war-ravaged country it might be quite meaningful to say that education has disappeared from the schools (since they are now used for hospitals or housing). In this situation, 'education,' even loosely defined, *has* disappeared from the schools.

This aspect requires consideration of the purpose of the discourse and requires the judgment, "This is (or is not) specific enough for our purpose." If the purpose is to come up with curriculum and budgetary recommendations for a school system long in existence, the statement is not specific enough. If the purpose is to make a report to the leader of a war-ravaged country, it is specific enough.

Another example of this aspect was given in the explanation of the pragmatic dimension—the teacher reading homework assignments. "The answers are the same," was specific enough for one purpose, but not for another.

This aspect extends on both the pragmatic and logical dimensions. That the pragmatic dimension applies was shown in the above discussion of the role of purpose. The logical dimension applies through the need for grasp of the meaning of the statement.

It might be thought that this aspect of critical thinking is one in which people do not make mistakes. In concrete situations this tends to be true, but in abstract situations it is easy to go wrong by forgetting to put questions and answers in the context of situations with purposes.⁵

⁵ Crawshaw-Williams (12) develops this point well.

6. *Judging whether a principle establishes a statement that is alleged to be an application of it.*

Decisions about the application of principles and hypotheses to the world of things, men, and events are similar to decisions about deduction, but there is a significant difference between them. Principles and hypotheses of the former type do not hold universally; they all have exceptions and limits. Sometimes these exceptions and limits are so far removed that we do not have to worry about them, and in such cases we can proceed as in deduction without fear of going wrong. Sometimes the limits and exceptions are close by, in which case, still approximating the deductive model, we use words like 'probable,' 'likely,' 'barring unforeseen circumstances,' etc., in the conclusion.

For an example of the latter case, consider the application of that standard law of economics, "If the supply is constant and the demand for a product decreases, the price will decrease." Two of the limits of the application of this law are within the knowledge of all of us. It is intended to apply to an economy free of government control and to a sector of it that is free of monopolistic control. Mention of these limits will suffice for present purposes, although there are others.

Now let us apply this law to a situation in which there is a decrease in demand for microscopes. Applying the law deductively, we are unalterably committed to a prediction of a price decrease. But it is not wise to be unalterably committed to such a prediction. For one thing, the well-known limits of the law might be breached: the government might decide to maintain the price of microscopes and buy up the extras; or a monopoly might be formed which would decrease production without decreasing price.

But secondly, other things that are not yet explicitly built into the limits might go wrong. The makers of microscopes might form a trade association and decide that with good advertising they can create a demand much greater than ever before, so that they can afford to raise prices.

It is because of considerations like this that qualifiers like 'probable' must be included in the application of many principles. The application of that law in that situation might be, "It is probable that there will be a lowering of price." But the application would not be this at all if it can be seen that a known limit is breached or that there is some other extenuating circumstance. The point is that the application of such principles should often not be stated any more strongly than this, even though the steps in reasoning parallel those of deduction.

This aspect of *critical thinking* is made up of two dimensions: the logical dimension, since one must decide what could be deduced, neglecting limits and extenuating circumstances; and the pragmatic dimension, since the question of how important it is to be right and how sure we must be in order even to say 'probable' must be faced.

7. *Judging whether an observation statement is reliable.*

An observation statement is a specific description. Over the years, those fields most concerned with accuracy of observation have built up a set of rules for judging the reliability of observation statements. These rules give a criterial dimension to this aspect of critical thinking. In addition, application of them to a particular situation, like the application of principles discussed previously, gives this critical thinking ability logical and pragmatic dimensions.

Here is a combined list of principles from the fields of law, history, and science:

- 7.1 Observation statements tend to be more reliable if the observer:
 - 7.11 Was unemotional, alert, and disinterested.
 - 7.12 Was skilled at observing the sort of thing observed.
 - 7.13 Had sensory equipment that was in good condition.
 - 7.14 Has a reputation for veracity.
 - 7.15 Used precise techniques.
 - 7.16 Had no preconception about the way the observation would turn out.
- 7.2 Observation statements tend to be more reliable if the observation conditions:
 - 7.21 Were such that the observer had good access.
 - 7.22 Provided a satisfactory medium of observation.
- 7.3 Observation statements tend to be more reliable to the extent that the statement:
 - 7.31 Is close to being a statement of direct observation.
 - 7.32 Is corroborated.
 - 7.33 Is corroboratable.
 - 7.34 Comes from a disinterested source with a reputation for veracity.
- 7.4 Observation statements, if based on a record, tend to be more reliable if the record:
 - 7.41 Was made at the time of observation.
 - 7.42 Was made by the person making the statement.
 - 7.43 Is believed by the person making the statement to be correct—either because he so believed at the time the record was made, or because he believes it was the record-maker's habit to make correct records.
- 7.5 Observation statements tend to be more reliable than inferences made from them.

8. *Judging whether an inductive conclusion is warranted.*

Inductive conclusions are of three types, simple generalizations, explanatory hypotheses, and theoretic systems. Though similar in many aspects, they are different enough to warrant separate treatment.

- 8.1 A simple generalization about experience. Such a generalization is warranted:

- 8.11 To the extent that there is a bulk of reliable instances of it. The greater the variability of the population, the greater the bulk needed.
- 8.12 To the extent that it fits into the larger structure of knowledge.
- 8.13 To the extent that the selecting of instances is unbiased.
 - 8.131 A pure random sample is unbiased.
 - 8.132 A systematic sample is unbiased if a careful investigation suggests that there is not a relevant cycle or trend followed by the sampling procedure.
 - 8.133 Stratification of a population on relevant variables and unbiased sampling within the strata, is likely to be more efficient than 8.131 or 8.132 alone.
 - 8.134 An unbiased sampling of clusters of the population and unbiased sampling (or complete enumeration) within the clusters is likely to be an efficient way of sampling when access to separate individual units is difficult.
- 8.14 To the extent that there are no counter-instances.

For example, the generalization that red-headed people tend to have hot tempers would be warranted to the extent that there is a large number of reliable instances of red-heads with hot tempers, to the extent that we are able to account for red-heads being hot-tempered, to the extent that our instances of red-heads are picked without bias, and to the extent that there is a lack of reliable instances of red-heads with even tempers.

The criterial dimension is involved here through knowledge of the above criteria. There is a vast literature on judging the adequacy of samples, which very rarely are purely random.⁶

The logical dimension is involved in the recognition of instances and the application of the above principles. And the pragmatic dimension is invoked in deciding that there is or is not enough evidence for the purposes of the inquiry.

- 8.2 An hypothesis which is related to its support through its explanatory power. An hypothesis is warranted to the extent that:
 - 8.21 It explains a bulk and variety of reliable data. If a datum is explained, it can be deduced or loosely derived (in the fashion of the application of principles) from the hypothesis together with established facts or generalizations.
 - 8.22 It is itself explained by a satisfactory system of knowledge.
 - 8.23 It is not inconsistent with any evidence.
 - 8.24 Its competitors are inconsistent with the evidence. This principle is the basis of controlled experiments.
 - 8.25 It is testable. It must be, or have been, possible to make predictions from it.

⁶ A valuable introductory pamphlet on this topic was prepared by Philip J. McCarthy (31).

The hypothesis can be either specific (as is the case in law and usually in history) or it can be general (as is ordinarily the case in physical sciences and the social sciences of economics, sociology, and psychology). Here is an example of a specific hypothesis:

Hissarlik is located at the site of Troy.

And here is an example of a general hypothesis:

The pressure in a liquid varies directly as the depth, assuming the pressure at the surface to be zero.

For purposes of illustration let us consider the bearing of each of the criteria on each hypothesis.

Explaining a bulk and variety of reliable data (8.21). Since Hissarlik is only an hour's walk from the sea, the Hissarlik hypothesis explains the reported ability of the Greeks to go back and forth from Troy several times a day. It explains why there are ruins at Hissarlik. These explained reports, it should be noted, can be derived from the Hissarlik hypotheses together with established facts or generalizations:

- H-1. Hissarlik is at the site of Troy.
 Hissarlik is one hour's walk from the sea.
 People are able to walk back and forth several times a day
 between places that are one hour's walk apart.
 Therefore, it is probable that the Greeks were able to go back
 and forth from Troy to the sea several times daily.
- H-2. Hissarlik is at the site of Troy.
 A large city when abandoned tends to leave ruins.
 Therefore, it is probable that there would be ruins at Hissarlik.

Of course explaining only those two pieces of evidence is not enough to establish the hypothesis. More evidence of different types must be provided. The pressure hypothesis explains why water spurts farther from a hole near the bottom of a tank than from a hole in the middle of a tank. It also explains the proportional relationships between the following sets of readings of pressure gauges attached to the supply tank in a water system:

Distance from top of tank (in ft.)	Pressure reading (in lbs./sq. in.)
0	0
5	2.1
10	4.2

These data can be derived from the hypothesis together with established facts or generalizations:

- P-1. The pressure varies directly as the depth.
 The greater the pressure at a hole, the farther the liquid will spurt.
The bottom hole is at a greater depth than the middle hole.
 Therefore, the water spurts farther from the hole near the bottom.
- P-2. The pressure varies directly as the depth.
 The depth at 10 ft. is twice that at 5 ft.
Therefore, the pressure at 10 ft (4.2 lbs./sq. in.) is twice that at 5 ft. (2.1 lbs./sq. in.).

Again the explanation of these data alone does not establish the hypothesis. More explained data of various types are needed.

Being explained by a satisfactory system of knowledge (8.22). If the Hissarlik hypothesis could itself be tentatively explained by established facts and generalizations, it would then be more acceptable. For example, suppose it were possible to show that the traits of the Trojans and the facts about the geography, climate, and nearby civilization at the time make it probable that the Trojan city would have developed at Hissarlik at the time that Troy was supposed to have existed. If it were possible to show that, the Hissarlik hypothesis would thereby receive support.

Similarly the pressure hypothesis is supported by showing that it can be explained, and thus derived, as follows:

Pressure in a liquid is the equivalent of the weight of a regular column of liquid extending to the top of the container.
The weight of a column of liquid varies directly with its depth.
 Therefore, the pressure in a liquid varies directly with the depth.

Not being inconsistent with any evidence (8.23). The Hissarlik hypothesis would be weakened if no springs could be found in the area of Hissarlik, since the *Iliad* mentions two springs in the area, one hot and one cold. The reasoning might go as follows:

Hissarlik is at the site of Troy.
 There were probably at least two springs at Troy, one hot and one cold.
Springs tend to remain in existence over the years.
 Therefore, it is probable that there are at least two springs at Hissarlik, one hot and one cold.

Note that in using the absence of springs as evidence against the hypothesis, we are assuming that springs tend to remain and that the report of the *Iliad* is reliable. Either of these could be wrong. The less dependable these auxiliary assumptions are, the less dependable is our counter-evidence.

The pressure hypothesis would be weakened by the discovery that water

spurted out the same amounts at the middle and the bottom, since the hypothesis implies otherwise. That is, it would be weakened if we did not previously have so much by way of other evidence built up in favor of the hypothesis—so much that in this case, one would have a right to suspect such data.

Its competitors' being inconsistent with the data (8.24). A competitor of the Hissarlik hypothesis is the hypothesis that Bunarbashi is at the site of Troy. This competing hypothesis is not consistent with the data that Bunarbashi is a three-hours' walk from the sea and that the Greeks were able to go back and forth several times daily, if we assume that the Greeks walked.

A competitor of the earlier-stated pressure hypothesis might be one to the effect that the pressure increases directly as one gets closer to the surface of the earth. This hypothesis is inconsistent with pressure gauge readings on two independent tanks, one over the other, when the top tank has the pressure gauge at its bottom, and the bottom tank has its gauge at the top. The alternative hypothesis implies that the gauge in the upper tank would give the smaller reading. The data are just the opposite.

A controlled experiment is designed to rule out competing hypotheses by producing data inconsistent with them. When we test the hypothesis that a new fertilizer will increase the growth of corn, we put the fertilizer in a corn patch, develop a companion corn patch, the control, identical in every respect possible except for fertilizer, and watch the results. If there is a difference, the fertilizer hypothesis can explain it. But it would not be explained by heavy rainfall, warm weather, sunlight, etc., since both patches supposedly received the same amount. These alternative hypotheses would justify a prediction of no difference and would thus be inconsistent with the data.

It is, of course, impossible to develop a perfectly controlled experiment, since the perfect isolation and variation of a single variable is not possible. The important thing might be a *combination* of weather and fertilizer, or the important thing might have slipped by unnoticed. But we can still see in the controlled experiment an attempt to approximate the logical goal of eliminating hypotheses by turning up data that is inconsistent with them. The controlled experiment is an efficient way of eliminating hypotheses by this method.

Being testable (8.25). This is a logical criterion, not a criterion of practicality or even physical possibility. The criterion requires only that it must be possible to *conceive* of what would count as evidence for, and what would count as evidence against, the hypothesis. We have already seen that this is possible for each of our hypotheses. The fact that some conceivable tests are not practically possible is not important so far as this criterion is concerned. A conceivable, though presumably physically impossible, test of the pressure hypothesis would involve swimming to the bottom of the ocean with pressure and depth gauges, recording readings at various points along the way.

An hypothesis that appears untestable is this one: "Airplane crashes are

caused by gremlins," since it does not appear to be possible to conceive of something that would count as evidence for and to conceive of something that would count as evidence against the hypothesis. The word "appear" is used deliberately, since the conceiving of evidence for and evidence against would immediately make the hypothesis testable—and would reveal to some extent the meaning of the hypothesis.

Most hypotheses that we consider are testable in this logical sense, so this criterion does not often discredit an hypothesis. But its fulfillment is absolutely essential for hypotheses about the world of things, men, and events.

Having thus considered the bearing of each criterion on each hypothesis, we may turn to the dimensional analysis of this aspect of *critical thinking*. Judging whether an explanatory hypothesis is warranted incorporates all three dimensions. The logical dimension is needed in the comprehension of the meaning of the hypothesis, in judging whether the evidence can be derived from the hypothesis, in judging whether the hypothesis can be derived from a broader and satisfactory system, in judging whether it and its competitors are inconsistent with the data, and in judging whether it is testable.

The criterial dimension functions in that the criteria, 8.21-8.25, should be known.

The pragmatic dimension is utilized in judgments about the derivation of, and from, hypotheses when matters of explanation are at hand. It is invoked here just as it was invoked in the application of principles—since one must judge that the warrant is strong *enough* to give an explanation. Similarly judgments about inconsistency have a pragmatic dimension, since the implications are only more or less probable. When a potential inconsistency is faced, one must decide whether the other material used in the derivation is strongly enough grounded so that the fault lies with the hypothesis—and not the assumptions. And one must decide whether a face-value inconsistency is to count as refuting the hypothesis or to be considered beyond the range over which the hypothesis is to hold.⁷ This decision is ordinarily based on decisions about convenience or simplicity, which in turn depend on the purpose for which the hypothesis might be used.

But most important of all, the so-called 'inductive leap' utilizes this dimension. Deciding that the evidence at hand is *enough* to establish the hypothesis requires consideration of the degree of satisfaction of the criteria, the purpose, and how important it is to be right; then the leap may or may not be made.

8.3 A theoretic system.

The difference between a theoretic system and an hypothesis of the type we have been considering is that the former is an involved network of relations between concepts, many of which are abstract and technical, while the latter is a simple relation between two or a small number of concepts, often less abstract and technical. Examples of theoretic systems are the kinetic theory

⁷ Toulmin (43) provides a valuable discussion of this matter.

of matter, the atomic theory, Gestalt psychology, the theory of evolution, Keynesian economics, Turner's frontier theory, and classical English grammar. Obviously evaluation of theories is a demanding task. It demands more than we can ordinarily expect of elementary and secondary students. Undergraduates are sometimes better equipped, and graduate students are expected to become equipped to perform this task.

Evaluating theories is comparable to evaluating hypotheses but much more complex. In general the same criteria apply but on a broader scale. Two modifications should be noted: the addition of the criterion of simplicity and the weakening of the effect of contrary evidence.

The criterion of simplicity calls for choosing the simpler of two competing systems, other things being equal. The classic example of the application of this criterion is the preference of the Copernican system, which considered the sun the center of the universe, to the Ptolemaic system, which looked upon the earth as the center. The Copernican system was simpler since it needed fewer cycles and epicycles to explain the movements of the planets.

Since theories have so many parts, contrary evidence does not usually result in outright rejection, but rather in adjustment to fit the contrary evidence—until the whole system becomes more complex than a competitor. The criterion of simplicity then functions.

Following are the criteria for theoretic systems. There will be brief comments, but no attempt to exemplify the operation of each will be made, because to do so would be a monumental task and would make rather laborious reading for those not versed in the fields chosen. The reader is invited to provide examples from a theoretic system in a field he knows.

A theoretic system is warranted to the extent that:

- 8.31 It explains a bulk and variety of reliable data. Within the system, furthermore, the less abstract statements should be explained by the more abstract ones.
- 8.32 It is explained by broader theories. Some theories are so broad already that, with our present state of knowledge, to demand fulfillment of this criterion is often to demand speculation.
- 8.33 It is not inconsistent with any evidence. As indicated earlier, occasional inconsistency can be handled by adjusting the theory. Sometimes the inconsistency must just be accepted for lack of a better theory, and we say, "The theory does not hold for this kind of case."
- 8.34 Its competitors are inconsistent with the data. Again a single inconsistency does not destroy a competitor, for it too can be adjusted, but a large number of inconsistencies damage it.
- 8.35 It is testable. When adjusting a theory to fit the data, people are sometimes tempted to make the theory impregnable by making it untestable. Freudian psychology is sometimes accused of being untestable.
- 8.36 It is simpler than its rivals. As theories are adjusted to fit new

data, they may become extremely complicated, as had happened to the entire Ptolemaic system at the time of Copernicus.

All three dimensions are used in judging theories for reasons like those advanced in the discussion of hypotheses.

9. *Judging whether the problem has been identified.*

Different kinds of judgments go under this label:

a) Judging that a want has been identified. As when someone says, "My problem is to learn to appreciate poetry." In this sense the judgment that the speaker has identified his problem is tantamount to judging that this is something the speaker, who might also be the judge, really wants to do. Problem identification here is identification of wants, either one's own, or someone else's. If they are one's own introspected wants, then critical thinking is not involved. For a person to know his wants (felt needs) is something that he can not fail to do.

If they are someone else's wants, then identifying problems is the same as establishing inductive hypotheses, as is the case for all subconscious wants, one's own or someone else's: for example, "Mark's problem is to get attention." Judging the identification of someone else's problem and of subconscious wants are then critical thinking of a type already discussed—judging inductive hypotheses.

b) Judging that a valuable goal has been selected. Here is such a problem identification: "Our problem in Culver City is to increase respect for law and order." Insofar as that is a statement of an end rather than a means, the judgment that it is an adequate identification of a problem is a value judgment. For reasons indicated earlier, this type of judging, though important, is excluded from this concept of *critical thinking*.

c) Judging that a means decision is adequate. For example, if the broader objective were respect for law and order the following might be a statement of a means decision: "Our problem in Culver City is to establish a youth bureau." The judgment here that the problem has been identified does at least these two things: (1) implies endorsement of the goal of respect for law and order (this part of the judgment then is a value judgment); (2) says that the means selected will facilitate achievement of the goal and that they will be at least more likely to facilitate it than any other course of action, within the limits of existing resources and goals. These limiting goals, by the way, are another place where values are impressed on problem identification. To judge that the problem has been identified is to judge that no unjustified goal violation would take place if the problem were solved.

To apply the means interpretation to our example: it is there implied that establishment of a youth bureau would increase the likelihood of winning respect for law and order, and would be more likely to do so than any other

course, such as giving the job to the schools (given the limits of the school budget, the state funds available for youth bureaus, trained personnel available, the goals of the school, etc.).

Judging a means decision is judging the application of a principle and judging the acceptability of the principle. To judge whether a youth bureau in Culver City would result in increased respect for law and order is to judge whether a principle about the effectiveness of youth bureaus, applied to this situation, gives us this statement with sufficient probability; and to judge whether the principle is acceptable.

In summary, problem identification is many different things and often a combination of them. Elements capable of being treated under the proposed notion of *critical thinking* are (1) judging the alleged identification of the wants of others and of subconscious wants (inductive hypotheses), and (2) judging the assertion of a means of reaching a goal (judging the application of principles and judging the principles themselves). Since each of these types of judging is treated elsewhere, nothing further need be said here.

10. *Judging whether something is an assumption.*

This topic is also complicated because there are various logically-different abilities that go under this title. These can be best approached through an examination of various uses of the word 'assumption': the deprecatory use, the concluding use, the premise use, and the presupposition use.

10.1 The deprecatory use and the concluding use.

The deprecatory use is the use when the charge is made that there is little or no evidence to support a given belief and that the belief is questionable. Here is an example: "You're just assuming that Frank didn't read the assignment." This deprecatory use is often found to be incorporated in the other uses, but sometimes it stands alone. As such its appearance is tantamount to a judgment that the view should perhaps be rejected, or at least be held in abeyance because of lack of support. No further discussion of the evaluation of this kind of assumption-claim is necessary here, since this is a general charge and is covered under discussion of the various other abilities.

In the concluding use, the term 'assumption' is used to mark a conclusion, but the deprecatory use is involved too, since the conclusion is implied not to be fully established. Here is an example: "My assumption is that Hissarlik is at the site of Troy." We need not be concerned with discussing whether something is an assumption in the concluding sense; the important question is whether the assumption is justified, and that question is covered elsewhere in this paper.

The first two uses of 'assumption' were specified in order to keep them out of the discussion of the next two; the following discussion, therefore, does not apply to them.

10.2 The premise use.

This kind of assumption stands anterior to a conclusion in a line of reasoning, whether the conclusion be inductive or deductive. To call something an assumption is to say that the conclusion depends upon it, and that if the conclusion is to be accepted, the alleged assumption should also be accepted. Thus the location of assumptions (in this sense) is a useful step in the evaluation of conclusions.

Here are criteria for premise-type assumptions:

- 10.21 Of the various possible gap-fillers, the alleged assumption should come closest to making the completed argument, proof, or explanation, a satisfactory one. (This criterion is necessary and sufficient.)
- 10.211 The simplest gap-filler is ordinarily the one to choose.
- 10.212 If there is a more plausible gap-filler among the more complex ones, it should be chosen. Plausibility, however, requires fitting in with existing knowledge—not being a special case.
- 10.22 Other conditions remaining the same, the state of affairs that is predicted could not occur (or probably would not occur) if the alleged assumption were false. (This criterion applies only to alleged empirically necessary assumptions, but for them it is necessary and sufficient.)
- 10.23 The community of experts in the field would not accept the position, conclusion, or argument, without first believing the assumption to be true. (This criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is a good ground.)

What is a gap-filler? Consider this piece of reasoning:

Since the demand for microscopes has decreased, the price may be expected to decrease.

A gap-filler here would be the principle mentioned earlier:

1. When the demand for a commodity decreases, the price will decrease.

It fills a gap in reasoning from the decrease in demand for microscopes to a decrease in price.

It is not the only way to fill the gap, however. Consider these alternatives:

2. When the demand for goods and services decreases, the price decreases.
3. When the demand for optical instruments decreases, the price decreases.
4. When the demand for optical instruments (other than field glasses) decreases, the price decreases.

Since all three of these will fill the gap, it should be clear that being a gap-filler is not by itself a sufficient condition for being an assumption. The sim-

plest gap-filler is ordinarily the one to attribute, thus ruling out 4. Simplicity might also be a ground for not accepting 2 as the assumption, since there is a conjunction of two things (goods and services) mentioned. But if the prevailing knowledge in economics admits no basis for distinguishing goods from services in the context of this "law," then simplicity is counterbalanced by the need to fit into existing knowledge. Gap-fillers 1 and 2 would then be equally defensible (or indefensible) and either could be called the assumption.

Gap-filler 3 introduces a new twist, talking only about optical instruments. It is as simple as 1 but is not as general. Other things being equal, generality is to be preferred. A system of knowledge is better if it covers more cases. But if the more general gap-filler (1) should be false, and the less general one (3) true (or more likely to be true), the less general gap-filler is the one to choose.

Assumption-finding then is the locating of a gap-filler, the simpler the better, provided that it fits into and contributes to a system of knowledge. The assumption-finder should try to be generous to the position whose assumptions he is locating, generous in that he should try to find the best candidate for participation in a knowledge system. He should not accept a false gap-filler as the assumption until he has searched for one that fits into an acceptable body of knowledge. Put more simply in a way that covers most cases, he should search for one that is true.

While discussing gap-filling it would be well to note that there is one sometimes-used criterion that is inapplicable: *logical* necessity. As exemplified by the four gap-fillers previously discussed, there is no single premise-type gap-filler which is logically necessary. It is always *logically* possible (though it may be extremely implausible) to complete an argument in more than one way.⁸

Empirical necessity (10.22) is different. To the extent that empirical statements can be necessary, there can be empirically necessary assumptions. For example, an argument which predicts that the pressure in a fixed cylinder of confined air will increase is assuming that there will be a temperature increase. Since an increase in temperature in that situation is necessary for there to be an increase in pressure, the assumption is empirically necessary and can be pinned on the argument with confidence.

Criterion 10.23 mentions the experts. Although their considered opinions can be wrong, they do ordinarily know what fits into their body of knowledge. And they do know what is used successfully in the field to back up arguments and conclusions. So they can ordinarily be expected to know what an argument would need in order to be a good one.

Premise-type assumption-checking extends in all three dimensions. The logical dimension is used in judging whether the alleged assumption would fill the gap. The criterial dimension is used in knowing the criteria of assumptions. And the pragmatic dimension operates when the decision is made that the search for other satisfactory gap-fillers has been thorough *enough*.

⁸ This point has been developed elsewhere by the author (17).

10.3 The presupposition use.

Presuppositions are sentences which must be true for a given statement even to make sense.⁹ The claim, "The governor's mistakes have caused our present plight," presupposes that the governor has made mistakes. His not having done so would make nonsense out of either the affirmation or denial of the claim. If the governor has made no mistakes, it does not even make sense to say that his mistakes have caused our plight; nor does it make sense to say that his mistakes have not caused our plight.

Presupposition-finding is useful in avoiding being swayed by false presuppositions (if the governor has made no mistakes, we should be able to react to the presupposition that he has). And presupposition-finding is useful in grasping a verbal picture, and a part or the whole of a theory.

Judging whether something is presupposed by something else is simply a matter of stating the meaning of the "something else." Thus presupposition-finding has only a logical dimension.

11. Judging whether a definition is adequate.

There are various kinds of activities that are called 'judging the adequacy of a definition.' One major distinction to be drawn is that between judging the adequacy of a concept and judging the explanation of the meaning of a term.

11.1 Judging the adequacy of a concept.

A concept in fact-stating discourse is valuable to the extent that it plays a contributing role in a worth while system of knowledge. For example, consider two concepts which are competitors for the term 'intelligence': *innate problem-solving ability* and *scholastic aptitude*. A judgment about the claim that 'innate problem-solving ability' is a more adequate definition of 'intelligence' is a judgment about the worth of the concept, *innate problem-solving ability*. And this depends on the extent to which this concept contributes to a worthwhile theoretic system. The value of a theoretic system has been discussed before (8.3) so no more will be said here. Judging adequacy of concepts in fact-stating discourse involves all three dimensions, as with the judging of systems.

A judgment about the adequacy of a "persuasive definition"¹⁰ is a special kind of judgment of a concept. A persuasive definition is an attempt to put across a proposal by attaching desired criteria to a term which arouses emotions. For example the definition of 'freedom' as the 'power to do' is a persuasive definition. The term 'freedom' is a term which arouses positive emotions. To try to attach the criterion, 'power to do,' to that word, instead of 'lack of government restraint' is to propose in effect that power to do is more important than lack of government restraint. Thus a judgment about the adequacy of

⁹ This is the sense of the term 'presupposition' that was presented by P. F. Strawson (42).

¹⁰ A term proposed by C. L. Stevenson (41).

this kind of definition is in effect a judgment about the worth of the proposal built into the concept.

To the extent that such judgments are value judgments, as is the case with the definitions of 'freedom,' making them is excluded from the present notion of *critical thinking*. This exclusion itself, by the way, exemplifies the choice of one concept over another. In order that prediction and control of students' behavior be facilitated, an unwieldy area (evaluating value statements) has been eliminated from the concept, *critical thinking*.

11.2 Judging the explanation of terms.¹¹

In addition to concern about the adequacy of the underlying concepts, three other things can be involved in judging the adequacy of a definition. One might judge whether a stipulation of a short term in place of a longer term provides efficiency, one might judge whether the standard meaning of the term is being reported, or one might judge whether the form of the definition is appropriate. Each of these areas of judgment will be discussed.

11.21 Stipulated definitions. Stipulated definitions (example: "Let us use 'DDT' for 'dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane' ") can go wrong by failing to warn us that they are stipulations rather than reports, by being inefficient (by loading us down with new terminology), or by being in poor form. Judgments about the stipulation-warning and about efficiency involve the application of principles, and thus involve all three dimensions: the application of principles requires the logical and pragmatic dimensions, and knowledge of the principles brings in the criterial dimension. Judgments about form will be discussed later.

11.22 Reported definitions. Judging whether the standard meaning of the term has been *reported* is a matter of applying the definition to see if it excludes what should be excluded and includes what should be included. To do this requires knowledge of the standard meaning (the logical dimension) shown either through examples and non-examples, or through another definition; comprehension of the offered definition (the logical dimension); and either application of the offered definition to the known examples and non-examples (the logical and pragmatic dimensions), or comparison of the offered definition with the known definition (logical and pragmatic dimensions again). Reported definitions can go wrong by failing to represent the standard meaning (in which case it is appropriate to say that the definition is false) or by being in poor form.

This is an example of a reported definition:

'Tissue' means the same as 'group of similar cells performing the same function.'

If this definition either fails to represent the standard meaning or if it is in poor form, then it is inadequate. Both of these are matters of degree.

¹¹ Robinson's treatment of definitions (35) is enlightening and the source of many of the ideas expressed here.

No reported definition of a term that applies to the world of things, men, and events can be expected to do a perfect job of inclusion and exclusion. There will always be borderline cases and exceptions. So the pragmatic question must be answered: "Is this good enough for our purposes in this context?"

For example, the above definition of 'tissue' implies that the cells of the skin of two people form a tissue since these cells all perform the same functions. In the context of a general science class, no heed need be paid to this exception. But there must not be exceptions which will mislead the audience in the enterprise in which it is engaged.

11.23 Forms of definition. The forms of definition are various. Decisions about which is appropriate depend on the nature of the term being defined and the context in which the definition is offered. Only the major forms are considered here; there are many variations which are legitimate and not considered. Equivalence of the term being defined and that which is offered in definition is usually desirable. The classification and synonym forms come closest to achieving this goal. The equivalent-context form and the range form achieve it more or less. And the example form and operational form do not achieve it at all, since they ensure a concrete interpretation.

11.231. Definition through classification. Classification definition is the prevalent form of definition and justifiably so. It provides brevity, rigor, and substitutability. The definition of 'tissue' given previously is a classification definition. Tissues were classified as groups of cells and were then distinguished from other groups of cells.

Here are the rules for classification definition:

- 11.2311 The defining part should contain (a) a general class, and (b) a feature or features that set this member off from members of the general class.
- 11.2312 The defining part should be equivalent to the part being defined.
- 11.2313 The defining part should not use the term to be defined.
- 11.2314 The defining part should not give more than enough to provide a complete classification.

The obvious exception to rule 11.2313 is that situation in which the term to be defined is composed of two or more terms (e.g. 'parallel lines'), one of which is already familiar. The term 'lines' can be repeated in the defining part, since it is not in question:

'Parallel lines' means the same as 'straight lines in the same plane which do not meet however far extended.'

The exception to rule 11.2314 is the situation in which the definition is to serve as a means of teaching a concept. Redundancy and even non-defining characteristics are often permissible because they are often useful in teaching.

The following definition is redundant:

'Parallelogram' means the same as 'four-sided plane figure with opposite sides equal and parallel.'

Either the reference to being equal or the reference to being parallel could have been omitted without any logical loss to the definition. But teaching the concept *parallelogram* is often facilitated by reference to both.

Here is an example of the addition of a non-defining characteristic:

'Concave lens' means the same as 'a lens with both surfaces curved inwards, which diverges parallel rays.'

The last clause gives a non-defining characteristic. A lens with both surfaces curved inward would be concave, even if it did not diverge parallel rays. But for purposes of teaching the concept at a low level of sophistication, it helps to include this characteristic in the definition.

Although classification definitions are appropriate for most situations there are certain kinds of situations for which they are not appropriate. They can be used only inconveniently to define relationship; they can not be used to give a concrete interpretation of abstract terms; and they are ill-suited in spirit to terms that have boundaries that are quite indefinite. To handle each of these weaknesses there is another form of definition which is more appropriate than classification definition. These forms will be considered after synonym definitions are mentioned.

11.232 Synonym definition. Where close synonyms exist, the meaning of which is known to the audience, this is an efficient and thus useful form. Synonyms are only rarely really equivalent, so caution should be exercised.

11.233 Definition through equivalent contexts. An equivalent-context definition puts the term in question in a standard context and equates this context with another context, presumably better understood. This form of definition is particularly appropriate for terms that express relationships between two things. The term 'anonymously' expresses a relationship between, say, a poem and its author, and may be defined as follows:

'The poem was written *anonymously*' means the same as, 'The writer of the poem did not reveal his name.'

11.234 Definition by example. This way of giving the meaning of a term is a very commonly used method. It is usually the best way to *teach* the meaning of a new term, if the new term refers to a new concept. Loose general terms which function largely in systems that organize facts (as opposed to providing prediction and control) are ordinarily best defined for the beginner by a list of examples *and* non-examples. 'Romanticism,' 'scientific method,' and 'nationalism' are terms that can be most thoroughly defined by abundant examples and non-examples. Shorter definitions for these terms can of course be framed. These will be considered later under the topic, "range definition."

A criterion for definition by example can be stated only vaguely: the examples and non-examples should be so selected that they clear up questions that are likely to arise. This requires enough variety to cover approximately the same area covered by the term. To call this a 'definition' may bother some people. It is called a definition here because it is a significant way of showing meaning, and is an alternative to the others; but it could be called something else and the important things said about it would still hold.

When economy of space is important, definition by example should not be used, unless it takes only a few examples to clear up a few doubtful areas. Definition by example is helpful in teaching terms used in systems of knowledge that are used for prediction and control, but for people working in the field it should be superseded by a more rigorous form. Probably the classification definition should be used if concrete interpretation is not needed, and if it is needed, the operational definition should be applied.

11.235 Operational definition. This form ordinarily puts in an if-clause, an operation performed by an investigator, and then gives with as much rigor as possible the relationship between the concept and the observation that would be made subsequent to the operation. For a definition of 'intelligence quotient,' the operation could be the administration and grading of a test; and the observations could be reports of the answers, summarized by the I. Q. score:

If the "California Test of Mental Maturity" is administered according to directions, a person's score approximates his intelligence quotient.

Here is an operational definition of 'sovereignty':

If Nation A orders the fishing vessels of Nation B to leave an area, the sovereignty of Nation A in that area would imply that the vessels probably will leave, or be apprehended, destroyed, or otherwise interfered with.

There are three interesting things to note about this definition:

- 1) The qualifier 'probably' is explicitly present. Some qualifier like this is always to be understood as part of an operational definition. To make the qualifier explicit simply suggests more strongly that the implied result might not occur.
- 2) Even after the antecedent condition is fulfilled, an equivalence is not suggested. A necessary condition of *sovereignty* is given instead. In the previous definition, a condition was given that was roughly both necessary and sufficient after the fulfillment of the antecedent condition.
- 3) No actual operation by an investigator is mentioned. We have here an extension of operational definition to cover those observations where the only operation involved is looking to see what there is to see. But the essential parts are there: concrete interpretation with a somewhat rigorous relationship be-

tween the concept and the interpretation, the relationship being alleged to hold if a condition is fulfilled.

11.236 Range definition. When definition by example was being considered we noted the problem of conveying the meaning of loose general terms with less consumption of time and space. *Range definitions*¹² do this task. They give a list of characteristics most of which apply whenever the term applies. The boundaries of range concepts are indefinite, as are the boundaries of mountain ranges. Range definitions show this indefiniteness. Here is a range definition of 'romanticism,' which shows the indefinite boundaries by the use of the expression, 'characterized by':

'Romanticism' is characterized by (1) a sturdy and plainly expressed belief in the brotherhood of man; (2) a deep sympathy with humble lives, human and animal alike; and (3) a sense of the independent spirit of man and his natural right to freedom.¹³

The criteria for judging range definitions are that they should be as loose as the concept and cover the same indefinite territory.

Judgments about form of definitions require all three dimensions of critical thinking ability. Knowledge of the rules for selecting forms as well as the rules of the form to be used is required, thus giving the criterial dimension. Application of these rules involves the logical and pragmatic dimensions.

In summary, judging the adequacy of a definition involves judging the worth of the concept and/or judging the way it is put. All three dimensions are involved, as the analysis has shown.

12. *Judging whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable.*

This aspect requires development in all three dimensions since it is concerned with the application of principles and, insofar as the evaluator is able, requires evaluation of the statement irrespective of its source. The criteria that apply are fairly straightforward, though they must be applied with discretion:

12.1 To the extent that one is able to apply them, the relevant criteria from 1 through 11 should be applied.

12.2 Furthermore the credentials of the alleged authority should be considered. An alleged authority should be accepted to the extent that:

12.21 He has a good reputation.

12.22 The statement is in his field.

12.23 He was disinterested—that is, he did not knowingly stand to profit by the results of his statements (except that he may have stood to have his reputation affected).

¹² A term and concept proposed by Max Black (4).

¹³ Adapted from Rewey Belle Inglis, *et al.*, *Adventures in English Literature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), p. 262.

- 12.24 His reputation could be affected by his statement and he was aware of this fact when he made his statement.
- 12.25 He studied the matter.
- 12.26 He followed the accepted procedures in coming to his conclusion (although there are legitimate exceptions to this requirement).
- 12.27 He was in full possession of his faculties.

All three dimensions are involved, since these judgments call for the application of criteria.

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

A range definition of *critical thinking* has been provided by listing twelve aspects which characterize a critical thinker. It should now be clear that there is considerable overlap in the list of twelve aspects. For example, a statement that the problem has been identified, in one of its senses, is a statement that a principle has been applied correctly. This duplication has been permitted in order to present a more comprehensible list, and to make more apparent the conformity to the ordinary sense of *critical thinking*.

Under most of the aspects of *critical thinking* a list of criteria was presented; criteria which may be used in making the judgment called for. In all cases requiring judgments about the world of things, men, and events, these criteria must be applied with discretion; they are not to be applied mechanically. This is partly because numerous exceptions and qualifications which could have been mentioned were not mentioned in the interest of brevity; partly because a list of exceptions and qualifications would be endless, if we were to attempt to list them all; and partly because some difficult problems are still in need of further study.¹⁴

Finally, a logical analysis of the twelve abilities was made along three dimensions: the logical, the criterial, and the pragmatic. Appropriately weighted and empirically supported, such a simplification would suggest foci for evaluation and teaching.

NEXT STEPS

Assuming that the foregoing range definition of *critical thinking* is acceptable, what are the next steps in research into evaluating and teaching *critical thinking*? General suggestions can be made; suggestions which require elaboration and adjustment for particular situations, and further adjustment as new information feeds back into the theoretical structure.

Evaluation

The list of aspects and criteria can be used to develop tables of specifications for critical thinking tests. Weighting decisions are yet to be made, as are deci-

¹⁴ For example, the meaning of 'cause'; though on this problem Gasking's analysis (19) is very helpful.

sions about the levels at which the different abilities are possible. The latter decisions will require considerably more research than has yet been done in the area of readiness.

Checking the validity of these critical thinking tests should proceed along the lines advocated by Cronbach and Meehl in their article on construct validity (13). A check for agreement between the presented dimensional analysis and an empirical factor analysis would be worthwhile.

A check of certain hypothesized correlations with other traits would also be valuable, since construct validity depends on showing relationships with known variables, relationships that conform to theory-generated expectations. The following relationships are tentatively suggested. They are put vaguely, but necessarily so at this early stage.

Since all three dimensions appear to be learnable somewhat as academic subject matter is learnable, a smaller correlation is expected with I. Q. tests than is found between I. Q. tests. Since mental ability is obviously required for these dimensions, however, a sizeable correlation with I. Q. at a given age level is still expected. Of the three dimensions the logical dimension is expected to have the highest correlation with I. Q. at a given age level, followed by the criterial dimension and the pragmatic dimension in that order. Instruction in *critical thinking* should increase all of these correlations on the assumption that I. Q. tests measure potential to learn.

Since experience might be expected to strengthen one's pragmatic and criterial dimensions more than one's logical dimension after sixteen years of age, the former two are expected to correlate more highly with age beyond sixteen. The works of Burt, Moore, and Valentine suggest that logical ability appears early in life and develops in a fairly even manner (7, 33, 47). If this is so, the logical dimension may be expected to correlate substantially with age in elementary and secondary school. Of course the other dimensions should correlate substantially with age in elementary and secondary school also.

The correlations hypothesized above assume that there is some improvement of critical thinking without instruction. On the assumption that critical thinking is teachable, there should be greater improvement on all three dimensions if deliberate instruction is given.

There is probably a negative correlation between the degree to which a personality is authoritarian and the logical dimension, since the logical dimension is understood to include ability to judge not only what does follow and is implied, but what would follow, and what would be implied, if—. There is probably also a negative correlation between the degree to which a personality is authoritarian and the pragmatic dimension, since the pragmatic dimension is antithetical to all-or-none thinking.

Social-class status of students outside of the upper class, is probably correlated with *critical thinking*. No correlation is expected between *critical think-*

ing and political, social, and moral values, if the previously-mentioned factors are partialled out.

A construct validity judgment would also be helped by determining relationships between test scores and variables in methods of teaching. Thus experiments in the teaching of *critical thinking* would be helpful in the development of evaluation instruments and vice versa.

Instruction

We need to learn at what age students of various types can efficiently master the various aspects and criteria. Alternatively, or as a supplement, we need to know at what ages various types of students can master at various levels the three dimensions of *critical thinking*. It can not be said now which approach would be more fruitful.

We need to know in what curriculum patterns the aspects and/or dimensions are most effectively presented. Should they be integrated into existing courses or presented in a separate course? If integrated, which courses should be the vehicles? Or should all courses be involved, since *critical thinking* is needed in all areas?

What methods of teaching are most appropriate? Should the criteria of *critical thinking* be made explicit or left implicit? Do different groups need different approaches: boys and girls; social class groups; high, medium, and low mental ability groups? Must class size be kept at twenty-five, or can classes be increased in size—perhaps to hundreds or thousands? And how can teachers be prepared to teach their students to think critically? A course in logic? A course in *critical thinking*? A course in the logic of teaching? A special methods course? On-the-job training? A heavy dose of their subject-matter?

Since developments in evaluation and instruction complement each other, they must proceed apace. Let us hope that the concept of *critical thinking* presented in this essay will help us to push forward on both fronts.

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Book Reviews

Slums and Suburbs, James B. Conant. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961. 147 pp. \$1.95 (paper); \$3.95 (cloth).

In his visits to the city neighborhoods and schools throughout the country, Dr. Conant was frequently "jolted" and "disturbed" by the conditions that he met with, and he has "sought to create a set of anxious thoughts in the minds of the conscientious citizens who, while living in the suburbs, may work in the city." After reading *Slums and Suburbs*, one cannot avoid the question how, in the first place, a man was ever chosen to survey the schools who is so unfitted by his own experience, training and type of mind. He could certainly have seen these conditions not far from Harvard. One is struck by his technological and even economic approach, as if the pragmatic problem to be solved were the allocation of resources, rather than the psychological and political one of renewing society with each growing generation. Naturally, in the post-Sputnik delirium, our Establishment would choose a Scientist and an Administrator. Having little acquaintance with social or psychological reality, and being apparently quite complacent with the dominant goals of our Nation, Dr. Conant often expresses his "impatience" with "hair-splitting" philosophers and their educational ideals. His own philosophy has been that the purpose of schooling is simply to man the Cold War and train technicians and semi-skilled apprentices for the corporations and other businesses as usual. In this new book, however, he discovers that we must also watch out for the "social dynamite" of accumulated frustration and resentment among those who are out-caste in the present dispensation; yet again his concern is to regularize things, rather than to improve the electorate, the proper educational aim of a democracy. I have grown impatient with Dr. Conant. In this short review of a short book, let me pass by his characteristic virtues of earnestness and moderation, and concentrate on the shortcomings of his sociology and pedagogy.

Dr. Conant discusses mainly the northern Negro slums where the schools are increasingly *de facto* segregated and are very inadequate. At considerable length he belittles stratagems of integration; for instance, open enrollment allowing children to be sent out of the neighborhood to better white schools. A chief argument that he uses is, curiously, the arid legalism that *Brown et al vs. Topeka* forbids segregation on color grounds *solely*, whereas the present segregation is because of neighborhood plan and housing, and not because of color! So the scientific mind. But of course the exact point of *Brown* was that color, socio-economic, and community segregation is one integral social fact preventing equality of opportunity, and to the child is one inseparable psychological whole. The honorable and logical next step, in the face of *de facto* segregation, must be to try to get rid of housing and income segregation. But this, says Dr. Conant, is quite "impossible"—it is hard but not impossible—and to insist that white and Negro children be mixed in the classroom is, according to Dr. Conant, "extremely defeatist." Indeed, with his general tendency to achieve the *immediate* maximum-efficient allocation of resources

for non-educational purposes, Dr. Conant must consider the mixture of slums and suburbs undesirable, for it would dilute the high I. Q.'s. (His ideal school, as explained in this book, is the "challenging" Bronx High School of Science, although he does not mention that BHSS is segregated at least 75% Jewish, the bright children of ambitious and often poor parents chosen from the vast population of Manhattan and the Bronx, with plenty of "open enrollment.") Instead, Dr. Conant's solution for the inadequate Negro schools is to spend more money and make them equal in plant and staff to the suburban schools; that is, he returns to *Plessy vs. Ferguson*, equal but separate facilities, as if the Warren court had not spoken at all! It is not by such reasoning that he will dampen the social dynamite; he affirms just what the fight is about. His belief that a kind of integration can be achieved by having a mixed staff quite overlooks the Uncle Tom effect of such paternalism, for what the child learns is that "all whites are persons in authority; some Negroes can become teachers too, just like whites."

Open enrollment is a poor expedient. The few whites rapidly disappear and only the better-off Negro parents can afford or care to use the opportunity, so that color and income-segregation increases. Commutation is always to be avoided if possible, and certainly small children should not be twice-daily boarding busses. Among our excessively mobile population, neighborhood attachment should be strengthened rather than weakened, especially the attachment of the less out-caste. Nevertheless, as psychological encouragement and as simple justice, I do not see any other interim possibility than to allow this choice.

Our social policy, however, must be not to improve the slum schools as such, but to get rid of the suburbs—physically if possible, but at least as a separate and separatist way of life. We must reverse our public policy on F.H.A. loans, which has encouraged the automobiles, the payment of sales-taxes at the point of delivery, etc., and use the accruing money to improve the urban neighborhoods; thereby we shall integrate and improve the schools. Dr. Conant treats the suburbs as if they were a long-established condition deeply engrained in social nature; he does not seem to realize that the suburban flight has been an artifact of class-legislation spending billions of the public-money for escape-roads and real-estate and tax advantages, that should have gone to making a good city. Conversely, when he coyly (and truly) derides the pedagogic relevance of better heating and plumbing in urban housing, he astonishingly does not seem to know the newsy fact that our public housing, the work of fools, grafters, and profiteers, has uprooted neighborhoods, built in income-segregation as a principle, driven out enterprises useful to the communities, created delinquency, and usually not bothered if there is a school at all. It is not heating and plumbing that have pedagogic relevance, but the quality of the environment and the doings of the families that choose to live in that environment. Under these circumstances, it is by no means so absurd as Dr. Conant thinks to try the other tack for a while; to try, devilishly, to district or bus so that middle-class children have to go to slum schools. This would, very speedily and realistically, improve those schools and begin to improve and integrate those neighborhoods—we know how the white parents squawk at even the open-enrollment. (I quote the President of a Junior High PTA: "It is a mistake to transport children from far away; the morale of our school is being destroyed by overcrowding.") On the other hand,

appeals to conscientious anxiety will get nowhere—from the history of P.S. 119 in New York, one is not impressed by the celerity with which the present regime exterminates rats from slum schools.

Dr. Conant's bent of mind leads him to a persistent embarrassment in logic. On the one hand, he is quite sure that a correct allocation of abilities to different life-careers, academic or "vocational," college or post-graduate, can be predetermined by tests. "How can aptitude be determined? By noting the judgment of the teachers, and by considering the scores on scholastic aptitude and intelligence tests . . . to make rough predictions of future success." (He apparently does not know Getzels and Jackson on the unreliability of teachers' judgments and tests for even academic achievement; and what would he make of the conclusion of Bruner and his colleagues—or, for that matter, of Freud—that this kind of grading might be *destructive* of real achievement?) On the other hand, he understands that the low scoring in the slums is perhaps *entirely* due to background conditions. He mentions the "startling improvements on test scores" in the Higher Horizons program (of Dan Schreiber), which is aimed at orienting underprivileged children toward college in spite of social obstacles; and he speaks of the "astonishing results" of the Banneker program, which relates community and school and forgets the scores altogether, in the manner of old-fashioned progressive education. Given this contradiction between strong reliance on the tests and the perhaps entire irrelevance of the tests, one would assume that, to conserve human resources and elevate the population, an educator would lay his main stress on changing social conditions and *vastly* increasing the pool of talent. Even technologically, this would, apparently rather quickly, pay off, if the reforms were deep and thoroughgoing. But quite to the contrary, Dr. Conant speedily settles for a "vocational" program for the low-scorers (I put the word in quotation-marks since it pains me to see this beautiful notion, of finding a child's true vocation or calling, debased to the usual meaning and practice.). His problem is then to get the trained children into existing jobs in the community, and to tailor the training *toward* those jobs. He does not entertain the idea that perhaps it is partly *because* of the very prospect of those jobs and the lack of incentive to fit into that existing community, that there are so many low-scorers, and drop-outs 65% unemployed, and high-school graduates 50% unemployed. He does not criticize the jobs, he hardly considers the structure of the community, he is clear only about the "social" goals. Whose goals? The success of all programs like Higher Horizons comes from taking the children seriously as human beings, with sentiments and purposes that make up a whole existence.

In the suburbs where the majority will go on to college, Dr. Conant, in the interests of efficiency, finds that he must again separate the sheep from the goats; for many who are college-bound because of money or family ambitions, are not really academically talented enough to go on to graduate and professional work. (Incidentally, the magic ratio of the academically talented was, nationally, "15%" in 1959, but now, curiously, it is "15-20%".) The less gifted must not aim for the "prestige colleges"—Dr. Conant uses the expression without quotation marks—whose chief function is to service professional and graduate schools (although, incidentally again, the director of admissions at Harvard informs me that it is "phony" to go to Harvard just to advance up the ladder, and he disapproves of a youngster doing a high-school just to make a college). Now how, in the suburbs, does the competitive selectivity

of Dr. Conant work out in actuality? Dr. Conant is disturbed that many suburban children, pushed by ambitious parents, break down in trying to over-achieve; and, with admirable class-loyalty, he solemnly, in italics, assures the parents that there are other, less prestigious colleges available for the less gifted who have money. But I can assure him that suburban adolescents have their own devices to protect themselves from breakdown. For instance, since grading is on the bell-curve, those who might perform too well and make it hard for everybody, agree, or are persuaded, to restrain their ability, just as adult factoryworkers have a code to produce neither too much nor too little. (James Coleman of Johns Hopkins has, in *The Adolescent Society*, given us a study of many such "constraints against being a good student.") Conversely, at schools like Bronx Science—I am a Bronx Science parent—the rate of cheating, as reported in the school paper last spring, goes as high as 70% in the senior year, though it is only 25% in the freshman year. This makes excellent training to end up as a Westinghouse or General Electric executive in jail, but it does not have direct relevance to the habit of science. Let me quote also from an editorial in the student paper of the Harvard Business School, that people are "placed by society and the pressure of capitalist conformity in a position where they can succeed only by violating the laws." Thus, among hip kids, the very devices of selection, grading, and competitiveness that our author relies on to produce competence, are likely to produce either sabotage or crime.

Though he speaks of a "general or liberal" education, Dr. Conant seems to have no concept of a liberal education at all. His purpose is always teleological, whereas the purpose of a liberal education is to bring up the young to be new centers of initiative and citizenly responsibility. He explains the reason for general education in the following odd sentence: "Talented students should develop specific skills in high school that, if not developed, restrict their choice of careers." That is, we do not want to educate free men who might take over, but adaptable kits of marketable skills. The "vocational" training for the lower I.Q.'s, effectually for the vast majority of the underprivileged class, is aimed toward specific opportunities in the neighborhoods, to give each child a single marketable skill, an apprentice-system at the public expense; but how will this educate a nation?

On the upward ladder, no age of growth seems to have needs of its own; everything is oriented to the future. For instance, Dr. Conant considers the junior-high idea as indifferent, so long as the "program" is right. One would have thought that the program and method would be importantly determined by the transition into puberty—but to be sure, since the sexual has been banned from the junior high as from the rest of the school system, Dr. Conant is right, the idea is indifferent. At the upper end of the ladder, correspondingly, the quicker the specific adaptation to the career, the better—according to Dr. Conant the advantages of 3 years of under-graduate college rather than 4 "hardly need be emphasized." And up the whole ladder, finally, "the ideal situation, in the best interests of both the individual and society," is the smooth transition throughout, and the immediate placement of the graduate by the job-bureau of the university; he singles out Engineering as the best example. (It is extraordinary, if this is so ideal, how the youth of the more sophisticated East are choosing *away* from this good example.) That is, we are to make professionals who know nothing, who have been speeded up, who

have explored nowhere, who have not had a chance to mature even psycho-sexually. It is this monstrous doctrine and practice that have already long saddled us with an inhumane and uncitizenly society, with slums of engineering without community plan, with unphilosophical medicine, a useless and venal technology, a sheepish electorate, a debased culture and jejune teachers who cannot relate the tradition and the world, and politics like Dr. Conant's. This is the education of the Organization. There is nothing newly threatening in any of Dr. Conant's books, nothing to be up in arms about; he strides the middle of the established road; it is a disaster.

The relation of society and school is necessarily ambiguous. Society demands the school it thinks it needs, and for the most part it gets what it deserves. Yet the school also has its own aims and as a community of youth and of concerned and somewhat detached and idealistic adults, it continually offers a possibility of change and growth. A wise society protects this cambium, this growing layer. The dialectic of this perennial ambiguity is the philosophy of education, with which Dr. Conant is so impatient. Dr. Conant does not conceive himself as a philosopher but as a kind of social-engineer, primarily to provide personnel and training, secondarily to avoid trouble. But man being what he is, I doubt that it is possible to get adequate personnel or avoid trouble unless one has higher aims than Dr. Conant. He is entirely impractical, for by the time some of these kids grow up, the world, if there is a world, will look very different.

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***The Schools*, Martin Mayer. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1960. 446 pp. \$4.95.**

With the publication of his fifth major book, Martin Mayer joins the ranks of distinguished authors—some obviously less distinguished than others—whose literary objective has been to portray American Education in action. The complex structure in which our schools and colleges operate makes any such task monumental in its dimensions. Customarily, education writers place their focus of attention on a relatively small segment of the school and collegiate systems. Unlike his colleagues, Mr. Mayer courageously attempts the assignment of examining the total spectrum. His courage is matched by a most refreshing frankness as he concludes the volume with the admission that "It is really impossible to write about the schools" (p. 425). Prior to reaching this conclusion, however, his provocative criticisms place this work in the category of significant contributions to the field of education.

Criticism of our schools and colleges is not a novelty. Neither should it be regarded as unwelcome, in spite of heated debates between the unyielding critic and the staunch defender. In a typical year upwards of 200 articles appear in publications of national circulation. Over the past decade, particularly since the launching of Sputnik in 1957 and the resulting interest in celestial hardware, the number has increased to well over 300 with the condemnatory tone much sharper and some of the articles far more destructive in scope. Scott and Hill in their comprehensive analysis, *Public Education Under Criticism* (Prentice-Hall, 1954), divide the critics into four groups, viz., scholars, professional educators, professional writers, and outright ene-

mies of education. Martin Mayer properly may be assigned to the third group as a thoughtful critic with unusual insight into major problems facing the schools.

This insight was enhanced considerably during thirty months of direct observation in approximately 150 schools here and abroad. The latter visitations were made in Great Britain, France, Denmark, Finland and Norway. Here again, Mr. Mayer departs from the standard procedure used by many of his associates in that he goes directly to the well. So many faulty evaluations have been made because of superficial contacts with institutions throughout the world, that one leader expressed the hope that judgments would be reserved unless the visitor "flew over the area during the hours of daylight." Many school critics, lacking the opportunity to "fly over" a given target, have based their conclusions on the hearsay evidence of totally unqualified or biased observers. In the course of his visits to education's firing line—the classroom—the author conferred with about 1500 individuals presumed to be knowledgeable. This approach certainly must be accepted as comprehensive in scope and sequence.

Yet, inherent in the above process is the major defect of *The Schools*. The interview technique at best leaves much to be desired. The contact with few exceptions is superficial and the fallibility of both the interviewer and the interviewee clearly apparent. As the author states in his discussion of Harvard's Professor B. F. Skinner and his teaching machines, "There are no wrong answers, only wrong questions" (p. 400). In other words Mr. Mayer's broad-gauge questions in many cases had to be of the sight-seeing variety, completely lacking in depth. His descriptions of the philosophies, points of view, methodologies and procedures of the profession reflect to a high degree the competency or incompetency of the individual being interviewed. In parts of the book factual errors appear indicating that several of those interviewed must have misinformed the author. Additionally, as he states himself in Chapter 10, "facts . . . are capable of many interpretations" (p. 182). These interpretations inevitably prejudice the result of research surveys of this type. This situation is not unique in education and would obtain in agriculture, law, medicine or any other field of endeavor.

One might also question the validity of the selected sample. Although 1500 is a substantial number, and interviewing these persons must have been a man-sized chore; nevertheless, the sample shrinks to insignificance when one contemplates the total number directly associated with the teaching profession in this country and abroad. It certainly would be possible to establish such a narrow base of participation that distortions were bound to occur. This would be true also for the school buildings and campuses which the author visited. Considering the fact that in the United States alone over 28,000 secondary schools are in operation daily, the 150-school itinerary loses some of its impressiveness. The problem is compounded when one considers that visitors do not have an opportunity to appraise what takes place prior to the observed lesson, nor can they be aware of post-visit activities. Add to this the ramifications of the good days and the bad days which teachers and all others experience.

The above is not designed to detract from the fact that the publication qualifies as one of the most comprehensive, if not the most comprehensive, work of this type by a professional writer in our time. Martin Mayer has esti-

mated that he collected over 6000 pages of notes and read books occupying 50 linear feet of shelf space in preparing the volume. In a period marked by the growth of a cult of shortcutters, this feat alone qualifies him for a commendation of the highest order.

For the nonprofessional interested in obtaining a broad overview of our schools—yesterday, today, and tomorrow—the author serves ably in the role of an academic Duncan Hines. His vivid descriptions of classrooms from Southern California to the Scandinavian Peninsula afford the reader an unusual view of the scholarly and the not so scholarly at work. Inevitably the success story of a particular school or program pivots on the presence of a Mr. or Miss Chips. The darker side of the coin is portrayed when classes are taught or schools administered by those mired in the ruts of mediocrity. Socio-economic implications, particularly those relating to slums and suburbs, also are handled expertly. His all-inclusive coverage of education touches upon how schools are organized from kindergarten level through the senior high school; programs of study in fields such as mathematics, science, language; tests and examinations; the tools of teaching; and how our future teachers are being trained.

To the professional, the anecdotal approach represents a far cry from the scientific and technical depth which the subject deserves. No one will deny the breadth of treatment, but a montage of school routine is without substance and for the educator parallels the postman's holiday walks. Teaching is far more complex than teacher telling; and learning far more complex than pupil doing. The handling of the philosophical and psychological aspects of education falls short at the professional level.

A less significant shortcoming in *The Schools* is the implication that many of the better practices are unusual enough to be categorized as unique. For those who earn their livelihood in education, many practices or adaptations of them will be recognized as more or less commonplace. Here again, the limitation of a 150-school sample takes its toll. The focus is narrowed further by perhaps too frequent reference to certain schools, such as those in the Tucson area, Salt Lake City, Connecticut's Westport, and suburban Chicago's New Trier. Nevertheless, the visits serve to emphasize the dual role of our schools, i.e. as the stabilizers or perpetuators of society, as well as the agents for change.

In spite of the above deficiencies, the author's style is sufficiently vigorous to hold the layman and the professional alike. Martin Mayer is a highly skilled writer and the book is both informative and entertaining. His discussion of the sacred cows of the profession are classics, and the descriptive nuggets found throughout the volume reflect a highly developed sense of humor. Of greater significance is his sense of fair play. Whether he is discussing the schools of this nation or of France; whether his reference is to public or private institutions; a common thread of fairness is found in each chapter. One senses, also, a deep and abiding faith in public education. He recognizes that institutions move forward slowly but surely. His expression of appreciation for the accomplishments of the schools and their teachers, as well as his hopes for a better tomorrow, are shared by citizens everywhere.

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The Transformation of the School, Lawrence A. Cremin. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1961. xi + 387 pp. \$5.50.

This most recent book from the prolific hand of Lawrence Cremin is important on several counts. First, Professor Cremin has attempted a most dangerous assignment: the description and explanation of a recent movement, that of "progressive education." Let it be said that the fur and feathers are still flying over the meaning and success or failure of that movement, and that Cremin is, then, attempting the "contemporary history" of an emotion-laden topic, a tricky, but nonetheless important task. Second, this book puts together many materials which previously have been scattered. Cremin's broad sweep collects and organizes a truly vast variety of sources and, in this compilation, he has performed a notable service; his footnotes will be carefully mined by generations of students. Third, *The Transformation of the School* places the progressive movement in education within the broader context of the social climate of the times. Needless to say, this is where the topic belongs, but many previous historians have failed to see the close interrelation of the various threads of the era in reform. Cremin's analysis benefits from his broad view. Finally, this book stands as an example of the difficulties in writing the history of education. "Education" is an elusive animal. It is hard enough to describe what was taught and what leaders said about what was taught, but it is an even far riskier business to determine what students actually learned and what values they carried with them when they left the school-houses.

Cremin defines his topic clearly in his preface: "The word *progressive* provides the clue to what it really was: the educational phase of American Progressivism writ large." In detail it meant the following: "First, it meant broadening the program and function of the school to include direct concern for health, vocation, and the quality of family and community life. Second, it meant applying in the classroom the pedagogical principles derived from new scientific research in psychology and the social sciences. Third, it meant tailoring instruction more and more to the different kinds and classes of children who were being brought within the purview of the school . . . Finally, Progressivism implied the radical faith that culture could be democratized without being vulgarized, the faith that everyone could share not only in the benefits of the new sciences but in the pursuit of the arts as well" (pp. viii-ix). Cremin sees the revolt against the old time education much as did Oscar Handlin in his little book, *John Dewey's Challenge to Education*. He finds the muckraking articles of Joseph Mayer Rice, published in 1892, to be of first importance. This is characteristic of Cremin's broad approach, for Rice was no professional pedagogue; he was a reformer in the main stream of protest. From Rice, Cremin moves on, sweeping over the lives and contributions of the little known and the well known: Calvin Woodward, Liberty Hyde Bailey, William James, John Dewey and many others. He deals in detail with a number of projects such as the Gary Plan, and he discusses at length the ideas and the conflicts of the group of brilliant and controversial men in the early years of Teachers College, Columbia. In a final chapter, "The Crisis in Popular Education," Cremin speaks of the decline of "progressive education" and deals, with laudable calmness and lack of polemic, with the arguments and counter-arguments of the 1950's. While the text is somewhat marred by Cremin's continual interest in biography—several

chapters seem almost to be a series of unconnected pictures—*The Transformation of the School* is by far the most useful and scholarly work on eighty recent years in American education yet published.

Ironically, the most interesting chapter of the book is probably the least successful. In "The Changing Pedagogical Mainstream," Cremin tries to deal with the *general* effect of the progressive movement on education. Where it was far easier for him to narrate the fortunes of the pioneering schools, such as Shady Hill, for which there was much written material, American schools in the broadest sense posed Cremin a difficult problem. It can be argued that what is attempted in this eighth chapter is more properly a separate, companion volume. Cremin's book as it stands is really a piece of intellectual history, a story of a developing idea or ideas and the initial effect that these ideas have had on the institutions at which they were directed. The social history—what was "really going on" in the run-of-the-mill American schools—is another kind of work. Cremin sees this problem clearly; as he writes, "On the one hand, there were the shining examples like Winnetka; on the other hand, there were schools that must have taught McGuffey and little else well into the thirties." But Cremin goes further, taking the icy plunge of generalization. He finds in the schools "a steady extension of educational opportunity, downward as well as upward." He finds an "expansion and reorganization of the curriculum at all levels" and a reorganization of the school ladder from 'eight-four' systems to 'six-three-three'. He finds an increased interest in extra-curricular matters, in grouping, in the material of instruction. He finds teachers better trained, "more active, more mobile and more informal in their relationships." He finds school architecture changing to take account of new pedagogy, and he finds also increased bureaucracy in school administration, though this latter point he finds somewhat paradoxical (pp. 305-308). But what is the evidence for all this? Cremin's sources for these matters are less complete, obviously, than they are for other portions of the book. He cites a 1939 report of the United States Office of Education and he uses, as well, John F. Latimer's analysis of Office of Education statistics entitled, *What's Happened to our High Schools?* Is this enough? Did "progressivism" in education touch the schools in all parts of the country, urban and rural, north and south, equally? If not, why not? Further, do studies of curricula give the best clues to the realities of the classrooms? There are knotty problems here, ones that deserve the historian's closest attention.

More important, however, in the last analysis, is the basic question: did the progressives "change" their pupils? The effect of ideas upon school organization, on curricula, on pedagogy have only antiquarian interest unless one can demonstrate that they indeed changed the students and through them, inevitably, society. Cremin has started this demonstration with a history of progressive ideas; next must come a careful study of the realities of American classrooms in the twentieth century, and finally some analysis of the effect of this change upon American youth.

Some might say at this juncture that a history of education that attempted carefully to assess the effects of ideas not only upon the educational institutions but, through them, *upon the students themselves* is an impossible one to write. Short of detailed sociological studies and long range investigations such as that of the Eight-Year Study, how can one make any generalization? This objection, however, is one leveled at much of what we might call social

history, an area in which sources are scattered, often in unlikely places, and hard to analyze. Matters like the influence of the family unit upon the training of the young—a topic imaginatively handled by Bernard Bailyn in his recent study called *Education in the Forming of American Society*—are difficult to describe and elusive to document. While all this may be true, these analyses may indeed be the most important kind of “history,” for they grasp at the questions that need answers rather than at the questions the answers of which may simply be easy to document. The really important question in all discussion of education is, of course, how are our children changed for their sixteen or more years of full time attendance in academic institutions?

This key question will be difficult to answer, but no more “difficult” it seems to me, than those relating to the ideal of liberty in American society, the influence of the frontier on American life, or the effect of industrialization upon laboring groups. An answer, of course, will not be “scientific” in the sense that it will be everlastingly irrefutable; it will have to be both imaginative and intuitive, but this kind of history is often the most perceptive and, in the end, most useful. An historian would, in this instance, have to look first at the classrooms, at the texts—they tell far more of what was taught than curriculum guides as any present day teacher can fully attest—, at teachers, at class size, at discipline and at the sorts of other affairs which touched the children. One must, then, dredge for the humdrum reality of the twentieth century classroom as the students experienced it. One might trace students by origin and final employment—some school systems kept such data, even in the 1890’s—to test, insofar as possible, the long-fabled “money argument” for education: were the schools social ladders? If so, which schools, and why? Were there regional, or racial, or ethnic variations in this pattern of social mobility? Such questions have been asked of immigrants’ children and productively answered. The schools were, for American-born children of recently-arrived foreigners, the crowbar that pried them from European culture, the means to make them English-speaking Americans in the fullest sense. Their parents were often and poignantly left behind. What were the schools to other groups?

A more subtle look could be taken at the mass media. Have the years of formal education affected Americans’ taste? If so, how? Surely there must be some correlation between the two, and this needs consideration. Schools willy-nilly teach values of some sort: what were these and have they changed?

Perhaps in all this I am calling more for the disciplines of the social sciences than for those of the historian. This may be so, but much of the problem involves assessment of changes in American society and culture over a hundred and fifty years, for such changes as the historian of education has in mind are ones that come slowly and relatively imperceptibly. Historians have not been afraid to examine the effects of other vague and hard-to-document topics; why should not similar studies be made of the influence of our formal and compulsory institutions of education upon their clients, the students, and upon American social and intellectual life?

But let not this digression into a discussion of needed research detract from Lawrence Cremin’s contribution in *The Transformation of the School*. His book raises these historiographical issues in sharp relief, and the lack of studies of the nature I have proposed is readily evident. Cremin has difficulty at many points due to the paucity of good monographs in the field. His book

is important as a piece of intellectual history and as an explanation of a major movement of our time. But it is also important as a demonstration of what else should be done.

Cremin has set a high standard of scholarship and literary grace in describing the transformation of the school; what is now needed, to accompany this work, is a study of equal stature of the transformation of the schools' students and their society with them.

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Professional Administrators for America's Schools, The Thirty-Eighth Yearbook of the American Association of School Administrators, 1960. National Education Association, Washington, D. C., 1960. 284 pp. \$5.00.

Twenty years from now, this volume may be viewed as one of the most significant steps in the painfully slow evolution of educational administration. It is the expression of the feelings of some of the most thoughtful leaders in the field about the current programs for training of a school administrator. They concluded that, "There is a shocking discrepancy between what (this) Commission recommends . . . and what exists at the present time" (p. 84). For once, a book produced by a committee sounds as tough-minded as the individual members of the committee.

This volume has a double significance—first, for the specific contents to which this review will eventually revert, and second, for the potential impact of the study on the condition of school administration in the United States.

This study was undertaken at the same time that the national organization of school leaders—the American Association of School Administrators—was considering how it might make "school administration the profession its leaders covet and often claim," as the Commission well puts it (p. vii). The first step was taken in 1959 when a majority of those voting on the question at the AASA National Convention in Atlantic City accepted a requirement that after 1964, new members of AASA must show evidence of completing at least two years of successful graduate study in educational administration, in a program approved by an accreditation body endorsed by the Executive Committee of the AASA.

Some commentators on matters educational might view this vote as merely extending the sway of "professional educators" by forcing more hapless students to take more courses in "educational administration." If the vote had merely required more training of whatever sort, there might be grounds for such suspicion.

However, the vote included the provision that such graduate training program would be *accredited*, and while at times such educational verbiage is merely ornamental, it is quite clear from the heat currently being generated that the standards now used in the accreditation process have some bite. AASA arranged for the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), to do this accrediting on the basis of standards which are based in large measure upon the findings of the Commission in *Professional Administrators for America's Schools*. This accrediting process has now been organized and is under way.

The NCATE accreditation standards, while reasonable and highly desirable, are too rigorous for many smaller institutions to meet. It appears that courses in educational administration—especially when provided cafeteria style on a part-time basis—are notably lucrative for the institutions concerned, which also often rely upon the graduates of such courses for help in teacher placement. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that any serious effort to establish high standards for the training of school administrators would generate powerful political forces within AASA either to water down the standards, or to rescind the vote requiring graduate study of future members. Either action would eliminate most of the impact of the accreditation effort.

Whether school administrators as a group really deserve the appellation of "professionals" will be demonstrated as this struggle develops. There may be a conclusive answer to those writers who ask recurrently and wistfully, "Is school administration *really* a profession?" If the AASA sticks by its guns, the answer is "Probably yes, in time." But there are little men fearful for their jobs when able and well-trained competitors appear on the scene, and small institutions greedy for the hard-earned dollars of ambitious teachers. If they can mobilize sufficient strength to achieve an ignominious reversal of the AASA vote of 1959, or to secure the less noticeable but no less fatal decision to allow a slow, unacknowledged erosion of the AASA-NCATE accreditation standards, the answer will clearly be "NO."

The significance of the *Professional Administrators for America's Schools* can be appreciated only if it is seen in this historical context. It may be that this book can rightly be compared in future decades to Abraham Flexner's epochal report and recommendations on the professional training of doctors in the United States. On the other hand, the book may be just the "high tide" of an unsuccessful attempt to "professionalize" what is now considerably less than a profession in many places. Judgment must be suspended on this point.

The product of the 1960 Yearbook Commission is a desperately-needed effort by a group of well-known leaders in the field of educational administration to lift the sights of their peers. The Commission judged that the most critical factor in the long run was the professional training of those men who would be heading toward the key post of school superintendent. Furthermore, better and more rigorous training will, over time, tend to secure better rewards for superintendents and thus attract more able men into the profession. In addition, they considered the problem of continued "in-service" education for both incumbent superintendents and those who are the product of the "new design" of preparation.

The book is launched through a disguised version of the process by which an actual school board sought a new superintendent, revealing many of the requirements of any sound preparational program. It then turns to a profile of the men who are now superintendents, drawn from questioning a broad sample of current superintendents. The next two chapters describe present preparational programs for school administrators and in-service training programs.

Next the study devotes a chapter to the tremendous changes affecting education in recent years and those ahead, in order to identify those new aspects of school administration which preparational programs must take into

account. In addition, this chapter notes some of the particular aspects of school administration, in the context of the administrative process generally.

The central concern of the study is the selection, preparation and continuing education of the school administrator, to which three chapters are devoted. The book then faces up to the very difficult problems involved in carrying out these proposals—how this intensive type of training can be financed, how to secure *real* improvement in preparational programs, and how to encourage the adoption of better practices by those already in administrative positions. Finally, it grapples with the most difficult problem of all—that of setting up some kind of professional standards and professional control by the school administrators themselves.

The Commission has identified the critical problems facing school administration, and did not pull any punches in noting the weak spots and inadequacies which were found. Occasionally, one may question some of their judgments, but what is refreshing is that the Commission made the judgments in the first place—often rather harsh ones. This reviewer will not pretend to assess all aspects of the Commission's study, but there are several points which raise interesting questions.

The detailed report on the way in which one school board selected a new superintendent represents a commendable approach to the most difficult problem that school boards commonly face, and certainly this is a good "springboard" for the study. However, this description may give some readers the impression that selection of superintendents is generally a completely rational, well-thought-out and informed process. It is only necessary to recall some recent "searches" for new school superintendents in some major cities to see that the real often falls far short of the ideal. In many cases, political, religious, ethnic, or other non-educational factors dominate the process. Even where there are good intentions, there is often a woeful amount of confusion on the part of school board members about what is *really* wanted or needed in a superintendent. This often is compounded by an absence of acquaintance with superintendents of real stature and a serious lack of information about the availability of able administrators.

The profile of the superintendent was drawn from lengthy questionnaires sent to about one-third of the superintendents of "urban" school districts—those with a population of 2,500 or more, counties which included a city of 30,000 or more, or rural districts in which more than half the population was "urban." Of the superintendents questioned, 62.7% replied. It may well be that those superintendents failing to return the questionnaire would show an even lower standard of preparation than those who did, and a sampling of the *non*-respondents would be very interesting, although one cannot hold this omission against the Commission, in view of all that they accomplished.

One aspect of the approach by the Yearbook Commission may lead the reader astray. There is a good deal of emphasis on the opinions of the current superintendents as to the nature of training required, and the adequacy of the training they received, as a guide to what should be. Since the bulk of the respondents had been in school administration for many years, it follows that their preparation was even more primitive and poorly-organized than that the Commission found today. The Commission also noted that the pressures on the superintendent often inhibit continuing self-education or other means of translating research findings and generalized concepts into the actual field situations.

There is one comment by the Commission on present training programs which certainly is open to debate. "Full-time graduate study in school administration is relatively rare. Where it does exist, the numbers of students are so small as to cast doubt upon the validity of the idea that *bona fide* programs actually exist. . . . What kind of an offering can be given to fewer than 25 students?" (p. 84). It is this reviewer's opinion that the kind of intensive preparational program which the Commission advocates may well limit the total number of students who can be adequately trained at one time to a number not too much larger than 25. Many of the highly-desirable aspects of training require high inputs of faculty time, and a faculty cannot be spread too thin or its value is lost. It is true that small programs are much more expensive than mass training, but also it may well be true that their product is considerably better.

In the last chapter, the Commission frankly states that there is much to be done before school administration is really going to be a profession, even if the AASA vote on membership requirements is sustained, and even if the AASA-NCATE accrediting program is continued at maximum effectiveness. Notably, administrators still lack the most distinguishing attributes of "real professions"—the power of controlling entry into the profession, and of being able to expel notably "unprofessional" members. Until that time, many school districts will be run by any person the school board, in its wisdom (or otherwise) may select.

As the Commission states bluntly, its work

has revealed the rather dismal montage of the preparation of school superintendents. There is a shocking discrepancy between what the Commission recommends in Chapter VII and what exists at the present time. Without doubt, if the investigation of the colleges and universities could have been carried out on a more intensive level, the discrepancy would have been greater. (p. 84)

The thinking of the 1960 Yearbook Commission, as developed in *Professional Administrators for America's Schools*, should be of the highest value in supporting efforts to raise school superintendency toward real and responsible "professionalism," in place of current status-conscious pretensions so frequently encountered.

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***The Overseas Americans*, Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1960. 316 pp. \$5.95.**

This book reports a study by Harlan Cleveland and his associates in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, carried on under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The overseas Americans are conducting abroad the traditional functions of diplomacy and political representation; they engage in business enterprises; they advise officials of other nations on the course of economic development; they provide technical assistance to speed modernization and change; they carry out military missions; they preach the gospel. These men and women are enmeshed along with their families in contempo-

rary international relations. They give major content to the American "image" abroad.

From this report we come away with brief impressions of how differing backgrounds, highly personal motives, purposeful professional interests, and other goals are blended to help explain why Americans go and stay abroad (or hurry home). These people who work at intervening in the internal affairs of other nations do not readily distinguish themselves from their countrymen who stay at home.

Yet special demands are made of the overseas American. He "faces the necessity of making important physical and psychological adjustments to both the living conditions and the work" (p. 26). Some Americans "go native" and some behave as if they "never left home." Most suffer from milder forms of "culture shock" and learn with some pain about novel (to them) conceptions of time, strange foods, and puzzling pieces of "the silent language" through which people all over conduct important communications. Wives and children also suffer the shock of radical changes in the way of life. In less developed areas of the world especially, "fear of disease, the chronic worry about schooling for the children, and the frustrating effort to cross the cultural barrier" (p. 50), place heavy burdens on wives.

To the authors much in our education and experience, indeed the "whole of American culture seems designed to make it difficult for Americans to move comfortably in many foreign cultures" (p. 41). Often "little Americas" represent our effort to enable Americans to survive on terms acceptable to them. But these enclaves bring irritations over this new style extra-territoriality.

But all of this is introduction to the central outcome of this study. Why do government people, missionaries, and businessmen "succeed" or "fail" abroad? If we can identify the elements that make a difference on the job, can we pick those who give most promise of success? Can we train them to meet the demands of overseas tasks?

After he learns to "adjust" and to profit from "culture shock" the overseas American must demonstrate more than the technical skills called for on jobs at home. He will always face in his work unusual demands as part of his foreign assignment. Just because he works in a setting that may be less than ideal for the fullest accomplishment, he can succeed only as he believes deeply in his mission. "Cultural empathy is the skill to understand the inner logic and coherence of other ways of life, plus the restraint not to judge them as bad because they are different from one's own ways" (p. 136). Finally, the effective overseasman assesses the varied forces at work that may help or hinder him as he seeks to effect change. He exhibits a sense of politics and organizational ability to develop self-sustaining enterprises, to build institutions that will allow him to work himself out of a job.

Can we pick people who are likely to meet these requirements? This book tells about some of the varied and at times sophisticated selection procedures we have at hand. But often we do not know enough in detail about what the overseas assignment consists in to guide recruitment efforts. Moreover, our educational system has not developed "a pool of Americans who, in addition to their vocational skills, are known in advance to have the understanding and the attitudes necessary to survival in overseas service" (p. 169).

Cleveland and his associates can, nevertheless, point to "internationalization" of undergraduate and graduate and professional studies. About

1,250,000 students who go to the 315 colleges and universities can draw on special programs of international studies, area studies, or opportunities for overseas study. About 750,000 students attend the 552 colleges without such programs. In many graduate schools, intensive studies of the major areas of the world can be pursued. None focus yet on the transferability of what is learned about one country or area to another. For the undergraduate student of some means a number of study programs allow him to advance his education overseas. Professional schools recognize the fact that their graduates may pursue some part of their career overseas and consequently need some special training. Yet this record should not obscure the fact that only with major educational reconstruction will it likely be possible to fill key posts overseas with the ablest people.

Because it has been of wide popular concern, the book's analysis of the "use and abuse of foreign languages" should add a kind of first-hand report from the experience of overseas Americans. More Americans with language skills are needed. Better language instruction ought to become the rule. But at best, knowledge of foreign languages represents only part of the qualifications of the American overseas. It may even be that "our linguistic renaissance" could threaten developing concern for other necessary elements of the education of Americans for work overseas.

If we are to act on the findings of this study, we need to free ourselves of some common fallacies: "knowing a foreign language is all-important"; "training for one area is completely different from training for another foreign area"; "orientation for overseas work should be rigidly compartmentalized according to the kind of work the trainees are going to do abroad"; and "overseas service is a new profession and (in university organization) a new academic discipline" (pp. 293, 294).

Within higher education, then, Cleveland and his associates urge that immersion in an alien culture become a common central experience. They propose that area study serve not only the needs of scholars but also the professionals going into an area. They urge that the curriculum of every professional school reflect the fact that some of its graduates will practice abroad. And part of American higher education ought to enable Americans to come to know America first.

To bring about especially these developments in higher education, the authors believe that the employing agencies will supply a needed prodding. They also urge, however, that the national government act on the example of the Morrill Acts and of the National Science Foundation by establishing a "National Foundation for Overseas Operations" to aid and encourage higher education to take some large steps towards meeting urgent needs.

So, using this study as a base, we confront in its special perspective some of the most persistent questions about higher education. Under what conditions can American universities initiate such changes as may be required to put our society into a posture more suitable for meeting our overseas commitments? The question is not only one of turning out "products" to be used in these ventures. Nor are our colleges and universities simply resources to be tapped as if they were somehow detached and self-sustaining organisms apart from our society. In that society they need to draw their sustenance from it. Can they then discover and put to use new energies to speed the growth of new attitudes and insights in the society itself so that it will sustain them even when they challenge the comfortable myths we live by? For their students,

One cannot argue with the facts presented here; this review, then, will concentrate on what can be done about an abysmally dark picture. As did the Basic Issues report¹, this one, too, begins with a reminder that English (and note that word; it has been disappearing in favor of Language Arts and Communication Skills) is the study of language, literature, and composition.

What other subject, I might interject here, has so lost its purpose? English, in the hands of people who could not teach it, has fallen back on what Jerome Bruner calls "a middle language," remote from real learning. The student is put through a process of remembering *about* topic sentences, nouns, infinitives, similies, climax, and such; but he can not *use* the concepts. Too many teachers give the impression, as one watches, of filling up time. The same process is now at work in required driver training classes; the teachers have more time than they know how to use. So my daughter is memorizing the parts of the carburetor; but when the motor is stalling, she cannot make it idle.

English, as a subject, is desperately in need of definition of what it is. In recognizing this fact, the report calls for a nationally supported program to work out the "essential content and methods of English" (p. 4).

The report accepts, we can infer, the fact that course content can not be worked out in curriculum committees formed within schools. Financial support must be obtained for the best teachers to get together and to work out an articulated program from kindergarten through college. The writers then suggest that "the development of a series of key regional centers for study and demonstration of sequential, articulated programs in English for a heterogeneous student population would effectively dramatize to the nation the need for improving English instruction at all grade levels" (p. 5). Until this is done, anyone in teacher training can see the great need for movie reels, or even recordings, of good teachers in action. The other suggestions mirror ideas already being carried out for in-service training of science teachers by the National Science Foundation. The common quality of all the suggestions is that the financial aid should come from outside the schools—from foundations or from the national government. One could wish that more towns would support their teachers financially for summer study.

When the report talks of the preparation of English teachers, we get to the heart of the problem. The fact that about fifty per cent of the people teaching English did not major in that subject is a result of the idea that anyone can teach English. He picks up a "grammar book" and makes the students learn that "a noun is the name of a person, place, or thing" and "a verb is an action word." Then when the student, in from science, concludes that explosion is a verb, he is called stupid. The report quotes Leonard Bloomfield, in 1924, saying "Our schools are conducted by persons who, from professors of education down to teachers in the classroom, know nothing of the results of linguistic science, not even the relation of writing to speech, or of standard language to dialect. In short, they do not know what language is, and yet they must teach it, and in consequence waste years of every child's life and reach a poor result" (p. 61).

¹"The Basic Issues in the Teaching of English," a pamphlet prepared by members of American Studies Association, the College English Association, The Modern Language Association, and the National Council of Teachers of English.

Children do not learn to read literature and to write because the education of the elementary school teacher for teaching reading and writing is practically non-existent. One can infer from the emphasis in the report that the critical state of secondary school language teaching requires teachers to have courses in the history of the English language, in Modern English grammar, in advanced composition, and in methods of teaching English.

The prospect is equally depressing when the report turns to preparation for teaching literature. More than fifty per cent of the colleges require only three or four courses in literature for a person majoring in English. What do they do for the other three years? And one might suspect that in such colleges the courses are surveys. The report implies that world literature should be studied in English courses. Here they are in sharp disagreement with the Basic Issues report which reminded us that literature in translation is no longer foreign literature. And when one looks at world literature books used in high schools, would one know that the pieces had originally been written in a foreign language if he were not so told? Many fine colleges think that French literature should be read in French. It would seem better to give priority to the understanding of our own culture before we try to understand others.

The report also emphasizes that survey courses often do not teach prospective teachers how to *read* a literary genre. And we know that a teacher who does not know how to read poetry can not teach poetry. On this matter there is one interesting and ambiguous reference to examinations for English teachers. We are some day going to have to face the fact of an examination as part of the accrediting process. People who can not read and write can not teach English; too many of them are now trying to. The student's improvement in writing will always be limited by how well the teacher can read his papers. And the teacher who cannot give a good reading to a literary work will never be able to ask questions enabling a class to give it a good reading. We are in the age of the over-tested student and the under-tested teacher.

The report turns next to the conditions under which English is taught. It cites a study² claiming to prove that English is best taught in small classes; it advocates a maximum load of four classes of 25 students each. It cites further the Dusel study³ which claims that if a teacher marks a paper for writing and thinking, he will spend 8.6 minutes for 250 words. Good English teaching is very expensive.

The final section of the report deals with the characteristics of high school departments which produce superior English students. Superior here is put in the context of those students who won prizes on contests run by the National Council of Teachers of English. The teachers in these schools tend to have strong undergraduate programs in English and many did their graduate work in English. They teach equal portions of writing and literature. They stress functional teaching of grammar, emphasizing application rather than identification. That is, a phrase is taught for how it works in the sentence, not just for what it is. These teachers follow a systematic course of study

² O. H. Ross and Bernard McKenna, "Class Size: the Multi-Million Dollar Question," Institute of Administrative Research, Teachers College, Columbia University, Study No. 11, 1955.

³ William J. Dusel, "Determining an Efficient Teaching Load in English," Illinois English Bulletin, March, 1956.

from which they may deviate. The teaching is supervised; the academically talented are accommodated; and books are available. And, if I may say so again, English is defined as literature, language, and composition.

When one finishes the report, he is left with some very basic questions: how can we get better teachers of English? and what should they be teaching? Here is the area of controversy. Unless certification requirements go up in the subject matter courses, there is little point to putting money into summer institutes. People will be coming into teaching faster than they can be re-trained. We can not purify a stream by catching occasional buckets of water under a waterfall and putting them on to boil. We will have to test the competence of teachers on a type of Graduate Record Examination or a National Teachers Examination, eliminating those who can not read and write, and those whose mental capacity is such that they should not be put in charge of a class. Yet most teachers are notably unwilling to submit themselves to any test of merit. ("You know we're for merit pay, but there is no way to tell good teachers from bad.") The experience of the Master of Arts in Teaching programs has been that the higher the admission standards go, the better the students who are attracted to them.

What should be taught in English is an equally sticky problem. America's best writers are very sparsely represented in ninety per cent of the high schools, and then only through what many critics would consider their weakest books. Yet one of the major purposes of English teaching is to hand on the culture of the race. Great books are great metaphors of human experience wherein the reader may find out more about who he is. The writer dramatizes the meaning of great ideas: patriotism, courage, honor, and human dignity. He offers concrete instances of these ideas which a reader can understand. For the student who has not read these books, the ideas remain merely words. Books are one of the few civilizing forces left to us. The liberal tradition represents what man has done, but it also records what he is capable of doing. It presents the image of a man. And in a world in which heroes are so few, where else will our students get their concept of individual dignity—the idea of what a man can be.

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Education and the Human Quest, Herbert A. Thelen, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1960. 224 pp. \$4.75.

The author of *Education and the Human Quest* sets a monumental task for himself and attacks it with enthusiasm. This task he states as follows:

We know a great deal about the nature of man, knowledge, and society; about the dynamics of learning by individuals; about factors affecting group performance; about intergroup relations and social action; about community improvement. But most of this knowledge has so far made almost no dent at all on educational practice, and . . . the likelihood of any significant improvement is discouragingly slight. . . . What I have done is to essay a nontechnical formulation

of Education as an applied branch of social science . . . For such a formulation to pay off . . . its practical implications have to be stated. So I have done that too. (p. 1)

Thelen's basic frame of reference is, "We must seek a different kind of education: an education that takes persons into account, that seeks, fosters, and builds on the universal human quest" (p. 10). The new education which the author envisages is to be based on an understanding of man, knowledge, and society (p. 14), and three related fundamental quests—personal inquiry, group investigation and reflective action—which have a common element, inquiry (pp. 77-85).

The fundamental human quest postulated here is not explained to this reviewer. Although the relationship between the individual and society is frequently recognized, the concept of human quest seems to imply a basic force which characterizes individuals independent of society. For example, "What I have been projecting here is the picture of the autonomous person. It is also the picture of a 'significant' life" (p. 90). The nature of this autonomous person who seems to achieve some significant individual way of life is not clear.

Although Thelen's analyses are generally based on sound behavioral science foundations, his conception of the inquiring-autonomous human being upon which he places much emphasis is not derived from a similar base. It seems rather to be a "given" condition which one accepts on faith. Some other gross generalizations are also presented with little support. For example, not all social scientists will accept the following generalization without further evidence: "In all groups there is a common and universal dynamic. It is a natural process that is just as fundamental and universal in groups as the quest for integration is to individuals . . . The nature of the dynamic is, as always, the generation and resolution of conflict between two natures" (pp. 114-115).

Any book which sets as its goal a revolutionary modification is almost certain to be attacked by educators firmly committed to the traditional patterns. One point on which they are likely to concentrate is Thelen's failure to demonstrate that the present system is as bad as he pictures it. Another is his lack of emphasis on learning tools (such as reading) which are necessary for inquiry. One gets the impression that the author is concentrating on secondary and higher education and assumes that the basic tools have already been acquired. He recognizes that skills must be learned (pp. 86-87 and Chap. 10) and that a different organization and personnel will be needed to teach them. Many will find his skill development laboratory inadequate for learning the basic tool behaviors of reading, writing and calculating.

The author's three basic models for Education—personal inquiry, group investigation and effective action (the fourth, skill development, is of a different order as noted above), offer a challenging program woven from current knowledge of human behavior, experimental projects, and some provocative case histories. As Thelen recognizes, such a program would involve a drastic reformulation of educational practice. This reviewer feels much that Thelen proposes is sound. Certainly the basic process of inquiry and investigation is fundamental to the necessary life-long process of learning in school or elsewhere. The importance of such a conception in the

rapidly changing world in which we live can not be overemphasized. I wish I could predict with some confidence, therefore, that Thelen's educational models would have a widespread impact on American education. Social institutions are resistant to rapid change, and education is no exception. Limited success could be predicted for Thelen's new kind of education on this basis alone, but in my judgment *Education and the Human Quest* does not convince the reader sufficiently to mobilize a new army of educational reformers.

W. B. BROOKOVER
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Daniel Coit Gilman and the Protean Ph.D., The Shaping of American Graduate Education, Francesco Cordasco. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1960. 160 pp.

Pioneer: A History of the Johns Hopkins University, 1874-1889, Hugh Hawkins. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1960. 368 pp. \$6.50.

These two volumes draw upon many of the same source materials and there is necessarily much overlap in the treatment. The purposes of each, however, are not identical. Professor Cordasco, as indicated by his choice of title, is primarily concerned with placing "... Daniel Coit Gilman (1831-1908) in the historical framework of the development of graduate education in the United States" (p. xi); whereas Professor Hawkins originally, in his Ph.D. dissertation presented at Johns Hopkins in 1954, undertook to investigate "... the spirit of the early Johns Hopkins University" (p. vii). In accord with his purpose, Cordasco traces the career of Gilman from his graduation at Yale in 1852 through service in several different capacities at Yale, 1855-1872; as president of the University of California, 1872-1875; as president of Johns Hopkins, 1886-1902; and finally as president of the Carnegie Institution, 1902-1904. Hawkins discusses Johns Hopkins University in the period from its founding in 1874 to the financial setback in 1899 which, along with other factors, brought about major changes in the operations of the university. Hawkins' treatment naturally provides much more in the way of insight into the qualities and qualifications of the staff members, the courses offered, and the role of the faculty and students (both graduate and undergraduate) in the university.

Both volumes appear to be of high scholarship, although this reviewer lacks sufficient detailed knowledge of the subject to pass final judgment. The fact, however, that *Pioneer* won for its author the 1959 Moses Coit Tyler prize of the American Historical Association vouches for the quality of that volume. Both volumes are interestingly written, although Cordasco has a somewhat annoying habit of repeating materials and incidents, which suggests that better organization and tighter writing might have reduced the length of his book with no loss in substance. In quality of binding and general appearance the Hawkins volume is much superior; indeed, the paper-bound Cordasco volume fell apart in the process of one reading.

For the general reader, both volumes are somewhat overburdened with the paraphernalia of scholarship; but this will be helpful to other scholars

who may wish to pursue further the extensive materials available. Readers concerned with gaining some understanding of the backgrounds of American higher education and forced to make a choice between the two volumes will probably do best by reading the book by Hawkins.

Neither volume leaves room for doubt as to the major contribution of Gilman to the development of graduate education in the United States. In emphasis on graduate study and definition of requirements for the doctorate, in development of the graduate "seminary" and of fellowships to entice graduate students, Gilman and Johns Hopkins blazed the way. Likewise, in expecting (even demanding) and recognizing research as a major function of the university, Gilman stands pre-eminent. To encourage and publicize research Gilman also pioneered in a system of visiting lectureships and in developing scholarly journals and interesting monographs. An early policy of submitting dissertations for criticism by eminent scholars in other institutions seems to have fallen later into disuse.

Cordasco takes issue with the often-reiterated idea that Gilman was markedly influenced by the German universities and developed at Johns Hopkins a system closely akin to the German model. Nevertheless, it seems clear from Cordasco's own treatment, reinforced by that of Hawkins, that Gilman, by his travels and by his selection of professors, was influenced by the German pattern. He was, however, too intelligent to miss the weaknesses of the ponderous German approach to scholarship; and he was ever conscious of the need to develop an educational program germane to the needs of his own country.

Cordasco also strikes at the erroneous belief that Johns Hopkins began solely as a graduate institution and emphasizes the existence from the beginning of an undergraduate college as part of the Gilman plan. From Hawkins' more extensive treatment, however, one gets the impression that Gilman, always alert to public relations, established the college largely to placate the demands of the Baltimore community. Although Gilman was concerned about the quality of instruction and hired at least one full professor whose primary task was instruction, the undergraduate college did not receive sustained attention in its early years. With money available for fellowships and with little competition in graduate instruction, Johns Hopkins did not view the college as a major source for graduate students. Nevertheless, the caliber of the students admitted to the undergraduate college and the associations offered there encouraged many to continue.

As Hawkins effectively demonstrates, there were innovations related to undergraduate education which are even yet in advance of current practices. Thus the faculty, possibly with encouragement by Gilman, initiated in 1884 a series of lectures on topics in education which "encouraged graduate students (sixty-two of them enrolled) to consider problems that they would face as college teachers" (p. 236). Although students selected a group of required courses, every student had also to "pursue a core of required subjects" (p. 245). Examinations were extensively used. "Besides the tests given by the instructor, the university itself sponsored six-hour written examinations for each course at the end of the year. At first, both sets of grades were recorded; later, an average was made up from the instructor's intermediate reports and the university's examination. For the latter, specialists were often brought in from outside" (p. 249). Hawkins reports also that "Gilman would never ad-

mit that Hopkins had a class system. When work was truly fitted to the individual, the system was not necessary, he explained in 1876, proposing to 'make attainments rather than time the condition of promotion' " (p. 249). Students were excused from requirements on the basis of examinations and might complete requirements in as little as one year. Although an honors system was under discussion in 1886, it was never developed. Johns Hopkins also seems to have pioneered in the development of an adviser system which, with the favorable student-to-faculty ratio, was unusually effective.

Yet Johns Hopkins was not a pioneer on all fronts. Although Gilman may have been, as Cordasco reports, personally favorable to the admission of women (p. 83), Johns Hopkins did not in practice reflect his concern. Although a Ph.D. was awarded to Florence Bascom in 1893, not until 1907 was a general policy for admission of women instituted. In his concern for public relations Gilman was not above suggesting the discontinuance of a text which aroused complaint in the religious community (Hawkins, p. 313), but, in general support of academic freedom, Johns Hopkins was clearly ahead of its time. The fact that the four major cases of academic freedom in the 1890's involved former Hopkins scholars strengthens that view.

Although Cordasco finds little to criticize in Gilman's career, Hawkins finds him overly sensitive to public opinion and not always as progressive as he otherwise might have been. In selection of scholars, Gilman also seems to have had a weakness for foreign imports, although their performance was frequently less meritorious than that of the home grown product.

More work of the type embraced in these two volumes is needed. Educators who have attempted to use the history of education as a basis for understanding the current scene have commonly lacked the objectivity and grounding in historical scholarship to do a good job. Historians seem usually to have been uninterested. There is, however, too little knowledge of the facts in the history of higher education and too much assumption that the status quo is sanctified by long practice. As these volumes make evident, some presumed innovations of recent years are but a renaissance. Historical precedent can exert a powerful influence on institutional policy, since a major reason for faculty opposition to new ideas is simply that they are new. As late as 1930, the faculty at Johns Hopkins found that the historical record of enrollment of a Negro in 1887 could be used effectively as a precedent. Likewise the path to adoption by faculties of proposals which otherwise appear irrationally revolutionary.

PAUL L. DRESSEL
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***The Child's Conception of Geometry*, Jean Piaget, Barbel Inhelder, and Alina Szemenska, translated by E. A. Lunzer. Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1960. 411 pp. \$7.50.**

For more than 30 years Piaget has been investigating the intellectual development of the child, with special attention to the growth of mathematical concepts. This is the only basic psychological research of any consequence in

this field, as far as I know. (The literature survey in *Psychological Problems in Mathematical Training*, edited by P. du Bois and R. Feierabend, Washington University, 1959, confirms this.) Yet I know of no methods text for the teaching of mathematics, nor any American book on educational psychology, which gives any adequate idea of this work. If they refer to Piaget at all, the discussion is almost exclusively devoted to his early work on the language of the child (1926) and on the child's concept of causality (1930).

This neglect may stem from the concentration of American psychologists on the physical, emotional, and social growth of the child (see, for example, Russell's *Children's Thinking*). Until recently the best American work on learning was confined to rats and pigeons—and at most rote learning in humans. In their efforts to emulate the scientific rigor of physics, the leading experimentalists have focused their attention on learning problems which could be sharply defined and objectively observed. They have left the study of the human cognitive processes which are qualitatively different from those of lower animals mostly to the fuzzier thinkers. I hope that this detailed review will stimulate some of the rigorous experimental psychologists to tackle the fascinating problems peculiar to human thinking.

The book under review is a sequel to *The Child's Conception of Space*, by the first two authors, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956, translated from the French book of 1948. In the latter book it was shown that the child's concepts of space develop in the order: topological, projective, then metric. (Educators should note that this is the logical order from the mathematical point of view, and is the reverse of the order in our curriculum.) The last two chapters dealt with concepts of distance as they arise in the development of coordinates. The present work is a detailed study of the child's ideas of measurement of length, angle, area, and volume.

Piaget's method is clinical. He presents the child with a problem and asks questions designed to elicit the child's thinking, while the experimenter avoids, as far as possible, any interference with the child's processes. The interviews are recorded and analyzed.

For example, two lead figures are placed on a table. A cardboard screen is placed between them. The experimenter asks whether they are still as near to each other as they were before. An interview with a four year old proceeds like this:

They're nearer.

Why? (No reply.)

Look at them carefully. Are they nearer than before or the same?

Nearer.

And like this. (Removes screen.)

Further.

The interviews are classified and arranged so as to show the development of the concept by stages.

On the basis of his work on many concepts over the years Piaget has developed a theory (discussed in detail in *The Psychology of Intelligence*, Humanities Press) that there are certain general stages in the intellectual growth of the child:

sensori-motor (birth to 2 years)

symbolic, preconceptual (2-4)

intuitive (4-7)
concrete operations (7-11)
formal operations (12-15)

(These ages are intended as rough averages.) Piaget interprets the experiments in terms of his theory, often using words in technical senses, whose definitions are given in his other writings.

It may be helpful to sketch some of this background. Intelligence, for Piaget, is characterized by the formation of systems of operations, having a certain mathematical structure, called "groupings" by Piaget. Operations are reversible and can be combined. Operations do not exist psychologically in isolation, but only as imbedded in groupings.

Operations and groupings evolve in the child as equilibria in adaptation through the processes of assimilation (incorporating elements of the environment into the child's behavior schemata to fit his environment). In the present book the development of ideas of measurement is traced from the stage of intuitive thought to the beginnings of the stage of formal operations.

At the early stage the child centers his attention on only one aspect of a situation, and has great difficulty in considering several aspects or points of view simultaneously. He forms his judgments on the basis of global perception without analysis into parts.

During the next stage the child thinks in terms of groupings of operations on objects which can be manipulated or known through the senses. He can reverse operations, and combine two operations into one. He recognizes that an operation conserves certain properties. He is unable to reason verbally or in general terms.

At the stage of formal operations the child is able to reason on the basis of simple assumptions which have no necessary relation to reality. He is able to think about objects which are separated from him in time and space.

In this review we can only describe a few of the studies in this volume. In the experiment with the lead figures and the screen mentioned above, Piaget identifies three stages in the child's development:

I. (up to age 6). The child thinks that the distance changes when a third object is introduced. He does not, in general, believe that the distance from A to B is the same as the distance from B to A.

II. (ages 5-7). He recognizes that there is an overall distance between two points. He recognizes conservation or symmetry of distance, but not both.

III. (from age 7). He believes in both the conservation and symmetry of distance.

In the investigation of the measurement and conservation of length, one experiment confronts the child with two parallel rows of about 15 matches. One of these rows is distorted by arranging the matches in zigzags, perhaps also breaking some. One asks, "Which path is longer?" At first there is no concept of conservation of length. After an intermediate stage in which the child considers the numbers of segments, the child attains the concept of conservation of length between the ages of 7 and 8:6.

In another experiment on the same concept, the child is presented with two straight pieces of string attached to nails, with a bead on each. One tells him, "This bead is a street car moving on a track. I move mine from here to there. You move yours just as far on the other track." The child is given a ruler, a pencil, strips of paper, and other tools for measurement. At first the child judges length by the point of arrival and cannot solve the problem if the

strings are parallel but his bead is at the opposite end from the experimenter's. There is a period when he can do this intuitively with no attempt at accurate measurement, then a period when he can solve the problem if the ruler is longer than the path, but not if it is shorter. Finally, there is a stage when he can solve the problem completely, even with a shorter ruler.

Piaget investigates also the child's ability to locate a point in two- or three-dimensional space, his concepts of angular measurement, his recognition of the straight line and the circle as loci, his understanding of relative motion, his ideas on the conservation and measurement of areas and volumes, and his concept of fractions. In a concluding chapter he attempts to interpret and synthesize the results of these studies.

He distinguishes three levels in the child's conceptual construction of Euclidean space:

- the qualitative operations of conservation of distance, length, area, volume, and congruence;
- the simple metrical operations—length in 1, 2, and 3 dimensions, construction of coordinate systems, measurement of angles and areas;
- calculation of areas and volumes.

The achievement of the first level occurs when the child can distinguish between space as a container with fixed sites, and the space occupied by movable objects. The second level depends on the ability of the child to apply the operations of subdivision and change of position, with the recognition that wholes are conserved by these operations. The achievement of the third level is associated with the conception of an area or volume as unaffected by the surrounding space, and the concept of space as a continuum.

Clearly these findings have important implications for education. What meaning can "2 quarts" have for a 7 year old who has not attained the concept of conservation of volume? What sense can the child make of the usual pie diagrams to illustrate fractions if he cannot combine the operations of dividing into halves and that of dividing into thirds to divide the pie into six equal parts? It is scandalous that people construct curricula in blithe ignorance of this basic work, which has been available, at least in French, since 1948, and in part also since 1941. Certainly no one is in a position to teach children properly unless she is aware of the psychological hurdles which must be overcome.

One of the barriers in making Piaget's work available to educators is the style in which his books are written, which is not overcome by a mere translation from French to English. The description of the experiments and the records of the interviews with children are clear enough. But the analysis and interpretation are often difficult reading.

First, he freely uses mathematical terms and concepts with which teachers, educators, and many psychologists are unfamiliar. Second, he has a technical psychological vocabulary of his own, and the definitions of these terms are distributed over several books. For instance, in this book he classifies children's responses as typical of stages I, II, III, and IV. Presumably these labels refer to his general theory of the stages of intellectual development, but this is nowhere mentioned in the book. Certainly an understanding of this book requires a scholarly background not generally found among educators in the field.

Third, he uses such terms as *grouping* and *coordination* sometimes with

reference to the mathematical concepts of *group* and *coordinate*, sometimes in a technical sense peculiar to Piaget himself, and sometimes in their everyday meanings. This must certainly be confusing to the reader who is unaware that these terms have special technical meanings. It is also confusing to the reader who recognizes these different meanings, but is uncertain which one Piaget is using in a particular context.

It would be extremely valuable to have an exposition of Piaget's work in language suitable for elementary teachers. A quite different exposition would be needed for the professional psychologist with the usual mathematical background. Such an exposition might stimulate urgently needed research on these problems. We shall suggest here a few directions which would be fruitful.

Adequate normative data does not exist. We need replication of Piaget's experiments with children who have been tested for intelligence, creativity, and other mental abilities, and for whom we have adequate data on home and school backgrounds. Some beginnings have been made by Inhelder, Bang, Pinard, and others. Inhelder suggests that Piaget's stages might be used as a basis for constructing intelligence tests. The construction, validation, and norming of such instruments would be very useful.

Are these stages biological or culturally determined? Or are they the result of interaction of both factors with the individual? Piaget believes that the development of operations in the child is a consequence of social interactions such as cooperation and argumentation, which lead the child to consider the viewpoints of others and to demonstrate his beliefs to them. In the symposium at Geneva in 1955 on *Le Problème des Stades en Psychologie de l'Enfant* (Presses Universitaires de Paris, 1956) he says that the stage of formal operations does not exist even among adults in many primitive societies and, except for a small elite, probably did not exist among the ancient Greeks. On the other hand, Monnier and Inhelder presented at that symposium some evidence of a relation between passage through a stage and change in the alpha wave pattern of the brain. Such evidence, even if confirmed, would still leave open the question whether mental growth is affected by intellectual fare as physical growth is by diet.

The real attack on this problem must be experimental. Can we alter the child's development of concepts by the experiences to which we expose him? This is also the fundamental problem of education. Piaget investigated only the development of the naive intuition in a certain culture, avoiding any interference with the child's mental processes. After seeing O. K. Moore teaching youngsters to read, and Hawley and Suppes teaching them geometry and some formal logic, and after my own experience in teaching coordinates to 3rd graders, I am sure that we have no adequate conception of what children can learn. Dr. Muller-Willis (a former Piaget student) and I are now engaged in the investigation of these problems.

The experimental testing of Piaget's hypotheses on the social factors in intellectual growth would also be important.

Often, in reading the accounts of Piaget's experiments, one wonders whether the child's trouble is with the concept or the words. Would the child respond differently if the question were put in a more concrete form? One also wonders whether the child's response would be different if he were asked to perform a simple experiment before being questioned. For example, in the

case of the two lead figures separated by a screen, suppose we showed the child how to measure the distance with a large wooden compass, then asked him to predict the distance after the screen is inserted and to test his prediction. I am not sure how much meaning distance has for a young child apart from a method for measuring it. In the study of the sum of the angles in a triangle, Piaget obtained negative results with such a technique.

This book is profound and suggestive. Its ideas are essential for anyone working in elementary education. It can be a fruitful source for important work in psychology.

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English in the Secondary School, Edwin H. Sauer. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1961. 245 pp. \$3.75.

For more years than is comfortable to recall, the criticism of the teaching of English in secondary schools, by student and professionals alike, has been that it is a five-day-a-week smörgåsbord. To which the bewildered English teacher, who has just learned that it will be necessary to find time in next year's program for a unit on telephone manners, can only add, "Yes, indeed." Rescue committees, which have responded to the call for help, have tended to bog down in that traditional quick-sand trap of all committees facing similar problems, a discussion of aims. The results were predictable.

Professor Edwin H. Sauer's results were unpredictable. Working as a committee of one, he has synthesized a wide experience of teaching in high schools all over the country, visits in an advisory capacity to many others, service on many distinguished committees, and the stimulation of discussion with his students in the Harvard Graduate School of Education into a definition of the content and methods of the English program which one half of his critical colleagues will consider definitive and the other half heuristic.

The book develops an integrated view of a proper curriculum for a secondary school English program in terms of its responsibility to the language and its users. This responsibility is viewed as only partially satisfied with the training of sensitive readers of a novel or a poem. It is completely fulfilled only with the development of creative users of the language. In reorienting the English curriculum from a critical to a creative emphasis, the author will prove to be a prophet of the future. Meanwhile he has provided an answer to the second most commonly recurring criticism of the English program, its failure to teach students how to write.

Starting out from clearly stated assumptions about language in general and the English language in particular, the book establishes its focal point in a persuasive definition of good English as the English best suited to the achievement of an author's purposes. The argument is a step by step digest of what have come to be accepted as orthodox positions in linguistics but which are too frequently diffused or diluted in applications to English study. Instead of legislating detailed outlines of curriculum content on these subjects, the author illustrates the essential definitions with material which is fresh, relevant, and suggestive for further classroom discussion.

The book also avoids the seductiveness of the "either-or" position on the question of how to teach grammar. The balanced attitude which avoids the cliché-ridden attacks on the traditional grammar also steers clear of a repetition of the cliché-ridden promises of the structural linguists. "Because we have a new and exciting way of approaching language study, we are hardly justified in tossing away hurriedly a system of analysis which apparently did not seem cumbersome to the philosophers, scientists, statesmen, and artists who used it to bring into our civilization the ideas which support us." Stating precisely what and how grammar should be taught is beyond the scope of the book, but the outlines of a solution are firmly sketched, and the list of suggested references is a careful digest of exactly those works with which a competent teacher should be familiar.

The discussion of a program of writing for *all* students is perhaps the best in the entire book. It takes the position that not only should every student be expected to write, but that it is surprising how good that writing can be if it is not approached in a despairing fashion. It is in this chapter that the shape of the imminent revision of the English secondary curriculum seems most clearly foreseen. How the recommendations of the Conant report, that all students write at least a theme a week, can best be realized are indicated in a series of detailed suggestions for the seventh through the twelfth grade. It is here that the focal point established in the definition of good English as effective usage is put to use as a basis for the justification of a creative, instead of a critical, orientation of the English program. The discussion of assignments designed to stimulate thinking and writing, not faking of ideas or copying of phrases, are a sure guarantee that this book can not be dismissed with the usual "untested" or "theoretical." Classroom experience is behind every suggestion on how to handle the difficult student. The style of the chapter itself suggests that the author was not bored with teaching composition, nor did he look upon the obligation as a necessary interruption of the only decent labor, teaching the love of literature.

Professor Sauer has no guarantee of safe passage through the problems of teaching literature, but he has had a lot of experience in observing the effects on that teaching of the lure of the sirens on the shore. There is as much temptation for the English teacher to abandon the demanding discussion of structure, form, and organization of a poem for a discussion of interesting bits of psychology, anthropology, and social problems to be found in a novel, as there is for the teacher to slight the teaching of grammar and composition in favor of literature. The purpose of teaching the novel, poetry, or drama is not some misty "appreciation," or to provide laboratory material for the validation of the findings of the psychiatrist or the platforms of various political groups. The purpose in teaching these literary forms should be to discipline the mind to an awareness of the values of controlled expression and to encourage the habit of emulating these values in one's own expression. From someone who has had so much experience with the academically talented and Advanced Placement courses, it is reassuring to learn that there is no need to enervate the student with the effete before he has really understood Huck Finn. The emphasis on modern American literature may put a strain on some old family ties, but the point is carefully argued and no one will disagree that quality of reading and understanding is to be preferred to quantity.

This is a book which makes it possible for the teacher to see the purpose of English in the secondary school curriculum more clearly, to realize that the obligation of the English teacher is more than just teaching grammar and something vaguely called "literature," but to do so without losing sight of that purpose. The English teacher has an obligation to develop the reading, writing, and speaking abilities of the nation. Of these the greatest current need is to improve the ability to communicate clearly and effectively. Effective communication is the product of creative, not critical, thinking, and it is to the development of that creativity that this book makes its greatest contribution.

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The Torch Lighters: Tomorrow's Teachers of Reading, Mary C. Austin, Coleman Morrison, et al. Harvard University Graduate School of Education, Cambridge, Mass. (distributed by Harvard University Press), 1961. 191 pp. \$1.00.

This book is a report of an investigation carried on under the direction of Mary C. Austin and Coleman Morrison by a study group sponsored by Harvard University Graduate School of Education under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. It reports a study of the training provided for prospective teachers of reading in colleges and universities throughout the United States and concludes with a series of twenty-two Conant-type recommendations for the improvement of the training programs.

The study is based on interviews with faculty members in a selected list of "representative" institutions that provide teacher training and on replies to a questionnaire designed to survey teacher preparatory programs in a larger group of colleges and universities. The results of the more intensive part of the study, which was carried on in seventy-four institutions by means of interviews, are given more weight in the report than those derived from the questionnaire survey of 371 colleges and universities.

In view of the weight given to the field study in the seventy-four colleges, the adequacy of this sample is of critical importance to the whole study. The technique used in drawing the sample of seventy-four colleges is described in Appendix B of the report. First, higher institutions with characteristics that would preclude their yielding valuable data for the study were eliminated from the study population. This step reduced the number of potential cooperating institutions from nearly 2,000 to 714. On the basis of a questionnaire concerning willingness to cooperate, the study group was further reduced to 530. The United States was then divided into seven regions, each containing approximately the same proportion of the 530 schools. Eleven colleges were selected at random for the field study from each of the seven regions making the total of seventy-seven. Three of these were unable to participate, thus reducing the sample to seventy-four. Faculty members in each of these seventy-four institutions were interviewed by a visiting team. This procedure seems well designed to furnish a representative sample of higher institutions that prepare students to teach in elementary schools.

Some of the findings and recommendations in the study apply specifically to the training program for future teachers of reading, but inevitably many of them are applicable to the training program for all elementary school teachers. For instance, institutional policies with regard to admission to the teacher training program, course requirements, and standards for graduation and state certification were essentially the same regardless of field of specialization.

The findings of the study are neither particularly new nor especially striking. Rather, these findings lend up-to-date, objective support to informed opinion concerning training programs for future teachers of reading and other skills.

Among the main findings of the study, it is particularly noteworthy that, although the quality of students preparing to teach in elementary schools is believed to be lower than that of students preparing to teach in high schools and students in other academic fields, only about one-fourth of the colleges and universities studied require formal application to the department of education. In other words, the screening of elementary education students continues to be inadequate, despite the fact that the general level of ability of these students is known to be rather low. This fact does not augur well for the training of future American citizens in reading and related skills.

College courses in reading instruction, the study shows, tend to be aimed at common goals—goals which reading specialists have stated as desirable objectives of a training program—but the stated goals of instruction are imperfectly implemented in practice teaching programs.

The hiatus between avowed objectives and practice is due to several factors. The great majority of the students do not undertake practice teaching until the final semester of their undergraduate work. This is frequently too late to permit correction of weaknesses in teaching; yet supervisors hesitate to withhold a passing grade in practice teaching from students who are so near the point of graduation. So, almost invariably, students engaged in practice teaching are approved to begin their teaching careers the following fall, however incapable and inadequately prepared they may be.

A second reason for the failure of practice to measure up to theory is that colleges seldom have any plan for selecting the cooperating teachers who supervise the practice teaching. The post of cooperating teacher is seldom a rewarding one, either professionally or financially, and many teachers in schools cooperating in the practice teaching program tend to avoid it. Hence, the colleges happily accept any teachers willing to volunteer their cooperation. The way to upgrade the cooperating teacher staff is fairly obvious—to give these teachers professional recognition and financial remuneration consonant with the demands and duties of the work.

Another arresting finding is that, although enrollment in basic reading instruction is required of almost every elementary education student, nearly half of these students take reading instruction as a part of a course in language arts. Of these language arts students, 60 per cent receive from $4\frac{1}{2}$ to $11\frac{1}{4}$ hours of reading instruction and 30 per cent get even less time. Consequently, important areas of the teaching of reading must be neglected. Typically, the college course in reading instruction stresses primary reading instruction, including materials and techniques of beginning reading instruction, reading readiness, phonics, and other techniques of word attack. The

diagnosis and treatment of reading difficulties, critical reading, and other higher reading skills that should be taught in the intermediate and upper grades receive slight attention.

Parts I and II of the report are devoted to a recital and discussion of findings in the field study and the questionnaire survey. Part III contains twenty-two clearly stated and well-supported recommendations. An abbreviated statement of some of the more important recommendations is as follows: that formal application to teacher education programs be required at the end of the sophomore year; that senior faculty members prominent in the field of reading take a more active part in the instruction of undergraduates; that the basic reading instruction for elementary teachers include content and techniques appropriate for the intermediate and upper grades; that a course in basic reading instruction be required of all secondary school teachers; that prospective teachers become acquainted with research and that additional research in critical reading, study skills, and grouping practices be initiated; that steps be taken to develop a staff of professionally responsible, well-paid cooperating teachers serving as associates to the colleges; that students who do practice teaching at only one grade level be given an opportunity to observe teaching at other grade levels; that students weak in either course work or practice teaching be required to extend the period of their training; and that colleges establish a program of following up their graduates to determine adequacy of preparation and weaknesses of the individual student. Observance of these and other recommendations in the report would go far toward improvement of the reading ability of American youth. The stated recommendations might well be supplemented with a further recommendation: train prospective teachers of reading at all levels in techniques of appraisal of reading ability and of correction of reading weaknesses of individual pupils.

It should be clear to everyone that the Harvard-Carnegie Reading Study has important implications for the improvement of our schools, the education of our young people, and the strengthening of our nation. For, as Dean Keppel says in his Foreword to the report, "The better teaching of reading is the foundation of higher standards in our schools and colleges, and other efforts will fail unless this first step is taken." This first step must be taken, for if we value our liberty we dare not fail to develop in this country an enlightened, responsible, and thinking citizenry.

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***Physical Disability: A Psychological Approach*, Beatrice A. Wright. Harper Bros., New York, 1960. 408 pp. \$6.00.**

Is there a psychology of the physically handicapped? The traditional answer derived from questionnaires and personality inventories have tended to minimize psychological differences between the disabled and non-disabled. This approach, immersed in empiricism and measurement, has led to shallow insights and a hodge-podge of unrelated observations which have not survived replication. Newer answers infused by the insights of psychoanalysis

and the depth psychologies have introduced important concepts, e.g. body image and regression which appear to be more interesting and may yet prove to be fruitful in dealing with the disabled. However, they leave one with the feeling that a physical disability is merely an alien intrusion on a preformed complex personality repertoire so that the practical problems in rehabilitation tend to be gobbled up by psychodynamics. Both approaches would seem to indicate that (a) there is no "psychology" of the physically handicapped and (b) there is little to learn from studying the adjustment of the physically handicapped.

Dr. Beatrice Wright, a distinguished and well known contributor to psychology and rehabilitation, argues that there is a psychology of the physically handicapped—somato-psychology. This is a branch of psychology concerned with variations in physique that affect the psychological situation of the person. Insight into this situation can teach us not only about the physically handicapped but about the non-handicapped as well. For example, accepting the loss of a body part may become psychologically equivalent to accepting the loss of a loved object or person. A state of mourning should therefore not surprise us, when it occurs after a recent traumatic disability. Further reflection yields instances which are also capable of broader inquiry—the problem of help from the standpoint of the donor as well as the recipient, sympathy, pity, staring, etc. These examples, closer to the type of question asked by the layman or naive observer, do indeed sound fresh and interesting, when compared to the types of questions posed in most of the psychological literature. Perhaps the reason for this is that most of the latter are anchored in theories and techniques that are irrelevant to the logic of the situation facing a disabled person.

Dr. Wright's approach to somato-psychology is to search for key themes and issues which will make sense out of a puzzling variety of facts. Let us take her handling of the problem of prejudice against the disabled as an example. Society's attitudes towards the disabled may be likened to prejudice exhibited against minority groups. Yet the matter is not permitted to rest there. The pros and cons for his analogy are then examined in detail. Pros—(1) attitudes to the disabled range from disparaging jokes to physical aversion, (2) employment opportunities for the disabled are limited, (3) social and recreational events are restricted, (4) people who are prejudiced and authoritarian hold negative attitudes to the disabled. This analogy leads to the insight that (a) marginally disabled may have greater psychological problems than the severely handicapped, just as the light skinned Negro may have greater difficulties than the dark skinned Negro whose status is relatively clear cut; and (b) there exist group stereotypes about the disabled. Wright admits the analogy is imperfect. Cons—(1) the disabled are encouraged to be like other people; Jews and Negroes are encouraged to remain themselves, and (2) social minorities share cultural patterns which have been institutionalized. The disabled do not. Here at last is a serious discussion of a serious, non-trivial question.

Adjustment of the disabled is treated in the same thoughtful way. Wright notes the frequent feelings of inferiority which lead to shame, self pity and attempts to cover up, deny and obliterate the thoughts of the disability. The individual continues to act as if he is not disabled and therefore sets his level of aspiration too high. Idolizing normal standards he is therefore doomed to

failure. Successful adjustment is not associated with achievement based on shame. It is associated with enlarging the scope of values, (i.e. the disability is not the only thing that matters), subordinating the disability effects, (i.e. disability doesn't affect all situations—an inferior body doesn't imply an inferior mind, an inferior mind doesn't imply an inferior worth). The criteria for values are not to be on a comparative basis, but rather on an asset basis (i.e. something considered in terms of its own merits). Wright's discussions on values and adjustment, based on the work of Dembo, Heider, Barker and others who have attempted to apply the theories of Kurt Lewin to this complex field are a signal contribution. She has used biographical and autobiographical material to document many of her points and give them a flesh and blood actuality. Her discussions range all the way from examining the development of the self concept to sources of attitudes to physical deviancy among lower animals, from theories of frustration and uncertainty as applied to the disabled to training in social skills. In attempting to reach other disciplines besides psychology, materials of interest to counselors, teachers and parents are discussed in great detail. One admires her ability to pick out an important issue and doggedly pursue it through its conclusions without being banal or obscurantist.

These virtues do carry a number of drawbacks. Thoroughness at times becomes tediousness. Too many topics discussed with such detail may make an overly rich meal for the reader who is inclined to lose patience or may not be completely interested in all of the areas. This reviewer found the chapters on the inferior status position of the disabled, the problems of coping, value changes in acceptance of a disability, development of the self concept, and grievances and gratifications in everyday life useful in leading discussion groups composed of disabled people. The student of psychology will find a rich harvest of ideas. Should the clinical psychologist find the approach lacking in depth, let him reexamine the depth approach to see if it can contribute as much. The educator, the rehabilitation worker and the parent will find the book helpful. Because of its wide range and careful qualifications the reviewer would discourage people from trying to master its contents in only a few sittings.

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The Inquiring Mind, Cyril O. Houle. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1961. 87 pp. \$1.50 (paper); \$5.00 (cloth).

The University of Wisconsin's satellite campus at Milwaukee, although only five years old, has already begun to attract nation-wide attention with its exploratory studies in adult education, or, as Provost J. M. Klotsche euphemizes, "town and gown" learning.

In the spring semester of 1960, the university invited to its Milwaukee campus as Kemper Knapp visiting professor, Cyril O. Houle, Professor of Education, University of Chicago. Among his contributions during this visiting professorship, Dr. Houle delivered a series of public lectures on his initial

research of the question: "What kinds of men and women retain alert and inquiring minds throughout the years of their maturity?" (p. x). *The Inquiring Mind* is the published version of these lectures.

That the book is exploratory in nature and represents only an initial inquiry into the subject of continuing education can, of course, be seen by Dr. Houle's use of the interrogatory *what*. We should hope that the *why* will follow after subsequent studies.

Having interviewed and submitted to questionnaires only some twenty-two Chicagoans pursuing adult education in one or more facets, Dr. Houle subdivides his subjects into three groups:

"goal-oriented, are those who use education as a means of accomplishing fairly clear-cut objectives . . .

"activity-oriented, are those who take part because they find in the circumstances of the learning a meaning which has no necessary connection, and often no connection at all, with the content or the announced purposes of the activity . . .

"learning-oriented, are those who seek knowledge for its own sake." (pp. 15-16)

To paraphrase, the first group are trying to improve their lot in their respective jobs by studying courses closely related to their present or hoped-for occupations; the second, to find a husband (or a wife), or as a release from boredom; the third, to learn for the sheer joy of learning; the unhatched egghead, if you will.

Essentially, these three groups become the central message—indeed the only message—of Dr. Houle's little book. We cannot quarrel with his three subgroups; they are clearly and neatly delineated. We are indebted to him for their simplicity, a trait one doesn't often find in writers today. Our quarrel rather lies with the necessity of an entire book's being fabricated on such skimpy material in general and, in specific, with two conclusions which the good professor draws from his select case studies.

Sadly enough, Professor Houle found in the greater number of his interviews that continued formal studying by his subjects (none of whom was, incidentally, connected with education in any occupational capacity) made of these people buffoons in the opinion of their acquaintances. Evidently, we still have in our blood enough of the backwoods frontiersmen who sneered at education as being effeminate and time-wasting. Despite even the post-sputnik groaning and the introduction into Washington of an intellectually-minded administration, the general public still seems to view the learned—and learning—with mistrust and scorn.

To solve the problem, Professor Houle offers:

What is needed is a more concerted effort, by educators and such allies as they can enlist among the value-establishers of our society, to express the importance of continuing education as clearly and as universally as they can so that the message finally penetrates to all those different clusters and groups of people who make up the public. Churchill and Eisenhower have made the Sunday painter respectable, and some comparable methods must be found to give social sanction to all those who wish to learn. (p. 54)

Quite obviously, a concerted effort by educators is needed; for, if we are to assume that these critics of adult education have had some, shall we say "regular," education of their own, be it merely elementary or even high school, then it is we teachers who have failed to impress upon them the importance of continuing learning, be it formal or informal. "The only thing wrong with education is the educator."

Yet, we must wonder, too, whether the crux of the problem is in our—or rather let us say Professor Houle's—interpretation of what constitutes education. Granted that he talks most generally of all types of adult education centers: the night school, the YMCA, the church school, among others, nevertheless, Dr. Houle consolidates all courses from dancing to philosophy into a single entity. Thus he gives the fun, the vocational, and the intellectual courses equal status! Certainly to claim that the study of typing or driver education is as important as that of history or philosophy is both foolhardy and ignorant. And yet, from a strict vocational viewpoint, many educators seem to agree with the professor's assumption. No doubt the number of recent secondary school graduates who have jobs as typists far exceeds those who have been hired as philosophers. But this fact merely compounds our boorishness and increases the number of unintelligent typists in the business and educational worlds. To extend the analogy further is unnecessary. It is no wonder that mockery and derision should result from such a ludicrous interpretation of education.

Paraphrasing, we must chide the professor also on his insistent plea for "social sanction to all those who wish to learn." This statement smacks of our nation-wide neurosis for popularity. We love to be loved and hate to be scorned, be it for foreign aid or Fandancing II.

The one other argument of Dr. Houle's with which we should like to take issue is his thesis—by no means novel—that "by specialized efforts in many fields, there have been great advances in in-service education" (p. 81). And here rears Janus' second head.

The scientist who cannot communicate with the congressman, the obstetrician who refuses to extract tonsils, the shop laborer who can never leave his narrowly defined job limits to learn the duties of the foreman, are all tangible shortcomings of this consuming evil, specialization. Formal education especially has been so dissected as to be hardly recognizable. The accumulation of facts, through research, is destroying the transference of wisdom from one generation to another. Adult education as a specific area of study is yet one more field to add to the rapidly reproducing creature. Time should prove us correct in that what is needed is not more specialized areas of learning, but a fusion of the present proliferation; in effect a return to a basic and liberal education—for all—as the very best preparation for life. The constant effusion of branches of learning, sprouting with the rapidity of lemmings, serves only to confuse the learner: the relationship of subject-to-subject, resulting in increased wisdom, becomes well-nigh impossible. To this effusion, *The Inquiring Mind* adds but one more voice, and that not really profound.

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THE EDITORS

Experimentalism in the Anesthetic Society Existential Education*

The author uses Dewey's theory of knowledge as a means of explicating the existentialist position. In comparing and contrasting the two he moves into a discussion of communication, where the existentialist views, he maintains, at once parallel and supplement those of Dewey. The final section of the article is devoted to an elucidation of the principles of teaching which might be derived from an existential philosophy. Here the author is concerned most particularly with the nature of the teacher's attitude toward his material and his students, and with the nature of the classroom experience.

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THE MAGNITUDE of the impact of the philosophy of experimentalism upon American education is hardly debatable. Although there might not have been so great an influence upon the practice of individual teachers as is sometimes thought, much of the work done in the teacher training institutions in the United States has been influenced by experimentalism. Human development, differential psychology, the psychology of learning, the emphasis on "psychological" tests and measurements, and programs in guidance are some of the fields of study that are dependent upon experimental techniques in research, and these fields at least encourage the use of scientific findings by the teacher regardless of the personal educational philosophy in use. One might expect the use of scientific findings to be accompanied by an educational philosophy developed from the metaphysical basis of the findings. The lack of an experimental philosophy in practice, therefore, seems to justify one more study in the educational philosophy of experimentalism.

Experimentalism in all its varieties is in the main stream of philosophic

* The author wishes to thank Dr. Donald Arnstine of the University of Wisconsin for his criticism of this article.

thought in the United States. No other philosopher of twentieth century America seems to have the stature of John Dewey. In Europe, however, another philosophy has appeared: existentialism. The significance of existentialism is unquestionable.¹ Granting the hazard that judgment on contemporaries always runs, one is tempted to conclude that the existentialists are in the center of the main stream of continental philosophy: Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre. If philosophizing is in fact always concerned with the human situation, then a comparison of the outstanding proponent of experimentalism with the movement on the continent seems to offer possibilities for an adequate philosophy of education.

It is the intended scope of the present paper to furnish working definitions of experimentalism and existentialism, defining them to facilitate their comparison and to facilitate drawing their implications for education. The comparison of the two that follows the definitions is intended to show how they are both needed for an adequate philosophy of education.² The last section is an attempt to indicate ways in which the synthesized view might be applicable in the classroom, particularly in the teaching of literature, from which illustrations are taken.

I. DEWEY'S THEORY OF KNOWING

One of the more obvious similarities of experimentalism and existentialism is their attempt to overcome, or escape, the mind/body problem that has plagued the history of philosophy from its beginning, becoming an increasing difficulty throughout the ages. Classical concepts of the mind invariably become involved with an ultra-complex theory of knowing that seldom has seemed satisfactory to other philosophers. Since the solution to the mind/body problem involves the theory of knowing, which in turn is obviously relevant to, and perhaps the starting place of, a philosophy of education, it will be highly illuminating to begin each of the definitions with their respective attitudes toward this perplexity.

Dewey overcomes the dichotomy by refusing to legitimize it.³ There is no entity that one can call *mind*. When one is engaged in an activity and an obstruction occurs, ways and means of dealing with similar obstructions in

¹ Paul Tillich, leading American existential theologian, suggests that existentialism characterizes the twentieth century much as the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Naturalism characterized the previous centuries. Tillich, "The Nature and the Significance of Existential Thought," *Journal of Philosophy*, LIII (November 8, 1956), 739.

² Van Cleve Morris has stated that existentialism may be thought of as a correction or an extension of experimentalism. Morris, "Freedom and Choice in the Educative Process," *Educational Theory*, VIII (October, 1958), 233.

³ Dewey's position will be restricted to that found in *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1916) and *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934). The latter supplements the former, particularly in the concept of experience. The definition of experimentalism in Part I will be restricted to the former for expository purposes.

the past *come to mind*. While activity is halted, the organism as a whole readjusts itself. When action is taken, the organism as a whole acts. What is often called *mind* is merely a phase of the activity of the whole organism: it is functional, instrumental, to the problem at hand.⁴ Mind is not "an isolated realm of inner consciousness" but "an accentuation of personal consciousness" when a new situation arises for which habits and instincts do not suffice.⁵ Purposive, active contact with the environment is necessary for consciousness to be something more than fantasy or revery. Sometimes the environment becomes too obstructive for the present capabilities of the organism. Then it tends to linger over the memories aroused instead of trying something that might remove the impediment. Linger over the memories, elaborating them, letting the imagination run riot, results in a divorce of consciousness from the environment. Consciousness then seems to take on a reality of its own. Instead of being instrumental, it becomes an instrument, seemingly an entity in its own right. The reification of "the mind" results in the theoretic separation of the mind from the body as well as from the environment, and the body takes on the aspects of the environment.⁶ Then the mind/body problem is encountered and must be dealt with. The questions that this problem poses (How does mind, the "realm of inner consciousness," know anything? How is the gap between the external world and mind bridged? Which is the ultimate criterion of truth?) are avoided by Dewey by his maintenance of the continuity of consciousness with the physical activity going on.⁷

The continuity of consciousness with the physical activity going on can be seen more clearly through an examination of Dewey's concept of experience. What is experience? There are two phases to experience, doing and undergoing. A person is alive: life is activity: activity is doing something, trying something. When one tries something he undergoes something in return: he does something and something is done to him. Consequences redound to the doer.⁸ Jump down the steps and undergo the consequences. The activity, however, is not an experience in the full sense of the term unless one undergoes something and connects the undergoing to the trying. He does not merely do something, he tries something. *Trying* implies an alertness to the possible consequences before action is taken. Thus a connection between what one has tried and what he has undergone is made. Jumping down the steps resulted in rapidity of movement, possibly stinging feet, perhaps jostling someone, or even a trip to the principal's office. Henceforth, jumping down the steps means the consequences. One can say that he has learned by experience: henceforth trying the same thing in a similar situation will cause one to

⁴ *Democracy and Education*, 403. Hereafter referred to as "D&E."

⁵ D&E, 404-5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 165, 403-5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 164, 400.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 163.

expect to undergo similar consequences; trying it will mean the consequences.⁹ Unfortunately, the situation will never be the same again. It may be similar, and similar enough so that trying the same thing actually does have the same consequences, enabling a person to form habits that deal with the ordinary, everyday obstructions in his activity.¹⁰ One never knows precisely when the situation is dissimilar to the degree that the habit will not suffice. When it will not, and activity remains blocked, the conscious phase of the organism becomes more active. Reflection occurs, one tries something, and if all goes well, activity is resumed. If consequences are perceived, a new experience is had.

The illustration used, jumping down steps, was elementary, and perhaps plays down the process of reflection, but all experience, from the most trivial to the most complex, is generically the same. Experience accrues from the perception of a connection between something tried and something undergone. The complexity possible, such as when writing a philosophical essay, is staggering, but it follows the same pattern as the illustration, according to Dewey. But, whereas the simple experience is almost all trial and error, and very little reflection, the complex experience is almost all reflection, and only slightly trial and error.¹¹ When reflection predominates, the experience can be called reflective experience or thinking. In reflective experience one reflects upon what he might do, and the doings and their consequences become continuous.¹²

The doings and their consequences become continuous because in reflection, when one is trying to overcome a blockage of activity, he weighs various alternatives before action. By reflecting one accepts the responsibility for the consequences of his action. Reflection begins when a purposive activity is under way. A blockage causes one to hesitate. There is an "accentuation of consciousness." One examines the situation, tries to interpret it, gathers data, gets ideas about courses of action, weighs them, formulates the course of action to try, and tries it.¹³ Reflection does not end, however, until the consequences of the action are connected to the situation as it was seen, to the data, to the various ideas, or suggested courses of action, and to the action tried. Thinking results in knowledge because consequences can be noted and used in similar situations for prediction of consequences.¹⁴

Knowledge accrues, then, as an abstraction from experience, from doings-undergoings. The essence of the experimental method is that knowledge is obtainable in no other way. The other ways in which so-called knowledge is obtained are either (1) opinion, taken on authority, or (2) data obtained

⁹ *Ibid.*, 163-4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 177.

¹² *Ibid.*, 170.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 170-77.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 177-8, 394.

through the experiments of others, as in textbooks, lectures, and word of mouth.¹⁵ As Dewey said,

we have no right to call anything knowledge except where our activity has actually produced certain physical changes in things, which agree with and confirm the conception entertained. Short of such specific changes, our beliefs are only hypotheses, theories, suggestions, guesses, and are to be entertained tentatively and to be utilized as indications of experiments to be tried.¹⁶

Knowledge is not the end of the experience: the experience is not undergone to gain knowledge. Rather, the experience itself is the fruition of activity, and it frees activity for more experience.

If there is an abstraction from the experience, knowledge, or the discernment of relationships, one will be freed for more experience to the extent that the knowledge is kept subordinate to life, to the experience available.¹⁷ Thus it is that the end or aim of experience, or education, is not the acquisition of knowledge, but instead it is "the direct transformation of the quality of experience." Education is "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."¹⁸ Life itself is experience, is education; experience, or education, is the transformation of life, or growth. The result or end is the process: how could one *know* another end?¹⁹

If an individual teacher attempts to use this notion of education, that is, if he sees that it was not merely a "notion of education," but that it describes what actually has to take place for education to occur, he is faced with a problem of his own. How can he use instrumentally in the classroom an experimental philosophy of education? How can he use the ideas of Dewey so as to promote the reconstruction of experience of each one of his charges and the reconstruction of his own experience without the manipulation of pupils and their environment that would tend to arbitrarily delimit the possibilities of experience?²⁰ How can a teacher work within a prescribed curriculum at any given level when pressures on the school from space-age alarmists result in an increasing emphasis on the mastery of experimental findings in a very unexperimental manner?²¹

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 185-6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 393.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 117, 178.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 89-90.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 117.

²⁰ The tendency to manipulation ends self-development, honest inquiry, and personal integrity. Arthur G. Wirth, "On Existentialism, The Emperor's New Clothes, and Education," *Educational Theory*, V (July, 1955), 152, n.

²¹ The Conant Report is one example of the sort of pressures suggested. It is rather easy to suggest increasing the school day, homework, hours required for graduation, and it sounds so virtuous to want to increase "knowledge" and boost national resources and prestige this way. Whether or not such emphasis upon the externals is educative is apparently beyond the grasp

For our present situation Dewey has no direct answers, and not too many suggestions. Subject matter, for Dewey, is the accumulated experience of the human race, and method, which is not separable from subject matter except for discursive purposes, is merely that arrangement of subject matter that renders it most usable in the ongoing immediate experience of the pupil.²² This does not mean that subject matter is a well-organized textbook, for then method becomes manipulation even if it is in Deweyan terminology. Over-emphasis on the experience of the race results in the well-organized textbook, on external methodology, and the mind/body problem appears. That is, the lack of a genuine problem in personal experience causes "mind" to be occupied with something other than an environment with which it can interact. The material in the textbook easily becomes something to be brought over into the "mind": the teacher contrives "problems." As a result, education becomes "intellectual" and divorced from the immediate experience of the pupil. Like it or not, the pupil has immediate experiences anyway, and his real education, or reconstruction of experience, has to occur out of and in spite of school, and it easily remains arrested at the level where his education became intellectualized, probably at the junior high or early high school age.²³

Dewey remains purposely non-directive when it comes to details of his ideas of subject matter and methodology because of his concern for the teacher's interaction with the pupil's immediate experience. Positive directions can warp that interaction. Corruption of experimentalism can occur because people do not like to remain experimental in that immediate experience. They want to know, to be certain of what they are doing, to produce results.²⁴ They want Dewey to spell out "the true way." It is this corruption of experimentalism that prompts the juxtaposition of existentialism and experimentalism, for the existentialists either reject what I have called the corruption of experimentalism (that which does not remain experimental in immediate experience, or the popular conception of science) or they maintain that it is not enough. An examination of existentialism and a subsequent comparison of it to experimentalism may clarify this point.²⁵

of the layman, who sees knowledge and education largely in terms of verbal information "mastered."

²² D&E, 194, 214-5.

²³ This seems to be Dewey's chief criticism of what he saw as traditional education, and the theme occurs over and over again in his writings. D&E, 197-200, 208-9, 217-8, 220-2, 268. I suspect it is also why Dewey is often ill-received by teachers. It is so easy to lapse into dependence upon the mind/body dichotomy, i. e., upon "intellectualizing." It is also irresponsible, since it disregards consequences.

²⁴ "The undisciplined mind is averse to suspense and intellectual hesitation; it is prone to assertion. It likes things undisturbed, settled. . . ." D&E, 222.

²⁵ To an "objective" scholar, the following exposition of existentialism is vastly oversimplified. Due to the nature of the approach, each existential philosopher's position is different; some even deny the validity of the term for their philosophy and then turn around and use it themselves. Instead of presenting the various viewpoints, I am going to proceed on the assumption that there is something of a core common to all of them.

II. THE EXISTENTIAL THEORY OF KNOWING

The experimental theory of knowing was presented rather simply above, perhaps too simply when one realizes that, in a sense, the whole of modern science rests upon it. Using things to solve problematic situations, to get oneself out of a jam, however, quickly involves immensely complicated measurements to serve as data in the formulation of hypotheses, or proposed courses of action. The mass of technical scientific knowledge, data, has become so great that a general anxiety exists. Can we know enough? How much knowledge must one have to be competent in his field? This anxiety results in the pressure put on education for the external acquisition of knowledge mentioned above. The pervasiveness of experimentally ascertained knowledge causes many people to acquire the faith that "science" has all the answers. We will be able to solve all our problems when scientific inquiry is pushed far enough, they think. Especially does this seem to be true in the sciences of man: anthropology, sociology, and psychology.²⁶

The existentialists do not share this faith. They insist that scientific knowledge assumes that man is a physical object. In order to ascertain facts about man, scientists reduce man to an object: the gain, objectivity; the loss, human being. They are right: that which is knowable about man, that which is universally valid, must stem from consideration of him as an object among objects. Unfortunately, consideration of him as a living organism among objects also results in his objectification because his processes of living are traced to their causes. In Sartre's words, "the psychologist rigorously guards against considering the men about him as *his fellow creatures*."²⁷ Tracing the living processes to their causes keeps man from being an active participant in life: consciousness is of no avail because genetically transmitted structures or forces or environmental factors determine his course of action for him. He becomes a machine, a cog in a larger machine. Scientists imply that he has lost his freedom.

Jaspers claims that this results in the loss of all values, human existence seems to become mass existence, and in general men resort to Machiavellian power struggles in life.²⁸ The loss of values is substantiated by scientists, and it is partly through their efforts that this has come about, and yet the existentialists are accused of being nihilists. But if those sciences that rest upon a determinism (and it matters not whether it is explicit or implicit) are correct,

²⁶ The difference between Dewey and many experimentalists, particularly lay followers, can be seen in Arturo Fallico's statement: "In all this scientific mess perhaps John Dewey alone endeavored to be honest when he declared that scientific knowledge is instrumental . . . a tool merely for living and nothing more." A tool does not indicate what it is to be used for. The existentialists, he goes on, are not against science and reason, but against scientism and rationalism. "Existentialism and Education," *Educational Theory*, IV (April, 1954), 169.

²⁷ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Emotions* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1948), 3. Italics his.

²⁸ Karl Jaspers, *Existentialism and Humanism* (New York: Russell Moore Co., 1952), 65.

then, as Ralph Harper, American philosopher of education, points out, man has no need for any philosophy.²⁹

The lack of a need for philosophy does in fact seem to be the prevailing philosophy. It is precisely the prevalence of this view that the existentialists see and are trying to overcome. Man, Jaspers repeats over and over, is more than we can *know* about him. By reducing the knowable to objectively verifiable knowledge about him, science has reduced man to a mere object, apparently, and even worse, has lapsed into an implicit mind/body, or a subject/object, dualism. Although the knowing subject may not be accounted for by the theories themselves, its existence is clearly implied.³⁰ The very fact that the subjective knower is often left out seems to verify the existentialist's cornerstone: before man knows anything about himself, he first of all *is*. The sciences of man try to answer the question, "What is man?" Their knowledge seems to be a pursuit of human nature. Even though they posit the relativity of concepts of human nature, they still pursue the question, "What is man?" The existentialists claim that this is begging the question. They accordingly rephrase the question to ask, "What does it mean to say, 'Man is'?"³¹

In other words, they start with man's subjectivity, his capacity as a knowing subject. On the one hand, Dewey began with man's objectivity, or totality in an environment, and denied subjectivity, or mind, except for the instrumental role of consciousness as one phase of experience, in order to overcome the subject/object dualism. The existentialists, on the other hand, begin with man's subjective consciousness and work to overcome the dualism from that end. As Sartre said, "It is this consciousness which must be interrogated, and what gives value to its responses is precisely that it is *mine*."³² In other words, they acknowledge that their philosophizing is not objective, or universally valid, but then they insist that that is the very function of philosophizing: to go beyond the reach of scientifically ascertainable data to explore the aspects of the human situation not open to experimental research. And they start with the fact that, first of all, man *is*.

Jaspers says, "What man is cannot be attributed to any knowledge about him. It can only be learned at the source, non-objectivity, beyond all that can ever be known."³³ The scientist would probably agree that knowledge about man does not enable him to say what man is, but in the minds of the laity descriptions of how man behaves become descriptions of what he is. For ex-

²⁹ "Significance of Existence and Recognition for Education," *National Society for the Study of Education Yearbook*, LIV (1956), 224. One wonders, then, if he would need science?

³⁰ As Fallico put it, "A man who is a self-conscious being, capable of giving an account of his own inward state is unknown and unknowable to this [naturalism, science] tradition." *op. cit.*, 170.

³¹ Van Cleve Morris, "Existentialism and Education," *Educational Theory*, IV (October, 1954), 249.

³² *The Emotions*, 11. (Italics his.)

³³ *Existentialism and Humanism*, 69. "Non-objectivity" seems to escape the connotations that have accumulated around "subjectivity." The terms are interchangeable for the existentialist.

ample, when Freud hypothesized the libidinal forces as the well-spring of behavior, his unsophisticated followers asserted that man was the creature that was this way. A theory of the *how* of behavior became "knowledge" of what man is. For many, the "essence" of man, human nature, had been found. The "scientific" outlook of the laity, then, is concerned with *what* a thing is, its nature, its essence.

The existentialists, on the other hand, turn around and try to determine *that* a thing is, its being, its existence. An examination of this approach (existence precedes essence) will illuminate what the existentialists mean by starting at the source, non-objectivity, subjectivity. Sartre has stated this very clearly:

What is meant here by saying that existence precedes essence? It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself. If man as the existentialist sees him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterwards will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. . . . Not only is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence. Man is nothing other than what he makes himself. Such is the first principle of existentialism. It is what is called "subjectivity."³⁴

If "man is born free and is everywhere in chains" it is because he has attempted to discover what human nature is and wilfully patterned his life after what he thought was its essence. Instead of turning up on the scene and choosing what he could become, modern man has accepted some form of determinism, religious, scientific, philosophical, or otherwise, as a closed system and let it govern his choices.³⁵ He has refused to be free and withdrawn into an authoritative code. But he did not escape his freedom; he cannot choose to be unfree, he can only choose to avoid his freedom. Every day that he chooses to let some rationalistic system based upon knowledge of the "objective" world govern him, he is untrue to himself, he is not facing his existence, he is not becoming what he can become. In short, he is alienated from himself.³⁶ He has chosen to be alienated from what he can become; he seeks refuge from immediate experience for fear of choosing wrongly. He chooses to relinquish responsibility for his present actions. To use a Freudian term, he rationalizes. Afraid, he pretends that life is not tragic after all. If whatever will be will be, he can flee responsibility: he can sing, drink, fornicate, manipulate, do what-

³⁴ *Existentialism* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1947), 18. Compare this to Dewey's view: for every organism "the only way it can become aware of its nature and its goal is by obstacles surmounted and means employed . . ." *Art as Experience*, 59. Dewey does seem to imply that there is a "nature" or essence to be discovered through experience. This is not, however, crucial for Dewey.

³⁵ That is, an open-ended view, religious, scientific, or philosophical, can be accepted as a determined or closed system.

³⁶ Fallico, 168-9.

ever he thinks he has to do to get along in the world, to work on the team, to fit into the organization, to vegetate.

Fleeing responsibility renders modern man inauthentic, in common parlance, neurotic.³⁷ Putting essence before existence keeps him from making contact with reality. This can be seen through an analysis of his existence. Man differs from other animal life in the twin facts of consciousness and self-consciousness. Man does not have "a consciousness," but he is conscious that he can choose what he will become, what he will be. Acceptance of existence involves acceptance of the process of making himself, of choosing his own essence. Acceptance of this choice is the authentication of manhood. And yet consciousness has no existence. Man has existence. His existence is his "facticity," his being-in-the-world. His consciousness is always becoming, it never is.

As a man, one is stuck out there in the world, in a situation. He does not know *what* he is, only *that* he is. As he interacts with his environment he becomes what he can be. He becomes himself, yet he never *is* himself. He cannot rest on what he has become, for this would posit an essence, and would constitute a determination of future choices. Present choices are not helped by past choices because there is no criterion by which one can ascertain their "correctness": present choices are "helped" by past choice only if they insure that the present is genuinely free for the person to become himself. In the present one cannot take refuge in the security of a determinism, not even of past choices; he is condemned to go on choosing: he is condemned to be free.

As man makes conscious choices, so too is he self-conscious. In fact, "consciousness exists to the exact extent to which it is conscious of existing."³⁸ One does not only have to choose what he will become, he also is aware of the fact that he has to choose. It is a conscious choice in the face of a world of possibilities.³⁹ Possibilities are infinite because one knows not what he is nor what he can become. Yet he is finite, he cannot become anything, or everything. He is stuck in facticity, with limited capacities in a particular environment.⁴⁰ His choice is fraught with danger, for he might choose to become that which he cannot become. Since he is aware of choosing what he will become, of choosing himself, since he is conscious of his consciousness, man is not only in danger when he chooses, but he is aware of that danger; he is afraid, in anguish, in despair, filled with concern over the outcome of his choice. He wants to become what he can become and must take the sole responsibility for choosing what he will become.

³⁷ Harry M. Tiebout points out the similarity of existential alienation and estrangement to psychoanalytic neurosis and psychosis. Tiebout, "Existentialism and Psychoanalysis," *Journal of Philosophy*, LVI (July 2, 1959), 606.

³⁸ Sartre, *The Emotions*, 11.

³⁹ Morris, "Existentialism and Education," 252.

⁴⁰ Sartre, *Existential Psychoanalysis* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1953), 4. Heidegger coined a special word for this, *Dasein*, being there. Sartre, *op. cit.*, 10.

The authentic person, then, chooses to act freely (he chooses to choose) in his situation in the world. He accepts his freedom, chooses, and stands by his choice. In his immediate situation, socially accepted values (or any prior values) are irrelevant and a hindrance. They prevent one from seeing the situation: they cast a rosy hue over certain aspects of the situation and prevent the use of freedom that is his.⁴¹ By his choice, however, the authentic person not only creates himself, he creates values. Those things that help him become himself become valuable for him. He chooses one thing rather than another, not because it is already valuable, but because that choice will permit him to come more fully to himself. In a valueless situation he has created value. The value created becomes part of the authentic person's being; he *is* that value and he will face ostracism or the firing squad because that is what he has become. Later repudiation of the value would deny his freedom and would be acceptance of inauthenticity, or non-being.⁴²

The existential theory of knowing and the overcoming of the traditional dualism should now be clear. Man is a physical creature in an environment. Consciousness has no ontological status: it does not exist. In the situation one is in, he is faced with choices. His consciousness of alternatives is an act of negation. One alternative is not the other. In the act of choosing he says that the choice not taken does not exist for him. He consciously negates that alternative. Likewise, he is aware that the alternative chosen is not himself. That which is doing the choosing, consciousness, is not the alternative chosen. It is not an object in the world. It is not any thing. It is nothing. There is no dualism because consciousness, subjectivity, is nothing.⁴³

One knows only those alternatives chosen that aid in one's process of becoming himself. One is only conscious of a multitude of alternatives until he chooses and, choosing, negates the alternatives. Choice, and action upon the choice, closes doors. One is assisted by the choice in becoming what he can become or he is not, and there is no criterion by which one can tell if he is becoming all that he can become or not. If a course of action authenticates his being, reveals what he can become to him, one can believe in, gain conviction in, what the world is and what he is and further choice is open. This is often called "subjective appropriation."

To rest with this definition of subjective appropriation, however, would be to miss an important aspect of existential thought. It was pointed out earlier that the existentialists do not remain satisfied with objectively ascertained knowledge.⁴⁴ The totality of the immediate situation goes far beyond what can be scientifically known about it. Response, then, ought to be based upon the total immediate situation, and not merely upon the cognizable. Further, scientific knowledge does not dictate a course of action. An urge to

⁴¹ Morris, "Existentialism and Education," 252.

⁴² It is the existential threat of non-being that is anxiety. Tillich, 744.

⁴³ See Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, *passim*.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

respond to the whole situation coupled with the realization that what we know about the situation is "objective," *i. e.*, indeterminate, forces the act of choice. Correct choice is substantiated by its contribution to one's being. "Doing reveals being."⁴⁵ One cannot contribute to his being except through a subjective appropriation of those aspects of the immediate situation that are relevant. Which these are is known through recognition and a "subjective" feeling of appropriateness. One recognizes those aspects of scientific cognition that correspond to his own existence, his own being.⁴⁶

The effort of the existentialists to restore man's sense of the possibilities of the immediate situation causes one commentator to say that "existentialism is best described as the esthetic perception of the percipient," and that existentialism is the esthetic perception of the universe.⁴⁷ "Perception of objects," he goes on, "involves the identification of the world of those objects with the self and its purposes." Such perception involves constant effort to sustain the objects and the world, on the one hand, and to sustain the self on the other.⁴⁸ This is precisely the plea of the existentialists—one should not become alienated from himself and the world by not sustaining the world, letting it lapse into *what* is cognizable, and by not sustaining the self, letting it lapse into *what* is cognizable.⁴⁹

Art is the means of assisting this maintenance of the world. "The creative act," says Sartre, "aims at a total renewal of the world . . . [at a] recovery of the totality of being. For this is quite the final goal of art: to recover this world by giving it to be seen as it is. . . ."⁵⁰

Yet, as I shall attempt to show presently, this plea for an esthetic perception of the universe, for a response to the immediate situation in its entirety, can also be found in Dewey's analysis of experience. The discussion has come full circle. The examination of a point of similarity between the two philosophies led to the separate consideration of their theories of knowing which in turn brought the discussion around to the second similarity, the esthetic perception of the universe. The comparison of experimentalism and existentialism properly begins at this point.

⁴⁵ Sartre, *What is Literature* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949), 238. (Italics his.)

⁴⁶ Harper, 219. Compare this to a statement of Jaspers: "It is as pure consciousness that I experience the truth of a proposition. This evidence is compelling. In every single case, I experience a compelling need to recognize a thing as true or false. But this evidence is always immediate and ultimate." *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949), 16.

⁴⁷ Lawrence Friedman, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and the Esthetic Universe," *Journal of Philosophy*, LV (July 17, 1958), 623, 624.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 626. Failure to sustain the world in perception, to substantiate the point, results in psychosis. Failure to sustain parts of it is neurosis, or alienation. Psychosis appears to be extreme inauthenticity; neurosis, partial inauthenticity. *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Tillich, 741, 746.

⁵⁰ *What is Literature*, 57.

III. THE TWO COMPARED

For Dewey, life is always accompanied by "eager, impassioned activities."⁵¹ These activities enable one to grow. One grows not only physically, but also in the "re-creation of beliefs, ideals, hopes, happiness, misery, and practices."⁵² This continual growth is experience as previously analyzed from its cognitive aspect. Experience is the continual renewal of life resulting from the interaction of the organism and the environment.⁵³ This continual renewal, however, varies in quality. Some experiences contribute a great deal to the renewal of life, and some contribute very little. These latter result from (1) a slight obstruction of a relatively unimportant activity, (2) a partial dealing with an obstacle encountered in an activity, and (3) a lack of full interaction with the environment. The first is of little importance here, the second results from the haste of an organism to be on its way, or from the last cause, of most importance at the present. The lack of a full, uninhibited interaction with the environment can result from not using all the data at hand, from not considering all the alternatives, and from overlooking some of the possible consequences.⁵⁴ On the other hand, some experiences do contribute maximally to the renewal of life, enabling one to achieve maximal fulfillment in subsequent experience.⁵⁵ It is these that Dewey calls consummatory experiences, esthetic experiences.⁵⁶ Esthetic experience is not simply something that artists have, nor only something that others have in the perception of works of art, but rather it is any experience that results from a full interaction with the environment that contributes to the return of peaceful harmony with the environment.⁵⁷ Esthetic experience, according to Dewey, is "experience in its integrity . . . it is experience freed from the forces that impede and confuse its development as experience."⁵⁸

What are these forces that hinder the development of experience, that keep it from having the consummatory, esthetic quality? The humdrum of everyday life, drifting with conventions, yielding to pressure, compromising, doing one's duty, and everything that passes for morality, particularly the superficial clichés and proverbs of common sense.⁵⁹ These things render an experience *anesthetic* by hindering full perception of the situation, preventing a maximum contribution to the renewal of life. They render experience *anesthetic* because they deny the emergence of the emotional quality that

⁵¹ D&E, 50.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵³ *Art as Experience*, 22. Hereafter referred to as "*Art*."

⁵⁴ *Art*., 27.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 326.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 16-7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 274.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 39-40.

accompanies an experience that "possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement."⁶⁰

By now the overwhelming similarity between experimentalism and existentialism should be clear. The forces that render experience anesthetic for Dewey are the identical forces that produce self-alienation for the existentialist. Both demand a full response with the environment. This can be seen in a positive statement of Dewey's: the esthetic experience results in "a fulfillment that reaches to the depths of our being—one that is an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence."⁶¹ One reaches a new plateau where new interactions are possible. "A fulfillment that reaches to the depths of our being" is equivalent to becoming what one can be, achieving being; the adjustment is authenticity; and the readiness for new interactions is similar to the existential idea that man never attains his essence, or he would be tied down in future immediate situations. In short, not to be ready for new interactions would be the acceptance of the security of a determinism, a self-determinism. Although the experienced world becomes part of oneself, Dewey would not think of any adjustment of one's being with the conditions of existence as a once-for-all proposition.⁶² Life is on-going: new interactions are not only inevitable but highly desirable. Problematic situations and ensuing experience will be encountered, enabling new adjustments to occur. This is similar to existentialism: one is never what he can become. If life is growth for Dewey, it is becoming for the existentialist. If interaction with the environment results in temporary fallings out, fallings back in, resulting in growth for Dewey,⁶³ facticity in a finite situation results in crises, or ultimate situations, resulting in becoming oneself for the existentialist.

If Dewey, however, views these fallings out with the environment as problematic, to be dealt with through reflective thinking, and if he describes the problematic situation only in the most general way, the existentialists accept these "ultimate situations" as choice situations wherein one is free to authenticate himself or alienate himself, and they describe crisis situations in a very specific, analytical way.

For Dewey, in reflective experience one looks around for data, formulates hypotheses from the ideas that the data suggest, considers consequences to the alternative courses of action that he has hypothesized, forms a tentative conclusion, and acts, testing the conclusion.⁶⁴ If the conclusion tests out satisfactorily, a consummatory, esthetic effect occurs. Even an experience that is primarily reflective can produce this effect.⁶⁵ That is, the conclusion is *not* merely intellectual. As we say, that was "quite an experience." Dewey does

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 104.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶⁴ *D&E.*, 176.

⁶⁵ *Art.*, 37.

not go into an analysis of specific problematic situations except by way of illustration.

The existentialists, on the other hand, do deal with specific crisis situations, ultimate situations. These are the situations that necessarily involve our very being: they are situations for which we have ontological concern. Universal knowledge is not the province of philosophy, but dealing with situations that are universal is. The existentialists, therefore, philosophize upon those situations with which everyone meets, sooner or later: death, suffering, anguish, chance, sickness, failure, guilt, uncertainty. Other situations come and go, but everyone must face the ultimate situations. How he faces them reveals what he is. In them he finds out what he can become. If he is authentic, he achieves esthetic, consummatory experiences in them. The ultimate situations, then, point out the human situation: that "no reliance can be put on worldly existence."⁶⁰ Stark, honest, the existentialists have been called radical realists, nihilists, pessimists, and so on, because of their perception of some of the inevitable consequences of life, because of their esthetic perception of the universe.⁶⁷

I am not sure that Dewey would deny the relevance of the perception of these consequences in experience. According to him, although all the consequences of an experience are never seen, the more that are seen, the richer is the quality of the experience.⁶⁸ The more consequences seen, the greater the chance of a fulfilling consummatory experience. There is no reason to suppose that the problematic situations that constitute experience for Dewey, the fallings out with the environment, cannot be enlarged so as to include the existentialists' ultimate situations. His analysis of what is anesthetic shows that. In fact, some of the optimism of the scientific humanists is not ascribable to Dewey when Dewey is concerned with an individual's experience. Further, if seeing consequences enriches the quality of life, and if one of the consequences of life is death, there seems to be no conflict between experimentalism and, for example, Heidegger's being-unto-death, that is, the tragic view of life. However, when Dewey says "through the phases of perturbation and conflict there abides the deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the sense of which haunts life like the sense of being founded on a rock,"⁶⁹ he is closer to the religious existentialists, Tillich, Jaspers, and Marcel.

The compatibility of Dewey's thought with the tragic view of life leads one to think that success-oriented experimentalists may be guilty of a narrow

⁶⁰ Jaspers, *The Way to Wisdom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), 20.

⁶⁷ I do not agree with this judgment of the existentialists. They seem to have a deep, abiding faith in man. Jaspers points out that nihilism is the result of the collapse of the objective world of the sciences and is a crisis through which one must go before he can philosophize on existence, i. e., before he can relate himself to being. *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, 168; *The Way to Wisdom*, 37.

⁶⁸ *Art.*, 44.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

interpretation of their philosophy if it is derived from Dewey. Similarly, the emphasis on data secured and objectified through experience (*i. e.*, scientific knowledge) may be the result of a partial interpretation of Dewey:

... art, the mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession, is the culmination of nature, and that science is properly a handmaiden that conducts events to this happy issue.⁷⁰

Since art is continuous with all experience, all consummatory experience is art. Science is auxiliary to meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession (constitutive of a consummatory experience), or, to subjective appropriation. Dewey would probably not countenance the phrase, but, essentially, it seems he would agree.

Again, if the truth of a conclusion is tested in action, that test can only be tested by (1) it did what it was expected to do, that is, it resulted in the consequences anticipated, or it did not, and (2) the consequences are only tested, and are only testable, by further action and further consequences, which means, ultimately by the fulfillment of experience—which, as I have tried to show previously, is tantamount to becoming oneself. Becoming oneself, for the existentialist, occurs through subjective appropriation, in fear and trembling. The anguish over the commitment in subjective appropriation can be considered to parallel the attitude one might have in keeping a tentative conclusion tentative, although the latter seems more optimistic. Both show a deep concern against objectifying or absolutizing claims to knowledge. Both live in an open universe.

Further, if for Dewey consciousness only emerges when an ongoing activity is blocked, or when such blockage is anticipated, or when the situation is uncertain, might not consciousness always be active? Might not this "accentuation of consciousness" be similar to what the existentialists mean by saying that consciousness is always becoming, it never *is*, especially when Dewey says that the accentuation of consciousness caused by a problem results in its "turning in upon the individual's own attitudes, powers, wishes, etc.?"⁷¹ Particularly if one grants the view established above, that problems for Dewey might include the ultimate situations of the existentialists, and if the "etc." in the quotation includes the fears, doubts, and uncertainties that pervade the ultimate situations, can one say that Dewey and the existentialists are in considerable agreement on what constitutes consciousness. That is, when Dewey says, "'consciousness' is the more acute and intense in the degree of the readjustments that are demanded," that it varies in proportion to the degree

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 26n., quoting himself from Chapter 9, "Experience, Nature, and Art," *Experience and Nature*, 358.

⁷¹ D&E, 403. That is, the repository of objective knowledge is still "subjective" as it is used in common parlance for bias stemming from self-interest.

of the difficulty of the problem, he seems to be in essential agreement with Sartre's statement, "consciousness exists to the exact extent to which it is conscious of existing," which varies in proportion to the degree of ultimate concern.⁷²

IV. COMMUNICATION

Concerning at least one aspect of experience, however, Dewey seems at first glance to be completely at odds with existentialism. On the relationship of the individual to society and on the bearings of this relationship respecting the possibilities of communication, Dewey seems to have more of a social emphasis; the existentialists seem to have more emphasis upon the individual. For Dewey, experience, although it occurs in a physical world, is also primarily social. The interaction of the organism is interaction in a social as well as physical environment. Classical notions of individualism emphasizing personal rights over social claims stem from the mind/body dualism. The individual thinker would sift out from authoritatively given opinions the real truth, giving him a leverage with which society could be resisted legitimately.⁷³ For the experimentalist, however, even though knowledge must be personally tested to be valid, all testing (doing and undergoing) occurs in "a medium of accepted meanings and values."⁷⁴ The medium can be questioned, Dewey admits, only by individuals, but when one does question it he is expected to try to gain general acceptance of any revisions he may suggest. Otherwise he may only have irresponsible speculations, or he may be cut off from society. Gaining general acceptance of one's ideas also "tests" them against a wider range of experience, Dewey held. As a result, individuals are agencies of social progress.⁷⁵

But before one can question the medium of accepted meanings and values, he first of all receives them. They are transmitted through imitation and association from early childhood. It is the emphasis upon this aspect of Dewey's experimentalism, extended so as to include the whole of education and adult life, and de-emphasis upon the individual's role as an agency of progress, that causes some critics of Dewey to assert that his philosophy has been responsible for the apparent over-emphasis upon group activities.

In *Democracy and Education* (1916) Dewey does emphasize the social aspects of experience. Experience and education occur in "shared," "con-joint," "associated" activity.⁷⁶ Sharing in a common activity alters one's experience, socializes it.⁷⁷ Education, formal and otherwise, is a function of

⁷² *Art.*, 266; *The Emotions*, 11.

⁷³ *D&E*, 340-43.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 344.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 341, 347.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

society: it is society perpetuating itself, transmitting itself.⁷⁸ It transmits itself through communication. Communication is the life-blood of a society: in communication society lives and has its being: "Communication is a process of sharing experience till it becomes a common possession," modifying the experience of both parties involved.⁷⁹

The relative difficulty of communication is not particularly explicated by Dewey in *Democracy and Education*, but a look at his analysis of the problematic situation will reveal how he has often been interpreted. In a problematic situation one derives ideas, suggested conclusions, from the data at hand. The pupil must devise his own solution "not of course in isolation, but in correspondence with the teacher and other pupils."⁸⁰ Add to this his definition of democracy: "...it is primarily a form of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience," and his request that each refer his actions to the actions of others, and the others to his, and that each consider the others' actions to give direction to his own;⁸¹ and one gathers that Dewey takes communication as a fact. Communication is readily possible. Dewey's assumption that communication changes the experience of both parties leaves the door open for his later views. The charges that the various forms of groupism that grew with the twentieth century are derived from Dewey (that some of his critics make) might be more properly brought to those who derived their own ideas from Dewey, rather than followed Dewey. Responding to one's own experience in group situations might cause one to agree with the later Dewey, and with the existentialists, that communication is after all not as easy as *Democracy and Education* assumes.

The broader, more detailed analysis of experience that appears in *Art as Experience* (1934) apparently represents Dewey's attempt to square his philosophy with his experience. The later concept of experience is far less idealistic. When describing consummatory experience he says, "Only occasionally in the lives of many are the senses fraught with the sentiment that comes from a deep realization of intrinsic meanings."⁸² Although consummatory experience is in fact continuous with ordinary, everyday experience, and ordinary experiences can become consummatory, many of them are not. The continuity of experience does become broken in practical life. Fear of experience does result in the mind/body dualism.⁸³ As the quotation that follows will show, experience must be consummatory for genuine communication to occur. Hence, only spurious communication is available for many. Dewey's mature view on communication can be seen in the concluding statement to his chapter on "The Expressive Object":

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-4. See also 12, 17, 26, 42, 52, 114.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 5, 11.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁸² *Art.*, 21.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 23.

In the end, works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience.⁸⁴

In other words, one cannot accept the doctrine of sociality that can be found in Dewey's earlier books on education as a central tenet of Dewey: one cannot use it in practice because communication is not quite so simple. Dewey's analysis of what makes an experience anesthetic indicates that he might have reversed his stand on the point at issue: the relationship of the individual to society. Instead of society contributing to experience, it appears that society may be inimical to experience because it embodies those forces that render experience anesthetic, hindering communication as well. It is reasonable to assume that the fulfillment of experience, of life, for the individual is the dominant value for Dewey.⁸⁵ Indeed, there is a premonition of the shift in *Democracy and Education* in the chapter on aims in education.

Discussing aims, it is difficult for Dewey to be specific because all aims result from activity in progress. Stated aims, then, are merely a matter of emphasis at a particular time and place, "... and we do not emphasize things which do not require emphasis."⁸⁶ Stated aims are thus an attempt to balance the existing contemporary practice. Then, if *Democracy and Education* states explicitly as an aim of education democracy as a mode of associated living, we can assume that it, too, was a response to an existing situation, a period of intense individualism. If today is a period of collectivism, as some students of society (Reisman, for one) say it is, then existentialism can be seen as relevant to Dewey's position as a statement of the desirability of individual freedom.⁸⁷ Further, Dewey's observation on the lack of full communication that occurs despite apparent communication encourages one to suspect that perhaps he would not disagree with the use of existential ideas in education. But before the implications of existentialism for education can be considered, an examination of existential philosophizing on communication is in order.

If, for Dewey, full, unhindered communication occurs only in works of art, and if, on the principle of continuity, all communication is the same, varying only in the matter of degree, outside of works of art fullest communication would occur within and from consummatory experiences, between people that have had them and are capable of having them. This is so for two reasons: (1) consummatory experience assumes full perception of immediate situations. Those things that keep one from responding fully to immediate

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁸⁵ D&E, 117.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 130.

⁸⁷ It looks as if the "other-directed" personality and the "organization man" are products of over-emphasis upon sociality. Bernard Mehl concurs and says it is "fashionable" among intellectuals to criticize conformity and the education that produces it. "The Organization Man, The Organization Teacher, and General Education," *Educational Theory*, VIII (July, 1958), 169. I doubt if anything has ever been "fashionable" among intellectuals.

situations are those that keep one from having an experience that is consummatory and they also keep one from full consideration of the experience in later intercourse. (2) An act of communication itself can be an experience, providing the participants respond fully to the immediate situation that it is. It, too, can be a consummatory experience, but the forces that keep any experience from becoming consummatory are also operative in communication. And if, as suggested previously,⁸⁸ those people most fully open to experience are in the existential view authentic, one would expect the existential examination of communication to parallel and supplement Dewey's. Such, I submit, is the case.

First of all, the existentialists are not anti-social. Society is part of man's facticity, his being-in-the-world. It merely happens that social problems, by and large, are not problems of existence and are subordinate to the problems of existence.⁸⁹ The authentic person has community feelings. He merely discovers, when he shows up on the scene, that other people are alienated from themselves. Alienation keeps them from responding fully to the immediate situation. This includes other people. Communication is impossible in general because the dogmas, knowledge, *etc.*, accepted hinder communication. Those things that keep one from becoming himself serve also to alienate him from others. Consequently, what passes for communication is the babble of brooks and wind in the trees. The existential description amounts to a judgment, and the judgment implies that communication is a good to be sought, much as becoming oneself constitutes a good. So the existentialists have a deep sense of community, and their prodigious efforts to establish genuine communication results from a sense of social responsibility even if the contents of their philosophizing tends to exclude doctrines of sociality.

And the mechanics of communication for the existentialist? In existential communication one questions everything, nothing is taken for granted. It is the search for truth itself, the quest for being, it is philosophizing. It is completely unreserved. At its acme, communication is communion, the meeting of minds, yes, even the wedding of two minds. In communication the meeting counters the authentic being of the other and is assured of his own authenticity.⁹⁰ In communication the full subjectivity of each is met by the other. Neither restricts the freedom, the individuality, of the other.⁹¹ That is, com-

⁸⁸ D&E, 29.

⁸⁹ Jaspers, *Existentialism and Humanism*, 12. To subordinate the problems of existence to social problems posits man's essence: he is social. This would be a form of alienation.

⁹⁰ Jaspers, *The Way to Wisdom*, 326.

⁹¹ By way of contrast, the slightest objectification (consideration as an object. The verb indicates that this is a process one chooses to initiate) of the other hinders communication, cuts it off, alienates the other. An authentic person will not be made an object of, nor will he objectify authentic being. Sartre holds this to be impossible. According to him one inevitably objectifies the other. This may be so, and is a matter of existential analysis, not knowledge. Logically, communication would be impossible only when one of the parties is not fully himself in communication. This is precisely Sartre's point, however, and the reason his concept of freedom

munication occurs when one is fully immersed in the immediate situation (better, when two are immersed).⁹² The previous conclusion that existentialism was the esthetic perception of the universe is corroborated: existential communication is the esthetic perception of a fellow human being. A quotation from Dewey will support the general point of agreement of the two philosophies, the esthetic perception of the universe, and it will indicate that Dewey might be in agreement with the concept of existential communication:

For the uniquely distinguishing feature of esthetic experience is exactly the fact that no such distinction of self and object exists in it, since it is esthetic in the degree in which organism and environment [substitute "other organism"] cooperate to institute an experience in which the two are so fully integrated that each disappears.⁹³

And such consummatory experience transforms "interaction into participation and communication."⁹⁴

That is, the fullness of experience demands communication much as authenticity does. Being fully alive is akin to being fully oneself. As the end of being fully alive is to live more fully, so is being fully oneself a step toward becoming oneself. There is neither a cessation of experience, nor a cessation of becoming oneself.

The general agreement of the two philosophies on the esthetic perception of the universe suggests that Dewey could enter into communication with the existentialists. Dewey has said that a philosopher's esthetic theory is the test of his capacity to have experience, and a test of his system to grasp experience.⁹⁵ In the light of this discussion, it is also the test of his authenticity and a test of his system to grasp existence. Both philosophies indicate that they are themselves esthetic theories generalized.

V. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS DRAWN AND ILLUSTRATED

If Dewey has said that a philosopher's ability to grasp experience is tested in his esthetic theory, so too has he said, "Education is the laboratory in which philosophical distinctions become concrete and are tested."⁹⁶ The previous point was that philosophy was the generalized theory of art; the

is so profound, at once so great and majestic and terrifying and desperate. For Sartre the presence of anyone at all is alienating, restricting freedom and choice. The authentic man is on his own. Sartre, then, would probably not agree with the text on communication. On the other hand, Jaspers and Buber probably would. One cannot absolutize; one can only philosophize on existence, his own existence. See Maurice Friedman's "Martin Buber's Philosophy of Education," *Educational Theory*, VI (April, 1956), 95-8 for Buber's I-Thou concept.

⁹² See Jaspers, *The Way to Wisdom*, 25-6.

⁹³ *Art.*, 249.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 274.

⁹⁶ D&E, 384.

present point is that philosophy is "the general theory of education."⁹⁷ Conversely, the theory of education is philosophy particularized. That is, "philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately conducted practice."⁹⁸ This gives one a clue when drawing the implications of existentialism for education. Insofar as the general agreement ascribed herein to the two philosophies is valid, particularizing existentialism to derive its implications for education is justifiable, although the major existentialists have not produced a theory of education as yet. The following ideas will be couched in existentialistic terms, with an occasional reference to Dewey to point up areas of agreement.

If, for Dewey, life is experience, which is education, so too is becoming oneself "education" for the existentialist. "What is education?" asks Kierkegaard in the midst of an exposition of authenticity. He replies,

I should suppose that education was the curriculum one had to run through in order to catch up with oneself, and he who will not pass through this curriculum is helped very little by the fact that he was born in the most enlightened age.⁹⁹

What enables one "to catch up with himself," to become himself, is educative. Anything that alienates one from himself is not educative. Education is the process of becoming oneself. One becomes himself by choosing his response to immediate situations. The act of choice in a situation defines oneself. Anything that hinders the play of freedom in the choice is alienating.

Freedom is restricted when the teacher "objectifies" the pupil, that is, when he considers him as an object rather than as a subject. Objectifying is an active process one chooses in order to eliminate parts of the immediate situation that threaten to objectify one's own self. Objectification of the pupil ignores the fact that he is a potential esthetic percipient of the universe and prevents existential communication by making the pupil self conscious. Objectification sets up the mind/body dualism. To illustrate this with prevailing practices that objectify and alienate the pupil, one can mention forced memorization, repeating unbeliefs (or the things "learned" for which one has had no experience), rewards and punishments, group processes (especially the use of the "consensus"), examinations, cramming, objectively scored tests, a class curve, and marking, (especially the mark for the sake of the mark).¹⁰⁰

As objectification of the pupil is alienating and prevents communication, so too does objectification of the teacher alienate him and prevent existential communication. The teacher is not "a teacher," but an authentic person who is himself becoming himself: the pupil is not "a student," he is a person

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 383.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 387.

⁹⁹ *Fear and Trembling* (Anchor ed., 1954), 57.

¹⁰⁰ Wirth, 155-6.

becoming himself. The only difference between them is that the "teacher" is authentic: he has already "caught up with himself," become himself, and can be himself in the classroom. He is not himself in the sense that he knows what he is, he is himself in that he is becoming what he can be. He is aware of his freedom; he is aware that those forces that Dewey pointed out as capable of rendering experience anesthetic do not determine his choices; they do not render his existence inauthentic. In Dewey's view, he is open to the experience of the immediate situation of the classroom.

The pupil, on the other hand, is alienated from himself. He has not yet "caught up with himself." He is not yet chosen; the task of authentication lies ahead for him.¹⁰¹ Communication with the teacher who is himself, becoming himself, wakens possibilities for the pupil. He becomes aware of his freedom. Since he is his freedom, he becomes aware of himself and what he can become. In Dewey's terms, he is ready for fulfillment in experience because he is free to examine the evidence. Consequences are opened up, determined only by the pupil's choice among them of what he will become. Consummatory experience is possible.

But the locus of the experience changes. No longer is it with things, actual physical stuff. The process of communication is the experience undergone. The "teacher" will not have to know what "experiences" have been undergone by the "pupil," for these would determine the immediate situation in the classroom. The authentic teacher, by refusing to objectify the pupil, is always where the pupil is, exactly and in every instance. Not to be confused with the concept of "empathy," which, from the existential viewpoint, is a form of self-induced inauthenticity (one imagines he can "feel with" the other, who is objectified in the process), nor with the prevailing concept of "acceptance," which would be to objectify the pupil and his "needs" or "interests" (with suspended judgment but still with objectification); meeting the pupil where he is consists of meeting the immediate problematic situation together in existential communication. The authentic teacher, as esthetic percipient of the universe, is capable of responding in an immediate situation so as to become what he can become (here, the teacher he can be). The classroom is an immediate situation of the most challenging type. Perforce, the teacher meets the pupil where he is.

If the teacher is the esthetic percipient of the universe, one might properly question, "has the teacher no values?"

First of all, the existentialist would deny the validity of the question. People that would canonize teachers want them to accept absolute value systems that would alienate the teacher from himself. This is de-humanizing. On the other hand, they want the teacher to be loving and tender, as human as he can become.

¹⁰¹ Loosely speaking, inauthenticity is immaturity; authenticity is maturity.

Secondly, of course the teacher has values. The difference, as should be clear from the previous analysis, is that the teacher is aware of the fact that he has chosen those values he has: he has become those values, in anguish. They were not "values" before he chose them. He knows that his constant choice, in the full dread of uncertainty, is their only support. He is free, then, when the immediate situation demands it, to discuss his values without proselytizing. If the communication is authentic, the pupil is free to choose his own values: the teacher is not an exemplar of particular values, but an exemplar of an authentic, committed person. The example of commitment to freely chosen values seems to be more salutary to the growth of integrity, to use common parlance, than overt acceptance of absolute values that the pupil sees as inauthentic, that is, hypocritical.

The discussion thus far has been concerned with the pursuit of being, or authenticity, through existential communication. This comprises general method. Obviously one cannot communicate without content. An examination of content, or subject matter, for the early Dewey will lead to the existential view. For the early Dewey, subject matter is the experience of the human race. This is where application of Dewey easily falls down: the experience of the race is seen as "out there," repositied in textbooks, *etc.*; and one gets it into the pupil's experience through giving him problems. Even though genuine problems of life are utilized, a manipulative technique is easy to fall into, particularly since Dewey states quite explicitly that method is merely the arrangement of subject matter that renders it easiest to assimilate. Method becomes alienating manipulation. On the other hand, after Dewey finished his rebellion against the classics in the curriculum and saw the sciences established, he could see more use for literature. The following statement of his illustrates this very well:

It is by way of communication that art becomes the incomparable organ of instruction, but the way is so remote from that usually associated with the idea of education [1934], it is a way that lifts art so far above what we are accustomed to think of as instruction, that we are repelled by any suggestion of teaching and learning in connection with art.¹⁰²

It is this commentary upon "what we are accustomed to think of as instruction" that encourages one to assume Dewey's concurrence with the inclusion of literature in the curriculum and with the "method" herein explicated.

The role of literature in the curriculum designed to help one "catch up with oneself" will be clarified by a prior review of the general curriculum.

¹⁰² *Art.*, 347. Compare this with Sartre's function of literature: "the writer has chosen to reveal the world and particularly to reveal man to other men so that the latter may assume full responsibility before the object which has been thus laid bare." *What is Literature*, 24.

History would help one come to himself since it deals with men in ultimate situations and it leads to the present age of crisis when the human race faces complete failure. It is a little more difficult to see the place of science. Laboratory experimentation seems helpful insofar as it clarifies the immediate situation, but it could become a means of alienation through emphasis on the "objective" world, rather than on the world one meets as existence. One can see here in the curriculum how thoroughly alienated modern man is. To exclude science is unthinkable, but the emphasis upon "objectivity" when it is taught seems to lead to alienation through the mind/body dualism. It easily becomes a collection of facts to be mastered. One would have to keep the attitude that science is only auxiliary to life, yet he could not preach that essential attitude. It seems as though it would be very difficult for a teacher of science to remain authentic. One must know the contents of science, yet that knowledge is not education. It does not help man come to know what he is, in the existential view. Van Cleve Morris agrees that the humanities and arts would receive the emphasis of the existential educator, and that the de-emphasis of science and the social sciences would follow.¹⁰³

Content for the existentialist, then, would appear to center in literature. Kierkegaard's literary style, the use of the novel by Camus, and the writing of novels and drama by Sartre imply as much. Jaspers' essay on humanism literally demanded it. In this essay Jaspers pointed out the dangers of the use of literature in education. The positive general method outlined above for any subject matter is accentuated by Jaspers' warnings on what not to do with literature. For literature, one should not (1) teach for familiarity, (2) use a philological approach, (3) conserve culture or tradition, (4) lapse into a relativism or intellectual objectivity, or (5) use works of literature as goals to be mastered.¹⁰⁴ Positively, one must allow for subjective appropriation. In literature more than in life itself, excepting ultimate situations, there is the opportunity for one to authenticate himself.¹⁰⁵ In literature subjectively appropriated one can find out what he is and what he can become.

When Dewey says that instruction in art (substitute literature) is not information about it, but rather "a matter of communication and participation in the values of life by means of the imagination," he corroborates existentialism very closely.¹⁰⁶ And if art is experience, possessing all the qualities of a normal experience, the reading of literature that is a work of art is itself the chief locus of instruction. That is, even if the method of instruction would produce alienation, the pupil's first-hand perception of the work could help him come to himself in spite of instruction. For this reason genuine

¹⁰³ "Existentialism and Education," 256.

¹⁰⁴ *Existentialism and Humanism*, 86.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Art.*, 336.

works of art would have to be used, selection taking into account the reading level attained by the student.¹⁰⁷

Prescription of specific works would be as alienating as prescription of specific methods. If the teacher is to be himself, he has to choose here as elsewhere. The only criterion would be if it offered an esthetic (consummatory) experience or not; if the reader could become so involved in it that subject and object became one. If he lived the experience embodied it could help him come to himself.¹⁰⁸ If it contained ultimate situations, fine. If it dealt with authentic people, fine. If it dealt with inauthentic, alienated people, fine. One can see here the efficacy and perhaps primacy of tragedy. The tragic hero really comes to himself.¹⁰⁹ It would not, however, include those things that keep it from becoming a work of art. It would not contain moralizing or be character building except in the existential sense. In the existential sense, man finding out what he is and what he can become (the pursuit of authenticity), all education is character building.¹¹⁰

Although prescription of subject matter would be alienating, constituting as it does the deprivation of choice in an immediate situation, the authentic person could see in a prescribed curriculum an opportunity to become himself. It becomes the situation, or his historical facticity.¹¹¹ It is with this view in mind that I will attempt to illustrate some of the ideas put forth. The following illustrations are chosen from the standard eleventh grade course in American literature. I do not intend to be analytical, precise, comprehensive, nor directive. I wish only to make a few general ideas clear, especially in respect to the relation of the experience undergone in the reading of a work of art to the experience undergone in the classroom.

Bryant's "Thanatopsis" illustrates a work of art that involves an ultimate situation in its expressed content. Overtly, it mentions the consolation of nature when one is overcome with thoughts of death. An existentialistic interpretation would probably be that thinking about death brought home to the narrator his being-unto-death, that is, his finitude. The poem might be the author's coming to himself in a crisis. The final stanza, "So live that when thy summons comes . . ." suggests that the narrator realized that al-

¹⁰⁷ This may seem self-contradictory, but I doubt if it is. A work of art is a source of a consummatory experience. Customarily one judges whether or not it meets the criterion on mature adult standards. For the immature, however, the source of such an experience might be found in something that seems superficial to adult standards. Reading level, that is, is not of primary relevance in selection.

¹⁰⁸ This obviously implies no censorship. Cf. Sartre: "the writer requires of the reader . . . the gift of his whole person," *What is Literature*, 51.

¹⁰⁹ Instead of catharsis, it seems that the release that tragedy brings comes from the fact that it helps one to know what he can become and assists him in being-unto-death, letting him know how he might face it, for how he faces death determines what he is.

¹¹⁰ Harper, 238; M. Friedman, 103.

¹¹¹ This is the problem of the authentic teacher at any rate. "*Being situated* is an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom." Sartre, *What is Literature*, 150. (Italics his.) Acceptance of the situation is comparable to Dewey's habituation, D&E, 55-7.

though death brought no hopes, yet one might live by putting conscious significance and meaning into his life so that when he dies he can face death as though he were immortal. The anguish and the responsibility for one's own life that characterizes existentialism is implicit; this is not an easy course to take and one is not deluding himself with a belief in immortality.

In my own teaching I would always read this poem out loud in its entirety. The phrasing is difficult but the rhythms are magnificent. It is a long poem, and when one is finished he must pause. There is a consummatory experience available and one must let it take its course. That is, it is a work of art for a superior class that is not troubled by the vocabulary and that can concentrate long enough to take in the whole poem. (For a slow class it is not a work of art. It is too difficult. Then one paraphrases and hopes for the best in discussion. Existential communication can develop there.)¹¹² As Dewey said in the statement quoted, "we are repelled by any suggestion of teaching and learning in connection with art."

And so one pauses. One does not paraphrase, explain, or haul out existentialistic jargon. One certainly does not ask pointed questions. All these objectify the poem and set up the mind/body dualism (the poem is out there, the knowing subject is here) and work against the experience available. That is, they create a threefold alienation: the pupil is alienated from the world (poem), from the teacher, and from himself. One cannot "teach" the poem. If an existential relationship has been established in the class one can talk about death, possibly the meaning of the poem, or paraphrase a troubling passage upon request. All the teacher can do is somehow or other insure relationship of the poem with life—with the pupil's own existence. He does not make a point of doing this, he *will* do it if he is authentic. The whole discussion will be somewhere intermediate between the poem and the pupil's own existence. Further, if all goes well, it will be an experience in its own right. That is, if the discussion results in communication, the teacher-pupil relationship will result in an absence of objectification of each other; there will be a confrontation. This confrontation, "wholly present," is not dissimilar to the confrontation that occurs in the reading of the poem. In both there is a complete lack of self-consciousness, a complete immersion of subjectivity in the immediate situation. A consummatory experience can be had.

This sounds rather ideal, but it can happen, and unless it does happen there is, for the existentialist, no education—no coming to oneself. One must let subjective appropriation occur. One cannot do anything to hinder it to be maximally effective, not even request subjective appropriation. Letting the pupil make his choice of what he will become is very difficult, as I hope this simple illustration has shown.

The selections from *Walden* usually included in a high school anthology

¹¹² This does not imply any correlation between authenticity and "intelligence," although there may be one. See note 107.

are not a work of art in the sense that the whole volume is, but the selections usually are such that existential communication and esthetic perception of the universe are virtually assured. In his opening statements Thoreau asks the existential question: "I went to the woods . . . to live deliberately . . . to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its lowest terms. . . ." Although this hypostatizing of life seems to be consideration of an essence, what Thoreau wanted was an esthetic view. The forces Dewey suggests as rendering experience anesthetic were preventing Thoreau from understanding what life was, what it meant to live, to be. Thoreau's return to society depicts the conscious choice of the authentic man. "Yes," Thoreau might have said, "routine and convention help me become myself as long as I knowingly choose to be within their scope. Only when they press upon me unquestioned do they keep me from being myself and from becoming myself."

Thoreau's essay on civil disobedience embodies the concept of personal choice and commitment. When his society did not uphold his values, Thoreau's preference for jail rather than surrendering his values resulted from his awareness that in choosing those values he was becoming himself, what he could be. That is, if Thoreau was authentic. His well-known query, "Why are you not here, Waldo?" in response to Emerson's question of why he was in jail points up the difference between the authentic and the inauthentic man. Although historically Thoreau might have been inauthentic, which is doubtful since it is difficult to conceive of his life as possessing more significance, the literary treatment in the essay presents an authentic man. Incidentally, nothing bears witness to the existentialists' belief that every person is attempting to become himself (the surge toward being) more than the usual admiration of Thoreau's courage.

Again, the teacher does not have to "teach" Thoreau. Thoreau becomes the arena, to borrow a phrase from Jaspers, for the classroom experience. Whitman, too, is such an arena. "There Was a Child Went Forth" is the biography of the authentic person. Whitman's "Song of Myself" is the universe ready and available for "esthetic perception," and on the other hand embodies the concept of communication, that is, the mutual immersion of subjectivities in each other.

The illustrations thus far have tried to show (1) the methodology that is appropriate to an understanding of an ultimate situation embodied in a work of art, as "Thanatopsis," (2) the use of abstract statements of an authentic person asking himself the ultimate questions to aid in the pupil's choice and commitment, as in Thoreau, and (3) the open-ended view of the universe that permits consummatory experiences to occur, that permit authenticity, as in Whitman.

The type of literature that contains inauthentic people can be illustrated with J. D. Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye*. Not only valuable because it contains hosts of inauthentic, alienated people, *The Catcher in the Rye*'s

Holden Caulfield, the existential hero in the crisis of having to accept his facticity, his being-in-the-world, what he cannot be, is very close to the threat of non-being that faces all men, particularly the teen-ager in present day America.¹¹³ Holden's world is full of "phonies" (his term for inauthenticity); his roommate's love affairs are mutual objectifications of each other by the lovers (similar to Sartre's analysis in *Being and Nothingness*) that alienate and prevent authentic communication; his older brother's flight to Hollywood embodies man's self-alienation when he relies upon success in society to determine his being; his younger brother's death embodies his inchoate awareness of his own finitude; and his self-alienation through acceptance of social standards embodies the question, "What does it mean to say 'I am'?" as the question is forced upon Holden. His own choice to become the catcher in the rye has not yet been made at the end of the novel. Holden has no way of knowing whether he can become the catcher or not: his freedom is very real, and his need for commitment is apparent.¹¹⁴

The value of this book lies in its realistic acceptance of an alienated society. Through it the reader can discover his freedom and his facticity. He can discover that if he is going to become what he can become, himself, he will have to choose his own values and sustain them himself through commitment to them in his historical situation.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the illustrations just given are illustrations only and nothing more.¹¹⁵ They are attempts to complete a rather abstract exposition and are to serve as part of the dialogue, the present attempt at communication. One does not *know* if the position reached herein can contribute to life, or experience, or to becoming oneself. Only scientific knowledge can *know* what will contribute, and science is not enough. To become himself the teacher must commit himself, in anguish and in fear and trembling. One must try for himself. He does not become an existentialist, he becomes himself. This highlights the duty of the teacher from the existential viewpoint: to help the student's respect for his own consciousness in indeterminate situations grow, which, as Walter Cerf points out, "is basic democratic faith."¹¹⁶ This is more important than *what* is taught.¹¹⁷

The task of helping a student gain respect for the validity of his own con-

¹¹³ A corroboration of this point (the threat of non-being) is in Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd* (1960). From an external point of view, Goodman discovers that one has a great deal of difficulty growing up in America and retaining his self-respect. He is forced to grow up absurd.

¹¹⁴ This point, and the theme of the essay, is substantiated by Jaspers' statement that it is these people who have not yet made up their minds about themselves that are affected most significantly by education. Jaspers, *The Idea of the University* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 106.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹¹⁶ "Existentialist Empiricism and Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXVII (Summer, 1957), 209.

¹¹⁷ Harper concurs. Harper, 234.

sciousness brings the discussion to the final point to be considered. For Dewey, discipline is keeping one's nose stuck in the course of activity which has been blocked until the activity is freed. It is the attitude that permits one to solve a problem in light of consequences, regardless of increased effort, although effort may be part of the consequences. Administered discipline is valuable insofar as it abets the attitude of seeing a thing through.¹¹⁸ This excludes, apparently, discipline as it usually is thought of, particularly as it is thought of in the secondary school where, because of the lack of experiences available, the traditional disciplinary situations arise. If the teacher wants to let the students respond to the immediate situation undetermined by his own values, how can he stop the wrestling in the back of the room, the talking during class, or cheating on an examination? Dewey's suggestion seems idealistic: fashion discipline to prompt self-discipline.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, if one enlarges the Deweyan problematic situation to life-size, if ultimate situations can be included in Dewey's concept of experience, and if one thinks about the classroom situation as an immediate situation wherein one can have an esthetic experience, then "disciplinary situations" become part of the content or subject matter of the course. Through them the student can come to himself.

This can be clarified by consideration of two points: (1) an authentic teacher will have very few discipline problems. Being himself is the surest way to receive the respect of his students. The surge for being repels students from inauthentic teachers, they are alienated from them. Conversely, they respect authenticity, particularly in the midst of inauthenticity. (2) If the teacher is authentic and a "disciplinary situation" does arise, it is either the result of the student's inauthenticity (he is not being what he can be, he does not want to become a "trouble maker") or it is the result of his authenticity (he is being what he chooses to be which happens to run counter to prevailing modes of conduct, he wants to be a "trouble maker."). It is an existential crisis and can be "dealt with" in existential communication. Administrative policies are part of the immediate situation in which the student *finds himself*, without causing inauthenticity and setting the scene for future discipline problems.¹²⁰ Speeding up the process obtains only temporary results because an existential awareness of himself is not gained by the student. On the other hand, the teacher can clarify the situation by rendering explicit the choice at hand. The student chooses for himself to become what he can become.

There are times, moreover, when the whole class will undergo a crisis (or,

¹¹⁸ D&E, 150-2.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 152. Direct commands to do something prevent self-discipline from developing; the alienation causes one to do nothing unless ordered to. "Obedience" is self-alienating, and inauthentic.

¹²⁰ Fallico, 171.

for Dewey, a problem). This is where the existential viewpoint seems to yield more light than Dewey does: through an existential crisis at the class level each individual is helped to become what he can become. Shocking, perhaps, but valid: the authentic teacher is so concerned for the coming to himself of each one of his charges that he can risk the temporary resentment that might result from plunging into a crisis that others might put down with the use of authority or ignore.¹²¹ Part of his task of helping his students become what they can be will involve incurring their wrath at times.

The teacher's duty here is twofold: to be himself and to let the student be himself. The student can be himself only by becoming aware of the fact that the prejudices he holds are prejudices, that his absolutes are "absolutes." The authentic teacher, merely by being himself will accidentally jar those prejudices and absolutes occasionally. He does not set about to do this; it happens. The only alternative for the teacher is to accept the role of "teacher" and an immature ideology. This he cannot do without self-alienation. Class crises, therefore, are almost certain to arise.

Fortunately, the class that has weathered an existential crisis will be more capable of existential communication. As for Dewey a problem becomes an "accentuation of consciousness," so too for the existentialist: the class that has come to itself through an existential crisis is more capable of coming to itself henceforth. More consequences are perceived and its experience is richer. As a tragedy as a work of art offers a consummatory experience, so too can a class crisis be consummatory, but it must be allowed to run its course and completed in an authenticating resolution.

The significance is in the quality of the experience, not content; the extent to which it enables one to be open to future experience, to let one become himself, is the educative value. As the artist can take any "subject matter" and make it into a work of art, which by the principle of continuity is only saying that as he can take any experience and render it communicable, so too can the teacher use any experience. He merely needs to be open to it. The fact that the illustrations were from literature, however, was not incidental. As the artist is open to his immediate situation and uses it to create a work of art that is his communication, so too is the teacher open to the immediate situation of the classroom. As the poet, dramatist, or novelist uses words as his mode of communication, so too does the teacher. As the artist is an esthetic percipient of

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 171. I do not think Dewey would disagree. The disruption of activity is necessary for consciousness, and consummation. Since the artist cares for the rapprochement with the environment, "he does not shun moments of resistance and tension." Rather, he utilizes them for their potentialities. *Art.*, 15. Sartre has something to say for those teachers who might be shocked by the text: "A clear-sighted view of the darkest possible situation is in itself already an optimistic act. It implies, in effect, that the situation can be *thought about*." *What is Literature*, 266. (*Italics his.*) The text of course implies that the teacher is an artist in the Deweyan sense, and he too would cultivate moments of tension and resistance for their potentialities—exactly as the existentialist.

the universe, so too must be the teacher. On this, I have attempted to show, experimentalism and existentialism agree. They also agree that education is the evolving esthetic perception of the universe, and that the incomparable vehicle of education is literature.¹²²

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¹²² When Dewey says, "Ultimately there are but two philosophies. One of them accepts life in all its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge and turns that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities—to imagination and art," (*Art*, 34) he is specifically referring to Keats' "negative capability" and Shakespeare, but I take this to include experimentalism and existentialism as well. The "other philosophy" for Dewey would be constituted by the various absolutistic and closed systems of philosophy and by practical thinking that is deterministic in nature.

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Academic Majors for Elementary School Teachers: Recent California Legislation

Recent California legislation lengthens college requirements for prospective teachers and administrators. At the same time it places greater emphasis on academic subjects. Professor Laycock here examines the genesis and history of this legislation and goes on to consider its probable implications for the training of elementary school teachers. Despite certain difficulties, ordinary transitional difficulties in the main, Professor Laycock feels that the new legislation represents a significant advance. Professor Laycock holds a Ph.D. in Educational Psychology from the University of California. In June, 1962, he leaves his post as Associate Professor of Education at the University of California to become Professor of Education at Oberlin, Ohio. His own area of major interest is the intellectual development of bright pupils, and he has recently come from a year spent investigating post-war curricula for the gifted in England, France and Sweden, and studying with Piaget and Inhelder at Geneva.

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CRITICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION have publicized silly and misguided practices in California schools for so long that many visitors expect to find everywhere the pathological signs of progressivism and life adjustment. In a state with explosive growth and infinite variety, examples can be found of almost anything, bad as well as good. Official rejoinders to criticism—meandering as they often do in high pedagogue—seldom reach the right audience with effective rebuttal. It is therefore an important event when the legislature of California enacts a sweeping reform in school certification. Sixty-odd separate and very specific credentials will be abolished, and five basic patterns of preparation will take their place. Much more significant than this tardy pruning, however, is a fundamental change: prospective teachers and administrators must attend college for at least five years, and must complete majors or minors in academic subjects. High school and junior college teachers have met these requirements for years in California, but most elementary teachers and ad-

ministrators may find them revolutionary. I should like to discuss the new régime as it will probably affect elementary teachers, sketching the background for the law and estimating its consequences.

I

The legislation is not a reflex response to contemporary hysteria, nor is it sudden surrender to the liberal arts colleges. Sputnik and the colleges certainly played a part, but more potent were other pressures that have been accumulating over the years. Aware of them, the State Board of Education (which sets policy) and various officials in the State Department of Education (which administers policy) began about 1955 to poke officially through the mound of credential requirements. They invited the counsel of professional associations that represent teachers, administrators, and trustees; they organized local meetings of parents and laymen; and they supported a "Citizens' Advisory Commission . . . on the Public Education System," this last notable for some persuasive opponents of the Establishment among its key members. Another blue-ribbon "Committee on Revision of the Credential Structure in California," met under the chairmanship of Stanford's Lucien B. Kinney, long identified with the search for specific definition of a program of teacher education. In 1958 their final report pointed out inadequacies in the existing state regulations:

There were too many and too specific types of credentials. The degree of detail was multiplying bureaucratic labor and discouraging many potential applicants.

The tendency was too great for job assignment to depend upon certification. Improper assignment had not been successfully avoided merely by legislating requirements.

The credentials as prescribed hamstrung teacher education curricula and have retarded innovation and improvement. Further, since a candidate could bypass a college's local requirements by applying directly to the state, the statewide minimum requirements gained added strength in all their complexity.

Kinney's Committee urged reduction of credential types, more responsibility for the training institutions, greater autonomy for governing boards, and heavier reliance upon the judgment of the organized profession. Each prospective teacher should have five years of college preparation, to include a major and a minor in fields taught in the schools, and a rounded professional training. Age-level specialization, internship, and optional completion of the fifth college year while teaching were some other recommendations.

Cynics predicted that the proverbial mouse would issue forth, that things

would remain unchanged. So it surprised many people when the State Superintendent of Public Instruction appeared before the California Council on Teacher Education in 1959 to urge a major reform, including the end of the undergraduate major in elementary education. Choosing the Council for his forum was adroit, because its members come from every teacher-training campus in the state, and thus included the chief supporters of the elementary education major. Later, at its January 1960 meeting, the State Board of Education heard final recommendations from such groups as the Parent-Teacher Association, the California Teachers Association, the California School Boards Association, and the Citizens' Advisory Commission.¹ Then their new policy, including five-year and academic-major requirements for elementary credentials, was sent on to the State Legislature for enactment into law. There the "Fisher Bill" (Senate Bill 57), after extended discussion and several amendments, passed and was approved by the governor in June, 1961.²

In general this bill requires separate credentials for employment in these five capacities:

- (1) Teaching in regular classrooms, with specialization in elementary, secondary, or junior college instruction.
- (2) Teaching "designated subjects" in vocational training.
- (3) Performing "designated services" in pupil personnel or health fields.
- (4) Supervision.
- (5) Administration.

In various ways the legislature responded to pressure for stiffer requirements. Academic majors or minors are imposed upon all teachers except those of trade skills. Pupil personnel workers must have at least a year of supervised clinical training. Supervisors (except of vocational programs) must complete six years of college and five years of teaching. Administrators need seven years of college and five years of teaching. Teachers are not normally to teach outside their specialties; when they do, permission is to be granted for limited periods. Many specific details—including some critical ones, such as the definition of "academic"—still remain to be decided officially before the new regulations will take effect.

The prolonged, and at times unpleasant, discussion surrounding the Fisher Bill was not a surprise, for it called for significant alteration in a complex public enterprise. Between January and June 1961, both legislative branches,

¹ See Roy E. Simpson, "A New Credential Structure for California," *California Schools*, XXXI (April, 1960), pp. 2-11.

² This bill is the "Licensing of Certificated Personnel Law of 1961." Copies are available from the Bill Room, State Capitol; and revised regulations based upon it from the Credentials Office, State Department of Education, both located in Sacramento 14, California.

in committee and on the floor, debated not only Fisher's proposal but others as well. Half a dozen major credential reforms vied for passage, including competing bills sponsored by the California Teachers Association and the California Federation of Teachers. The most significant of these bills was the one sponsored by the California Teachers Association, referred to as the "Bee Bill," after the name of the legislator who introduced it (Assembly Bill 1772). It differed chiefly from the Fisher Bill in leaving specification of details for a credential to later State Board action. It specified that the colleges should determine the acceptable content of degree programs and prescribe campus training for teachers within the limits set by the Legislature. Local boards would be free to hire teachers according to their own best interests. In a companion bill a new Commission on Teacher Licensure, to include teachers and administrators, would replace the existing Commission on Credentials as the body advisory to the State Board regarding certification. The fact that the CTA's counter-proposals lost out is a measure of the public's temper. For it is one of the best organized of professional organizations, and its representations to the Legislature usually carry impressive weight.

Fisher's proposal was part of the state administration's package of high-priority legislation, and its ultimate fate was not seriously questioned. As a consequence, strategy came to center upon amendments to meet the most serious objections. The five-year provision for elementary teaching, academic majors or minors required of nearly everybody, the potentially large number of separate specializations in the basic teaching credentials, the distribution of responsibility among state agencies and training institutions—these and myriad legalistic minutiae were debated. Publicity lighted up the "Einstein credential" part of the bill, whereby an outstandingly eminent person who did not meet all the ordinary requirements could receive a credential, to teach in his specialty. "Eminence" and "outstanding," without doubt, are difficult to translate into licensing terms. But the most significant discussion was reserved for something close to the heart of the matter: what is "academic"? Unfortunately for clear legislation, the discussion is still going on, for the State Board of Education is instructed in the legislation to set up its own definition. It is empowered to accept a subject major as "academic"—whatever a college may call it—if it finds that its courses and content are "equivalent to those of an academic subject major" at the college.

The Fisher Bill will take effect on July 1, 1963. Meanwhile, the California Council on Teacher Education and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction have appointed four Resource Committees and a Central Coordinating Committee to make specific recommendations to the State Board about the many details that will change legislation into operating regulations. The sixty-five persons on these committees are broadly representative of administrative agencies, training institutions, school personnel, and the general public. They are taking account of suggestions from all over the state, and

will report to the State Board in the spring of 1962. Then, if all goes well, in early summer 1962 the long-awaited regulations will be announced, a year ahead of ultimate application. Already the colleges are trying to foresee the changes they will have to make and are moving appropriately.

This article is concerned primarily with the elementary school. Under the regulations flowing from the Fisher Bill, prospective elementary teachers in California must meet these requirements, starting in 1963:

- (1) An approved bachelor's degree.
- (2) Five years of college, the fifth to be completed within five years of first employment.
- (3) A major and a minor, "one of which shall be in an academic subject matter area and one of which may be in a nonacademic subject matter area, normally taught in the public schools." "Academic subject matter area" is carefully confined to "the natural sciences, the social sciences (other than education and educational methodology), the humanities, mathematics, and the fine arts," and can be diversified among several disciplines. It is not clear yet whether the text of the bill is meant to restrict both major and minor to subjects taught in the schools. Three kinds of majors and minors are likely to be approved: those in single subjects, e.g., English or geography; those in broader fields, e.g., social or natural science; and "diversified" ones. These last, recognizing the awesome range of topics assigned to an elementary school teacher, will probably require courses in English, mathematics, science, and social science, at levels above those that all students study in their "general education." "Nonacademic" presumably refers to such applied fields as industrial arts and was intended to rule out the traditional "elementary education major." Final determination will depend upon the State Board, and will be problematic in such fields as agriculture, business, and home economics. In place of an academic major a student may choose "specialized preparation" for teaching exceptional children or for becoming a school librarian.
- (4) Professional courses directly concerned with classroom instruction. Here too, the State Board is to specify, aiming at a mixture strong in student teaching or its equivalent (for example, a paid internship). The Board is not expected to depart much from the present requirement of twenty-four semester hours in psychological foundations, curriculum principles, methods of teaching basic subjects, and student teaching.

The Legislature spoke plainly to the State Board, tersely ordering it "to emphasize academic and subject matter preparation" along with professional

courses and student teaching. The intent of this act, then, is to increase the academic background of elementary school teachers. However—a disappointment to the severest critics—requirements in child psychology, methodology, and other “professional” topics will not be eliminated. Instead, given five years of preparation, the typical student will continue to receive instruction in these courses and in “general education” (the customary freshman and sophomore prerequisites in English, history, etc.). But first of all he will usually pursue a major in one or a combination of the liberal disciplines. If intent is honored, this is the most important single change in California credential requirements in many years.

II

A drastic move is seldom easy, and there will be serious problems. Some of them spring from the eternal teacher shortage or from an emotional investment in doing things a certain way. Others are inherent in any attempt to improve college instruction or vocational training. I should like to discuss briefly some of these problems.

The loudest objection has come from persons responsible for hiring: now is not the time to increase requirements. Ever since World War II, California's population has increased by about 1,400 persons every day, 800 of them immigrants from other states drawn to the fabled sunshine.³ Providing classrooms and teachers for the children among 16,000,000 residents is a major enterprise. Roving superintendents manage to round up hundreds of new employees from all over America; each year about half the teachers newly hired come from outside the state. Even so, substandard provisional credentials must be issued every autumn. These “provisional teachers” are of many kinds: experienced persons from states whose certification is different and who need only a course or two for full recognition in California; older persons, often mothers, who turn to teaching as a new career; people newly retired from military careers; college students interrupting their study to earn money; and graduates who majored in non-teaching fields. In 1960, about 11% of the 71,000 elementary teachers in the entire state held provisional credentials, a drop from 16% in 1954. In some counties the figure is under 5%, in others over 30% (with one county at 51% and another at 100%—both mountainous and thinly populated).⁴

A special problem arises over the provisional teachers who were fully qualified in another state before moving to California. They are not very substandard; many have taught for years, and quickly become fully certified.

³ See the U.S. Census Bureau “Current Population Reports: Population Estimates,” issued regularly in Series P-25. Report 227 (April 26, 1961) estimated California's net gain 1950-1960 at 5,130,981, including 3,145,000 immigrants.

⁴ C. A. Larson and B. E. Hurd, “California's Need for Teachers, 1960-71,” *Bulletin*, California State Department of Education, Vol. XXX, No. 9 (August, 1961), p. 27.

Under the new legislation this type of qualified-but-provisional teacher will probably become even more frequent, for certification in other states resembles California's old pattern much more than it does the new. In fact, in many states the requirement of a bachelor's degree is so fresh that adding a fifth year will take some time. It happens that no single state or region fills California's need. For a long time the mid-west and middle Atlantic states were the major sources; recently the deep- and border-south states have increased their share.

Other objections come from within the colleges that have well-established curricula in elementary education. Their existing programs, of course, vary. Some keep to the state's official minimum of twenty-four semester hours of professional courses, others require more than forty. Some campuses urge students to begin working with children soon after admission, others rely upon a postgraduate internship. There are schools with few matriculation barriers, where most of the students are planning to teach; there are others that select very carefully and have only a few students who choose a program in education. Therefore, some local applications of the new law will vary. But despite their diversity, many of these colleges agree on one complaint: the law chooses to ignore the fact that a job was already being done. The traditional curricula were training teachers. Professional associations and student reactions concurred, insisting that it makes sense for a student wishing to teach to declare his intention, take directly applicable courses, and thus earn a degree and a credential at the same time. The new proposals, not at all camouflaged, clearly proposed another pattern, so that persons committed to the *status quo* have felt their livelihood, prestige, and self-confidence to be unfairly threatened.

Beyond individual campuses, professional educators as a group were stung. The Commission on Teacher Education of the California Teachers Association, under Charles Hamilton's seasoned leadership, analyzed the final form of the Fisher Bill, to find it wanting. Some of their objections followed the logic built into the CTA-sponsored Bee Bill: opposition to a narrow definition of "academic," and discouragement at the variety of specializations foreseen in the basic credentials. They saw the additional fifth year of college as no more than a codification of the "in-service growth" already common among teachers, and considered it no significant advance in standards. In general, they believed the Fisher Bill to depart from the pattern of teacher education elsewhere in the United States, and deplored it as contrary to trends in standards that responsible policy makers within the profession are encouraging.

California academicians, curiously, have reservations too. Not out of dis-agreement with the law itself, which they support, but because they are not sure how to deal with so many more students majoring in their departments. The distributions of majors will probably be skewed, with peaks in the

humanities and social sciences, and gaps in the natural sciences. It is very likely that many departments will notice important differences between the new crop of teaching majors and the more traditional students. From the time of Learned and Wood's classic investigation in the 1930's,⁵ surveys of American undergraduates have found that some fields attract brighter students than others. Learned and Wood tested nearly 6,000 sophomores in 1930 with the Otis Intelligence Test, to find that engineering students had the highest median score, education majors the lowest. After World War II, Wolfe and Oxtoby⁶ (citing academic aptitude scores on 10,000 graduates who had entered college in 1946) and the Educational Testing Service⁷ (summarizing early administration of the Selective Service College Qualification Test to 38,000 men in 1951) found education students at the bottom of the distribution, significantly below the general bulk. Wolfe and Oxtoby also noted in 1952 that, of 4,500 graduate students in the various fields, 46% of those in the bottom fifth on aptitude test scores were specializing in professional education. There were, to be sure, some very bright persons in education too, but far fewer than in other fields.

Now scores on standardized aptitude tests have limited use, and academic achievement is not synonymous with effective teaching. But academic departments will notice this change in clientele, and the new students will probably meet stiff competition for grades and status. Furthermore, because these prospective teachers will not be planning to go directly on to graduate study for higher degrees, they may not appeal to research-oriented persons in the department. Therefore a very touchy relationship must be sympathetically worked out between educators and their academic colleagues. If not, all the destructiveness of faculty antagonism will concentrate upon an ancient struggle. Variations in traditional academic majors and new groupings of interdisciplinary studies must be fashioned to suit new demands. The professional courses must be streamlined and rearranged to make room for adequate study of academic subjects, even within a five-year program.

The student, too, in committing himself, often reflects the attitudes he senses among his professors. At most colleges the education program is unpopular with students for various reasons, some well-founded and some fanciful. Other disciplines suffer unpopularity, but few are so wholeheartedly avoided on the basis of secondhand advice, especially by the brightest students. Thus, data from surveys like those of Learned and Wood reflect conscious choice. Student interest fluctuates as glamor surrounds first one occupation and then another, but education seldom has shared the magnetism of medi-

⁵ W. S. Learned and B. D. Wood, *The Student and His Knowledge* (New York: Carnegie Foundation, 1938).

⁶ Dael Wolfe and Toby Oxtoby, "Distribution of Ability of Students Specializing in Different Fields," *Science*, CXVI (September 26, 1952), pp. 311-14.

⁷ Educational Testing Service, *A Summary of Statistics on Selective Service College Qualification Test* (Princeton, New Jersey: Educational Testing Service, 1952).

cine or atomic physics. Faced with a slack reputation on the one hand and the intensified appeal of competitors on the other, departments of education will need vigorous recruiting in order to draw students. And once recruited, these students will remain sensitive to any evidence to support the rumors that education courses are second-rate.

All these are difficulties that would hamper any significant alteration in established routines, and they are aggravated by the forces that divide teacher-training from the liberal arts. If they can be resolved patiently, success may follow. But left alone, they will prove too stubborn and the law will face early repeal.

III

The disheartening thing about most of the complaints I have been hearing is that they miss the mark. The *primary* issue is the value of the academic major for an elementary school teacher, but nearly all of these complaints point out instead why change will be risky: the schools are desperately understaffed, tradition is hard to alter, students will not respond. In place of these secondary or irrelevant facts let us examine the why and the how of increasing academic background for prospective elementary school teachers.

In the first place, the present change in California is a continuation of a historical trend that far antedates the Sputniks: for a long time the typical teacher in the lower grades has been receiving more and more, longer and longer, preparation. During and after colonial times these "common-branch" teachers usually did not receive secondary school (i.e., advanced) study or any formal introduction to teaching procedures. During the nineteenth century, common-school graduates took some further schooling before starting to teach, perhaps at an academy, ordinarily at a normal school. By the twentieth century the normal school was the training ground for most elementary teachers, but most of its students still came to it directly from the common school. As matriculation demands raised the normal school to the college level, the teachers college appeared. During the period between the two world wars, this movement swept along until by now nearly all the teachers colleges have altered their names to signify that they are unrestricted colleges open to study in all fields.⁸

In the second place, the current California legislation provides that the lengthened training should be aimed at the teacher's personal development rather than exclusively at his vocational training. That is, the elementary teacher will finally cease being an apprentice in college. In the past, notably in the normal schools and the classic teachers colleges, the rule was that the

⁸ This brief history can be expanded by referring to standard sources about the development of American education. A convenient summary appears in J. S. Brubacher, *A History of the Problems of Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), pp. 505 ff.

novice must succeed in his first job, and everything in his training must look toward that culminating responsibility. The rest of his career, indeed his entire life thereafter, went untended. Now, he will be required to enter the same majors that provide prospective lawyers and scientists and citizens with the basis for their future lives.

It is a fascinating paradox that by thus seeming to turn aside for a time from his chosen career he in fact nourishes it. For teaching is so much caught up in the teacher's personality that the more he is himself an enthusiastic and informed person, the more effective he is likely to be in his classroom. Taking the time at college to cultivate his own resources makes him a better teacher, because he can apply the methods he eventually learns in the professional courses to a richer background. It is a tragedy to find so many prospective elementary teachers, even when their required courses are intended to touch upon geography or chemistry or literature, merely getting bits of these disciplines carefully selected for direct transfer into, say, the third grade. Many times they escape any awareness that what they are studying has anything to do with their own development. Hence the delusion that their education must be planned according to what they will teach. Requiring them now to take a major alongside students preparing for other professions is some insurance against premature and hampering preoccupation with a job.

The burden will be upon the academic departments, as it has always been, to see that all their majors are appropriately prepared for continuing their intellectual growth after graduation. Most professions in recent years have proclaimed how important nonspecific education is, as a basis for effective professional training and employment. Their central argument has been the need for persons who can change with the times, who have the fundamental background to figure out new techniques. The person who has learned only the techniques in vogue during his undergraduate generation is obsolescent upon graduation. So the departments must work out the best ways to stimulate continuing education and self-understanding throughout a life that stretches out long after commencement. Cooperation between the academic and the education departments is an important responsibility resting on both. There is here a special incentive to academicians, that any workable plans they develop are likely to raise standards in the lower schools where they so often find much to condemn.

In the third place, the California legislation marks out a new pattern for elementary teachers. It is quite a shift to insist that they undertake a more academic college program. But this they could do by merely taking a number of basic elective courses. The Legislature's mandate was that they take academic courses arranged into a *major*. Teachers thus put themselves under the same constraint as other undergraduates, to go beyond the general education of freshmen and sophomores into concentrated and advanced study. The legislation provides a continuum from the single-subject major at one con-

centrated end, through the broad-field, to the diversified major at the other. But for each there will be the demands of advanced study, whereby a student learns what limits there are to present knowledge, where the search for more is going on, and how fascinating the quest can be. The fact that elementary teachers must know so many things will probably convince many students that a broader major is safer than a specialized one, but I find this logic specious. It overlooks the distinction between the teacher's job and his life-long development and almost revives the earlier view that a teacher need only study what he will have to teach his pupils. Instead he should penetrate toward the frontier, and in American colleges this means taking advanced courses. It does not happen, of course, that every advanced student becomes sensitive to the quest for knowledge. But it is inevitable that he will not, if he is never exposed to it. The elementary teacher, who is charged to become a jack-of-all-trades, has a special need to sensitize himself to the discovery of knowledge rather than merely to its description or dissemination. If he studies one subject deeply, say English, he does not thereby learn directly about the geography or arithmetic he also must teach. He may not even learn the grammar or journalism assigned to his grade. But he will become aware of the attitudes and methods that surround intellectual discovery, and these are among the most precious things he can impart to pupils. And he will be more likely to continue his acquaintance with the field that absorbed his undergraduate attention, making better use than is usual now of summer study or night classes.

The direct value of advanced courses for elementary school teachers is the attitude toward learning that will keep them, as adults, intellectually vigorous. Fortunately, indirect values also abound. A teacher's continuing study may generate enthusiasm that he automatically passes on to his pupils. The advanced knowledge he gains permits him to deal far more adroitly with unexpected questions from his class, especially from his brighter pupils. Pooling his particular expertise with that which his colleagues have in other fields makes for team-teaching of a high order. One should realize that advanced study is chiefly defensible in what it does for the teacher. But he should not overlook the benefits that can sharpen teaching skill.

IV

In summary, California's recent legislation is part of a long-range trend to lengthen an elementary teacher's training. I believe that this change in the law will improve teaching, to the extent that it induces teachers to increase their own intellectual background. Immediate difficulties and long-range problems will make transition difficult: the teacher shortage continues, the inherited antipathy between professional education and the liberal arts still

affects faculty and students, and vested interests on and off campus must adapt themselves to change.

However, in my opinion, the chief desideratum is the shift from overriding concern with teaching to concentration upon a teacher's own intellectual growth. The new law continues to require of him a large number of courses—the equivalent of most majors anywhere—that give direct professional instruction regarding classroom skills and obligations. But it now intends that he no longer make his undergraduate career one prolonged introduction to his first job. In private and public colleges over the state that have been requiring them for years, there is convincing evidence that academic majors are appropriate. On these campuses the internal problems of faculty cooperation and student recruiting have been successfully met, and employers out in the field do not hesitate to commend their programs or to hire their graduates. The discouraging thing, in fact, is that there should be so much hurly-burly. Historically, this legislation is overdue. If its provisions enrich the lives of teachers and at the same time increase their skill, the experiment will succeed and California's example can command national respect.

The Role of Self-Knowledge in the Educational Process

This article views the psychological phenomena of the classroom as normal rather than pathological. The author considers emotional interactions, usually ignored by teacher and student, in relation to the learning situation. Awareness of psychological processes can lead to enhancement of learning according to Professor Jones. He stresses the importance of the student's freedom to draw on his personal resources in creative thought.

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IT IS BECOMING a cliché in psychological circles to note that normal mental processes have not had anything like the systematic scrutiny which Freud gave to their pathological counterparts in his refinements of the therapeutic arts. This paper seeks to enlist Freud in the work of refining the educative arts. It will be instructive therefore to begin with an instance of the psycho-normalities of everyday life:

A radio announcer recently interrupted my reverie to say that a clarinet concerto would next be played—Benny Goodman, soloist. During approximately the next ten seconds there occurred the following: Benny Goodman? That's right, he plays concert music too. I wonder if I can tell the difference between Goodman and that English fellow, what's his name . . . can't think of it . . . anyhow I wouldn't know the difference . . . and my wife thinks I'm so adept at that kind of thing. Look at me, I can't even distinguish Goodman from . . . what is that name? . . . I wonder why I cultivate that illusion of hers. I suppose its because *she* knows so much about painting. . . . Still, that is

phoney of me. Of course, I *might* have done all right in music. If only that Aunt of mine had been less insistent about the violin. . . . How did I ever keep from killing that woman? So what if I *had* broken a finger playing baseball? Perhaps now I'd at least be able to distinguish Goodman from . . .

With the elusive name on the tip of my tongue, and with a sense of impending recognition, I was suddenly sitting in the bleachers at Fenway Park in Boston. George Kell, then third baseman for the Red Sox, was at bat and hit a killing line drive, the trajectory of which, from his bat to a point about one inch above the wall, formed an absolutely unwavering acute angle. It was the last of the ninth and the Red Sox won by a very well-deserved inch.

George Kell . . . K-E-L-L . . . but, of course: *Reginald* Kell is that English fellow's name!

Thus was my wife's opinion of my musical ear vindicated—true, by way of a not very musical detour, but as I thought of it later, by a not very phoney one either. In other words, in ten seconds I had re-discovered that I am neither better nor worse than I am.

I offer that anecdote in illustration of what I shall mean by self-knowledge. It is not a thing; it is a process. It is not the pinnacle of experience, but no one approaches his particular pinnacles without it. Volumes have been written on what may have taken place during that speck of time. Alfred Adler would have been impressed with the way a picture of perfection had compensated my ruminations of *imperfection*. Charles Fisher might observe that an acute angle multiplied by two equals the letter K. Freud, of course, would have asked me who the Good-man was that I had lost in the first place, and he would certainly have made something more of the *killings* that were made on the way from Goodman to *Kell* to *Kell*. We shall have need of more volumes before we can explain preconscious processing. We know now though that it is a very subjective process.

For the purpose at hand I want only to draw attention to a series of empirical events: a lapse of memory was followed by experiences of personal conflict, followed in turn by a pictorial image, and then by restoration of the memory lapse. Presumably, had the sequence cut out at either the conflicts or the image, the restoration would not have followed, and I would have languished in a state of relative mental disorder. I wanted to say this at the outset, because I shall later emphasize the *enhancing* effects of self-knowledge, and I don't want the reader to think that I overlook its sheer survival value.

I want next briefly to summarize an experiment, which later became a little book entitled *An Application of Psychoanalysis to Education*. The students of a preparatory school for girls could elect to take in their senior year a course called the "Self-Knowledge Workshop." The course consisted of two ordinary class periods per week, during which various traditional psychologies were offered, interspersed by one lengthy and *extra-ordinary* discussion meeting, in which anything which could be put into words was encouraged. (That

is not so easy an invitation to accept as it may appear). The course spanned an academic year and the discussion meetings were tape recorded.¹

Over the year there ensued, openly and articulately, a succession of emotional struggles between students and teacher, between students and students, within the students, and within the teacher. The same struggles transpire, I believe, in most classrooms, with the exception that they do so covertly in an atmosphere of what Kubie describes as the "conspiracy of silence."² By arranging, this one time, that the emotional tug of war, which comprises much of the educative process, should occur openly, it was possible to trace a phenomenon that psychologists are increasingly taking pains to document. I refer to the works of Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kubie, Jean Piaget, Heinz Werner, and the students of subliminal perception. The general observation is that human beings when confronted by a novel and challenging situation begin to master themselves in relation to that situation by recapitulating a telescoped version of their own life history in respect to it. Before learning to trust themselves in it, for example, they may first become untrustworthy, in order to see what happens. They may then become too trusting, like children; then too big for their britches; then doubtful; then secure; then adventurous; then ashamed. They may find a way to fall in love in the new situation, and becoming disillusioned they may then turn bitter and biting critics of it. Eventually, depending on the situation, having sunk their own roots in it they can feel their own oats in it. At that point they have made it their own, as we say. The parameters and the rhythm of the process vary with the unit of observation. But the same recapitulative principle seems to guide human adaptation whether we take the epigenetic unit of the life cycle or the microgenetic unit of split-second perception.

Such a process—very much intensified and concentrated for the sake of observation—was recorded in the experiment. Further, an elaborate battery of psychological tests was administered to the experimental students and to two closely matched groups of control students.³ We were therefore able to report that, insofar as these tests can measure such things, the experimental students showed a significant increase over the year in "self-acceptance," while the control subjects did not. We were also able to add in passing to the already impressive body of evidence in support of the psychodynamic theory of race prejudice: the experimental students showed a significant decrease in

¹ For the flavor of psychoanalytic education, as distinct from psychoanalytic treatment, the reader is referred to the book, where appear extensive verbatim accounts of the former: Richard M. Jones, *An Application of Psychoanalysis to Education* (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1960).

² Lawrence S. Kubie, *Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1958).

³ The test battery included the Berger scale for self-acceptance, the Dorris-Levinson-Hanfmann self-reference sentence completion test, the revised Bogardus social distance scale and the social attitude battery.

attitudes of ethnic intolerance, presumably as an ancillary effect of the increase in self-tolerance, since, again, the control students did not.

But this was not the whole story. An unexpected finding, which I was not prepared at the time of writing up the study to fully exploit, was the following: not only did the control students not share the positive changes with their experimental counterparts but they showed significant changes in the opposite direction. In other words, as a result of some unknown influence in their senior year of high school—and these were known as top-quality preparatory schools—they had become significantly less tolerant of themselves, a little less open to novelty, a little less adventuresome, a little less likely to seek out meaningful encounters, or to face up actively to the inevitable conflicts that make meaningful all encounters. In sum, the evidence suggested that either in spite of or because of certain external achievements, such as good grades and admission to good colleges, these students had been injured as human beings. In self-awareness, and all that that singularly human possession generates in the way of imaginative and critical living, they had less when they went out than when they came in.

I want now to marshall this sobering piece of data in support of a critical position on the educative process, which was taken by Edith Weisskopf twelve years ago.⁴ Dr. Weisskopf observes that while the social science literature contains considerable information about creative thought and the conditions of its growth, educators have strangely not taken it much to heart. Dr. Weisskopf for example grants that industry, regular study habits, and a critical and controlled attitude are necessary attributes of successful intellectual work, and that those creative individuals who eventually learned the values of relaxation, irregular habits, and the periodic abandonment of criticism and control have usually spent years exercising the virtues advocated by traditional educators. "Yet," she observes, "the question remains unanswered why, among the four stages of the creative process, namely, preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification, we prepare children for the first and last stage only, and completely ignore the other two stages." (p. 188)

She suggests in conclusion one possible answer to her question:

The process of insight and illumination appears to be directed by unconscious forces to a higher degree than the process of preparation and verification. Just as lightning represents the sudden explosive merging of positive and negative electricity, intellectual insight may represent the sudden merging of conscious content accumulated during the stage of preparation with unconscious material. Thus, it may be the denial of this repressed material which causes educators to deny the process of illumination. In other words, we do not want to accept the fact that intellectual activity takes part

⁴ Edith A. Weisskopf, "Some Comments Concerning the Role of Education in the 'Creation of Creation,'" *Journal of Educational Psychology*, XLII (March, 1951), pp. 185-189.

of its energy supply from the big reservoir of unacceptable impulses called the Id, that the material carefully and rationally accumulated during the period of preparation has to become imbued with Id-impulses in order to be brought to life. (p. 188)

Now, in the light of Dr. Weisskopf's diagnosis, why *might* those students have left good secondary schools less human than when they went into them? I suggest it was because their education consisted of a kind of squeeze play on a grand scale in which students are set up to prepare for and to verify almost everything in the world of knowledge except their own capacities to contribute to it.

You know how it is when you are prevented from contributing to some enterprise that may initially have interested you. You feel angry, then left out; then, it being usually not appropriate to express either of these, you make peace with your discomforts by one ego-salving ploy or another. But, inevitably, somewhere along in that private sequence of events the germ of a lethal suspicion has usually been spawned, namely: "Perhaps I didn't have anything to contribute." That suspicion, driven sufficiently far underground, and requiring sufficiently often to be thrown this bone or that of spurious achievement, is what creates uncreative thinkers. And that suspicion, along with elaborate theories and practices for its care and keeping, is what sustains, as we well know, the esprit de corps of many a school and of many a teacher. In whatever ways it may be couched in terms of educational philosophies or psychologies it comes back to the "conspiracy of silence."

Now to a definition of terms: the educative process refers to anything that transpires in a school room which helps to fire all four cylinders of the creative act: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. This definition takes seriously the mounting evidence that, so far as humans are concerned, one learns creatively or one does not learn at all. Self-knowledge lends itself less readily to definition. We know it is relevant to those two middle phases: incubation and illumination. Something like it mediated my mental detour from Goodman to Kell to Kell. It has been called "insight," "competence," "identity," even in some circles "genitality." I prefer the makeshift definition of a student who described it as that which enhances by "en-chance-ment."

For example, picture an eleven-year-old boy in sixth grade mathematics who was asked to say what infinity was. He replied, "It's like a box of cream of wheat."⁵ He was censured for silliness, and to outward appearances that was that. But the inward result was a misused conscience warning the boy not to take a chance with *that* kind of thing again. He later found his way into psychotherapy where some of the dimensions of the chance he had taken in that moment of classroom routine were brought to light. His father had

⁵ For the benefit of youthful readers, the Cream of Wheat label formerly pictured a chef holding a box of Cream of Wheat, which pictured a chef holding a box of Cream of Wheat, etc.

deserted the family when the boy was four. Forced to take a job his mother had just time each morning to get him settled into breakfast before leaving for work. There was our future math student, morning after morning, random fantasies engaging and disengaging a half-conscious gaze on a box of cream of wheat. As reconstructed in therapy those fantasies alternated usually between themes of longing for a lost father, and of hatred for a mother whom he unconsciously blamed for the loss. I have tried but I can think of no better word to describe the intensity of that hateful longing than "infinite."

The point, however, is not that mental mysteries can be reconstructed. The point is that infinity *is* like a box of cream of wheat—exactly so, vividly so, originally so. In whatever manner the concept of infinity had been introduced to him he had begun to assimilate it by reliving his own history in respect to it. And by re-living that particular segment of his history he was enhancing the concept of infinity, I say, by one momentous en-chance-ment, because those were not benign moments spent with the cream of wheat box. But the chance failed, and two reciprocal opportunities defaulted as a consequence, one therapeutic, the other educational. The first was an opportunity to re-view from a less helpless vantage a portion of his formative years, which while not happy was manifestly not meaningless. The second was an opportunity to create infinity!

We should, I think, neither be too easy nor too hard on the teacher who forfeited those opportunities. If inclined to let her off we shall protest that she had no way of knowing all this—what with thirty children to tend, etc., and not being a psychoanalyst, etc. But finding out how infinity is like a box of cream of wheat would have been a superb way to get the idea across to the other twenty-nine; and it required no more knowledge to confirm that particular en-chance-ment than an understanding of Robert Frost's homely observation that you know somebody is thinking when you hear a figure of speech. A gifted teacher will rush to an analogy like a shortstop to a slow-rolling grounder, because it happens to be good practice. On the other hand it is true that gifted teachers are hard put to confirm their gifts in a school where from teacher selection to in-service training and from curriculum construction to classroom architecture the educative process is polarized from preparation to verification, and back again—unilluminated.

What might the role of self-knowledge have been in that potentially educative process? Suppose the teacher had been inclined not only to allow the analogy but to aid it, to encourage it, to draw it out, to help it interchange with similar experiences of classmates, to detect in it patterns of recurrent enhancements both illuminating and distorting, and to draw those out? I am speaking of a technology originated in the office of Sigmund Freud and since perfected by the psychiatric profession in the treatment of mental illness: free associative techniques, methods for the elucidation and interpretation of transference and resistance, "working through" procedures, and so forth.

These are admittedly not playtoys to be distributed indiscriminately among inexperienced teachers. For the present their modified applications in classrooms had best be encouraged only with teachers who know enough from first-hand experience—whether by way of personal psychotherapy; or in-service training groups, such as described by Leo Berman,⁶ or consultation measures, such as described by Gerald Caplan⁷—to seek administrative sanction for experimentation along these lines. Such experimentation should be part of formal research programs, for obvious reasons, not the least of which stem from the restraints that well designed research tends to impose on experimentation. Ongoing consultation, preferably with an experienced and psychoanalytically trained educator, should be available in order to reduce the possibilities of unnecessarily triggering off neurotic anxieties. And my own judgment is that at least two teachers should be thus engaged in any school that decides to move in this direction, as there are certain kinds of mutual support and consultation that can only take place between junior equals.

While the cautions and restraints of consultation and research are clearly in order, the indiscriminate trepidations of some psychoanalysts, I think, are not. Those who would restrict the influence of applied psychoanalytic psychology and over-extend the treatment of neurosis forget the versatility of psychoanalysis. In the present context clinical neurosis is not our concern. If the incidence of certain disease entities happens indirectly to be reduced by psychoanalytically oriented education, so much the better. The direct objective, however, is better learning—not transformed personalities, not insight into the etiology of symptoms, in brief not the objectives of psychotherapy—but better, more active, more lasting, let us say ego-syntonic learning. Let us admit in advance that measures undertaken to deepen the educative process will sometimes *appear* to be introducing psychotherapy into the *classrooms*. *But Freud has taught us not to be taken in by appearances.*

If trepidation is to be prescribed it *should not be* in respect to the techniques themselves but in respect to certain reverberations, which the successful application of those techniques can be predicted to effect. The students will complain that they are not being taught correctly, but that is to be welcomed, as it introduces the question of what correct teaching is, and students should recognize that this is a real question. But parents will soon be heard from. The school is stirring up trouble at home, they will complain, and besides it isn't good for young people to know so much about themselves; it makes them brood—by which is meant that the brooding will now have

⁶ Leo Berman, "Psychoanalysis and Group Psychotherapy," *The Psychoanalytic Review*, XXXVII, 2 (1950), pp. 156-163; "Mental Hygiene for Educators: Report on an Experiment Using a Combined Seminar and Group Psychotherapy Approach," *The Psychoanalytic Review*, XL, 4 (1953), pp. 319-332; "A Group Psychotherapy Technique for Training in Clinical Psychology," *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, XXIII, 2 (1953), pp. 322-327.

⁷ Gerald Caplan, "Mental Health Consultation" (unpublished manuscript), draft copy from Harvard School of Public Health, September 20, 1957.

become articulate. A trustee will proclaim that a school is a school and not a mental hospital; a janitor will sulk about rearrangements of furniture. And, not least, a psychiatrist may be consulted who can be counted on to announce his profession's ambivalence in such matters. The school's efforts are admirable, he will say, but should not be continued without *medical supervision*. Even a principal or dean enlightened enough to encourage his teachers in this direction and strong enough to protect them in it will probably throw in the towel when he sees the price of *that*.

Let us be clear with what it is we are dealing. Dr. Weisskopf surveys with too much alacrity, I think, the barbed wire at this particular frontier of education, when she says, "In other words we do not want to accept the fact that intellectual activity takes part of its energy supply from the reservoir of unacceptable impulses called the Id." The concept of the Id is a relatively new one in the history of ideas. Long ago it was called "Beelzebub," and people would only confront it (in public) at the behest of priests and their assorted technologies including the burning stake. We are more humane now and no longer see the Id as bad—only sick. Thus, now it is to be confronted "if you say so, Doctor." Right there is the barbed wire, because God forbid that a teacher should say so. And yet we have psychoanalytic evidence and the reports of the best creative minds that "the material carefully and rationally accumulated during the period of preparation *has to become* imbued with Id-impulses in order to be brought to life."⁸

Now, I am as thankful as the next person that we are out of the dark ages. But, as a teacher, I am reluctant to call in a physician every time I see a chance to foster creativity in my classroom; and, as a psychologist, I am reluctant to define the creative process in terms of psychopathology just because the two have been known to overlap. For example, in one of my classes, where a standing assignment is to hand in dreams thought to relate to classroom matters, a young woman submitted the following:

I viewed myself coughing up dead mice, rats, squirrels and other kinds of tiny animals. The more someone would try to pat me on the back so that I would stop coughing the more I would cough up these animals. Finally I stopped, but I felt so listless and hollow that I could barely stand up and had to lean on a chair for support. The same unidentified (I suspect male) person who was patting me on the back decided to pick me up so that I could get where I was going easier. To his utter shock, however, I completely seemed to collapse as if nothing else were inside me now that the animals had been removed. As he picked me up I seemed to dry or shrivel up and then I awoke.

I had previously written a letter of recommendation for the author of the dream on the strength of which she was offered a teaching position in a local

⁸ Weisskopf (p. 188).

school system. I knew her well and thought she would make a first-rate teacher. Also, I had admonished her the day before for the annoying habit of writing out exam questions prior to writing her answers. I thought that unnecessary and told her so. On the next occasion allotted to discussion of dreams the dreamer, with the help of her classmates, and of my silence, arrived at the following interpretation of the dream. It presented her, they thought, with a picture of her mixed feelings about being the dependent person she had all along complained of being. Furthermore it showed how she sometimes felt toward those who encouraged her dependence. She had, she reported, been walking on air since receiving the job offer, and had been speculating what my letter must have said about her. Doubts arose: she had noted there were times when I seemed to enjoy the sound of my own words. What if the letter had been one of those times? What if she was not ready to teach? What if she made a fool of herself on her first job? My harshness of the day before, it seemed, was on the way to convincing her of the worst. Two camps formed around the issue of whether I should be asked to show her a copy of the letter. She was against it. I kept my peace. The hour concluded on the question of the source of self-confidence.

That, I considered, was a fruitful hour of teaching. The source of self-confidence was a subject not extraneous to the course, which was educational psychology. And I don't expect to soon see as vivid a representation of concern over self-confidence at the Id level as was pictured by that dream.

It should not be concluded from the above example that every item in the syllabus must be dramatically and explicitly related to Id material in order to be made active parts of a student's working knowledge. It is what this example *implies* that warrants emphasis, namely that students need to be encouraged (1) to seek the help of the teacher and fellow students with psychologically short-circuiting emotional issues *when necessary*, and (2) to exploit in the privacy of their own thoughts the enhancing properties of relatively conflict-free personal imagery. The latter has no need of dreams, but will show itself rather in silently restored memory lapses, in immediately relevant figures of speech, in novel examples, in working metaphors, and in other such signs that the student is making his education his own. Neither of the above conditions, however, can be created in classrooms if the teacher is oblivious to their need. Nor is verbal permissiveness enough. Time—regularly scheduled periods of time—must be allotted by the teacher to the acquisition of relevant self-knowledge. In no other way can a teacher begin to be convincing with respect to the kinds of thought processes he values in his students. And, knowing what we do about the amount of true knowledge typically gained from classroom time, what, after all, can be lost if we re-allocate some of it?

In conclusion let me concede a point. Psychologists are presently better equipped to state *why* educators should locate the role of self-knowledge in

the educative process than to specify how we should locate it, or *what*, once located, we should do about it. The challenge is particularly vexing to the college educator, for the reason that he deals with students so accustomed to the squeeze play that almost any measure designed to invite inspiring or illuminating thought is met with scorn if not with fright. It always takes me a month to convince a quorum of my classes, first that I am serious about the dream assignment, second that I am of sound mind, third that I am competent to teach at a respectable university, and fourth that I am not experimenting on them. Many never get beyond the second doubt, but for some "education-in-depth" becomes more than a title in Kubie's book.

Until students come to college accustomed to firing all four cylinders of the learning process the college teacher will on occasion have to appear mighty like a psychiatrist—with or without medical supervision. A good psychological counseling center goes a long way toward relieving the classrooms of accumulated self-ignorance; however, in the long view a psychological counseling center is a stop-gap measure, awaiting the day when students will look more naturally to teachers than to doctors for self-knowledge. Meanwhile, given a strong and sympathetic dean, there is much a classroom teacher can try in the way of making self-knowledge not the end in itself, which it must be in a counseling center, but the means to actively enhanced learning, which is its design in nature.

Notes from Readers

A Note on Behaviorism as Educational Theory*

THERE ARE, perhaps, considerable gains to be expected from the development of so-called teaching machines and programmed instruction (TMPI, for short). There are surely dangers, however, in a behavioristic rationale that is philosophically presumptuous and logically confused. For this rationale not only guides the technical work of the laboratory, but is offered to the public and profession as *educational theory*, with general import for practice, and moreover, the stamp of scientific authority. A consideration of two pieces in the Fall 1961 issue of the *Review* will, I believe, indicate certain of the defects and dangers involved. I refer to the article by B. F. Skinner and the review by Harlan Lane.*

The scientific rhetoric, especially in the latter piece, is misleading in the extreme. One would never guess, from the recurrent and belligerent references to "a science of behavior," that psychology and the social sciences are riddled with schools, sects, and fundamental controversies, that learning theory itself is fragmented and fails to approach the scientific status of physical theory, nor that the specifically Skinnerian approach has been subjected to more than one radical and negative conceptual critique in recent years.¹ Frequent and vigorous emission of the verbal response "behavioral science" is, apparently, sufficient to smooth over these uncomfortable facts, and to transform hope into reality.

Nor could one guess, from Mr. Lane's review, that there is any problem in arguing from facts to values, since he is quite forthright in pronouncing *his* values, and makes no effort to avoid giving the impression that these values are uniquely "objective" and "scientific." Indeed, at one point, after telling us what we *must* do ("We *must* review the goals of education, specify the desired behaviors, and examine the means of obtaining—not 'developing'—these behaviors, in the light of a science of behavior," p. 471), he declares that "to do less is *dishonest*." In the same direct way, he tells us "a conception of education is *required* that is consistent with our conception of other areas of applied science," that "The traditional image of man is a cartoon against the backdrop of modern science," that "We *need the courage* to draw up specifications for an educated man that are *not* specifications for ourselves and the *willingness to control behavior* to bring that man about." (p. 471) (my italics throughout). He never explains how science can yield all these value judgments nor, alternatively, what their extra-scientific warrant might be supposed to be. Having avoided the philosophical warrant might avoided neither philosophical naiveté nor philosophical dogmatism.

As against those interested in experimental comparisons of automated in-

* B. F. Skinner, "Why We Need Teaching Machines," *Harvard Educational Review* XXXI (Fall, 1961), 377-398.

Harlan Lane, "Review of *Teaching Machines and Programmed Learning*, by A. A. Lumsdaine and Robert Glaser," *Ibid.*, 469-476.

¹ See, for example, Chomsky, N. in *Language*, 1959, 35, pp. 26-58, and Scriven, M. "A Study of Radical Behaviorism" in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. I, University of Minnesota Press, 1956.

struction with other methods, Lane denies that such "evaluation research" is necessary: "Interest in automated instruction . . . has the same justifications as the basic endeavor to understand man's condition and to improve it." (p. 475) And as against those willing to permit the educator to evaluate teaching machines selectively in the light of personal philosophy, Lane declares that "such an outcome would be disastrous for the ultimate efficacy of automated teaching. What is required of the educator, on the contrary, is a re-evaluation of personal philosophy in the light of the *principles of behavior* that underlie . . . the technological revolution . . ." (p. 472) (my italics). Since even Lane apparently agrees that, as a matter of fact, "no one point of view is held unanimously among psychologists," he is here clearly referring to *principles of behavior, as he sees them*. The total upshot is indeed remarkable. The educator's not to question why, his but to accept TMPI *in toto* as Lane interprets it. If no *educational* purpose can, in practice, be shown to be advanced, the educator may rest assured that all is for the glory of the ultimate efficacy of automated teaching!

In Mr. Lane's view, finally, the concept linking laboratory and education is *control*, and he says, "to the extent that we sacrifice this control we impair and deflect the learning process." (p. 473) Without the least acknowledgment of the radical differences in context provided by laboratory and classroom, or of the morally crucial variations in the meaning of 'control,' Lane glides easily and resoundingly from the notion of *experimental control* to that of *educational manipulation*: "An analysis of behavior under the *controlled conditions of the laboratory* is propaedeutic to the *manipulation of that behavior* in the complex environment of the classroom." (p. 475) It would be hard to find a more transparent example of the misuse of scientific concepts in the interests of a manipulative social philosophy.

One irony is that Professor Skinner himself, after claiming teaching machines to be an "application of basic science" (p. 397), admits in the next breath that current machines might have been designed on the basis of classroom experience and common sense, and are even explainable in traditional terms. This admission not only removes the presumed evidential ground for the immediately preceding claim, but punctures the scientizing in Mr. Lane's review.

Mr. Skinner's paper, though more moderate than Mr. Lane's review, is, unfortunately, not at all clearer on the topic of values. He also is apparently not satisfied with what man has been and wants to find out what he may become "under carefully controlled conditions," but he states further that "the goal of education should be nothing short of the fullest possible development of the human organism." (p. 398) (my italics). (As a technology, education is still immature, he says, because it defines its goals in terms of traditional achievements and is concerned with reproducing the characteristics of already educated men.) It is not clear if the above-stated value judgment is thought by Mr. Skinner to be a consequence of the "science of behavior," nor if, alternatively, he takes it to have some independent warrant. At any rate, Mr. Skinner does not appear troubled by the fact that "the fullest possible development of the human organism" is not merely a vague but a virtually empty prescription for education, because there is no single fullest possible development of the human organism: *Conflicting possibilities exist with qualitatively different purposes are projected, what direction we shall* Unless we indicate what

follow in developing human possibilities, we shall be in danger of rushing headlong in all directions, or finding ourselves on a path we never properly evaluated. Without such indication of purpose, the ideal of the *new man* is no ideal at all, but only a morally dangerous facsimile.

But aside from values, Mr. Skinner's and related systems court conceptual confusion by trying to encompass everything. So Mr. Lane, in the passage earlier quoted, assumed that all educational goals would turn out to be "desired behaviors," without pondering the conceptual absurdity of construing as *behaviors* such goals as individuality, imagination, integrity, autonomy, and sensitivity. And Professor Skinner, too, has got to fit everything in, including, along with "simple verbal repertoires," also thinking, and even the solution of personal problems. Is it a wonder that the analysis of thinking turns up such things as "attending" (to what? how? to what purpose?) and "studying," (involving taking notes, outlining, constructing mnemonic patterns, and other "behaviors which . . . are of more subtle dimensions")?

To be sure, Mr. Skinner admits much remains to be done in analyzing scientific and mathematical thought, but says there is no reason to suppose it less adaptable to programmed instruction than simple verbal repertoires, once the behavior is specified. No differences are acknowledged between simple tasks governed by mechanical routines and creative theoretical constructions. All are specifiable and all programmable. Old-fashioned inductivism in the philosophy of science and discredited cookbook approaches to science education are here put together in the nutshell of behaviorism.

Certain general difficulties in Mr. Skinner's approach have been pointed out by Scriven and by Chomsky, and I am not concerned to discuss them here. Rather, I want to show how behaviorism functions as *educational theory* in Mr. Skinner's hands. Put briefly, his claim is that the new behaviorial analysis is superior to traditional notions of knowledge and ability. The educator is led to believe there is something suspect in all those aspects of education which cannot be exhaustively analyzed into overt physical movements or complexes of such. On the other hand, when the claim of behavioral superiority is put to the test of critical examination, a curious result emerges: The claim turns out to be *empty*, since behavioral notions are no narrower or less abstract than the traditional ones, which, in any event, are admittedly indispensable. Thus, the plausibility of behaviorism (in the present context) derives from its disguised duplication of traditional ideas, while its radical shock-value and narrowing educational effect derive from its spurious claim of superiority.

I take one example from Mr. Skinner's paper. He writes, "We can define terms like 'information,' 'knowledge,' and 'verbal ability' by reference to the behavior from which we infer their presence. *We may then teach the behavior directly . . .* Instead of teaching an 'ability to read' we may set up the behavioral repertoire which distinguishes the child who knows how to read from one who does not." (p. 383) Now, obviously, if the behavior is simply a *sign* or *inferential base* for determining the presence of knowledge, and (as appears from the last quoted sentence) the behavioral description is not equivalent to its traditional counterpart, then 'behavior' will *not* suffice to *define* 'knowledge' and the latter term is not eliminable behaviorally. But perhaps there is at least a *practical* advance, in that the behavioral base is clearer than the vague notion of 'knowing'; surely the appropriate behavioral repertoire is more determinate than the vague concept 'knows how to read.'

First, however, Mr. Skinner substitutes for 'knows how to read' the concept 'shows he knows how read,' offering to analyze the latter behaviorally. Then, he says the latter in fact involves a behavioral repertoire of great complexity, of which he gives several *examples*, ending with "*and so on, in a long list.*" (p. 383) Where is the advance over the original, "traditional" notion? Did anyone "traditionally" ever deny that *showing one knows how to read* may be indicated by the cited examples, e.g. reading aloud, finding objects described in a text, *etc., in a long list*? Did anyone ever have trouble "traditionally" in applying this notion? Conversely, does it help in any way to sharpen the "traditional" notion to be told there is a very complex behavioral substitute, *which is not further specified nor defined*?

Mr. Skinner suggests that, because it is a large task to get a child to acquire the elements of the behavioral repertoire associated with reading, "it is tempting to try to circumvent it by teaching something called 'an ability to read' from which all these specific behaviors will flow." (p. 384) Presumably, it is better to say we are teaching or "setting up," a *behavioral repertoire* from which they will flow. Or (perhaps), far better to say we are teaching items belonging to a *behavioral repertoire*, than items belonging to an *ability*. Behavioral terminology is after all scientific; there *must* be a superiority in using it. How far are we at this point from sheer word-magic?

Let us by all means advance the study of teaching machines and programmed instruction. Before we offer any technical rationale as an educational theory, however, let us be sure we have *at least confronted* the relevant logical, philosophical, and educational issues.

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Book Reviews

The Crisis of Western Education, Christopher Dawson. Sheed & Ward, New York, 1961. vi + 246 pp., \$3.95.

Within the last decade the Roman Catholic historian, Christopher Dawson, has published a large number of articles in various American periodicals dealing with questions of education. *The Crisis of Western Education* contains all of these various historical essays with some supplementary material of a more pragmatic nature, and presumably represents the definitive statement of his views. The book is made up of a survey of "The History of Liberal Education in the West," and of shorter sections entitled respectively, "The Situation of Christian Education in the Modern World," and "Western Man and the Technological Order." It concludes with an appendix containing "Specific Programs for the Study of Christian Culture," by John J. Mulloy and John P. Gleason.

Mr. Dawson's general thesis is that modern education has lost its principle of unity, and that what vestigial order it possesses is fast disappearing in the struggle within the university among various competing fields. This may or may not be a valid appraisal of the state of "Western education," but it is probably one that will be acceptable to the large body of American educators which, during the past twenty years or so, has been diligently seeking some hierarchic factor for the curriculum, and which has tended to hypostatize the term "integration" into a kind of fetishistic symbol. One may feel, as I do, that such a quest often ignores the elementary truth that if one places a good student in the presence of a good teacher one will have a good school whether the program be based on the *Ratio Studiorum*, *The Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, or *General Education in a Free Society*; but assuming that this theoretical exercise in self-diagnosis is probably beneficial, I nevertheless question whether the remedy which Mr. Dawson proffers will meet with the approbation of the majority of American educators: "What is needed, it seems to me, is a comprehensive course of studies which would deal with Christian culture in the same integrative and objective way in which the humanist educators dealt with Classical culture."¹

I must insert at this point that my doubts as to the suitability of his program do not stem from my membership in that American society which he has characterized as a "behavioristic monism,"² nor from the fact that I represent in his own words "the views of the avant garde of American Catholic educationalists."³ In fact, anyone familiar with the entire spectrum of American intellectual life must recognize the view of America as a "conformist society,"⁴ which Mr. Dawson has underwritten, as irrelevant to our problems and, in the radical sense, impertinent. Coming from Dickens or Arnold or from twentieth century critics such as Simone de Beauvoir, who had a professed bias, this kind of judgment is no surprise. But coming in 1961, in the face of

¹ *Medieval Essays*, New York, 1954, p. 7.

² *Jubilee*, April, 1961.

³ *Thought*, Winter, 1960.

⁴ *America*, Jan. 21, 1961.

such assessments as those of Bruckberger, Maritain, Maurois, or even Brogan and Siegfried, and coming from someone who is proposing an educational schema for American schools, one must conclude that Mr. Dawson does not yet see this country in proper perspective. It is a truism that in no field has there been so much controversy and discussion over organization and over methodology as in education. It should be equally patent that many of those who criticize Mr. Dawson's suggestions do so simply because they doubt their value—not because of some blind attachment to this or that sector on the academic front.

Furthermore it is not so much that Mr. Dawson errs frequently in his judgments of American society and of the Catholic educational community, or that with his cosmic view of history he can make such pronouncements as: "During the last hundred or two hundred years mankind has been subjected to a process which makes for uniformity and universality" (p. 101); but rather what is profoundly disturbing is that this amalgam of opinion or asseveration is very rarely radicated in the reality from which it allegedly derives. I would like to point out a few of those deracinated views, first, because they illuminate their author's detachment from so much contemporary discussion of crucial educational issues, and second, because it is on the basis of these judgments that Mr. Dawson has felt it necessary to outline his "Christian culture" curriculum. Mr. Dawson declares: "No one denies the existence of a Christian literature, a Christian philosophy . . ." (p. 113). Yet Cardinal Newman denied precisely that; and the existence of a Christian philosophy has been the subject for more than forty years of continuing discussion by such diverse thinkers as Etienne Gilson, Maurice Blondel, Maurice Nédoncelle, Pierre Mandonnet, Emile Bréhier, Fernand van Steenberghen, and Léon Brunschvicg. Catholics, Mr. Dawson informs us, "have never altogether lost sight of the medieval ideal of an order and hierarchy of knowledge . . ." (p. 133). One wonders why Mr. Dawson does not follow this "medieval" example and opt for theology or philosophy as the integrating element in education rather than for historical studies. As I will shortly suggest, the former fields do provide a principle for structuring education which so loose and variable a concept as "Christian culture" cannot offer.

Mr. Dawson attempts to prove a decline in religious faith by citing a sociological survey published in 1951 of which he says, "It devotes a good deal of attention to the religious question and makes the *first* serious attempt to estimate by methods of social survey what influence Christianity exerts in the lives of people today" (p. 171, my italics). But the declension theory to which Mr. Dawson subscribes can hardly be confirmed unless he can cite other comparable methods of analysis for earlier periods, and particularly for the period of "Christian culture," showing in them evidence of a greater margin of religious belief. There is, in fact, a double shift throughout Mr. Dawson's later writings and particularly in the present book, in which the religious spirit of the past is determined by the great cultural monuments—generally the commonplace *exempla* from the textbooks: cathedrals, *Summa*, *Commedia*, etc.—and the spiritual debility of modern civilization is seen in the conclusions of the poll which he cites in this book. But the flawed interpretation is in some ways less discomfitting than the manifest error of fact. For Mr. Dawson seems unaware of other studies antedating that to which he refers: e.g., those by Schnepf, Nuesse, McCaffrey, Kelly, and Hart in this country, and those by Brochard, Lagare, and Boulard in France. And I think it is more

than ironic that the sociologist who has published more scientific estimates on Catholic religious life, Joseph H. Fichter, has emphasized, in the same symposium in which Mr. Dawson affirmed his belief that America was a "totalitarian" society, the impossibility of statistically verifying the current jeremiads about religious and moral disintegration. Father Fichter's conclusion is worth quoting here: "Without being chauvinistic or ethnocentric we might even believe, and also hope, that the American sociocultural system is the brightest and bravest attempt at moral progress that man has ever made."⁵

As one reads Mr. Dawson it becomes clear that he is not interested in education as such, but rather in using the school as the instrument for safeguarding values which he thinks are presently endangered in our "modern secular world." Thus, with reference to the "secular school," he remarks: "While the latter initiates the student into the life and thought of modern secular society, Christian education should be an initiation into a universal spiritual society—the community of the *civitas Dei*" (p. 187). These are stirring words, but their clarion note is muted by the confusion which they point up in Mr. Dawson's thinking between the orders of nature and of grace: a confusion which is at the core of the entire notion of a "Christian culture."⁶

For why do we educate, except to prepare for the world? . . . If then a University is a direct preparation for this world, let it be what it professes. It is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world.

Those who feel that the school ought not to concern itself primarily with this or that sectarian program, with this or that political or moral schema, will have difficulty applauding Mr. Dawson's views; for he seems to envision the school as the best mechanism available for his personal brand of social engineering, that is, as a device for imparting the particular kind of historical information which he favors. "[Catholic educators] have to keep alive the concept of Christian culture in a secular world" (p. 187). I would say, on the contrary, that all educators, Catholic or not, have as their mission primarily the presentation to their students of that body of knowledge the contemplation of which will best educe from them their own "being," which will best actualize their unique selfness. The criterion for determining a curriculum is not then the *intrinsic excellence* of a particular body of knowledge but rather its aptitude for realizing such a goal. As Jacques Maritain has said, "With regard to the development of the human mind, neither the richest material facilities nor the richest equipment in methods, information, and erudition are the main point. The great thing is the awakening of the inner resources and creativity."⁷ Mr. Dawson seems concerned neither with "creativity" nor with the "inner resources" of the student; he is intent on using the school to build a bulwark against the onslaughts of the "secular world." No matter how laudable an undertaking this may be, it is not, I submit, one to which the traditional sovereign independence of the university should be subverted.

But let us return to the type of empirical judgment which forms the base from which Mr. Dawson's theories have been distilled. We are told that the man engaged in "public education" is "forced by the conditions of his work

⁵ *America*, Jan. 21, 1961.

⁶ *The Idea of a University*, ed. Daniel O'Connell, S.J., Chicago, 1927, p. 251.

⁷ *Education at the Crossroads*, New Haven, 1943, p. 43.

to treat vital spiritual issues as lying outside his sphere of competence" (p. 204). Mr. Dawson is not very clear in his definitions; throughout the book he identifies the word "spiritual" with the word "religious"; and the word "religious" invariably comes to mean "Christian," which, in the end, means "Catholic" and "Roman". But if we take "spiritual" in its traditional sense as encompassing not only the arts or philosophy or religion, but as that area which embraces any speculative field, as distinct from the purely pragmatic, then Mr. Dawson's statement is simply not applicable to American education. It is even less accurate when focussed on the screen of practice rather than of theory because, as anyone with more than a passing familiarity can attest, teachers in public schools enjoy a high degree of freedom in discussing "spiritual" matters—these being in reality the only matters that do admit of any discussion.

Mr. Dawson maintains in his present work the Tolstoyan conjecture that in the pre-technological order,

the craftsman and the manual laborer tended to release their psychic tensions in the exercise of their work. But in the technological order this is not so, the man who drives a truck or minds a machine has to subordinate himself to the discipline of the machine. (p. 74)

Again we are faced with one of those judgments, based on a romantic view of the past, which, though one would have thought it untenable even in the New Jerusalem of Ruskin or Morris, is nevertheless irrefutable—unless one can devise some valid method of determining the cultural dynamics, i.e., the peace of mind of helots, freedmen, and serfs. But I do think one can question the *post-propter* line of a corollary observation:⁸

... the new secular culture proved unable to control the sub-rational forces which are always present below the surface of culture. During the present century these forces have manifested themselves in a succession of revolutions and wars which have steadily increased in violence and destructiveness until they endanger the existence of Western Civilization itself.

The true cause of this phenomenon is neither political nor economic but psychological. It is the direct result of the one-sided rationalization of modern culture and of the starvation and frustration of man's spiritual nature.

I see no reason to believe that there is any difference, save in implementation, between the kind of acquisitive urge that led, say, to the Hundred Years War and World War II; and who is to say that Raymond of Toulouse or Philip II had greater control of their subrational drives than contemporary powermad hegemonists? The difference would seem to be in the fact that earlier tyrants could only exile their opponents while their contemporary counterparts have the technical means to seek to exterminate them. Nor do I feel that such vents for the subrational as an *autò da fe* had more "spirituality" about them than the Moscow purge trials.

So much for the type of judgment and historical insight that goes to make up much of Mr. Dawson's reason for advocating the study of "Christian

⁸ *The Historic Reality of Christian Culture*, New York, 1960, pp. 92-93.

culture" as the integrating element in education. However, the phrase "Christian culture" itself bears examination. Strangely enough the cardinal word, "culture," is employed with such looseness as to make any precise criticism of the concept virtually impossible. The word is sometimes used in its fullest socio-anthropological sense as signifying the total moral and intellectual ambience of a people, and at other times it is used in a manner reminiscent of Matthew Arnold or Principal Shairp. We are told, for example, of certain Renaissance Platonists, "... though they were far inferior to the great medieval thinkers as metaphysicians and theologians, they were highly successful in the field of culture. . . ." (pp. 32-33). "Culture" here is apparently being used in the limited sense of "humane letters," for certainly metaphysics and theology are elements of a culture. Similarly, "The democrat . . . has no use for authority either in the State or in the school or in the sphere of cultural activities" (p. 105). I find it difficult to see why the "sphere of cultural activities" in the proper sociological meaning of "culture" which Mr. Dawson elsewhere endorses does not include the activities of the state and the school. Examples of this confusing ambiguity could be multiplied, but I will cite only one more passage: "... Protestant churches have gradually abandoned the field of culture to the State and have confined their activities to the purely ecclesiastical sphere" (p. 186). Again, I have nothing to say as to the validity of the assertion; right now, I am interested only in the assumption that the "purely ecclesiastical sphere" can ever be conceived as divorced from "culture" in the exact anthropological meaning of that word. Mr. Dawson here seems to be identifying the "field of culture" with the field of formal schooling.

An even greater confusion underlies Mr. Dawson's use of the phrase, "Christian culture"; and it is, I believe, his reliance on this phrase, in the face of continuing criticism of it as a scientific, historical or theological concept, which best illustrates the insular character of his thought. One fears that the spiritual mint which puts into currency a phrase such as "Christian culture" has more in common with the intellectual stamp of a T. E. Hulme or a Hurrell Froude than with that of contemporary Catholic thought. It is a coinage which may have had some proselytizing value a few decades ago when Chesterton and Belloc or the patriots of the *Action Française* were lobbying for a militant *renouveau Catholique*. In the present moment it is precisely this identification of Christianity with any specific temporal achievements that seems most likely to inhibit its mission.

Moreover the phrase "Christian culture" seems to me not only theologically unsound, but also historically unwieldy. It attempts to encompass phenomena and data much too conflicting and disparate to be subsumed under one heading. If this "Christian culture" includes the period roughly from the dissolution of the empire in the West to the fall of Constantinople, that is, the period conventionally defined as the Middle Ages, then one is going to have to treat of such things as that suppression of individual conscience which Acton discussed in his essay, "The Beginnings of the Modern State." One is going to have to note with Fanfani in *Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism*, and with Auerbach in *Mimesis*, that medieval society, frequently ignoring the worth of the individual as such often recognized his merit only in virtue of the office he held or the work he did—hence the significance of costume as a badge of distinction. (This *ex opere operato* conception of the parallels, oddly enough, the conception of man as a technological creature, which Dawson finds unique to modern society.) In the

development of a program in "Christian culture," one is going to have to take into account the popular culture reflected in the Goliardic songs and in the vulgar literatures, which were often not very Christian. One will also have to take note of the aberrations that flourished in a good part of that exemplary era and which are illustrated in the paintings and sculptured works on the Dance of Death theme, in the flagellant mobs, in the ecclesiastical frauds and forgeries, in the Inquisitions, and in the burning of heretics. If one looks out of the West for this "Christian culture," one may examine Byzantium, and meet what Soloviev excoriated as a non-Christian culture in *Russia and the Universal Church*. And if one looks to the period before the fifth century, one will find a considerable expansion of what can be called theological culture, but less that can be called "Christian culture" in the sense of an intellectual and social order that reflected the Christian spirit in its politics, its literature, and its art.

If one is going to point out the relevance of medieval thought to contemporary social practice, one ought to observe with Miss Ewart Lewis that "the idea that some sort of claim to freedom was inherent in human nature flickered through medieval theory, but it remained ambiguous and undeveloped."⁹ One should recognize with E. M. Sait in *Political Institutions* that the democratic character of the priories was less influential on political thought than the progress of the communes. And one will probably conclude with Bernard Lyon that among the common people real estate development, not philosophical principles or ecclesiastical guidance, engendered the longing for freedom.¹⁰

I do not mention all these authors in support of a thesis of my own making; the thesis flows from the facts which they have disclosed, and it is that there often was a fissure, a separation between the lofty and admirable *credenda* of theology and the *agenda* of temporal affairs. One may call it what he will: a separation of theory and practice, of the objective and the subjective, of the system and the element, of the community and the person; but it is a separation that must be acknowledged, and that leads one to wonder whether the term "Christian culture" is the best description for historical realities which are composed of so many non-Christian forces. From the educator's rather than from the historian's viewpoint, it makes one wonder whether so scattered an assemblage of forces, so fluid and intermingled a collocation of phenomena, will provide the unified scheme of learning which had been traditionally found in the study of classical culture.

I believe that the capital flaw in Mr. Dawson's argument is his confusion of the natural and the supernatural; and he identifies a society which was nominally Christian with a "Christian society"—this latter being a conception of society which, given human nature, can never be realized in history, and which must remain as T. S. Eliot's title suggested, only an "idea." Because of his own noble dedication to such a notion of "Christian culture," Mr. Dawson would like to see it enforced by the school. I believe this would destroy the traditional ideal of *universitas* and would be as detrimental to education as to the mission of religion.

If I have been severe in my criticism of Mr. Dawson's educational program it is because I am convinced Catholic education in America is now encounter-

⁹ *The American Political Science Review*, June, 1956.

¹⁰ *The American Historical Review*, October, 1957.

ing very serious problems, and I believe his book far from resolving them does not even face up to them. I have discussed some of these problems in *The Catholic Dimension in Higher Education*: I will mention one issue I did not treat of in that work which seems to bear on the present discussion. Recent surveys have indicated that students in Catholic schools in the South have fundamentally the same attitude on racial questions as other students. To the degree that this is so, such schools can no more be called Christian than one could call Christian that society which tolerated, let us say for example, the expulsion and persecution of the Jews or Moriscos.

JUSTUS GEORGE LAWLER
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A reply by John J. Mulloy:*

We rightly expect a review to provide us with an understanding of what a book is about and to be written with some measure of objectivity. These requirements of responsible reviewing Mr. Lawler has signally failed to meet in the article he has contributed above. Whatever else Mr. Lawler is concerned with in his review, he has little interest in informing the reader of the contents of *The Crisis of Western Education* or in allowing him to assess the significance of its proposals for educational reform.

One of the difficulties about answering such an attack as Mr. Lawler's is the hit-and-run nature of its presentation. There is relatively little considered argument, but much roll calling of writers who are drafted to do service in the cause of Mr. Lawler's vindication. However, in the haste of their recruitment, Mr. Lawler fails to inform us just what these writers really believe about the subject under discussion.

Let me provide four examples. First, in Mr. Lawler's reference to other sociological studies of religion which antedated that of Rowntree and Lavers, we are not informed which of those studies disagreed with the results discovered by the English sociologists. In fact, the whole point argued here by Mr. Lawler is that they *antedated* the Rowntree-Lavers study—not how comprehensive was the nature of the studies, what their findings were, nor whether they were really comparable with the Rowntree-Lavers survey. Thus the chief points of significance were disregarded for concentration on a side issue.

The same type of procedure is also employed in Mr. Lawler's challenge to the existence of Christian philosophy. It thus permits him to use the name of Gilson, who has devoted his life to proving the existence of Christian philosophy, as though he actually were in agreement with Mr. Lawler!

It is even more revealing of Mr. Lawler's method that in citing Father Fichter, a Jesuit sociologist who studied Catholic religious practices in the South, he did not mention what Father Fichter's findings were, but preferred to quote the latter's optimistic contribution to a symposium which did not demand reference to the nature of these findings. The findings, indicated that better than 51% of the 14,838 Catholics studied in the three Southern parishes

* Editorial Note: The Harvard Educational Review wishes to acknowledge that Mr. Lawler proposed a reply to his review from Mr. Dawson or one of his colleagues. This review was intended simply as an exposition of Mr. Dawson's views, but as a continuation of Mr.

included in the survey were either dormant or marginal Catholics, meaning that they "did not even approach" what Father Fichter set down as minimum standards of acceptable religious observance.¹ I think it would have been more honest of Mr. Lawler to mention this fact when he was attacking the conclusions of Professor Dawson on the increasing secularization of modern life.

One final example. In his criticism of Christian culture study Mr. Lawler makes key use of certain quotations from Jacques Maritain's volume of 1943, *Education at the Crossroads*, with the implication that there is a direct conflict between the educational views of Maritain and those of Dawson. Yet in the Kent School symposium, published in 1957 as *The Christian Idea of Education*, Professor Maritain specifically mentioned Christopher Dawson's ideas on Christian culture study for approval and agreement.²

As we might expect from what we have seen of Mr. Lawler's method of presenting writers, the account which he provides of Christopher Dawson's view of America is also tailored to suit the demands of his dialectic. Let me therefore cite one example of the real issue with which Dawson believes America is confronted—the conflict between the demands made on society by the technological order and the older liberal traditions of American culture.

The American way of life was built on a threefold tradition of freedom—political, economic and religious—and if the new secularist forces were to subjugate these freedoms to a monolithic technological order, it would destroy the foundations on which American culture was based. The American way of life can only maintain its character within the general framework of Western Christian culture. If this relation is lost, something essential to the life of the nation will be lost and American democracy itself will become subordinated to the technological order. (p. 184)

Because the United States is at the center of the struggle for social and moral freedom in the modern world, the educational decisions arrived at in America, Dawson believes, will have a profound influence on educational policy in the newly emergent nations of Asia and Africa (pp. 86-88).

Our next task must be to consider what is the basic meaning of education in the college or university, for it is upon this point that Mr. Lawler challenges Professor Dawson as attempting to subvert higher education to the service of merely utilitarian ends. He finds evidence of this in Professor Dawson's alleged intention to use the school "to build a bulwark against the onslaughts of the 'secular world,'" and in his employing the school "as the best mechanism available for his personal brand of social engineering." In his conclusion, Mr. Lawler speaks of Professor Dawson's wish to see Christian culture study "enforced by the school."

I should like to turn Mr. Lawler's attention to the second chapter of the Harvard Report, *General Education in a Free Society*, which contains a statement of the objectives of higher education. These include: (1) the transmission of the cultural heritage, "an inherited view of man and society which it is the function, though not the only function, of education to pass on;" (2) "... not just knowledge of values, but commitment to them, the embodiment of the ideal in one's actions, feelings and thoughts;" and (3) the

development of a critical spirit which coexists with the commitment, for "a belief which does not meet the challenge of criticism and dissent soon becomes inert, habitual, dead."³

Now it seems to me that in attempting to brand Christian culture study as utilitarian, Mr. Lawler is ignoring the fact that all education has a social dimension; part of that dimension is the commitment to values referred to in the Harvard Report. The particular manner in which students will be educated to realize "their own 'being'" will always be in the form of some particular cultural pattern, not an abstract excellence apart from the values and ideals of the society imparting the education.

To speak as though the communication of such cultural ideals rendered education a mere "mechanism" is to condemn the whole of education by human societies throughout the course of history—including our own programs of general education in the United States today. One may of course favor such a wholesale condemnation of the past, but I think Mr. Lawler should at least realize the implications of what he is saying before using it so confidently as a standard of judgment.

With a concern similar to that of the first goal cited from the Harvard Report, Professor Dawson has written:⁴

Hence it is clear that without some understanding of this great cultural tradition which molded the life and thought of our ancestors for ten to fifteen centuries, we cannot understand our past and we shall become progressively alienated from our own spiritual inheritance, as in fact so much of our population is today. By the study of Christian culture we become conscious of our spiritual roots and integrated into the continuing life of the historic community of culture.

In the next paragraph of the same lecture Professor Dawson shows why he believes Christian culture study will allow for the development of the critical faculties of the student, a goal which is not achieved at the present time by the abstract non-historical teaching of theology and philosophy.⁵

One of the weaknesses of our education in the past has been due to our ignoring this historical dimension of Christian culture. Thus while the student may receive a thorough grounding in the principles of Thomist theology and ethics, there is a danger that this knowledge will remain in the sphere of theory and of textbooks, unless he is able to make some study of how these doctrines and these ethical values have in fact affected or failed to affect the way of life of Christian men and societies.

... there is a great danger in the United States that while secular education is being pushed toward an extreme metaphysical relativism by sociology and psychology, Catholic education is being pushed in the opposite direction toward a metaphysical absolutism so that you will get two mutually exclusive and incomprehensible universes of discourse.

I think it is most revealing that Mr. Lawler should ask again in the present review why Professor Dawson does not "opt for theology or philosophy" as an

integrating principle, when the answer was already given in the *Thought* article from which I have just quoted. Intelligent debate would have defended theology and philosophy in the way that seemed best suited to meet Professor Dawson's objections; but to raise the question as though it had never before been considered by Dawson simply muddies the wells of rational discussion.

The same lack of a sense of responsibility shows itself in Mr. Lawler's pretentious juggling with the different meanings of the word *culture* and in his pretended surprise that a word may be used differently in different contexts and still be used properly in each. Professor Dawson's alleged ambiguity is not Dawson's at all; it lies in the very nature of the English language and in the fact that words have several different connotations attached to them, so that a reader is expected to know from his own experience with language what particular use is intended in the particular context in which it is found.

On a par with this sort of thing is the implication that Professor Dawson does not tell us what he means by the anthropological use of the term *culture*. As carefully as Newman defined the particular meaning he intended of the word *development* in connection with *The Development of Christian Doctrine*,⁹ does Dawson from the very first page (indeed from the very first paragraph) of the book explain with his characteristic clarity the special use of the term on which his argument about Christian culture rests. Here are the different pages in the book where Dawson discusses culture and its elements, and how these tie in with his thesis in the book: pages 3 to 5; 135 to 139; 147 to 151; 155; 164. To ignore his careful delineation of the term and the lucidity with which Dawson analyzes his thesis is, in a reviewer, simply unpardonable.

Suppose we turn next to what is essentially a variation on the same theme—Mr. Lawler's refusal to consider Professor Dawson's particular use of the term Christian culture, and his substitution in its stead of his own concept so that he may the more easily refute it. When we speak of Islamic culture or Confucian culture or Christian culture, do we mean that the societies having these cultures have to conform in every way to the ideal norms by which the culture's values are expressed? Or do we mean that these norms and values serve as a kind of goal toward which human activities are directed as an ideal, and the influence of which upon a society serves as a kind of regulative standard or law? From the anthropologists' point of view, there is no doubt that it is the second of these two interpretations which is the correct one. And since Professor Dawson has specifically said, both in the St. Mary's lecture and in the volume under review, that it is anthropology which provides the starting point for the conception of Christian culture, there is no reason why Mr. Lawler should be ignorant of Dawson's intended meaning. This anthropological concept of culture is set forth quite clearly in *The Crisis of Western Education*:

In the same way the spiritual archetypes which formed the character and inspired the life of Western man are of Christian origin, and however imperfectly they were realized in practice, it is impossible to understand his pattern of behavior unless we take account of them.

We study political ideas in relation to history, although we know that the majority of men are never governed by purely ideological motives. How much more then should we study the religious element

in culture, for this affected the majority of men from the cradle to the grave for more than twelve centuries. (pp. 142-143)

This brings me to what I find one of the most misleading of Mr. Lawler's tactics in the pursuit of his debate about the meaning of Christian culture study. Knowing that the term "medieval" is one that can be used in a derogatory sense, he attempts by different phrases and references to suggest that the study of Christian culture is concerned only or largely with the study of the Middle Ages. He nowhere mentions in his review the fact that Professor Dawson has identified six different periods for the study of Christian culture, only two of which fall within the Middle Ages. He nowhere recognizes (what is abundantly clear from the specific programs for which the present writer is responsible, as well as from the body of the volume itself) that Christian culture study provides for a consideration of the interaction between Christianity and culture in three different social milieux—the ancient world, the medieval world, and the modern world. Professor Dawson devotes two pages to a brief characterization of each of these six periods and says about them, "Each of these periods has its own specific character, which can be studied in art and philosophy, in literature and in social institutions" (pp. 140-142).

In closing I should like to call attention to a profound analogy which exists between the work of Newman and Dawson. Christopher Dawson's view of the interaction between Christianity and culture, which constitutes the ground for the study of Christian culture, bears a decided resemblance to Newman's approach in *The Development of Christian Doctrine*. In this volume Newman pointed out that the body of revealed truth within the Church develops and becomes more explicit through its contact with the social and historical circumstances which confront it throughout the course of Christian history.

The same process which interested Newman from the side of Christian theology interests Dawson from the opposite side: the historical societies and cultures which Christianity encounters and influences in its journey through history. As Dawson expresses this conception:

The essence of this study, as I envisage it, is that it concerns itself with a dynamic process which does not belong to any single period, but is co-extensive with the history of Christianity and inseparable from it. This process involves three successive phases: (1) the confrontation of Christianity—the Church and the Gospel—with a non-Christian secular or pagan environment; (2) the process of permeation of one by the other; (3) the eventual creation of new forms of culture and thought—art, literature, institutions, and so forth—from the process of interaction. (pp. 163-164)

From this passage, it is clear that the study of Christian culture is concerned with a process of interaction which results in the creation of new cultural forms. Thus, in Dawson's view, there is a distinction between the historical process in itself and the cultural results in which it is manifested. Dawson makes this even more explicit in another part of the volume under review: "This kind of program is not simply a study of the Christian classics; nor is it primarily a literary study. It is a cultural study in the sociological and historical sense, and it would devote more attention to the social institutions and moral values of Christian culture than to its literary and artistic achieve-

The study of the complex relationship between religion and culture has been a main task of the work of Christopher Dawson over the past forty years. He has treated it with bold originality of conception and with faithful attention to historical fact. May I suggest that Mr. Lawler abandon his hasty reading of this work in the pursuit of some misleading and worthless personal triumph. Instead let him give to it that contemplation which he tells us in his book on education is a necessary condition for any real learning.

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REFERENCES

1. "The Marginal Catholic: An Institutional Approach" by Joseph H. Fichter, in *Religion, Society and the Individual* by J. Milton Yinger (author and editor), (Macmillan, New York, 1957), pp. 423-432. See especially pages 427-428.
2. "Typical Aspects of Christian Education" by Jacques Maritain in *The Christian Idea of Education* edited by Edmund Fuller (New Haven, 1957), pp. 178-180.
3. *General Education in a Free Society*: Report of the Harvard Committee (Cambridge, Mass., 1945), pp. 45; 72; 77.
4. "The Study of Christian Culture" by C. Dawson in *Thought* (Winter 1960 issue, Vol. XXXV), pp. 487-488.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 488; 491.
6. See pp. 38 ff. of the Longmans (New York) edition of 1949.

Postscript by Justus George Lawler

I regret the moral judgments Mr. Mulloy has made on my motives and my integrity. It disturbs me that an advocate of "Christian Culture" would discharge upon me such indictments as the following phrases imply: "... it would have been more honest of Mr. Lawler..."; "... lack of a sense of responsibility..."; "... pretentious juggling... and pretended surprise..."; "pursuit of some misleading and worthless personal triumph..."

However, I am pleased that Mr. Mulloy has taken note of my "dialectic," even though the development of this dialectic seems to have escaped him. I first set forth a few of the many errors of fact which Mr. Dawson has woven together, and second, I discussed the flaws in the theory which he tailored from that tissue.

First, concerning the Rowntree-Lavers study, the chief point in introducing it at this stage of my argument was the error of *fact* in Mr. Dawson's treatment of it.

Second, if M. Gilson has "devoted his life to proving the existence of Christian philosophy," it is obvious that Mr. Dawson's statement, "No one denies the existence of... a Christian philosophy," is simply not true. Gilson would not spend his life proving the existence of something that "no one denies."

Third, concerning Fr. Fichter's statement, Mr. Mulloy apparently feels that Fr. Fichter makes his surveys with his left hand and extrapolates his theory with his right, and that there is no bond between the two exercises, those of Fr. Fichter may strike one as being, they are useless in supporting any

But the point I stressed is that no matter how pessimistic findings such as declension theory unless one can employ similar statistical methods—an impossibility—for earlier periods.

Fourth, Mr. Mulloy's digression on utilitarian ends is meaningless since I specifically said in quoting M. Maritain that I was talking about the *primary* end of education; that there are secondary ends which serve a useful purpose, *though obvious* and stressed in my book on Catholic higher education, is irrelevant. Mr. Mulloy in his program of studies at the end of Mr. Dawson's book wants students to read Hopkins' *Poems* as a "Significant Book of Divided Christendom." I suggest that this is pragmatic and utilitarian rather than contemplative and esthetic.

All of the errors of fact—including those of chronology—indicate careless thinking and make suspect the subsequent theory. Mr. Dawson launches the most absolute of judgments without the slightest qualification. Two examples which were quoted from Dawson in my original Ms. are: "The *only* sections of the American population that are fully committed to maintaining full Christian education are the Catholics . . ."; or, ". . . the churches [in America] have lost *all* control over the religious formation of the people." (My italics throughout.)

Concerning my "pretentious juggling" with the word "culture," for reasons of brevity I would merely point out that, for example, no one writes a book about dogs, and then proceeds to talk about, let us say, "the dog star," "dogged determination," "dogwood," "dogfish," and "bulldogs."

My criticism of the term "Christian Culture" has been made in *Theological Studies* and in my book on higher education: I suggest that Mr. Mulloy read them.

Postscript by John J. Mulloy

My own regret is that Mr. Lawler saw fit to write the kind of review he did. I know of no other term but "lack of a sense of responsibility" with which to characterize the tactics which Mr. Lawler employed throughout the whole of his review in his attempt to discredit Christian culture as a program of study and to vindicate his position in this controversy.

I am confident that anyone who reads *The Crisis of Western Education* after having seen it through the mirror of Mr. Lawler's presentation of its contents will agree with the severity of my judgments concerning Mr. Lawler's methods in this matter.

With regard to the use of the word "culture," I fear that Mr. Lawler does not yet understand that he is not indicting Professor Dawson in this matter, but his own understanding of the way in which the English language is used. Whatever may be Mr. Lawler's particular difficulties in this matter, I do not think that Professor Dawson should be asked to take them into account when writing for a more general public.

As to the rest of the points raised in Mr. Lawler's postscript, I do not see that they alter in any degree the basic misrepresentations of the different authors' positions of which he has been guilty.

Finally, it is regrettable that, for reasons of space, *The Harvard Educational Review* was forced to omit that section of my reply to Mr. Lawler in which the signature of Mr. Lawler's proposals for higher education as these

were presented in his book on the subject. There I set forth what seemed to me the basic contradiction between Mr. Lawler's advocacy of integration of the curriculum for reasons which he later condemned with the utmost vigor in his review of *The Crisis of Western Education*. Among other things, it was this contradiction which made it difficult for me to regard Mr. Lawler's review as intending to provide any serious consideration of the issues with which Christopher Dawson's volume dealt.

The Education of Nations: a Comparison in Historical Perspective, Robert Ulich. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1961. 325 pp. \$6.75.

This is a most enjoyable book. Any attempt to distil the essential commonalities of Western traditions of education from the immense precipitate of history and national variation must be a brave Herculean labour. Professor Robert Ulich does it with an urbanity and felicity of style that will command the admiration of any student of comparative education. The volume, handsomely produced by the Harvard University Press, provides a judicious summary view of the educational experience of England, France, Germany, the United States and Russia, as well as a consideration of the translation of this experience to the new nations of Africa and Asia—all with a large-handed comparative coverage.

Professor Ulich's approach is that of a gentle liberal-conservative with a keen appreciation of the frailty of human intellectual and moral excellence and, therefore, an urgent concern with the need to preserve educational institutions that foster superior scholarly attainment—a concern which sometimes leads him to overestimate the threat of the strongly egalitarian tendencies of modern educational expansion. Thus some readers will feel, as I do, that he does less than justice to the quality that is encompassed within the ramshackle structure of American education. There is far too much reluctance, on both sides of the Atlantic, to recognise that in such colleges as Antioch, Swarthmore, Reed and Wesleyan, America offers a level of undergraduate education, devoted and courageously experimental in its spirit, which has probably no equal anywhere in the world, and certainly not in the Oxford and Cambridge of Anglophile dreams. And, of course, since World War II, the leading American graduate schools at Harvard, Chicago, Berkeley, etc., have been exploring new frontiers of educational experience in the advanced, affluent educative society, which for other countries have yet to appear over the horizon. Professor Ulich writes of American education basically as an application of European classical and medieval ideas to the novel conditions of a new continent. He does not bring out the massive modern fact of American education as having entered a new era of pedagogy which has reversed traditional cultural dependencies; until now, European, not to mention African and Asian, cultural institutions are provincial to the American metropolis.

Perhaps this is attributable to the modesty and reticence of an American writer. The problems of perspective and balance in a work of this kind are bound to leave room for argument. One might feel that Professor Ulich has been too kind to English pragmatic wisdom and too harsh with French intellectualist centralism. One may regret the neglect of much that is significant in

contemporary European educational development which arises from the omission of Scandinavia from his survey. Yet the sweep and interest of the narrative remains.

Nevertheless, in the end, this reviewer is left unsatisfied. The reason is fundamental. The disappointment lies not in the author's historical erudition, which is vast, nor in his moral sensibility, which is insistent and appealing, but in the nature of the approach itself. A study of this kind must surely begin with an explicit theory of social structure and social change that specifies relationships between education and the social system. Professor Ulich has wise things to say about the relationship of, say, educational ideas to political movements or curriculum content to national character. But without the discipline of a sociological theory we are left only with respect for his sagacity, without certainty of our knowledge. It cannot be claimed that such a theory exists in any highly articulated or widely accepted form. It can, however, be asserted that the value of the comparative method is sharply reduced when not employed within the terms set by such theories of social change as are available to us.

The relevance of this criticism may be illustrated from Professor Ulich's treatment of the 'era of technology'—the modern history of Western education which raises the relationship between education and the economy as a crucial issue for the moral and political as well as the economic life of industrial countries. His introductory treatment is the inadequate and partial one of defining education as a counterweight to the prevailing trend towards mechanisation (p. 72). Admittedly in his excellent chapter on Russia he goes beyond this to explore the complexity of educational response to economic growth in the post-revolutionary period. But a general analysis of the pressures of industrialisation which bring educational institutions to a central position in the social structure as sources of social change through research and as agencies of social selection and training for a consequently changing occupational structure, would have given him a clear framework for explicit comparison of perhaps the most significant aspects of the modern education of nations, developed or under-developed. It is along these lines that a cumulative study of comparative education must be sought.

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African Development and Education in Southern Rhodesia, Franklin Parker.
International Education Monographs No. 2. Ohio State University Press,
Columbus, Ohio, 1960. 165 pp. \$1.75.

Dr. Parker is to be commended for presenting in concise and readable form a summary of social conditions in Southern Rhodesia and a description of some of the problems facing educationalists in that area. The book says very little that is new and the early sections, particularly, which trace the growth of European influence are perhaps overlong in relation to the size of the volume and contain material which can be easily extracted from a number of existing standard works. However, for the general reader and for those whose knowledge of Africa is limited this little volume presents in simple terms an

array of facts and data relating to some aspects of social change and formal education and is well worth examining.

It is unfortunate that anyone writing on contemporary Africa is doomed to be out-of-date before publication. Dr. Parker's work does not include reference to some very recent developments in the area, such as new constitutional proposals, the accelerated growth of the nationalist movement, and above all the current controversies raging over the Federation. Nonetheless, in treating one of the potentially most explosive areas on the continent the author has displayed a considerable measure of objectivity and sympathy for both African and settler aspirations and none but the most extreme supporters of white or alternatively African supremacy could take exception to his analysis. Only occasionally do ethnocentric judgments obtrude as when the Africans of sixty years ago are characterised as existing in a state of "apathetic barbarism." For those whose contact with traditional African cultures has been more intense there is a constant awareness of a remarkable degree of adaptation to what was essentially a harsh environment and one is impressed by the subtlety and richness of many traditional societies. The mere absence of an advanced technology in them does not justify the use of such descriptive language. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile such statements with the later observation that "A great mistake of African education in the early days was to discard the traditional folklore, music, dancing, and languages. Only when these are pursued and rediscovered will the African attain self-understanding." Such a view derives from what Malinowski so well expressed as the "Jigsaw Puzzle" theory of culture—that it is possible to remove cultural components and traits and incorporate them into new institutional frameworks without affecting other elements of that culture. In practice, such attempts, apart from the ethical problem of differentiating "desirable" cultural elements from "apathetic barbarism," fail to perceive that culture is not a mechanical summation of traits but a functional totality.

This brings us to the core of our discussion, and we should regard this particular volume as significant for what it does not say as for what it does. There is, perhaps, a reluctance on the part of educationalists to really grapple with basic problems of the functional impact of western systems of education on African societies. This reluctance results partly from an unwillingness to really comprehend developments in social theory and partly from a tendency to recoil from the implications of their data when they conflict with preconceived notions of how formal educational institutions ought to function irrespective of how they actually do. The author is aware that early African demand for schools was essentially directed towards "academic" provision as opposed to alternative types of instruction. Yet, in his later discussion of the implications of the Phelps-Stokes Reports and the early memoranda of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies he fails to draw the conclusion that the recommendations of these bodies were at variance with African demand and incongruent with the objective functions of the schools and the purposes for which they were used by Africans. The Phelps-Stokes Report, in particular, has been regarded as something of a hallowed document by a generation of educationalists embodying as it did the concept of "cultural adaptation" of the schools. Yet its ideas were by no means new and the historian of African education finds parallel views expressed by a number of writers dating back to a memorandum by the Education Committee of the Privy Council written in 1847. Attempts to give African schools both in

British and French territories an industrial and agricultural bias and adapt them to their cultural environment have been frequent. Yet it is fair to say that their impact on African education has been negligible except in the pages of the journals where these documents are periodically rediscovered. Frequently, the failure of such schemes is attributed to disinterest on the part of the colonial power, yet most evidence points to the fact that in many areas (including Southern Rhodesia) quite strenuous efforts were made to implement them. The plain fact of the matter is that such notions derived from a very imperfect idea of the nature of social change in Africa and the crucial role of the European elite. During the last twenty years increased sociological research has indicated the limitations of theories of cultural adaptation, as well as delineating the shortcomings of its political analogue, the theory of Indirect Rule.

Basically, such views, and I feel that Dr. Parker would subscribe to them, see the main problem of the schools as *curricular* in nature. Thus it is implied that the dysfunctions resulting from the introduction of western education—such as the breakdown of indigenous political and social systems, the African search for "white-collar" jobs with resulting unemployment, the flight from the rural areas and from agriculture, low enrolments and wastage in schools—could have been checked somehow if that demon of educational mythology, the "academic curriculum," had been replaced by something more "appropriate" to Africans ("appropriate" as defined by educationalists). Yet, in practice, there is virtually no evidence for any of these assertions.

Firstly, empirical research by the present writer in Ghana and by Callaway in Nigeria would suggest that the "white-collar" aspirations of Africans are not the result of the curriculum of the schools but rather the consequence of a perception by Africans of the rewards of the occupational structure, a realistic perception in terms of income as well as status implications. Unemployment among school leavers is not due to the products of the schools only wanting "white collar" employment (there is virtually no evidence for this) but is rather due to dysfunctions occurring between the overall rate of expansion of the exchange economy and the total output of the schools (irrespective of the type of education provided). Curricular reform is no solution to such dysfunctionalities so long as education is perceived by Africans as constituting a gateway from the subsistence economy to employment within a limited exchange sector.

Secondly, concerning the problem of low enrolments and wastage in schools, Dr. Parker advances several reasons for such phenomena as overcrowding and poverty. Yet there is evidence to suggest that these are simply contributory causes and not the main independent variables in the situation. Furthermore, neither is curriculum the crucial factor. In many areas in Africa, enrolment is low and wastage is high even where specially devised curricula are used in the schools. The French particularly were obliged to abandon such experiments in the face of African opposition to them.

Thirdly, the schools are frequently blamed for draining individuals from the rural areas into the towns. Such a contention is probably true, but it has been assumed by educationalists that an "adapted" curriculum based on agriculture would check this flow. There is no evidence to support this view, and the fact that urbanisation is a phenomenon equally present throughout the western world would suggest that the potential role of the schools in checking the flight from the rural areas is negligible.

These examples have been quoted merely to illustrate that educationalists are, in one sense, prone to exaggerate the role of the schools in influencing social change. Western education has certainly produced change but only in conjunction with a number of other factors such as the extension of an exchange economy, the nature of European overrule, and the function of the European elite as a reference group. Dr. Parker certainly gives mention of these factors but then drops them after p. 67 and does not show how the whole complex is interwoven into educational development. If he had done so, he would have gone a long way toward explaining some of the paradoxical features of educational development in Africa—notably the African stress on academic as opposed to "appropriate" curricula.

In essence, the transfer of western educational institutions to the African scene may be described as one of minimal structural change but maximal shifts in function. The formal features of British education, for example, remain with minor variations in Southern Rhodesia, but the functions of these formal structures have changed within the new institutional framework. It is the educationalist's neglect of the *latent* functions of the schools that frequently leads him to misinterpret their role in social change.

Thus traditional societies rarely developed formal agencies for education except in those areas where special initiation ceremonies were performed or where "bush schools" existed as in parts of West Africa. Generally speaking, however, the homogenizing function of education, which enabled individuals to acquire necessary skills and internalize appropriate modes of behaviour, was carried out primarily through informal agencies. Valuable studies of indigenous education in Africa have been contributed by Read, Raum and Ammar; but serious methodological implications arise if it is suggested that such studies are particularly relevant for the formal schools. To imply this would be to ignore the fact that as soon as indigenous educational processes are supplemented by formal agencies the whole nature of the sociological problem of education changes. Formal schools in the African context are not, nor can they be, agencies of cultural transmission primarily but instead become largely agencies of social differentiation. As Floud and Halsey put it:

a fresh set of sociological problems is created as soon as educational tasks are performed by specialized agencies, since the possibility then arises that these may behave as relatively independent variables in the functioning of the social system, promoting or impeding change and producing unintended as well as intended, and dysfunctional as well as functional consequences.

From this viewpoint the most crucial thing about Western education in Africa is not what the schools teach but rather that one has been to school when a large proportion of the population has not. Attendance at school enables access to a nascent system of stratification and a new occupational structure and as such the prime objective function of the schools is one of social mobility in an emergent rather than a traditional social structure. The dysfunctional consequences of formal education in relation to traditional social organization are largely unavoidable; they arise not from the "wrong" curricula but from the very existence of formal schools, which constitute a new sociological dimension in African society.

The role of the European elite, as a reference group in what is essentially

a "caste" system, is crucial in determining the nature of African aspirations, leading to emergent concepts of status based increasingly upon occupational and educational variables. Dr. Parker makes reference to the African desire to emulate Europeans but does not seem to appreciate the profound sociological significance of emulation in a "caste" structure. To a large extent African educational aspirations have derived precisely from observation of the European elite itself; internal stratification and the African quest for "parity" in education arises from a particularly shrewd and realistic appraisal of the uses to which education can be put. Educationalists evidently regard this tendency to imitation as undesirable, but it is almost inevitable in such caste situations. Indeed, from the point of view of the mobility functions of formal education, it is inevitable that the educational demand should be for an academic type of education which is perceived to be the key to European supremacy.

From this viewpoint, the attempt to modify formal institutions of education to accord with the "needs" of African society are doomed to failure unless they are congruent with the expectations of the clientele of the schools themselves and do not at the same time interfere with the latent mobility functions of these institutions. In practice, attempts to modify the schools in the light of putative notions of what is good for the African are likely to do precisely this, in the same manner that the experiments at Tuskegee and Hampton aimed at providing special forms of education for American Negroes and thus deprived them of parity of educational experience with the dominant white caste. It is to the credit of W. E. B. Dubois that he was far more conscious of these realities than most of his contemporaries and fully perceived that the question of educational parity in a caste situation, colonial or otherwise, is far more sociologically significant than the question of educational content.

Yet educationalists have ignored this issue in the case of Africa especially. Their proposals for educational reform have varied from including a large proportion of "practical" subjects, such as agriculture or hygiene, to stressing elements ripped from the indigenous setting. This is precisely what the African has not desired from the schools and is unlikely to desire so long as the white minority receives a distinctly different type of education and so long as rewards of a "practical" education in terms of status and income are not comparable with academic alternatives. Such a situation is dependent largely upon pressures exerted on the schools by changes in the occupational, economic and status structure, and not upon the efforts of the schools themselves. In passing, it is appropriate to note that in our own society, despite the volume of discussion on "functional education" (whatever the phrase may mean), the greatest prizes in terms of elite membership and financial reward are still largely appropriated by those who have passed through the portals of essentially academic institutions. In this context, classics at Harvard provide a far more "functional" education than agricultural engineering at a State University. The African can hardly be blamed for desiring a little of the same educational medicine.

What is particularly needed in research in Africa, therefore, is less concentration upon how many schools there are and what they teach and far more stress upon what groups are getting formal education. If schools are seen in terms of their role as the key to economic, social and political power between white minorities and the African masses (or perhaps more important, as the key to supremacy among African ethnic groups themselves) then careful

studies of ethnic and social recruitment into the schools are desirable. For example, Dr. Parker refers to the dominant and powerful Matabele and the fragmented and militarily unsuccessful Mashona. It would have been a valuable investigation to determine how these groups have used western education since the coming of the European. For example, in Uganda, Ankole political and social organization was based essentially upon caste characteristics with a dominant group of Hima pastoralists and a subordinate caste of Iru agriculturalists. In practice, the latter group have utilised western education so effectively that there has been a reversal of power and the Iru have emerged as the dominant group in a new emergent social and political structure. It is a hypothesis worth testing that, throughout most of Africa, dominant elites or militarily successful minorities have been rather more reluctant to utilise western education than subordinate groups, who have more readily perceived education as an alternative avenue to power and status lying outside the traditional structure. The most notable exception to this has been Buganda where the traditional elite has, so far, reinforced its position by the early monopoly of western education. In Rhodesia, the presumption might be that the Mashona have used western education more effectively than the Matabele. If this has been so in fact, future political and social control will rest with the former group.

Competition between groups for education as the instrument of "legitimate" status and power is one of the most significant developments in modern Africa. Although rarely mentioned by educationalists, it is decisive in its impact. It should be noted also that the mere extension of primary education to all merely carries the struggle upward into the secondary schools as it has done already in Ghana.

These general remarks have aimed at stressing some of the underlying factors which are crucial to education both in Southern Rhodesia and other parts of Africa. Although educational writers are prone to pay lip service to the social and economic milieu in which the schools function, more frequently than not they assume that the schools are an autonomous institution. When these schools do not function in the ways that they anticipate, they are frequently dismayed. Dr. Parker's study is a useful collection of facts about Southern Rhodesia, but it constitutes the beginning and not the end of any realistic study of formal education in that area.

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1. *Harvard Educational Review*, 1959, 29, p. 289.

Adult Experience and College Degrees: A Report of the Experimental Degree Project for Adults at Brooklyn College, 1954-58, Bernard H. Stern and Ellswerth Missall. Western Reserve University Press, Cleveland, 1960. 249 pp. \$2.50.

This report is required reading for the policy-makers of every college or university situated in or near a city with a population of half-a-million and up. Here is presented a virtual blueprint for a particular type of adult education which could and should be offered more widely.

There is a cadre of mature adults in every urban center: men and women lacking college degrees, dissatisfied with the haphazard adult education

courses offered by almost all "in town" institutions. These "extension" or "non-credit" courses have no unity or purpose. Attending such classes may be preferable, to reasonably intelligent, mature adults, to watching the inanities of television, but they fail to stimulate a drive for a goal, without which studying is sporadic and usually dies on the vine.

The carrot which Brooklyn College has skillfully set over the nose of the mature, serious-minded adult is the sacred "degree." To make the prize seem more attainable, the college, with the help of the Center for the Study of Liberal Education for Adults and the Fund for Adult Education, worked out a plan for likely adults whereby their life experiences became equated with regular undergraduate courses in any discipline and thereby were accepted as college credits toward a degree.

The authors present thirteen cases, five men and eight women, ranging in age from 35 to 53, who received from 34 to 61 credits toward a Bachelor's degree on the basis of their life records as proven to faculty members. These credits were based on recommendations from twelve different departments. This group of thirteen was made up of the high scorers, but over one-third of the adults accepted into the Brooklyn College project were granted some credits because of their learning acquired *outside* formal classes.

The report is based on the academic journeys of six groups admitted to the experiment at various times between June 1954 and September 1958. The size of each varied between 27 and 36, and the groups totalled 167 members. As of September 1958, sixteen of them had received their degrees and 130 were still in attendance. The balance (21) were on indefinite leave of absence. Additional groups have been admitted since September 1958, and the project is now on a continuing basis.

The report starts with a brief history of the development and organization of the project, goes into recruitment procedures, and gives a valuable statistical analysis of the nature of the special student body, with a number of detailed case histories. This is followed by an exhaustive explanation of what may be the most controversial feature of the project—the granting of academic credits based on "real life" experience of selected adults; among them a piano teacher, a policeman, operator of a mail order business, president of a drugstore chain, foreign language radio producer, and a high school clerk.

The authors explain the formal educational process employed. They discuss the three basic seminars specially set up for these adult students: 1) Social Sciences; 2) Humanities and Communication; 3) Physical Science and Mathematics. Incidentally, results of area tests taken by entering adults were compared with results of 3,000 upper seniors in twenty-one universities and colleges. In Humanities, the newly fledged adult students had a better composite score than the seniors; in Social Science, only a slightly lower score; in Natural Science an appreciably lower score. It is striking that this same pattern emerges from the authors' discussion of the development of the three seminars; only with the Physical Science and Math seminar did these adults have real difficulty, probably reflecting the more limited subject matter and teaching in primary and secondary schools at the times they attended.

The concluding part of the report is the most interesting and significant. It is an evaluation of the experiment by both instructors and students concerned, followed by notes by the authors on the general implications of results achieved. Their feeling may be summed up by a quotation: "It appears likely that, percentage-wise, more adults than adolescents, equally well selected for

their achievement and potential, can be found who will give greater attention to the substance rather than to the 'ritual' of education."

This reviewer had a most personal interest in the report, since he was one of the entering guinea pigs in February, 1956, and a graduate in June, 1961. It seems to me that Professors Stern and Missall have written an honest, readable and useful summation of a rather daring experiment. It is clear that not only were the promoters of the project enthusiastic innovators, but the administration and faculty of Brooklyn College were highly cooperative in a deed of considerable academic idol-smashing. Based on my own five-and-a-half years in the project (studying at night while conducting a full-time business five days a week), I can discover no inaccuracies, no over-emphases, no un-called-for exuberance in the report. It is a factual presentation of a lovingly thought-out plan which has had a full measure of success in the relatively short time of seven years.

Of considerably more importance is my strongly held feeling that I personally profited enormously from the project, which never could have been attempted on the traditional college-credit plan, and which would have been impossible through the assiduous taking of non-credit courses. I have acquired a remarkably satisfying concept of how the disciplines, social and physical, fit together, how communication acts as the common key to all. I also learned much about the workings of the academic mind which, I venture to say, the immature student rarely learns. This knowledge is a bonus of the plan and carries no credit. But in these times of the ascendancy of Academe in government to an extent not seen since the early New Deal, it is of infinite value to have knowledge of the curious operation of the professorial thought process, particularly in respect to its utter disregard of the "time" difficulties of adult students. Those who seek college degrees at the age of 45 or 50 find their delight in course-content tempered by irritation at inefficient systems for book procurement, ridiculous registration procedures and hopeless daytime-hour appointments for conferences with professors. These may be bearable to the teen-age student but represent obstacles for the oldster, hampered as he usually is with a living to be earned or a household to be run.

Nonetheless, this reviewer can say no more than that he wishes for every thoughtful adult who is groping unhappily through bridge games, television programs or regulation adult education courses that somewhere near him some college or university will profit by Brooklyn College's courageous pace-making, and offer a similar feast of true learning with an attainable goal.

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Language and Language Learning: Theory and Practice, Nelson Brooks.
Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1960. 238 pp. \$3.50.

In thirteen brief, essay-like chapters, Professor Brooks has succeeded in making a comprehensive statement of the basic principles and methods of the new approach to language teaching. Much that appears here has been said before, but not with the special pertinency which, in this instance, relates theory to practice. A predominant theme gives the book its structural unity: "the learning of a second language in American classrooms." Its unity of

purpose stems from the author's contention that the basic aim of such learning is "direct communication with native speakers, as well as the study of their civilization and their literature" (p. x).

In the early chapters of the book, Professor Brooks lays the groundwork for a method of teaching consistently devoted to this aim. The first deals generally with the philosophy of language; the second, with the scientific approach to the study of language through the concepts and techniques of modern descriptive linguistics. In both, there is a constant emphasis on language as a mode of adaptation to a particular environment through communication, as overt behavior, and as "talk"; the case for the primacy of audio-lingual activities is related convincingly to general concepts of verbal behavior and linguistic structure. The third chapter is devoted to the physiological and psychological aspects of language learning. The thesis here is that the initial goal in second language learning, as in learning the mother tongue, should be an effective control of structure achieved through the formation of habitual responses.

The long-range objectives of the language course are the subject of the two chapters which follow. As regards culture, Professor Brooks argues for a broadening of the traditional definition, largely humanistic or artistic, to include the concepts of the behavioral sciences. No conclusions detrimental to the study of literature are intended; and there are equally judicious comments about its rightful place in the language program.

Following a concise statement of the objectives of the proposed language program (Chapter VIII), Professor Brooks devotes three chapters to the problems involved in its implementation: course organization, methods, materials, integration of classroom and language laboratory, and techniques of evaluation. Progress toward an effective bilingualism obviously demands a longer and more meticulously structured sequence of language courses. The pages on "continuity for the learner" (110-135) describe a program consisting of three separate "streams" (beginning in grades 3, 7 and 9 respectively), with the longest divided into six different "levels," the content of each of which is prescribed in some detail. The timeliness of such a proposal will be evident to those who have to accommodate the precocious students now emerging from the FLES (Foreign Languages in the Elementary Schools) program. Equally pertinent are the remarks on "tests and measurements" (pp. 157-168). The new language program is doomed to failure if haphazard testing continues to serve as a basis for placement or if tests meant to measure one skill (traditionally, reading) are indiscriminately taken to be an adequate index of growth in other skills. Professor Brooks is an expert on (and at) testing, and his advice in the matter cannot lightly be disregarded.

The central issue of the book is raised in the fourth chapter: is the learner to incorporate certain foreign elements into a "compound" linguistic system dominated by the mother tongue, or is he to acquire, "within the limits of his experience, a coordinate system of two languages in which not only the overt patterns of behavior that characterize the new language, but also the mental processes that accompany it, shall have equal status with the mother tongue, yet be entirely separate from it"? Professor Brooks of course opts for the latter, from which it follows that: "... a ringing challenge is sounded, a radical transformation is called for, a new orientation of procedures is demanded and a thorough house cleaning of methods, materials, texts, and tests is unavoidable" (pp. 47-48). The remainder of this chapter describes the proper se-

quence and the appropriate kinds of learning activities in a program having as its goal a genuine, if limited, bilingualism. Those who seek a concise, authoritative statement of the principles of the new school of language teaching will find it in these pages.

In Chapter VI, Professor Brooks turns from the learner to the teacher and to the latter's position in a school system in which language teaching still plays an ill-defined and anomalous role. His trenchant comments suggest the word "indictment"; but, on the positive side, he elaborates the definition of a teacher who is a competent practitioner of the foreign tongue and who faces squarely the fact that his primary function is to aid the student in acquiring new linguistic habits. To the members of a profession long plagued by the temptation to teach "something else" too soon and by complacency about inferior standards of linguistic performance, such a definition is by no means as obvious as it may appear to the layman.

In the final chapter, Professor Brooks argues that the established academic disciplines, notably those devoted to scientific research or literary scholarship, will aid in the development of the new program, but that they cannot be expected to initiate it, direct it, or determine its ultimate goals. In their stead, he advocates an interdisciplinary field of study, *linguistics*, which would include "philosophy, philology, literature, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and pedagogy" (p. 175). Problems of euphony and of feasibility aside (I am thinking of the unlikelihood of a Ph. D. program which would permit such breadth without depth), this proposal has the great merit of establishing high standards for what Professor Brooks hopes will come to be recognized as an autonomous profession.

There are two appendices. The first, called "How to . . .," contains practical suggestions, arranged alphabetically according to a key word or concept ("Cultural islands, how to establish," for example). The second is a "Glossary of Terms," again in alphabetical order. In both cases, the choice of such a device is unfortunate. It results in repetitiousness and, at times, contradiction. (Compare the two discussions of the *phoneme*, pp. 25-28 and 217-219. Pitch, loudness, etc., are treated as "qualities of phonemes" in the first case, as "phonemes" in the second.) In the body of the text, definitions and discussions of method fit into a carefully ordered structure and are related to one another by the processes of reasoned argument; in the appendices, the fragmented text reappears as a list of quintessential, but unrelated, comments and prescriptions.

Language and Language Learning is destined to become the handbook of the *linguist*. With admirable fervor, Professor Brooks speaks in the name of those who are carrying out a long-needed reform of language teaching in this country. For the first time, to my knowledge, we have here a comprehensive statement of the principles behind this reform and of a consistent method derived from them. Teachers, administrators and parents will all derive from it a clearer understanding of the radical transformations which are taking place, or should take place, in the schools of their own communities.

This being said, the book leaves one with some misgivings. The views propounded by Professor Brooks have, to date, been dynamic and productive. The danger now is that they may harden into doctrinaire rigidity before their full potential has been realized, and largely because tentative conclusions and working hypotheses come to be stated as absolute truths. In passing, Professor Brooks does admit the possibility of alternatives or objections, both theoretical

cal and practical. Still, he wishes above all to persuade, not to elucidate; and tendentious argument prevails. In the long run, many of his readers are apt to lose sight of the entirely laudable aim which he proposes: to teach more American students to understand, speak, read and write more foreign languages more effectively. It has long been obvious that the most devastating argument against foreign language teaching in this country has been not the chauvinistic aversion to anything foreign, but rather the complaints of those who have dutifully studied a foreign language without observing any significant change in their own verbal behavior. On the pragmatic side, the proposal that we meet more compelling aims by more appropriate means will meet with wide approval. On the theoretical side, there will be some objections to the author's insistence on language as communication or "talk", to his elaboration of a concept of culture which at times verges on the trivial, to his inadequate treatment of the autonomous features of written language, or to his stress on a mode of behavior ("dyadic") which is too exclusive to account for individual or group reactions to language learning. But such objections are peripheral. They do not detract from the real merits of the program of improved teaching proposed by Professor Brooks.

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Secondary Education for All: The English Approach, A. Harry Passow. International Education Monographs, No. 3, A Kappa Delta Pi Publication, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 290 pp. \$1.75 (paper).

This book is a report on the state of English education in 1958-59, by an American Professor of Education who spent a Fellowship year in England. The sources for his study consisted of visits to 55 schools and colleges of a wide variety of types, a survey of the literature, both historical and recent, and the experience of being a parent of children enrolled at an English school. In addition to his knowledge of the American system, the author, Professor Harry Passow, brought with him his experience as a teacher in New York State.

The result is a thorough account of the English educational scene, with a balanced appraisal of present trends. The English "approach" is seen through American eyes, and the "shocks" and "surprises" registered by Professor Passow and his wife are reported. However, the tone of the book is quiet. The differences and contrasts between the two education systems are stated objectively.

For whom is this book intended? First, it forms an inexpensive work of reference for students of English education, or for use with courses in comparative education. It is full of facts about statutory provision, including a condensed account of the chronological development of educational provision since the 1830s. The book is focussed upon, but by no means restricted to, the theme of "secondary education for all": chapters are also included on the relation between the secondary schools and the universities, on the independent (private) schools, on instruction, the teaching profession, examinations, and Youth Services. The discussion and references indicate that Professor Passow has a firm grasp of current educational controversies in England.

While his general purpose derives from the conviction that comparative studies lead to a better understanding of our own ways, Professor Passow also has a more practical end in view. The study is addressed to educators in the belief that "American educators can profit from studying certain English practices" (p. 7). It attempts to provide a background for administrators or policy-makers who are seriously considering which English practices might be introduced into American schools systems or individual schools. Thus, in the form the book takes, the component parts of the English system are described within their context, and, at the same time, some of the parts are discussed with the aim of assessing their relevance to American education.

One of the practices which might qualify for transplantation is provision for the gifted child. Professor Passow tells us that his own central concern has been with "the education of the talented within the framework of appropriate education for all children and youth" (p. 5). His concern with this aspect of English education extends to selection, ability grouping in secondary schools, and the role of external examinations. Conversely, he is interested in the unselected and the under-achiever. In answering his own question, "Are the gifted better provided for in England?" (p. 258), Professor Passow turns to the highly select grammar school (i.e. the academic type of secondary school) and its Sixth Form, which awes him with its "rigorous curriculum" and competition for scarce university places (p. 127). He believes that "we can learn from the English . . . that we have been timid in setting goals for our brightest youth" (p. 270), and that, given the conditions (in terms of teachers and methods, for example), "individual intellectual potential" can also be stretched to its utmost in other school environments (p. 264).

Professor Passow makes his case in a restrained and convincing manner. His descriptions of the component parts of the English system are sufficiently detailed to be of value to American educators. For example, Chapter V, "Instruction and Learning in Secondary Schools," is meaty and stimulating in comparison with many accounts of English secondary education. It deals not only with the influence of the universities and the external school-leaving examinations upon the curriculum, but also with such factors as the individuality of aims and the diversity of particular schools, instructional resources and materials (including textbooks and telecasts), and the state of educational research. The contents of this chapter are inclusive, condensed, and up-to-date. Professor Passow has relied on published material and reports and on visits to schools; his "general observations," while occasionally as loose as "secondary teachers use rather traditional methods" (page 121), are adequately supported by the best evidence his methods of investigation could be expected to yield.

There is, however, a shortcoming resulting from the exercise of scholarly restraint. On one hand there is a lack of comparative sociological analysis in the discussion of practices firmly rooted in England which might flourish or wither if introduced into the United States. While the lack is noticeable, the author did not set out to provide a sociological study. Yet, on the other hand, from the practical viewpoint, almost too much care has been taken not to criticize or give offense. His purpose stated, the author could have gone further in expressing ethnocentric judgments. And if American policy-makers are really expected to read the study with an eye to constructive change, the direction of the conclusions could profitably have received clearer emphasis.

That Professor Passow had feelings about English educational practices

and could pass judgement were he not reluctant to offend, is brought out in his references to the status and freedom of teachers (pp. 24 and 232), and to his children's attendance at English schools (pp. 30, 42, and 54-56). His ten-year-old son took the "Eleven-Plus" selection examination for a grammar school place. This event, and others, obviously influenced the author's interpretation of his material. In fact, it is to be regretted that the Passows did not also have a child in secondary school to provide evidence on time-tables, homework and classroom practice, comparable with the inside information on the primary school.

One of the most readable sections of the book is the Appendix, an article by the author's wife, reprinted from the London *Times Educational Supplement*. Here it is claimed that the children's primary school stimulated a "renewed zest for learning". Vivid glimpses are given of the children's enthusiasm for their school work, and of the parents' reactions to the discovery that "religion is indeed taught in state-maintained schools" or to "the use of external incentives" to spur the pupil (p. 279). To one familiar with the English education system, the article, short as it is, rings true; and Professor Passow is to be commended on including it as both a supplement and a foil to his own highly informative work.

BRIDGET TANCOCK HECKSCHER
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***Education and Income: Inequalities in our Public Schools*, Patricia Cayo Sexton. Viking Press, New York, 1961. xxi + 298 pp. \$6.00.**

Education and Income is an important and controversial book. Important because it gives rarely obtainable data on the relation between income levels within a great city, the quality of schools, and the quality of children's school performance. Controversial because it argues that there is a cause-effect relation between quality of schools and quality of school performance of boys and girls, rather than between income of parents and quality of school performance of their children, which is the connection more frequently pointed out.

In effect, Patricia Sexton says that the demonstrably poor school performance of children of low-income families is due to poor schooling, and that if their schooling was improved substantially, the school performance of these low income children would rival that of children from high income families. Thus the book is a direct challenge to the proposition that American schools equalize opportunity for children of poor families.

The setting for this book is Big City, one of the five largest cities of the country, not New York or Chicago. The data were obtained from two sources. Average family income was known from economic data for the various areas of the city. Data on schools and data from school files on pupils were made available by the superintendent of schools, who had established a citizens' committee on school needs and was willing to open the schools to public examination. Dr. Sexton believes that a study like this would not have been allowed in most big cities, nor in Big City under the previous superintendent. She herself has a strong feeling for people of low income families, having been

a factory worker and a union steward, and being the daughter of an automobile factory worker.

The book also contains a selection of data from studies of social class and education in other communities made during the last twenty years. Thus the author builds a case which covers all of the big cities of the United States.

The situation of children of low-income families is getting worse, Dr. Sexton believes, as the big cities become more and more solidly lower-class in composition, while middle-class people move out to the suburbs. She estimates that in 1961, one out of three big city children is "culturally deprived," whereas in 1950, one in ten deserved this description.

The core of the book is a set of tables showing how the characteristics of pupils and of elementary and secondary schools are related to the income levels of the areas where they are located. These tables show that there is a regular gradation from unfavorable to favorable in the schools as they range from low income to high income districts. The following characteristics show this gradation: Intelligence quotient, percent of non-promotion, proportion of children who qualify for the city's "gifted child" program, proportion of pupils in ungraded (slow learner) classes, proportion of pupils in Detention School, proportion of pupils who are members of Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts, proportion of pupils dropping out of school without graduating from high school, numbers of failures in school subjects, degree of pupil transiency, proportion of pupils in extracurricular activities, proportion of high school seniors applying for transcripts for college entrance, rheumatic fever rates, diphtheria rates, tuberculosis rates, attendance at high schools, percent of parents belonging to PTA, proportion of substitute teachers teaching regular classes, and newness and adequacy of school buildings.

The author's basic proposition is that children of lower-class families are not treated as well by the schools as are children of middle-class families. She says (p. 7), "In the final analysis, the neglect of low-income students and the stratification system of the schools can probably be traced to three principal sources: one, the IQ evasion, two, the before-mentioned contempt, or at least indifference, which is often felt by teachers and others for their social 'inferiors,' and the irritation caused by their behavior, manners, and appearance; three, the fact that upper-income groups have usually been in control of school boards and thereby in control of what goes on in the school and the methods of distributing rewards. In addition there is the fact that very little pressure is applied to the school by lower-income individuals or groups representing them, while upper-income groups tend to have great influence on the schools and to be active in school affairs."

After proving that under present conditions children from slum schools do poorly in relation to children from middle-class schools, she says (p. xvii), "This is true not necessarily because of any deficiency of talent or ability but because society, being dominated by elites, has given their children a head start and, following the lead as always, the schools have compounded the advantage by providing them with superior educational services of every conceivable variety."

The problem is principally one of social class difference and conflict. "So we are dealing with a social class problem, but one which is seriously aggravated by racial discrimination" (p. 17). No data are given on race differences in school performance or in the school facilities given to children. The data all deal with socio-economic differences.

Dr. Sexton questions whether there is a "real" difference of ability between children of different social classes. "Are upper-income children really so much more 'gifted' than lower income children? If lower-income groups were afforded the same educational advantages as upper-income groups would their children be just as 'gifted'? They might be, and there is evidence that they would be" (p. 61).

She is arguing that the lower-income groups are exploited by the high-income groups in the society, and particularly in the treatment given their children in the public schools. Perhaps, she has purposely over-stated the argument for the sake of making it clear and simple, though she does not admit this. The critic of her position would probably attack it with the following arguments:

She overdoes the criticism of intelligence tests, which she believes are used to discriminate against lower-class children. One of her concluding recommendations is that "Use of IQ tests should be stopped" (p. 267). In support of this she reviews the research on the social-class bias in verbal intelligence tests. She notes that this research casts doubt on the proposition that IQ tests are valid measures of *native* intelligence, and yet school people tend to use them as though they were tests of native intelligence. But if she were in charge of a program to increase the educational opportunity of culturally deprived children, would she not use IQ tests as a partial means of selecting those pupils who should be given special attention?

She overstates the power of even the best schools to improve the minds of children, and she underestimates the importance of experience in the family for the intellectual development of the child. Although she presents a brief (but good) chapter on "Life at Home" which makes it clear that the low income home generally gives the child less opportunity for mental and social growth than does life in a middle-class home, this fact is not used in the argument of the book. One gets the impression that the author believes that a vastly-improved school program for children of low-income families can make up for the handicaps they suffer in their home experience.

This reviewer agrees with most of her proposals for improving opportunity through the schools for these children, but he suspects that she is hoping for more than the schools alone can produce. Probably Dr. Sexton would agree that concentrating resources on an improved school program in low-income areas of the city should be regarded as a temporary expedient, while we work for a thoroughgoing program of urban renewal which will recreate Big City physically and socially, reduce the degree of economic stratification which is reflected in residential stratification, and bring into being communities within the city where low-income and high-income families live in the same school district and send their children to the same school. Then, with teachers who understand the problems of low-income families, it may be possible more nearly to equalize opportunity and to improve the life chances of working-class children.

The book expresses a good many judgments on present practices and situations in education, all growing out of a consistent set of ideas about the functions of public education in the modern metropolis. There is opposition to: ability grouping, special classes for the gifted, educational policies of conservative metropolitan newspapers, and the predominantly middle-class composition of school boards. On the other hand, there is approval of: making the expenditure per pupil at least equal for children of the various income

groups; greater emphasis on the skilful teaching of reading to children of low income families; recruitment of teachers with zeal for teaching low-income pupils; reduction of class size in low-income schools; the use of extra help, rather than failing marks, to motivate low income children who are falling behind; more male teachers in low-income schools; opening the achievement records of pupils of individual schools to public inspection.

Patricia Sexton is advocating a thesis, marshalling all the evidence she can find, both from her own study and from the literature of research on education. She writes clearly and forcefully. She gives an eloquent and powerful argument.

The book is thus both an exhortation and a presentation of scientific data. Probably the exhortation will obscure the scientific presentation in the eyes of most readers. In a way this is unfortunate, for the study presents the best recent data available on the relations between economic status and school performance and school conditions. The data are extremely useful, and deserve wide reading, whether or not one agrees with Dr. Sexton's thesis.

ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST
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The Process of Education, Jerome S. Bruner. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960. 97 pp. \$2.75.

What shall be taught, when and how? Acting as the spokesman for a conference of mathematicians, scientists, and psychologists concerned with improving instruction, Jerome Bruner, Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, attempts answers to these ageless educational questions. The author urges that students should be taught the basic structure of each subject in the curriculum. There are, he believes a relatively few fundamental ideas in each area of knowledge which comprise its structure. The concept of tropism in biology and the commutative, associative and distributive laws of mathematics are examples of fundamental ideas. According to Bruner there are several important reasons why instruction should focus on fundamental concepts. He asserts that the learning of fundamental principles "makes a subject more comprehensible," improves memory of the subject, decreases the gap between "advanced" knowledge and "elementary" knowledge, increases joy and excitement in learning, increases the chances for the development of "intuitive" thinking, and "appears to be the main road to adequate transfer of training."

The conclusion that teaching fundamental things is to be preferred to teaching the trivial is not remarkable. What is remarkable is that a fundamentalist in educational circles is one who advocates vocabulary and number-fact drill rather than one who stresses the importance of basic ideas. Considering the state of educational thinking, an analysis of the role of key ideas in the development and application of knowledge is a definite contribution. There is, however, in Bruner's compelling exposition of this theme a suggestion of an extreme form of idealism. Bruner allows the inference that he believes "fundamental" concepts are so powerful that an understanding of them is psychologically different from an understanding of "ordinary" concepts. For example, it is asserted that "the more fundamental or basic is the

idea [the student] has learned, almost by definition, the greater will be its breadth of applicability. Indeed, this is almost a tautology, for what is meant by "fundamental" in this sense is precisely that an idea has wide as well as powerful applicability" (p. 18).

The attempt to rationalize the argument regarding the potency of an understanding of fundamental ideas in terms of psychological theory and evidence is not entirely convincing. One of the boldest statements in a self-avowedly bold work is the assertion that "virtually all of the evidence of the last two decades on the nature of learning and transfer has indicated that, while the original theory of formal discipline was poorly stated in terms of the training of faculties, it is indeed a fact that massive general transfer can be achieved by appropriate learning, even to the degree that learning properly under optimum conditions leads one to 'learn how to learn'" (p. 7). In the first place the statement is a very strong one which perhaps should read "some evidence suggests" rather than "virtually all of the evidence indicates." Most of the evidence suggesting "massive general transfer" and "learning to learn" is to be found in studies in which monkeys, after lengthy training, consistently learned in one or two attempts which of any two dime store trinkets always concealed a raisin. Make no mistake about it; this research has exciting implication for education. But Bruner's ideas go far beyond the evidence. He is apparently willing to extrapolate directly from monkeys choosing between trinkets to human children learning the fundamental concepts of mathematics, skipping over the myriad problems which must be solved before the kind of learning seen in a laboratory demonstration can conceivably be produced in the classroom. Admittedly speculating, Bruner sometimes approaches the fanciful. Practical educators, who unquestionably will be profoundly influenced by this provocative book, must be cautioned to distinguish between a psychologist's vision as to what may sometime be known about the learning of complex concepts and what we actually know today.

One of the biggest bombshells ever exploded in education is Bruner's conjecture "that any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development" (p. 33). This is no piece of rhetoric. It is a serious conviction. The heart of *The Process of Education* is contained in the anecdotes and insights that the author offers to show that his conjecture is a plausible one. The basic notion is that ideas must be presented in terms of the child's way of viewing things. This means paying close attention to the child's intellectual functioning at each stage of his development. The author leans heavily on the formulations of Piaget and Inhelder in analyzing children's intellectual functioning. Presenting ideas in technical jargon, and pedagogical circumlocutions—obstacles to comprehension which Bruner captures in the neat phrase "middle language".

The trick is to present ideas in such a manner that they are intuitively accessible. Once again Bruner permits a confusion between philosophical idealism and psychological theory, in this case almost seeming to say that if ideas are stripped of the linguistic inventions of man, children will perceive the Platonic ideals directly. Intuition is the route to the acquisition of fundamental concepts and it is also a valuable quality in its own right. A person with cultivated intuition can often make a guess later proven correct by analytic procedures. Bruner's emphasis on intuition is a healthy antidote to the naively deterministic and static conception of knowledge prevailing in educa-

tion. The psychological status of intuition is murky, as the author himself states repeatedly. Bruner's solution: a plea for hard thinking and a great deal of research. Unfortunately Bruner's formulations probably will not be much help to those researchers who accept the challenge.

The Process of Education is an eloquent expression of a hope for education. It contains fascinating teaching lore and inspired hunches about learning. As a psychological rationale for the movement to improve instruction in mathematics and the sciences, it is a disappointment. Despite the efforts of a psychologist with excellent intuition, alas, we still do not have a clear picture of the structure of the process of education.

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The Countdown on Segregated Education, edited by William W. Brickman and Stanley Lehrer. Society for the Advancement of Education, New York, 1960. 175 pp. \$3.50 (cloth); \$2.25 (paper).

Which is the more salient truth about desegregation: that in only four states is there total segregation, or that only seven percent of the Negro school children of the Southern states attend schools with White children? The answer will vary with whom we ask: Ralph McGill or Roy Wilkins or Malcolm X or Herman Talmadge. How then can we draw a balance sheet that objectively reflects the actual situation of school desegregation? Probably we cannot, since no fact speaks for itself, and no facts stand by themselves, but only in contexts.

The main value of this little book is the ease with which it makes it possible for the reader to get an overview of the numerous contexts, historical, sociological and psychological, within which the struggle for desegregation is being waged. And it provides a valuable, rarely-encountered, albeit all-too-brief, analysis of the situation of segregation and discrimination against minorities in other countries.

The misfortune of the book lies in its brevity. It is all too similar to an issue of the Reader's Digest. Knowing as we do what has been written and what could be written by such men as Carl Hansen, Superintendent of Schools in Washington, D. C., and by Alfred Lee, Professor of Sociology at Brooklyn, it is hard to imagine why they would consent to write statements that would not even serve as adequate introductions to the longer and more serious works they have written on the same subjects. Perhaps they too were glad to serve the purpose of providing a very condensed overview. I cite these two men in particular precisely because the subjects on which they write (Hansen on the outcome of desegregation in Washington, and Lee on the impact of segregated housing on public schools) are the vital core of argument today regarding the desirability of more and faster desegregation. That desegregation has worked in Washington, D. C., contrary to all dour expectations, Hansen has told us eloquently in his pamphlets published by the Anti-Defamation League. How useful it would be indeed if we could get the details of the Washington story to a wider public than seems thus far to have been reached.

So, too, recent controversy about the impact of segregated slum dwelling on the quality of education makes Lee's subject vitally important. How excellent it would have been if we could have had a sound, substantial analysis of how segregation and low quality educational outcome go hand in hand. As it is, Lee barely has time to state the problem before editorially imposed limitations of space cut him off. Perhaps other forums will make it possible to discuss Mr. Conant's recent pronouncements at greater length.

Some of the most interesting and significant aspects of the interplay between social structure and the educational system have been exposed during the struggle over segregated education. It would have been a genuine contribution indeed if the editors had seen fit to have these questions pursued more rigorously and systematically in this book. Those of us who are concerned with the development of systematic study of education as a social institution must regret the failure of this book in this particular regard.

Perhaps it would have been wiser not to publish this book. Most of it appeared in the May 7 and May 21 (1960) issues of *School and Society*. Why then spend the effort at publishing this material anew, however valuable we admit it to be? I see no uses to which it can be put beyond those already possible to serve with the issues of *School and Society*.

None of this is to be construed as intending to detract from the interest and importance of the topics considered by the various authors.

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Readers who have a special interest in topics discussed in articles, or in the treatment of controversial issues presented in the REVIEW, are welcome to submit notes for publication. Notes should be brief, not exceeding five typewritten, double-spaced pages.

THE EDITORS

Religious Schools and "Secular" Subjects

An Analysis of the Premises of Title III, Section 305
of the National Defense Education Act

Are the subjects science, mathematics and foreign languages, which are aided by Section 305 of the National Defense Education Act, truly "secular" subjects in parochial schools, as supporters maintain? This question is thoroughly explored and answered negatively in the following article. This report, which is based on a 192-page study of parochial school textbooks, challenges on both constitutional and public policy grounds Section 305, under which more than 162 loans totaling \$2,000,000 have been granted.

This controversial thesis has received considerable attention in the popular and religious press. The Review offers this article in the belief it will be an enduring source of reference and debate.

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DURING THE LAST SERIES of testimony before Congressional Committees¹ on the constitutionality of providing federal aid for parochial schools, a rather unusual line of argument developed. It had always been assumed that churches made the sacrifices a separate parochial school system entails because they believed that education must be placed in a uniquely religious context which the public schools could not supply. The most forthright statement of that position can be found in Pope Pius XI's encyclical *The Christian Education of Youth*.

For the mere fact that a school gives some religious instruction . . . does not . . . make it a fit place for Catholic students. To be this, it is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organization of the

¹ U.S. House of Representatives, House Committee on Education and Labor and its subcommittees, *Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.* (Spring), 1961.

school, and its teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch, be regulated by the Christian spirit . . .²

Although this statement is the core of the standard definition of educational philosophy for the Catholic Church, none of the Church's spokesmen mentioned it or that philosophy in the testimony.

The reason for that omission becomes apparent when one remembers the constitutional policy that must be followed in any federal educational program. An admission that the whole curriculum of a church school is permeated by religion would create an insoluble First Amendment problem for the supporters of federal aid to parochial schools. Consequently, these supporters took a different tack. They argued that every parochial school teaches a few religious subjects, of course, but that in a modern society most time is necessarily spent on "secular" or academic subjects. Although the government cannot finance religious education, the two parts of the curriculum are separable by subject matter and federal aid can be used to support the "secular" subjects.

This position was clearly set forth in the "Statement on Behalf of Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York" as presented to the House General Subcommittee on Education by Lawrence X. Cusack, a New York attorney. Mr. Cusack argued that the government might provide aid

. . . for the non-religious facilities of church-related schools, and perhaps for the compensation of teachers of secular subjects . . . The constitutional justification for this fourth approach is that Federal aid would be limited to the secular aspects of such schools and would not foster or promote religion.

The "non-religious" subjects Mr. Cusack specifically mentioned were mathematics, geography, physics and chemistry.³ The terms "non-religious" and "secular" were used interchangeably throughout this and other parts of the testimony.

The opponents of federal aid to parochial schools found this line of reasoning difficult to understand for two reasons. In the first place, it completely contradicts the traditional educational philosophy of the Catholic Church.⁴ Second, it undermines the very purpose of a separate school system. If, after all, the church school teaches religion only one or two hours a day and the "secular" subjects do not "foster or promote" religion, why not send all chil-

² Quoted in William A. Brownell, Sister Mary Gerardus, Reverend David C. Fullmer and Sister Mary Francis Jerome, *Teachers' Manual for Finding Truth in Arithmetic* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1959), Preface.

³ U.S., Congress, House, General Committee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings, on H.R. 4970*, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, Part 2, p. 1003.

⁴ Examples are the declaration by Pius XI, quoted previously, or the following statement by Leo XIII: "It is necessary not only that religious instruction be given to the young at certain times, but that every other subject taught, be permeated with Christian piety." (Quoted in Brownell *et al.*, *loc. cit.*)

dren to the public school for the "secular" subjects and then release them to the church schools for the periods of religion? However, the purpose of this study is not to explore the contradictions in the religious school-secular subject argument, but to show that under current practices in parochial schools the argument's major premise is empirically false. In short, the religious and secular aspects of education are not separated by subject matter in parochial schools.

Although contradictory, the supposed dichotomy between religious schools and secular subjects has almost become a part of public policy. The major use of the religious school-secular subject argument has been in the context of the National Defense Education Act and proposals for its extension. The legislative history of the Act is important.

HISTORY OF THE N.D.E.A.

N.D.E.A. was born in the post-Sputnik flurry of educational anxiety in 1958. The Administration proposed that Congress take immediate steps to strengthen the teaching of sciences, mathematics and modern foreign languages in public schools. This request was met with an unusually quick response from Congress, and bills were introduced by both parties to achieve that goal.⁵ As with all other education bills in 1958, the proposals to aid the teaching of sciences, mathematics and languages at the elementary and high school levels were for public schools only. Consequently, no church-state issues came up during the hearings on these bills. The organizations that generally represent the three major faiths on church-state issues, the National Council of Churches, the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the American Jewish Congress, did not send representatives or even bother to submit formal statements during the testimony.

The provision (Section 305) aiding parochial schools was not inserted until the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare began marking up their bill after all the hearings were completed. The parallel House Committee on Education and Labor version of the bill included no aid for parochial schools. But during the Senate-House Conference Committee meeting to create a unified bill, one of the many compromises the House committee accepted was the Senate insertion of parochial school aid.⁶ The second session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress was almost over when the Conference report was made; and, since bills reported out of Conference Committee can not be amended anyway, the debate in both Houses was short.⁷

⁵ U.S., Congress, Senate, S. 3187 and S. 4237; and House, H.R. 10381, H.R. 10768, H.R. 11785, and H.R. 12630, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958.

⁶ U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Hearings, on S. 622, S. 1227, S. 1228, S. 1271, S. 1411, S. 1562 and S. 1726*, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., May 12, 13, 1961, p. 103.

⁷ U.S., *Congressional Record*, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1958, CIV, Part 15, 19595-19618 (House of Representatives) and 19078-19087 (Senate).

In neither debate was any mention made of the change providing for aid to parochial schools, and it is doubtful that any but a few even noted that a part of Title III of the bill had been extended to cover "non-profit private schools." So with neither hearings nor debate on the church-state issue, Congress for the first time in history provided major federal aid in the forms of loans to parochial elementary and high schools.

By 1961 when N.D.E.A. was due to expire, the nature of educational issues had changed considerably. A major drive was launched to include parochial schools in all federal aid bills that might be passed, and church-state problems were major issues in all educational discussion in the Eighty-Seventh Congress. In order to inform itself and the public, Congress asked the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in cooperation with the Attorney General to prepare some guide-lines on constitutional policy in this area. The Department made formal response in the "Memorandum on the Impact of the First Amendment to the Constitution upon Federal Aid to Education." Although the "Memorandum" found that almost all other kinds of federal aid to parochial schools were prohibited by the First Amendment, the religious school-secular subject concept was used as the constitutional rationale for the Title III, Section 305 loans under N.D.E.A. The "Memorandum" states,

To what extent a special purpose provides constitutional legitimacy to assistance to elementary or secondary schools depends on the extent to which the specific objectives being advanced are unrelated to the religious aspects of sectarian education. The problem is complicated because assistance for one purpose may free funds which would otherwise be devoted to it for use to support the religious function and thus, in effect, indirectly yet substantially support religion in violation of the establishment clause. At the present time, the National Defense Education Act permits the U. S. Commissioner of Education to make loans to private schools to acquire science, mathematics, or foreign language equipment. We believe such loans are constitutional because the connection between loans for such purposes and the religious functions of a sectarian school seems to be nonexistent or minimal.⁸

Based on this constitutional reasoning and the desire to save a part of the floundering aid to education program, Congress on September 6, 1961, renewed the National Defense Education Act⁹ for two more years. Title III, Section 305 continued to provide government loans to non-profit private elementary and high schools (including church schools) for the acquisition of

⁸ Quoted in U.S., Congress, House, Special Committee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings, on H.R. 5266*, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., March 15-17, 1961, p. 58. Also see testimony by Commissioner of Education McMurrin, U.S., Congress, Joint Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings, on H.R. 6774, H.R. 4253, H.R. 7378*, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., June 1, 2, 1961, p. 85.

equipment for teaching sciences, mathematics and modern foreign languages and for minor classroom remodeling.¹⁰ There was a restriction placed in the bill proposing extension that "These facilities cannot be used for general or religious education."¹¹ The authors of the Bill apparently assumed, as did the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, that the courses in science, mathematics and modern foreign languages as actually taught throughout the country in parochial schools were not a part of the religious education of the schools. Otherwise the restrictions in the Bill would have been meaningless.

During the testimony on renewal of N.D.E.A., the belief that there were factually no religious or sectarian aspects in the subjects the Act aided was repeatedly affirmed before Congressional committees. After all, the Health, Education and Welfare Memorandum had made the constitutionality of the Section 305 loans entirely dependent on that fact. As is evident in the following dialogue between an administrator of the Act and a Congressman, there was still some uneasiness about the constitutional problem.

MR. PUCINSKI.¹² MR. Witness, do you have any reason to believe, or do you have any evidence that would indicate, that these 162 loans that were approved by your Department, totaling more than \$2 million for the special purpose of science, language, or mathematics, that any of this equipment was used for courses and purposes other than purely secular instruction?

MR. LUDINGTON.¹³ We have no such evidence at this time.

MR. PUCINSKI. Have you made any effort to ascertain that?

MR. LUDINGTON. The loan application which is submitted by the interested school states that this equipment will be used for instruction in mathematics, science, or modern foreign language.

MR. PUCINSKI. Therefore, you have no reason to believe that it is used for any other purpose except that the law provided?

MR. LUDINGTON. Due to the types of equipment, I would find it difficult to find ways of using it in other types of courses.

• • •

MR. PUCINSKI. So, based on your experience with the act so far, you have no reason to believe that the lending of this money to private schools, although they may be church related, has in any way interfered with the separation of doctrine?

¹⁰ Any claim that equipment as opposed to the other essentials of teaching is necessarily non-religious is a meaningless distinction from a church-state point of view. It would be the same as claiming that the state could contribute bricks for a church building and wood for the pews because those two elements were in themselves not religious. The essential criterion is the purpose for which the elements are used, be it church equipment or school equipment. To know that, one must examine the actual content of the subject matter. For an example of a court making this kind of analysis, see *Dickman v. School District, Oregon City*, 366 P2d 553 (1961).

¹¹ Summary of H.R. 7904 and Sec. 305.

¹² Congressman from Illinois.

¹³ Director, Aid to State and Local Schools, Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

MR. LUDINGTON. I go by the applications and the kinds of equipment that they have listed on those applications, and it is our belief that these are held to math, science, and foreign languages.¹⁴

Although Mr. Ludington had been administering the Act for two years, his testimony dealing with its church-state aspects is not very clear. He simply assumed, as did others, that there was no religious content in the teaching of science, mathematics and languages. When later in the testimony another witness challenged this general assumption on the basis of the stated educational philosophy of some church schools, the following dialogue took place:

MR. CARROLL.¹⁵ . . . I believe that churches and religious bodies establish and maintain schools, colleges, and universities for the primary purpose of propagating and advancing their particular religious faith, creed, and practice.

Therefore, I believe that financial support for such educational operations is in reality support for a particular religion, creed, faith, and practice.

MR. PUCINSKI. Would you be good enough to tell me how you perpetuate a religious faith in an algebraic formula?

MR. CARROLL. I do not know if it is done in that way.

MR. FULLER.¹⁶ I would venture, if you don't mind, a reply to that.

MR. PUCINSKI. Let us try.

MR. FULLER. In my testimony I quoted from a number of liberal arts college catalogs, and scores of others could be obtained which say the same thing, that a component of the particular religion pervades the entire institution. This is the theory, it is the reason for the establishment of the separate church school.

So the religious influence will pervade the entire institution. No one supposes that a church university is going to teach only religion, they teach all kinds of subjects but the influence is there.

MR. PUCINSKI. But this act limits any Federal assistance to a very specific purpose, totally unrelated to religious teaching. If you can show me how you can bring religious doctrine into an algebraic formula, maybe you can, I do not know.¹⁷

In a later discussion, Congressman Pucinski said that he did have doubts about the factor of religious content in the humanities. He stated these reservations:

MR. PUCINSKI. I have no objection to extending aid to the humanities to public schools. I would have no objection, but I might tell you that I would, myself, object to extending the National Defense Education Act provisions to humanities in Title III simply

¹⁴ Joint Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearing, on H.R. 6774, H.R. 4253, H.R. 7378, 1961, Part 1, pp. 121-22.*

¹⁵ Executive Secretary, Council of Chief State School Officers.

¹⁶ State Superintendent of Public Instruction of North Carolina and President, Council of Chief State School Officers.

¹⁷ Joint Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings, on H.R. 6774, H.R. 7378, 1961, Part 1, p. 280.*

because there I think you are coming into an area where you might be crossing the line of using Federal assistance for teaching one particular religion.

This I do not think is healthy for America. But we are here suggesting that we use these loans for these very specific purposes totally unrelated to religious teaching. As I said the other day, I wish something, somebody would show me how you can introduce religious dogma into an algebraic formula.¹⁸

However, the assumption that there is no religious content in the subjects covered by Title III of the National Defense Education Act still remained. Congressman Pucinski said that the N.D.E.A. loans "would be used for a purpose totally unrelated to the teaching of religion in that school."¹⁹ In another place he stated that the loans were to be made for purely non-sectarian purposes.²⁰ Earlier, Commissioner of Education McMurrin contended that the N.D.E.A. loans were "very clearly aid which is directed to instruction that has no relationship whatever to a sectarian purpose . . ."²¹

The fullest statement of this position was made by Congressman Pucinski toward the end of the testimony.

These loans would be made available for the specific purpose of developing science, math, and language facilities. And I certainly think it would be in order to suggest that they include also loans for construction of facilities and physical fitness and perhaps cafeterias.

We heard testimony yesterday from Coach Wilkinson, who stressed the great importance of physical fitness in this country. And yet these are things that are completely divorced from any sectarian teaching. These are subjects that, as I have said many, many times, it would be extremely difficult to try to impugn, or to associate with these secular subjects any religious dogma.

As a matter of fact, so far as I know, the textbooks which are used for the teaching of these subjects in the private schools, even though they may be church related, are the same textbooks that are being used by the secular, by the public schools. So there is no conflict there.²²

It is exactly these points that are examined in this study. Research shows that many of the science, mathematics and language textbooks used in parochial schools in America today are specifically designed for parochial schools or are standard texts altered for parochial school use. In these books, specifically religious aspects of the culture are emphasized, and sectarian doctrines are integrated with the subject matter wherever possible. Obviously if this were not the case, there would be no need to go to the expense of publishing special books or editions.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Part 2, p. 399.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Part 2, p. 475.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Part 1, p. 301.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Part 1, p. 85.

²² *Ibid.*, Part 2, p. 471.

Before demonstrating these facts, certain premises should be stated. There is here no intent to impugn either the quality or the character of the teaching in parochial schools. Except for certain occasional distortions which are questionable from a scholarly point of view, I have no objection to the presentation of these subjects in a specifically religious context. I merely wish to show that, contrary to the assumptions behind Section 305 of the National Defense Education Act, sectarian material has been integrated into the teaching of sciences, mathematics and languages in parochial schools. Religious doctrine *can* be taught in an algebraic formula or, at least, in an arithmetic book.

Although over one hundred textbooks and teaching manuals were examined, no claim is made that these books are universally used in parochial schools or that all subjects in all parochial schools contain an equal amount of religious material. These variations will be discussed in the conclusion. However, care was taken to select only books produced by major publishers and currently in use. About 60 per cent of the books examined were high school or junior high school texts. About 90 per cent of the books surveyed were Catholic texts, which is about the percentage of Catholic students in the non-public school population. Evidence from the Catholic texts is presented first. The final report on this research contains 40 pages of quotations from the books surveyed and 120 photostats of textbook pages.²³ Even so, this is far from being exhaustive. The evidence presented here is necessarily only a sample of the integration of religious materials into "secular" subjects.

SCIENCES

The term "sciences" in the National Defense Education Act is nowhere precisely defined. The matter is not so simple as it might appear. What exactly is a science is a question that has received varied answers from some of our finest academic minds. It can be assumed that Congress meant in general the "natural" sciences rather than the "social" sciences. However, the borderline is not always distinct. What about geography, physiology or experimental psychology? Even if a clear distinction between subjects could be made, the condition of the Act that the government avoid aiding the teaching of religion would not be met. As will be shown, even into subjects which are undeniably scientific, parochial schools inject a considerable amount of religious interpretation and even some sectarian doctrine. From the point of view of the Catholic philosophy of education it could not be otherwise.

At the elementary school level most of the religion in textbooks is generally a simple theism. The subtitles of a science series illustrate the point: *The Things in God's World* (Grade 1); *God's Laws for His World* (Grade 2);

²³ George R. La Noue, "Religious Schools and 'Secular' Subjects. A Study Prepared for the Department of Religious Liberty of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A." (unpublished manuscript).

Our Gifts from God's World (Grade 3); *God's Plan for His World* (Grade 4); *Learning More About God's Laws* (Grade 5); *More Gifts from God's World* (Grade 6); *Man in God's World* (Grade 7); and *Progress in Using God's Gifts* (Grade 8).²⁴ The theistic theme is carried out in this series and in others by the use of religious symbols, scriptural quotations and, according to teaching manuals, by explicit and repeated reference by the teacher to God as creator.

This theistic theme carries with it a specifically Christian view of the ultimate ends of man. For example, the teaching manuals for both sixth and eighth grade science texts express this idea:

Our children must realize that they live only once, and that after their life on earth they will meet their Maker, and Him alone, to whom they will report on the care they have taken of their bodies and souls. Religion and science can work hand in hand to teach this great lesson of life, success, and happiness. Teachers can help make this experience a "labor of love" for the children. Knowledge of the greatness of God and the interdependence of creatures will help the children to find "grace" before God, realizing that "great is the power of God" and that "He is honored by the humble" (Eccles. 2:20-21).²⁵

* * *

The children should again reflect on the importance of everything God made. Even the tiniest creatures fit into God's economy, some of them, perhaps, being only instruments of God's punishments—for example, the things that harm us. God's punishments, however, are necessary, just as His rewards are necessary, so that justice may be the medium through which He shows His love in the final "show-down" when the angels separate the good stewards of God's things from those that thought more of themselves on this earth than of others and of God.²⁶

The theistic concept of the creation of the world can also be a source of specific action. A teaching manual remarks,

The children can review the fact that religion is a study of God through revelation and that science is a study of God through creation. Realization of the importance of the relation of religion and science helps children to conclude that Catholic Action is the result in our lives of the convictions of religion and that conservation of natural resources is the result of the convictions of science. In the pursuit of Catholic Action the spiritual and corporal works of mercy are the guide; in the pursuit of conservation the proper use of soil, water, minerals, forests, and wildlife is the guide.²⁷

²⁴ Sister M. Aquinas et al, *Science 1-8 with Health and Safety* (River Forest, Ill.: Laidlaw Brothers, 1961).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Teachers' Manual for Science 6, p. 6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Teachers' Manual for Science 8, p. 100.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

Although a simple theism is the rule at the grade school level, specific references to the Church and the youngster's role in it are not infrequent. One teaching manual suggests that the teacher correlate science with social studies by going over the rules for behavior at Mass, urging the children to make the Sign of the Cross with reverence, to keep silence in church, to walk and genuflect correctly and to make room for others in the pew.²⁸

At the high school level, the use of biblical quotations and religious symbols is common throughout parochial school science text books. Religious doctrine is most prominent in these books when creation and evolution are discussed. The following statement illustrates the Catholic philosophical basis for these discussions:

For, according to Pope Pius XII in the encyclical *Humani Generis* (August 12, 1950), whatever new truth the human mind is able to discover by honest research cannot contradict the truth already acquired and established. God created the human intellect and guides it. The truths that God has revealed cannot be opposed to, or opposed by, the truths the scientist finds in nature. For the truths of revelation and of nature are both from God. The Church therefore welcomes whatever facts can be established with certainty. That is why the Catholic scientist is urged to re-examine his premises if a scientific hypothesis is directly or indirectly opposed to the teaching of the Church.²⁹

Another text discusses in simpler language the same problem of science and religion in the context of evolution.

The Catholic Church does not restrict the study of scientific fact or the acceptance of scientific theory unless they are opposed to truth revealed by God. . . . As Catholics we understand that our faith never interferes with honest, intellectual inquiry or freedom of thought. While at times there may be a seeming contradiction, particularly with regard to questions concerning both human science and Divine revelation, there can be no real opposition between the findings of reason and the doctrines of faith And there is no need of disregarding the natural for that it must be bad or to reject the supernatural. Our saintly scholars in the Church of Christ are effective reassurances in this matter.³⁰

Although these passages imply that there can be no conflict between science and the Church, certain interpretations given to the student are held uniquely by Catholics, or, at least, by Christians; and the context of the material is all Catholic. Only this brief example which defines the parts of evolutionary theory a Catholic may hold can be given here:

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Teachers' Manual for Science 1, p. 18.

²⁹ Dale C. Braungart and Sister Rita Buddeke, *Biology—The Study of Living Things* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 525.

³⁰ Mother Mary Celeste, *Biology for Catholic Students* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1957),

One related question is now closed for Catholics. That is the question of polygenism. Polygenism may mean the theory that men existed after Adam but were not directly descended from him; or the theory that Adam was a name that is merely a symbol for a multitude of parents. Both of these theories have been opposed by the Church. Even though there are many races known today, the Church teaches that Adam and Eve were the original parents of the human race.³¹

The wisdom of the Catholic Church and its role as a patron of science are often pointed out.

Long before the scientific principles of genetics were formulated, the wisdom of the Church was shown when her authorities prohibited the marriage of persons within the third degree of kindred.³²

* * *

Through the ages the popes have encouraged Catholics to engage in scientific studies. They have often made speeches or written letters or encyclicals that have been sent to all the bishops of the world. In these letters the popes have stressed to Catholics the importance of interesting themselves in the study of science.³³

Although the role of the Church in scientific affairs is emphasized, some Catholic texts omit information about the non-Catholic world. Subjects like birth control, sterilization and euthanasia are usually mentioned only in terms of the Church's judgments. Other points of view are rarely indicated and never discussed.³⁴ In the biographies of about one hundred famous scientists at the end of two of the major Catholic biology texts, the religion of the scientist is mentioned only if he is Catholic.³⁵ This particular practice, if reinforced in the teaching, may leave students with an inadequate understanding of the contributions which persons of other faiths have made to the culture.

In practice, science textbooks, as they are currently written for all grade and high schools, public and private, contain considerably more than "pure" science. In linking science materials to the circumstances familiar to the student, they often go into family living, health and safety. Religion, of course, has much to say about the family and personal habits. One text tells the student, "... dependence on Divine Providence builds up healthy mental outlooks"

Chapter 15. This chapter ends with the question, "What four fundamental truths must Catholics uphold in discussing evolution?"

³¹ Braungart and Buddeke, *loc. cit.*

³² Mother Mary Celeste, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

³³ Sister Mary Raphael and Sister Monica Marie, *Science and Living in Today's World* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1953), p. 24.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, and Mother Celeste, *op. cit.* This tendency is also found in Julian S. Maline and Joseph F. Downey, *Prose and Poetry for Enjoyment* (St. Thomas More Edition; Syracuse, N.Y.: L. W. Singer, 1958).

and "Prayer and the grace of God are powerful aids in overcoming bad habits."³⁶

The best example of this type of integration of religion into science is a series of high school science texts called the Christian Social Living Series. These books are one-third natural science, one-third social science and one-third religion. The texts are geared for all high school girls whether they are considering a religious vocation or marriage. The direction of the series is stated by Cardinal Cushing in the preface:

Most of you have a sacred vocation to fulfill your role in a great apostolate, the apostolate of the Christian woman in Society and especially in the family. Some of you, and not a few, I sincerely hope, have already made up your minds to seek admission into a religious community. Some of you, no doubt, are praying that God will enlighten you and guide you in the choice of this vocation. . . .

You have been prepared for life, as a citizen of the City of Man, as a citizen of the City of God. This preparation has been a Catholic preparation. Courses can be followed and passed successfully in any school, but the whole purpose of the Catholic school is to teach Christ. If He is learned, then all is learned. . . .

May Our Divine Lord and His Blessed Mother guide and direct you as you approach the close of your high school course and prepare you to fulfill your vocation as a Christian woman in the kingdom of God on earth which is the Catholic Church. May you ever keep before your eyes your ultimate goal, your eternal salvation, for only salvation spells success for a Christian.³⁷

In the elementary grades, most of the science taught is in geography—a hybrid of the natural and social sciences.³⁸ The importance of religion in parochial school geography courses is illustrated in the following quotation from a teachers' manual:

It would be difficult to find a part of the Geography Program that would not contribute in some way to the development of a Christian conscience, to the furthering of a Catholic viewpoint toward our neighbors at home or in the rest of the world, or to the growth of strong aesthetic, social and spiritual concepts. However, some portions of the course and some specific geographic conclusions lend themselves more obviously to the objective of forming a strong Catholic outlook.³⁹

³⁶ Mother Mary Celeste, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-7.

³⁷ Sister Mary Annetta and Sister Mary Leonard, *Preparing for the Woman's Apostolate in the Family* (New York: William H. Sadlier, Inc., 1956), Preface.

³⁸ Geography was specifically called a "non-religious" subject in the "Statement on Behalf of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York," General Committee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings, on H.R. 4970*, Part 2, p. 1003.

³⁹ Sister Mary Fidelis, *The Earth and Its People* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), p. 87.

PLATE I

For, according to Pope Pius XII in his encyclical *Humani Generis* (August 12, 1950), whatever new truth the human mind is able to discover by honest research cannot contradict the truth already acquired and established. God created the human intellect and guides it. The truths that God has revealed cannot be opposed to, or opposed by, the truths the scientist finds in nature. For the truths of revelation and of nature are both from God. The Church therefore welcomes whatever facts can be established with certainty. That is why the Catholic scientist is urged to re-examine his premises if a scientific hypothesis is directly or indirectly opposed to the teaching of the Church.

Man consists of a spiritual soul and an organic body. These two parts belong together, but they are also distinct from each other. *The theory of evolution cannot apply to man's soul.* For the human soul, being non-material, cannot come from matter at all. It is, as men have held for centuries and as the Church teaches, a direct creation of God.

The question of human evolution is therefore limited to man's body. The encyclical *Humani Generis* of Pius XII speaks of a possible descent from "pre-existing living matter" and not of something as specific as an animal such as an ape. It is not forbidden for a Catholic to discuss the origin of man from such animals. The Pope cautions, however, that these discussions should be carried on by experts, with moderation and discretion. He also cautions Catholics against admitting that the origin of the human body from some pre-existing matter is an established scientific fact. On the contrary, it is a theory.

One related question is now closed for Catholics. That is the question of **polygenism**. Polygenism may mean the theory that men existed after Adam but were not directly descended from him; or the theory that Adam was a name that is merely a symbol for a multitude of parents. Both of these theories have been opposed by the Church. Even though there are many different races

known today, the Church teaches that Adam and Eve were the original parents of the human race.

The encyclical *Humani Generis* gives no positive answer to the origin of man's body. Catholics, provided they are informed and prudent, are free to discuss the scientific evidence for evolution and to accept on evidence the idea that man's body evolved. However, there can be no question on the origin of man's soul. It is an article of Catholic Faith that the soul is created directly by God. And surely the dignity of man is not diminished if we suppose that God allowed man's body to evolve for millions of years before creating the first human soul.



A detail from one of the entrances to the Cathedral of Chartres. While God was creating the birds on the fifth day, He was thinking of man, whom He was still to create on the next day—man who was to be an unusual creature, a composite of soul and body, who was to live on the earth, and who bore within his soul the likeness of his Maker. As the medieval Christian artist saw him, this is man as he appeared in the mind of God on the day before his creation.

EVOLUTION OF MAN 525

PLATE II



helped preserve the United Kingdom in World War II. At one time, only the fleet and a handful of Royal Air Force planes held off the forces of Hitler's Germany and kept free government alive in Europe. The British today have this recent triumph to inspire them, and recall that their wartime Prime Minister told them that of their long and eventful history, "This was their finest hour."

Since the war, many former colonies of the United Kingdom have become independent. But Britain is still an extremely important nation in the world. It has one of the world's greatest industrial centers in the Midlands; its scientists and engineers are among the most inventive in the world; its ships carry British goods all over the world. Most important, its recent history has proved that free people, devoted to their liberty and willing to defend it, can save their country, and help bring freedom back to other lands that had lost it.

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Looking back

The brief overview you have had in this book helps you to understand that the greatness of our American nation, the stamina of its people, and its cultural and spiritual values are all the result of a rich heritage that has been handed down and improved through the ages. The cradle lands of the Middle East are lands that have had a considerable influence on our culture. Their greatest influence is due to the fact that they set the stage for the most tremendous act in history, our redemption by Jesus Christ and the foundation of the Catholic Church. Europe was the continent where the message of Christ took permanent root, and it has been the defender of the Faith even in spite of bitter persecution up to the present day. The dome of St. Peter's, the greatest ever built by man, stands as a symbol of the desire of Christ that all nations and all peoples receive the truth of Christianity. Europe has been faithful to this commission of Christ, and missionaries have gone out all over the world to spread the message of salvation. We in the United States work hand in hand with our European friends to bring the full benefits of our culture to supplement the best of the cultures of other lands.

Around the throne of Our Holy Father are gathered cardinals from Europe, North America, South America, Asia, and Africa. Much remains to be done to spread the spiritual and material benefits of Western culture to hundreds of millions in the world, especially to those suffering behind the Iron Curtain. Our Blessed Mother chose many spots in Europe, Fatima, Lourdes, La Salette, Beaurain, and others to remind us that she wishes us to make her Son better known and to offer us her most powerful assistance in obtaining salvation for the whole world.

Sister Mary Xaveria, I.H.M., Ph.D.,
Europe and the Mediterranean World

(Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 362.

(This is a text published for use in Roman Catholic Schools.)

PLATE III

ARE YOU A REAL APOSTLE?

Education Is a social responsibility

Does it seem possible that it was almost a year ago that you started *Preparing for Woman's Apostolate in Society*? Do you recall that there were three goals toward which you were aiming during the year: *knowledge, conviction, and action*? Your store of knowledge should have increased at least as regards the fundamentals of sociology, civics, and economics. We hope that you have been convinced that there are many problems to be solved in our society, and above all, that there are Christian solutions to all these problems. Now it is time for action. In a few short weeks your high school days will be behind you. Will you be able to use your knowledge and conviction to lead you to purposeful activity?

A recent book is entitled *Fitting God into the Picture*. That title gives us much food for thought. Did you observe as you studied the various social problems that when He was left out, disorder and even chaos resulted, that when He is put back into the social order, harmony results?

Father James O'Toole in a most worthwhile pamphlet entitled *What Is Catholic Action?* shows us how our action—our Catholic Action—is the absolute necessity of the day. His words are so meaningful that they are quoted here:

"... Knowledge of what's wrong with our world will make it easier to see what's to be righted.

Before the sixteenth century the Church had pretty well succeeded in laying the foundations of the Kingdom of God in this world. All human institutions were building with Christ as their cornerstone.

The first turn in the tide, the beginning of modern secularism, is marked by the Protestant revolution. Luther and his contemporaries said—Let's do away with the Church. They were sufficiently successful to initiate the trend which became a drive at the time of the French Revolution. Only the drive went further. This time it was against the Saviour of mankind, and the battle cry could

be heard in the world—let's do away with Christ. By the nineteenth century the drive was almost universally triumphant and its leaders were ready to complete their task with the final slogan—let's do away with God.

So you and I are born into a world where the final campaign against God has begun. It has been a matter of stages.

First of all they said—we will take God out of government; and they not only planned it but they did it by the complete separation of Church and State.

Then they said—we will take God out of education—and they not only said it but they did it. We have only to look around.

Then they said—we will take God out of business, and labor and economics—and they destroyed the old guilds and told capitalists, business men, industrialists, and bankers—when it is a question of profits, anything goes.

Then they said—we will take God out of the family—and their plan has succeeded. On all sides religious marriage was supplanted by a civil ceremony. They knew that Christ had said "what God hath joined together let no man put asunder" so they passed the laws permitting divorce.

The next object of attack was the children who might be born as fruit of the watered-down marriage contract, and propaganda for eugenics and mercy-killing followed on the heels of contraception and abortion. The ethics of the medical profession were de-Christianized and the law was denied its basis in the Ten Commandments.

They took God out of entertainment, out of the theater, out of the movies; they paid no attention to Him or His rights. Literature declared its independence. The press passed God by in discreet silence; books and pulp magazines went the whole way and became an outright campaign in the interests of God's enemy, the devil."

PLATE IV

UNIT SUMMARY

For your last unit summary, gather together all your ammunition for your attack on the anti-Christian elements of modern society. Develop the

main points that have been stressed in this unit into a well-constructed essay. The following will guide you in your organization.

Introduction:

Show that educational opportunities are particularly important as they prepare us to lead militant Christian lives and also teach us ways to promote the acceptance of Christian principles in all walks of life.

Section I:

Describe a complete education and evaluate your own education according to the seven objectives of Catholic secondary education, which are as follows:

- (1) To develop *intelligent* Catholics
- (2) To develop *spiritually vigorous* Catholics
- (3) To develop *healthy* Catholics
- (4) To develop *cultured* Catholics
- (5) To develop *vocationally prepared* Catholics
- (6) To develop *social-minded* Catholics
- (7) To develop American Catholics

Section II:

Explain the school systems in the United States and the problems faced in American education.

Section III:

Prove that a Christian philosophy of education, as described by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical on the *Christian Education of Youth*, is the only true education. Give arguments to show the errors in the major modern false philosophies of education.

Section IV:

Explain the need of the lay apostolate and indicate the various fields in which lay apostles are urgently needed.

Conclusion:

Indicate the practical ways in which you as a Catholic woman can use your education to best advantage for God, for neighbor, and for self.

This "objective of forming a strong Catholic outlook" is mainly carried out in texts by taking a missionary's perspective on all other cultures. One teachers' edition of a geography text suggests, "Return to the theme of the common religious needs of all people; sum up the different kinds of people in America; remind children that the Catholic Church is Christ's church for all mankind."⁴⁰ This book also stresses the shortages of missionaries in Latin America, a current concern of the United States' hierarchy, and the status of Mary as a symbol of unity for the whole Western Hemisphere.

In every country of the Western Hemisphere, shrines and churches have been erected in Mary's honor. The most recent and the most beautiful of these shrines is the one that has been erected in Washington, D. C., the capital of our country.

As children of Mary, let us often pray for all her children in the Western Hemisphere and throughout the world. "Pray for us, O Holy Mother of God, that we may be made worthy of the promises of Christ."⁴¹

Another textbook introduces the children to families in America, Bolivia, Uganda, Algeria, Spain, Netherlands, Viet-Nam, and Alaska.⁴² The family studied in every culture is always Catholic. Unless the student were otherwise instructed, it is doubtful if he would realize from the text that the typical cultures are non-Catholic in some of these parts of the world. A similar tendency to emphasize Catholic features is also found in a book dealing with different types of American community life.⁴³

In addition, certain problems in geographical studies are handled in the context of specific sectarian doctrines. A teachers' manual states,

Neo-Malthusians see a bleak future with millions of people starving if population continues to grow. Their solution is population limitation by artificial birth control, a solution which is morally unacceptable to Catholics. Fortunately, there is another solution, for studies show that with proper conservation all of our renewable resources can actually be increased beyond their present amounts. . . . In short, conservation offers a way to insure adequate supplies of natural resources for the foreseeable future. Can there be any question as to where the Church stands on this matter?⁴⁴

MATHEMATICS

It was generally conceded during the testimony that mathematics was probably the most secular or non-religious subject. "How can there be any re-

⁴⁰ Sister Mary Veronica, *Lands of the Western Hemisphere* (Teachers' Edition; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1961), p. 43.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁴² Sister Mary Fidelis, *op. cit.*

⁴³ Sister Mary Celeste, *Our Home the Earth* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Teachers' Manual, p. 5.

ligious doctrine in an algebraic formula?" was a frequent question. The fact is that, as the Preface of a parochial school textbook explains, "The teaching of arithmetic to Catholic children should not be confined only to knowledge that pertains to quantitative thinking, but should also present applications of this knowledge in situations which are normal to them."⁴⁵ As will be shown, "the situations that are normal to them" provide the opportunity to integrate a vast range of religious material into the arithmetic texts. Generally this is accomplished by using religious symbols, illustrations and examples in problems. For example,

How much money must I have to buy these four books? *Poems About the Christ Child*, \$1.85; *Story of Our Lady*, \$2.25; *Saint Joseph*, \$1.05; *Saint Theresa*, \$2.00.⁴⁶

The children of St. Francis School ransomed 125 pagan babies last year. This year they hope to increase this number by 20%. If they succeed, how many babies will they ransom this year?⁴⁷

David sells subscriptions to the *Catholic Digest* on a commission basis of 20%. If the subscription is \$2.50 a year, what is David's commission on each sale?⁴⁸

China has a population of approximately 600,000,000. Through the efforts of missionaries 3,000,000 have been converted to Catholicism. What percentage of the people of China have been converted?⁴⁹

In Africa Father Murray, a Holy Ghost father, was given a triangular piece of ground upon which to build his church. What was the area of this ground if it had a base of 80 feet and an altitude of 120 feet?⁵⁰

Sometimes, however, there is an apparent effort to inculcate a specific religious attitude. For example,

Ray has 26 roses for Our Lady's Altar. He puts them into vases, 6 in each vase. Then he sees he has 2 roses over, so Sister finds a little vase for them. Ray is very happy as he puts the flowers at Our Lady's feet.⁵¹

Mr. Drumm teaches the boys how to make toys. They are in the workshop every Saturday and are very happy as they hammer away.

⁴⁵ William A. Brownell et al., *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁴⁶ Sister M. Paulita Campbell, *Progress in Arithmetic, Grade 4* (New York: William H. Sadlier, Inc., 1957), p. 85.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Grade 6, p. 129.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Grade 7, p. 64.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Grade 3, p. 130.

They know these toys will be sold and the money sent to the Missions. This is their way of being "Little Missionaries." (Problem follows.)⁵²

Jim made the Way of the Cross. He likes the sixth station very much. What Roman numeral was written above it?⁵³

In millions of homes Our Lady's challenge has been accepted, but she wants billions throughout the world to join the Family Rosary for Peace. Do you know how to write in figures large numbers such as those just mentioned?⁵⁴

The Mass is an act of worship by which we offer to God our adoration, our gratitude, our sorrow for sin, and by which we beg for His blessings. Throughout the world there are a million Masses said each day. A million is a number that contains seven figures. In figures it is written 1,000,000.⁵⁵

Sometimes prayers or devotional poems are included in arithmetic books.

Mental and drill
And all our thoughts too
Immaculate Mother
We trust them to you.⁵⁶

On another page is an illustration of children holding *Progress in Arithmetic* books gathering around the figure of Jesus saying the following verse:

Dear gentle Jesus,
So tender and true,
We, Your Sixth Graders,
Come unto You.
We want to make progress
Right from the start,
So we place all our work
In Your Sacred Heart.⁵⁷

MODERN LANGUAGES

The integration of religion into the teaching of languages is accomplished in two ways in parochial school textbooks. At the elementary school level, religious themes are emphasized in vocabulary and grammar drills.⁵⁸ As

⁵² *Ibid.*, Grade 4, p. 70.

⁵³ Sister Mary St. William, Sister Mary Emerentia, Sister Mary Florence, et al., *New Ways in Numbers* (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1961), p. 103.

⁵⁴ Sister M. Paulita Campbell, *Grade 7*, p. 1.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Grade 6, p. 2.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵⁸ Substantiating photostats are in author's possession.

PLATE V

THE NATURE OF THE PROGRAM FOR
FINDING TRUTH IN ARITHMETIC

Purpose of the Program	Page		Page
Introduction		Ratio Idea	[3]
Principles Underlying the Aims of This Program	[1]	Number Facts	[3]
Philosophical Principle	[2]	Addition Process	[4]
Mathematical and Social Principles	[2]	Emotional Responses	[4]
A Well-Rounded Program	[2]	The Teaching Process	[4]
The Materials of Instruction	[2]	Common Principles	[4]
The Learning Process	[2]	Organizing Teaching Experiences	[4]
The Nature of the Learning Process	[2]	Manipulative Experiences	[5]
Types of Learning	[2]	Real or Concrete Objects	[5]
Arbitrary Associations	[2]	Substitute or Representative Objects	[5]
Meanings	[3]	Experiences with Pictures	[5]
The Numbers	[3]	Pictures of Real Objects	[5]
Serial Idea	[3]	Pictures of Substitute Objects	[5]
Group Idea	[3]	Use of Number Symbol Representations	[5]
Component Idea	[3]	Verbally Described Situations	[5]
		Numbers and the Signs of Operation	[6]

Purpose of the Program

Introduction

The authors of *FINDING TRUTH IN ARITHMETIC* have recognized that first and foremost, an arithmetic program designed for Catholic schools must be mathematically sound. Over and above this, they have recognized that there are innumerable situations which involve quantitative thinking, measurement, and other mathematical understandings and skills in typical social circumstances. Furthermore, they have taken advantage of the fact that these situations present opportunities for the exercise of Christian virtues. The virtues of justice, charity, honesty, liberality, prudence, and temperance often form an integral part of such situations.

The teaching of arithmetic to Catholic children should not be confined only to knowledge that pertains to quantitative thinking, but also should present applications of this knowledge in situations which are normal to them. Awareness of the possibility of exercising virtue in the use of mathematical knowledge develops gradually and needs the help of teachers and textbooks. Therefore, a textbook on arithmetic written in the spirit of Christian philosophy should be a welcome contribution to Catholic education.

FINDING TRUTH IN ARITHMETIC presents situations which are normal to the Catholic child: The teacher will recognize the full Christian significance. Textbook pages and thoughtfully prepared lesson suggestions combine to make this program one that is truly functional from the point of view of arithmetic and of Christian social living.

The authors of an arithmetic program for Catholic schools must always be conscious that the learner is a child of God, endowed with intelligence and free-will. This child must be thoroughly instructed in the science of

quantity, basic number facts and processes and their relationships, basic measurements, and problem-solving. Like a strand running through this instruction is the brightness of mathematical truth. This truth is sacred and the sacredness of this truth must be woven into the mind and heart of the child.

Every child, every adult uses his arithmetical knowledge to some extent in everyday living. The use of quantity in human relations suggests at once the moral virtues. Shall we stress these virtues or ignore them as the child learns to use numbers? In a Catholic school we cannot ignore the fact that in the use of material things the child must be properly instructed not only to be just, but also to exercise prudence and temperance. Selfishness, which leads to greed, avarice, and injustice must be counteracted by instilling ideals of charity and even of liberality.

Catholic teachers should reflect again and again on the content of the encyclical of Pope Pius XI, *The Christian Education of Youth*. Here is a quotation that is pertinent:

For the mere fact that a school gives some religious instruction . . . does not . . . make it a fit place for Catholic students. To be this, it is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organization of the school, and its teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch, be regulated by the Christian spirit . . .

In the same paragraph His Holiness quotes his predecessor, Leo XIII:

It is necessary not only that religious instruction be given to the young at certain fixed times, but also that every other subject taught, be permeated with Christian piety.

[1]

William A. Brownell et al.,
Finding Truth in Arithmetic

(Teachers' Edition; Boston: Ginn and Co., 1959), p. 1.

(This is a text published for use in Roman Catholic Schools.)

PLATE VI



UNIT 10

REVIEW OF NUMBER FACTS

Boys and girls, Unit X offers you an opportunity to revisit your old friends in the form of review. It will help to fasten in your minds many of the things you have already learned. It will also introduce more advanced work in addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Here you will find your old troublemakers, the zeros,

under various disguises. These zeros will teasingly ask, "How well have you conquered me? Am I your master or are you mine?" Many of the facts you have learned will present themselves to you again. I hope that you understand thoroughly all that you are required to know.

How Well Do You Remember?

1. There are 37 boys in our room. Each boy says the Rosary every day. How many do we say in 20 days?
2. Each time we say the Rosary we say 53 Hail Marys. If 40 fourth grade girls say the Rosary, how many Hail Marys do they say?
3. There are 240 girls and 274 boys in our school. If $\frac{1}{4}$ of them say the Rosary in their homes, how many say it?
4. During one week in October many people came to church to say the Rosary. On Monday 350 people came, on Tuesday 450, on Wednesday 425, on Thursday 480, and on Friday 500. What was the average daily attendance?
5. In the Holy Name school, 135 children say the Rosary at home every night. In the Holy Child school there are 4 times that many children who say the Rosary. How many children in both schools say the Rosary every night?

the students progress, they begin to read short articles on the culture of the country and eventually its literature. The opportunity to present religion in these selections is ever present. Sometimes the religious material is presented directly. Other times it is a matter of emphasis on Catholic parts of the culture and omission of all that is critical of or objectionable to the Church. This is put clearly in the Foreword by Roy J. Deferrari in a high school French series for Catholic Schools.

The culture of France is Catholic despite the efforts of some anti-clericals to make it appear otherwise. The authors assume this fact, neither suppressing the Catholic features of the country nor laboring the already obvious ones. The Catholicity of France shines forth naturally on every hand in the content of the lessons, in the illustrations, and in the reading selections. The authors, moreover, have succeeded in choosing material for the second book (*Pour Lire et Parler*) which not only exemplifies the most important types of French literature but also accurately reflects French life. This has been accomplished without recourse to works which are on the Index of Forbidden Books. . . . The series fills a need and will accomplish much for the Church and for France.⁵⁹

In the second book of the series, *Pour Lire et Parler*, Mr. Deferrari makes clear the criteria by which these selections "which accurately portray French life" have been chosen.

Teachers of French in Catholic schools have long regretted the lack of appropriate reading material to present to their students. In this volume only writings that are positively Catholic in tone or at least those that are essentially unobjectionable are included.⁶⁰

ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

English is included here as a subsection of modern languages because it is almost a certainty to be the first extension if the National Defense Education Act is expanded. A strong plea that English be included was registered by a blue-ribbon panel of lay educational consultants in the last Congress, and S. 1228 was introduced for that purpose.⁶¹ In the House, H.R. 7904 proposed extension of N.D.E.A. to cover teaching "the English language to students whose primary language is not English."

Second, the technique of integrating religion into the teaching of a language is the same whether the language is foreign or domestic. Literature and religion run the whole range of human activity and emotion. In Catholic

⁵⁹ Sister Mary Keller, *Le Français Vivant* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1959), Foreword.

⁶⁰ Sister Mary Keller and Elizabeth C. Peters, *Pour Lire et Parler* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1950), Foreword.

⁶¹ *Report of the Consultants to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education on Areas Related to the National Defense Education Act of 1958*, January 12, 1961.

PLATE VII

Une visite à Jésus

La classe est finie. David retourne à la maison avec son ami Louis. David commence à courir.

— Attrape-moi, dit-il à Louis.

Louis court après David. Les voici près de l'église. David s'arrête et pense.

— A quoi penses-tu, David? demande Louis.

— Jésus est seul dans le tabernacle. Viens, Louis. Allons faire une visite à Jésus.

David ouvre la grande porte de l'église. Il entre avec son ami. Ils vont à la sainte table et se mettent à genoux. Ils parlent à Jésus dans le tabernacle. Voici la prière de Louis et de David:

Bonjour, Jésus, je t'aime de tout mon cœur. Je veux être un bon garçon pour te faire plaisir. Bénis mon père, ma mère, mes amis et tout le monde. Au revoir, Jésus. A demain.




PLATE VIII

Teaching the Seventh Reader Program

To Mary Immaculate (Page 10)

OBJECTIVES

Reading. To assist the pupils to grasp the meaning of the ideas set forth in the poem; to lead them to enjoy the rhythm and the melodic sounds of words in poetry.

Christian Social Living. To emphasize that our country has been dedicated to the Virgin Mother; to show how love of country follows love of God.

BACKGROUND MATERIAL

Sister Maryanna, O.P., who wrote "To Mary Immaculate," was born in New York City, educated at St. Vincent Ferrer School, Dominican Academy, and Mary Immaculate School, joining the Dominicans at Columbus, Ohio, in 1928. She continued her studies at St. Mary of the Springs College, at Duquesne University, and at Columbia University. She has written for *America*, *Ave Maria*, *The Torch*, and the *Young Catholic Messengers*, and is notable for her poems and stories for children.

VOCABULARY

Words Listed in the Glossary: mystic

PREPARATION.

Ask, "Who is the patroness of the United States? What is her title? What is meant by *the Immaculate Conception*?" Tell the pupils that the Immaculate Conception was declared an article of faith by the Vatican Council in 1854, although Catholics had believed in the ever-sinlessness of the Mother of God since the early ages of the Church.

Ask if anyone remembers how the Church celebrated the centenary of the declaration of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Allow volunteers to tell about Marian Year; supply any information which the pupils do not know about Marian Year observances.

Discuss with the class the twofold aspect of the meaning of *patron* or *patroness*. (A person, first, to whom special honor is given; and, second, from whom special favors and protection are received.) Have the pupils approach the reading of the poem with these two ideas of patroness in mind.

PROCEDURE

Instruct the pupils to read the poem slowly, thoughtfully, and reverently as a prayer for their country and for themselves. After they

literature books, there are essays on theology, religious poems, many stories of the lives of heroic missionaries and clergy, passages from the lives of saints, prayers, and selections on Catholic interpretations of institutions and movements in the culture. The rigor of this effort is best illustrated by quoting from the foreword of a Catholic High School Literature series.

In the first place, we believe that Catholic educators in the United States have discussed very thoroughly and convincingly the importance of centering all studies in Catholic schools around the fundamental principles of the Catholic faith. Every subject, be it a natural science or one of the humanities, in a preschool class or within a college group, should be so organized and presented in all Catholic institutions. . . .

The other conviction held by the Committee is that it is unquestionably better for Catholic educators to plan and build their own textbooks rather than to attempt to "baptize" books planned and executed by men with an educational philosophy other than that of the Catholic Church. Manifestly it is safer for Catholic educators to build completely new books intended for Catholic schools than, in attempting to revise non-Catholic books, to run the risk of a superficial treatment which allows the subtle subversive principles of the original work to remain.⁶²

Another parochial high school literature text makes a similar point.

Like the other volumes of the St. Thomas More Series, this book is edited from a Catholic point of view, for Catholic students. Every selection from nonsense verses to Negro spirituals is integrated with the Catholic philosophy of life. Such integration is possible because wholesome literature as a comment on life, is essentially in accord with the Christian, and therefore the Catholic outlook. As Faith does not deny but builds on nature, so necessarily literature of both natural and supernatural inspiration is taken into account in the making of this book. Catholic and non-Catholic authors will be found side by side, but in every instance their comments on life find interpretation in the light of the Catholic faith and Catholic ideals.⁶³

This stress on Catholic philosophy, morals and religious teachings is indicated in notes to the student on American life and literature in the beginning of two different high school texts.

There is much of it [American life], however, that is not touched with the Catholic spirit. Much of it is either openly or secretly against it. This is not surprising, for once men cut themselves off from the teaching of Him Who pointed to Himself as the Way, the

⁶² Roy J. Deferrari, Sister Mary Theresa Brentano, and Brother Edward P. Sheekey, *Joy in Reading* (New York: William H. Sadlier, Inc., 1941).

⁶³ Julian S. Maline and Joseph F. Downey, *Prose and Poetry for Enjoyment* (St. Thomas More Edition; Syracuse, N.Y.: L. W. Singer, 1955).

Truth and the Life, they wandered into the myriad paths of error. Hence it is imperative that we train ourselves to think, to read critically, for many an author with a persuasive style has only a husk of truth to offer the reader, or he may even be spreading the deadly virus of positive error.⁶⁴

* * *

But the fullest appreciation of your nation's literature will come through the Catholic point of view which clearly establishes the relationship between literature and life. Your Catholic principles will be challenged by many of the selections that you read. The authors have anticipated such challenges. Since you are a Catholic student, it is important for you to be ready to interpret the happenings in American life with a Catholic set of Standards. That is why a Catholic outlook appears in the introductory material preceding selections and in the questions which follow. You will find that your book is built around the principle stated some years ago by Sister Mary Madeleva: "Catholic literature is any literature that is treated as a Catholic would treat it."⁶⁵

THE NON-CATHOLIC SCHOOLS

This study has concentrated on the integration of religion in Catholic science, mathematics and language textbooks for two reasons. The Catholic parochial school system enrolls 91 per cent of all non-public school students,⁶⁶ and Catholic educators have been predominant among those requesting public assistance for religious schools. However, the Missouri Synod Lutheran Church has established a school system that educates more than 125,000 elementary school students and 7,000 high school pupils.⁶⁷ In addition, two smaller Protestant denominations, the Seventh-day Adventists and the Christian Reformed Church, have school systems that educate substantial proportions of their school-age populations. It is important to note that these Churches have declared their opposition to accepting public money for their schools on constitutional and policy grounds. There is also a scattering of schools that have various types of association with other Protestant denominations as well as some Hebrew Day Schools.

Since these schools have current relationships to religious organizations and were often founded from religious motivations, it is logical to expect that religion influences their curricula. However, when compared with Catholic schools, it is fair to generalize that non-Catholic schools have less religious content integrated into the teachings of sciences, mathematics and languages. In the first place, non-Catholic schools must depend more on standard text-

⁶⁴ Julian S. Maline and Frederick Manion, *Prose and Poetry of America* (St. Thomas More Edition; Syracuse, N.Y., L. W. Singer Co., 1955), p. 3.

⁶⁵ Donald F. Connors, Brother Edward P. Sheekey and Roy J. Deferrari, *The New American Profile* (New York: William H. Sadlier, Inc., 1954), p. 7.

⁶⁶ Fred F. Beach, *The State and Non-Public Schools*, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

books for economic reasons since they do not provide nearly so large a market as the Catholic schools do. A secondary factor may be that the nature of Catholic theology provides more possibilities for the integration of religion into *all* subjects. For example, the significant role of religious symbolism in Catholic theology is more likely to lead to integration of religious elements into arithmetic and grammar drill in Catholic texts than in non-Catholic books.

Still, because they are religiously inspired, the non-Catholic church schools include some religious elements in the teaching of science, mathematics and languages. The nature of the religious elements varies from special denominational biology textbooks that do not accept evolution, used by the Seventh-day Adventists, to supplemental reading lists published by the Council for Religion in Independent Schools. A Lutheran guide stresses,

A Lutheran elementary school teacher will insist that all areas of the curriculum reflect an adequate philosophy of Christian education. Thus he will select content and provide experiences that are consistent with such a philosophy.

... Moreover, the Lutheran elementary school teacher will constantly search for materials that can be correlated with basic texts and that enable him to emphasize more fully a Christian point of view.⁶⁸

The Introduction to a teaching manual for elementary science in Christian Reformed schools states,

But the science textbooks are generally still anti-Christian, or at best non-Christian. They do not give honor to the God of creation, or even acknowledge Him as the author of the universe. That, however, is not a reason for neglecting the study of science. It is rather a reason for taking up the subject with vigor and determination, as a duty toward Him whom we profess to be sovereign not only of our lives but of the universe.⁶⁹

The National Union of Christian Schools (Christian Reformed) has also produced a curriculum guide for teachers of mathematics. Although the problems themselves are not built around religious symbols or ideas, the guide indicates how Christian teaching, probably with a Calvinistic emphasis, can be integrated into mathematics.

Appraising the student's progress toward God-centered thinking in mathematics is difficult. Periodic discussion of questions like the following may help the teacher make the proper evaluation.

⁶⁸ *Catalogue of Instructional Materials for Lutheran Elementary Schools* (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House, 1961), p. 5.

⁶⁹ Sidney Dykstra, *Manual for the Teaching of Science*, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: National Union of Christian Schools, 1961), Introduction.

PLATE IX

MATHEMATICS

I. INTRODUCTION

Mathematics is the science dealing with numbers and quantitative relationships. It is present in every phase of our life. We use it in our personal, business, and social activities, and it enters our life of worship. Mathematics makes possible our creative activity. Works of art, craftsmanship, music, and poetry are all constructed on a framework of form and sequence. In fact, mathematics gives expression to the order and form of everything we do.

Ideas of quantities and exact relationships have their source in God. This is apparent from the order and design in creation. Notice the patterns in nature. The snowflake always has six angles. Each kind of flower has a certain number of petals. Crystals of chemicals like salt are in the form of cubes or other geometric designs. God apparently used what in our language is called higher mathematics to plan the course of the stars and the great galaxies beyond our solar system. His power to think mathematically is infinite and goes altogether beyond our limits. These great wonders that fill our earth and sky are all a part of God's revelation of Himself to us.

There is a striving in man, placed there by God, to search out this wonderful universe and to bend its forces to his control. This is the task God gave at the beginning of history. In Genesis 1:28 God commanded man to "be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the heavens, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." God also placed within man the ability to grasp the principles of mathematics and develop them into a science to use as a tool in fulfilling this task. This too is a revelation of God and a gift from Him.

Mathematics, then, is a product of man's cultural activity. The system man developed from those mathematical principles everywhere present in creation is his interpretation of a part of the whole body of truth which is God's general revelation to mankind.

PLATE X

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CURRICULUM GUIDE

And teaching mathematics becomes a calling to impart to the child this part of God's revelation in a clear, meaningful way according to his ability to receive it. Mathematics is a medium in which the school forms a maturing Christian--a child who, first learning only to group and count objects, grows into one who uses numbers in every part of his developing life, who begins to see mathematics as a part of the whole pattern of truth, and learns to praise the God of truth, and in whom there is a growing sense of responsibility to place this gift along with all others in the service of the Giver.

II. OBJECTIVES

The objectives for teaching mathematics in grades one through nine may be stated as follows:

- To instill in the student a sense of wonder for the orderliness and beauty of God's creation as interpreted by mathematics
- To help the student see mathematics as a revelation of God
- To teach the meaning of numbers and the number system
- To give the learner an understanding of the terminology used in mathematics
- To have the student achieve mastery in the use of the four fundamental processes
- To stimulate and guide the student to discover number relationships
- To develop the pupil's ability to attack and solve problems involving number relations
- To produce skill in "mental" arithmetic
- To teach concepts of measurement and geometric form
- To have the student understand algebraic processes and gain skill in their use
- To form desirable attitudes and habits in the use of numbers
- To show that mathematics is useful in interpersonal relations
- To have the student become aware of the role mathematics has played in our understanding of natural science
- To develop in the student the concept of God's ownership and man's stewardship of economic goods
- To instill an appreciation for the importance of business ethics according to the Christian concept

Why is it important to learn mathematics? Responses should relate to the idea that mathematics reveals God.

Why should a student's work be neat, accurate, and honest? Responses should relate to the idea that mathematics is a useful tool for work and service and must be done according to God's standards.

What would be the basis on which you would establish a business? Responses should relate to Christian ethics, stewardship, and usefulness.

How are number ideas used in making things? Responses should relate to mathematics as a tool for our creative activity.

How were mathematical ideas used in the creation of the world? Responses should relate to God the Creator and indicate the observation of form and order in creation.

Where does the idea of numbers come from? Responses should relate to God as the source of mathematical principles and of all knowledge.

What part did man play in revealing God through mathematics? Responses should deal with the history of the number system.⁷⁰

The influence of religion is most pronounced in Seventh-day Adventist science textbooks since this Church does not accept most parts of evolutionary theory. This position is defined in the Foreword of the denominational biology textbook.

The book is designed for the student who believes in the Bible as the inspired word of God. It has been prepared by request of and under the direction of the Department of Education of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists. Seventh-day Adventists do not believe that man has evolved from lower animals. They accept the literal Biblical account that man and all forms of animal and plant life were created by God at the beginning of this world. They admit that many modifications have come into plants and animals since creation, even causing the formation of new varieties and species, but that never has one major group of animals or plants given rise to another major group.⁷¹

In this case the religion in a "secular" subject is not just a matter of context or symbolism but a whole shift of scientific theory based on religious tenets. The Adventists are quite clear about the importance of this view of creation to their overall philosophy.


It is not enough to be able to tell why you believe in the Seventh-day Sabbath, or in the second coming of Christ. These are vital certainly but so is the reason why you believe in a literal Creation and a uni-

⁷⁰ Sidney Dykstra, *Mathematics Curriculum Guide* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: National Union of Christian Schools, 1958), p. 38.

⁷¹ Ernest S. Booth, *Biology: The Story of Life* (Mountain View, Calif. Pacific Press Publishing Assoc., 1954), Preface.

PLATE XI

FOSSILS



the beginning of the Flood that the ark was opened. Noah, his family, and all the animals left the ark. The Flood evidently ended abruptly by the rising of the continents out of the water rather than by the water drying up, as people might ordinarily suppose (see Psalm 104:6-8, margin). This event is substantiated by the fact that one day the dove went out of the ark but could find no land anywhere, then just two weeks later the dove stayed out entirely. There must have then been plenty of land for the dove to live outside the ark. There is abundant geological evidence to show that the continents actually arose, and the ocean beds sank, thus bringing the Flood to an abrupt end. It was the land which dried up at the close of the Flood, for the water is still with us in the ocean. Before the Flood, you recall, the earth was primarily land, while now it is only a fourth land.

During the entire year of the Flood the bodies of animals and plants were being buried in layers of mud as we find them today. During the first half of the Flood tremendous wave action must have occurred along with the breaking up of the crust of the earth. Erosion of the hills and mountains formed great quantities of mud and other sediments in which the dead creatures were buried. When the great wind began to blow at the end of the first 150 days, tearing off exposed mountaintops and whipping up the Floodwaters, still greater amounts of sediment would

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Major events of the Flood.

Ernest S. Booth,

Biology: *The Story of Life*

(Mountain View, Calif.: Pacific Press Publishing Assoc., 1950), p. 473.

(This is a text published for use in Seventh-day Adventist Schools.)

PLATE XII

*"The heavens are the works of Thine hands: . . .
they shall be changed: but Thou art the same,
and Thy years shall not fail."*

(HEB. 1:10, 12; PS. 102:25-27)

Sprinkled in the Milky Way, on the side of the Pole Star opposite the Big Dipper, are five stars. They look like a big "W" (or in winter an "M") that was sat on and bent down. Some people think they should be called a chair or even a queen's throne. They named the constellation Cassiopeia (*kas ih oh pee ya*) after a queen of Ethiopia.

Back in the year 1572, a boy named Tycho was very interested in the stars. He thought they were wonderful, so he always dressed up in his best clothes when he went out to look at them. One night he saw a star near the "W" that he had never seen before. Every night he looked at this star, and it got brighter and brighter. Soon Tycho's star was so bright it could be seen even in the daytime. But after about a year it went back to being a dim star that people could hardly see at all.

Like Tycho's star, other of these giant balls of hot gases sometimes explode their outer layer with a big flash of fire and then slowly get dim again. A star which does this is called a "nova." Do you think God made a star do this as a "sign" to guide the wise men to Bethlehem to find Jesus, the "Star out of Jacob" (Num. 24:17)? These wise men had spent much of their time watching and studying stars, and God showed them by the stars that the promised Savior had come. Matt. 2:9 RSV tells us "the star which they had seen in the East went before them, till it came to rest over the place where the child was." The star might have been a bright nova which appeared near the sun and shone in the western sky after sunset for them to follow.

There is a story that people in the Holy Land still tell. It says that one day, exactly at noon, the wise men were getting water from the well of the inn at Bethlehem. They looked down the dark well, and in the water they saw the reflection of the star. Since the star was directly over them, they knew this was the place where Jesus was. Who knows what wonderful things God may be trying to show us through the stars!

"W"

Fritz A. Callies,
God's Stars

(Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Publishing House, 1960), p. 10.

(This book was published for juveniles and is in use in some Lutheran elementary schools.)

versal Flood. Upon a belief in Creation Week hinges the Sabbath. Upon a belief in the fall of man and degeneration as a result of sin, hinges the whole plan of redemption. What need would there be of a Savior for men who were growing more and more perfect through the ages?⁷²

This theological perspective is also evident in a discussion of disease in an Adventist physiology book.

It was only after Adam and Eve submitted to Satan's temptation and thus introduced sin into the world that sickness, disease, and suffering made their first appearance. Through the centuries that have followed, the effects of sin have made the human body weaker, generation by generation. In our time the body's organs and tissues are very easily overtaken by disease.⁷³

This text is also used to defend the social regulations set by the Church, which include prohibitions against smoking, drinking, card-playing and dancing and admonitions against meat-eating and body-contact sports.

As you learn more about the evils that surround you, you will be glad that you are an Adventist. The stand which the church has taken is for your protection. You will be happier in living up to the high ideals of the church and loyally supporting its program of healthful living.⁷⁴

Adventist education offers not only the opportunity to teach the Church's doctrine and moral system. The Adventists have concluded that their schools are the source of other values and results as well.

Through the curriculum and the extracurriculum of Adventist schools, the church is strengthened by the Christian homes set up by youth brought together in the pursuit of education. In order to retain their children and youth in the church and for possible service for the church as laymen or as church workers in its worldwide program, and in order to increase the likelihood of successful Christian homes for the youth, Adventists have found it advisable to place their children in Adventist Christian schools. . . .

The denomination has found that her youth trained in her own schools are far more likely to give this complete commitment than are those trained in public schools.⁷⁵

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 478.

⁷³ Harold Shrycock, *Living* (Mountain View, Calif.: Pacific Press Publishing Assoc., 1958), Preface.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁷⁵ Richard Hamill, *Philosophy of Seventh-day Adventist Education* (Washington, D.C.: General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1959), pp. 23-4.

CONCLUSION

The extent of the religious context of parochial education, Catholic or non-Catholic, would have been more apparent, although difficult to document on paper, if we had considered the whole program of one of these schools. In a Catholic school, for example, the school day often begins with a Mass which all the children are urged to attend. There are often prayers at the beginning and end of each class, regardless of the subject. There are statues of saints, the Blessed Virgin, crucifixes and other religious symbols throughout the school. The school building itself is usually an integral part of the parish property. More important, however, are the teachers who generally belong to religious orders. Their vocation is the highest aspiration of the devout Catholic and the Church is their whole life. They take an oath of absolute obedience to the Church and to their superiors. Their presence as symbol and actual embodiment of the religious ideals of the Church can hardly have less impact in a class in woodworking than in one in Church history. Although it takes somewhat different forms, the religious environment for education is equally important in Protestant schools.

This study has concerned itself, however, only with overt examples of religion in textbooks of subjects which have been called "secular" and which are included in the National Defense Education Act. There are seven general ways in which religion is integrated into the academic materials in the parochial school textbooks which have been studied.

1. Religious symbols and subjects used in examples for arithmetic and grammar drill. Common in mathematics and languages.
2. Specific sectarian doctrines taught wherever controversial matter appears in the text. Common in science, geography, and languages.
3. A general theistic Christian approach to all matters. Common in all subjects.
4. Requests that children concern themselves with specific Church goals. Common in geography and languages.
5. Appeals to Church authority for proof of a point. Common in science, geography and languages.
6. Selective emphasis on religious institutions and contributions to the culture and on facts favorable to the Church and omission of institutions and contributions to the culture made by others and of facts unfavorable to the Church. Common in science, geography, and languages.
7. Defense of the Church's social ideas and regulations. Common in science, geography and languages.

What are the implications of these findings for any future proposal to subsidize the teaching of secular subjects in parochial schools? The issue is very much alive. In addition to Section 305 of the National Defense Education Act, supporters in Congress of federal aid to parochial schools are proposing that the "secular" subject formula be expanded to include broader

forms of aid such as classroom construction and payment of teachers' salaries and to include more subject areas. Several journalists and lawyers have lately recommended the "secular" subject concept as a constitutional compromise for alleviating the financial burden on parochial schools.⁷⁶ The recent legal brief by the legal department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference is almost wholly based on the "secular" subject concept. Although the brief concedes that it would be unconstitutional for the federal government to finance religious education, it concludes that "... aid to the secular function (of parochial schools) may take the form of matching grants or long-term loans to institutions, or of scholarships, tuition payments or tax benefits."⁷⁷

Although the concept of a division between secular and religious aspects of parochial school education denies and might eventually harm the philosophy of education which undergirds these systems, it might be possible somehow to draw a legally viable line between the two parts.⁷⁸ The evidence presented here can not answer that question in any final sense.⁷⁹ That is a task for Congress and ultimately the Courts. But the idea that all science, mathematics and languages as taught in parochial schools are "secular" subjects, simply because of the nature of these subjects, is entirely too facile. It ignores all reality of teaching practices in many of these schools.

The concept of a "secular" subject in a religious school is very complex. There are unquestionably variations in the amount of religious content in courses.⁸⁰ There is more overt religious material in the textbooks for the elementary grades than for high schools.⁸¹ There is apt to be more religion in biology than in organic chemistry; more in arithmetic than in calculus. But whenever any subject is linked to other subjects or to life itself, there is the possibility of a religious element.

William R. Consedine, the legal counsel of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, has suggested in reply to a report of this research,

If the simple presence of religious content in a textbook makes public purchase of the textbook unconstitutional, every school district in the Nation has long been violating the Constitution.⁸²

⁷⁶ See, for example, Paul G. Kauper, "Church and State: Cooperative Separation," 60 *Michigan Law Review*, 36; and Christopher Jencks, "Catholics and School Aid," *New Republic*, CXLVI (March 19, 1962), 21-4. Jencks is considerably more cognizant of the problems in this approach than is Kauper.

⁷⁷ Legal Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference, "The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church-Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education," 50 *The Georgetown Law Journal*, 437.

⁷⁸ Other constitutional problems would still remain.

⁷⁹ In communities where parochial school educators were willing to accept some subjects taught in a secular manner, "shared time" might be a solution with fewer constitutional and long range policy problems. See Harry L. Stearns, "Shared Time," *Religious Education* (January-February, 1962), pp. 3-36.

⁸⁰ There is often more religion in the subjects not covered in this study: history, philosophy, psychology, government and sociology, for example.

⁸¹ There are also more textbooks available at the elementary school level since the parochial school market is larger there.

⁸² Quoted in *The Brooklyn Tablet*, May 19, 1962, p. 4.

But the evidence presented here of the religious element in "secular" subject parochial school textbooks is more than the plain mention of the empirical religious aspects of the culture, which, of course, would be quite constitutional in public school texts. It is more than just a religious context or the use of religious symbols instead of secular symbols. The religious element in parochial school texts is a part of a careful effort to indicate the relevance of a particular religion to every phase of life and to inculcate belief in the tenets of a particular church as the source of all religious truth and the pathway to salvation. As Msgr. George W. Casey recently put it, "Let us face it, the chief reason for the Catholic school system is the preservation of the faith."⁸³ Religious education can be an entirely legitimate activity when carried on with private funds, but serious constitutional problems are raised when it is financed by federal taxes.

As the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Memorandum and the Congressional testimony quoted earlier made clear, the constitutional basis for the Section 305 loans was the belief that science, mathematics and languages were "secular" subjects even as taught in parochial schools. Both the supporters and opponents of the legislation agreed with the provision in the bill for extension that public funds should not be used to subsidize religious education. This is widely held by all parties to be a fundamental constitutional principle. The Supreme Court has repeated three times Justice Black's definition of the establishment clause.

The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.⁸⁴

It has been demonstrated that the assumption that science, mathematics and modern languages are "secular" subjects as taught in contemporary parochial schools is false. These subjects, on the contrary, are often integral parts of the schools' total program of religious education. This presents a serious dilemma for the supporters of this approach to aiding religious schools if they are firm in their regard for constitutional principles.⁸⁵ Since it is evi-

⁸³ Quoted in *The Boston Pilot*, August 12, 1961. The Seventh-day Adventists have made a similar statement: "The Adventist school makes Adventists and attracts Adventists When properly utilized the Christian school is the greatest evangelizing agent in the Church." Quoted, and backed with statistics, in Department of Education, *Seventh-day Adventists Youth at Mid-Century* (Washington, D. C.: Review and Herald Publishing Assoc., 1951), p. 26.

⁸⁴ *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); *McCollum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); *Torasco v. Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488, (1961). See also Justice Douglas's majority opinion in *Zorack v. Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952): "Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education. . . ."

⁸⁵ In a case last year in Oregon, that state's Supreme Court found that an Oregon law that allowed the lending of secular state-chosen textbooks to parochial school students still violated separation of church and state because evidence was presented that the courses in which these

dent that at least some religion is being taught in some of the subjects that are eligible for subsidy under N.D.E.A., a means of distinguishing which subjects contain religious material and in which schools would have to be devised. The dangerous implications of this procedure are obvious. An authority would have to be set up to supervise local curricula, to censor textbooks for religious material and to investigate infractions and abuses with public money. On the other hand, if there are no controls, the government will continue to run the risk that some of its money is or will be used for the teaching of religion and the promotion of a Church. Congress is forbidden by the First Amendment to establish religion directly. It is also forbidden by its public trust to distribute public money without examination or controls where there is a danger that federal funds might indirectly establish religion or a Church. The current government programs of aid to religious schools in the guise of aiding "secular" subjects violate both constitutional principles and sound public policy.

textbooks were used were being taught in a sectarian manner. The Section 305 loans under N.D.E.A. present a similar kind of problem. In a case decided thirty-three years ago upholding a state provision of secular textbooks, *Cochran v. Board of Education*, 281 U.S. 370, no evidence was presented about the sectarian use of such textbooks. The Supreme Court said, however: "Among these books, naturally, none is to be expected, adapted to religious instruction," at 375.

Some Aspects of Educational Planning in Underdeveloped Areas

Adam Curle, dealing with what he recognizes as "an almost universal dilemma," presents a broad view of the relationship between social, economic, and educational planning in societies undergoing rapid change. Direct in his approach, he maintains that "countries are underdeveloped because most of their people are underdeveloped, having had no opportunity of expanding their potential capacities in the service of society."

Visiting Professor of Education at Harvard University in 1961-62, Adam Curle received the degrees of M.A., B.Sc., and D.Phil. from Oxford University where he was a University Lecturer in Social Psychology. He was Professor and head of the department of Education and Psychology at the University of Exeter and Professor and later head of the department of Education at the University College of Ghana. He also served for three years as Advisor on Social Affairs to the Government of Pakistan. His most recent appointment is Director of the Harvard Graduate School of Education's Center for Studies in Education and Development.

ADAM CURLE
Harvard University

THE WEALTHIER FRACTION of the world has, during the post-war period, grown increasingly concerned over the condition of the underdeveloped two thirds. A few figures may illustrate the relatively much greater poverty of this fraction. It possesses less than a third of the world's riches (the same amount as is owned by the wealthiest 8 per cent of the world's population); the average calorie intake is 2,000 (as opposed to over 3,000 in the U.S.A., where the protein consumption is also significantly higher). About 75 per cent are illiterate (as opposed to around 2 per cent in Western Europe); per capita income is less than \$100 (in the U.S.A. it is \$2,500). The majority of people are debilitated by chronic illnesses virtually unknown to the developed world—kwashiakor, bilharzia, hookworm, malaria—as well as ravaged periodically

by preventable epidemics—cholera, smallpox, typhus, and bubonic plague. There is less than one motor vehicle per thousand people (as contrasted with over 100 in the developed world); life expectancy is about 30 years (as opposed to about 70 in most of the wealthiest group of countries).¹

Such statistics could be prolonged indefinitely and would continue to show the same picture: the enormous gulf between those who have, and are yearly having a bit more (per capita income has increased by \$500 in the U.S.A. over the last 10 years), and those who have not. Indeed, those who have not are in many cases actually having less. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, their populations are increasing so rapidly that additional production is simply consumed. Secondly, there is a tendency in many places, as Myrdal points out,² for investment to be attracted from the poor to the already rich areas.

It need hardly be argued that the great gap is an increasing threat to the stability of the world and, unless we take vigorous action, one which is likely to get worse as the population grows. (By the year 2000, it is calculated that three quarters of the world's population will be in the same condition as today's two thirds.)³ The challenge to the conscience of the rich is equally great.

Happily the developed world has taken up the challenge, and for motives in which expediency and altruism are inextricably blended. In the last fifteen years an unprecedentedly large amount of aid has flowed from the rich to the poor countries; but viewed as a whole, the results have been disappointing: the "take off," as Rostow⁴ calls it, has been achieved by very few of the developed nations. The character of this help has been largely based on the assumption that the chief lack of the underdeveloped countries was capital, and the technical personnel required to form capital. This assumption is now being vigorously challenged by many economists, who maintain that underdevelopment is not merely an economic but also a social phenomenon. Galbraith⁵ in particular makes this point vigorously, stressing that a literate population and a highly educated elite are just as important for development as the inflow of capital. He goes on to list three other items relating to the social system as being of equal importance. These are social justice, an efficient administration, and clear understanding of what development entails.

¹ This comparative information is derived from a number of sources, the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook, 1960*; the Food and Agriculture Organisation *Yearbook, 1960*; UNESCO *Basic Facts and Figures, 1960*; Norton Ginsburg, *Atlas of Economic Development* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1961); W.S. and E.S. Woytinski, *World Population and Production* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).

² Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and the Under-developed Areas* (London: Duckworth, 1957), pp. 50-63.

³ *The Future Growth of World Population*, Population Studies, ST/SOA/Series A/28 (New York: United Nations, 1958).

⁴ W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: a non-communist manifesto* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

⁵ J.K. Galbraith, "A Positive Approach to Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (April 1961).

EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The significance of education in particular is now generally maintained, as was demonstrated by the recent conference of the OECD on *Economic Growth and Investment in Education* (Washington, October 1961). Some economists have attempted to quantify the contribution of education to economic expansion. Schultz,⁶ for example, maintains that less than a third of the increase in the national income of countries can be explained by quantitative increases in factor inputs. The residual has not been accurately broken down, but the most important factors appear to be the improvement of the human material through better health and training, and through the development of science and technology.

Encouraging though such developments may be, it is perhaps limiting that many people who are concerned about speeding the educational growth of underdeveloped countries think in rather narrow terms of increasing the supply of skilled manpower. If we stop to consider the social context responsible for the previous failure to produce this manpower, we see that the problem is wider than this. Underdeveloped societies are underdeveloped because they are not geared to the types of activity which development entails, and one of these is education in the general sense of the word. Many of these societies espouse systems of belief which are antipathetic to the flexible, empirical spirit necessary to technical achievement. Their social systems are often of a sort which would impede the growth of large commercial or industrial undertakings, or of individual capital accumulation. Large proportions of their populations, being chronically malnourished or diseased, are physically incapable of taxing technological work or agricultural innovation even if they were emotionally oriented and intellectually prepared for it. The enormous poverty of the majority of people in the underdeveloped world forms an almost unbreakable vicious circle with sickness, disease—and underproduction. The perimeter of this circle is very often reinforced by either political considerations, or the non-egalitarian character of the society, or both.

It is common knowledge that the ruling classes of many nations have been reluctant to spend much money on the education of those who might then compete with or supplant them. The differences between these classes and their poorer compatriots reflect and are similar in principle to the differences between nations.⁷ Even without explicit government policy, the enormous gulf between rich and poor, powerful and impotent, well educated and illiter-

⁶ Theodore W. Schultz, "Capital Formation by Education," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. LXVIII, No. 6 (1960), pp. 571-583, and his other writings. H.M. Phillips gives even greater weight to education in "Education as a Basic Factor in Economic Development," *Final Report of Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa* (Addis Ababa, May 1961; Paris: UNESCO, 1961).

⁷ This is neatly illustrated in "Problems of Regional Development and Industrial Location in Europe," *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954* (Geneva, 1955).

ate is incredibly difficult to bridge. Underdeveloped societies tend to be highly stratified in terms of race, religion, tribe, region, class, or caste. In consequence the path of advancement for any one born in the lowest strata is hard and steep. He has to cross obstacles in the shape of indifferent schooling, of his own physical difficulties—malnourishment and chronic disease—and of social inertia. Eventually he has the final problem of establishing himself in a world in which there is no ready-made place for him.

For all these reasons, only a fraction of the potential talent of the underdeveloped countries is put to productive use, and it is very largely for this reason that they remain underdeveloped. The problem is one which education is qualified to tackle, at least in part, so long as it is borne in mind that we are not thinking simply of producing the people, but also of changing the society; or rather of producing the people who will change the social structure as they contribute to the economy. Naturally these things always go together, but the emphasis we lay on one or other aspect of the development continuum affects our priorities.

One of the main things lacking in the underdeveloped countries is a middle class. In the traditional land-based economy there is little to stimulate the entrepreneur, while the growth of the technical, professional, and administrative class has been so slow, because of the inadequate educational system, that its members have tended to align themselves with the existing power groups. Thus the small emergent middle class, instead of establishing its own standards of competence, of professional integrity, and of appointment in terms of ability and training, has often striven to become as exclusive as the old elite, emulating rather than rivaling it. This proclivity is reinforced and illustrated by the difficulty of filling the intermediate posts, which is almost as serious an impediment to development as the complete lack of trained persons. Compare, for example, the figures for doctors and less highly trained medical personnel in the United Kingdom and in India.

TABLE 1⁸

Type of personnel	Per number of persons	
	India	United Kingdom
1 doctor	6,300	1,000
1 nurse	43,000	300
1 health visitor	400,000	4,710
1 midwife	60,000	618

The reasons for the inversion of the British pattern are complex, but one implication is that hierarchy matters even to the "new class" and that it frequently sets up barriers as strong as those through which its members have

⁸ Government of India, Planning Commission, *The First Five Year Plan* (New Delhi, 1952), p. 490.

themselves broken. The high prestige of the top grade occasioning the lack of intermediate personnel is one cause of slow professional growth; it also leads to inefficiency and waste, as when a doctor spends half of his time as his own laboratory technician.

This is not to say that education is doing a bad job, but that to have its full social effect, it must have a sufficient volume. If the middle class is to be influential enough to break through resistances against effective economic behavior, to establish high standards of efficiency in administration, industry, and business, and gradually to draw together the extremes of the population, then it must be sufficiently large.

In the old days when the British Colonial Office was planning a slow socio-educational evolution for Africa, it was assumed that the middle class would grow gradually over a period of decades. But political pressures and the urgency of reaching what Sax calls the Demographic Transition⁹ give us very much less time. The African countries, among others, feel the urgency most keenly, and ambitious plans of educational expansion are being everywhere developed. From the point of view of the arguments I am putting forward, this is excellent, but when we get down to the details there are vast difficulties.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

First there is the problem of how much a country can spend on education, and I will not attempt to answer this, except to say that the answer will to some extent depend on the apportionment of resources between activities which have a more and a less rapid impact on the economy. Lewis¹⁰ makes the distinction between "consumer" and "investment" education. He argues that teaching an African cook to read is "consumer" education; for, while of personal value to the cook, it does not improve his professional competence. My own experience leads me to disagree with the contention about the cook who will now be able to read cook books and the price of food in the market, while I am in general doubtful about the validity of the dichotomy. It is particularly hard to draw sharp lines of differentiation between productive and non-productive learning in the peasant economies which comprise those in most of the underdeveloped countries. Moreover, I believe we must continually emphasize the economic importance, though indirect, which education might have in helping to build a more adaptable and pragmatic society. I consider it more profitable to consider the problem in terms of long and short term educational investment. There can be little doubt that the most im-

⁹ Karl Sax, *Standing Room Only: The World's Exploding Population* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955). This is "the transition from a high-birth-rate, high-death-rate culture (with low living standards) to a low-birth-rate, low-death-rate culture (with relatively high living standards)," p. 4.

¹⁰ W. Arthur Lewis, "Education and Economic Development," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. X, No. 2 (June 1961), pp. 113-127.

mediate short-term returns can be obtained from investment in adult education. On-the-job training in metal, engineering, and building trades, agricultural extension, apprenticeship schemes, and all the educational activities which go with community development will obtain results in weeks or months, whereas schemes involving formal education may take ten years or more to mature.

There is another extremely important side to this. A poor country's capacity to absorb trained personnel is not great. For one thing, the jobs are few; for another, the wage expectation of the small number of educated persons is relatively much higher than in a richer country. In Ghana, for example, a primary school teacher is paid four times more relative to the national average income than one in the U.S.A. Therefore the poor countries can afford proportionally fewer trained people than the rich ones, although their need is so much greater. Here is one of the many vicious circles of underdevelopment. If primary education is expanded as rapidly as political pressure and national pride demand, the result—as in many West African countries—is the unemployed primary school graduate. In the Philippines and India¹¹ the academic level at which unemployment occurs is higher, but the principle is similar. There are no jobs at a level which young people consider proper for themselves, and so, having wasted their country's money on their education, they proceed to waste their family's resources on their maintenance. Given time, the number of available jobs will go up, or the aspiration of the school leaver go down, but again we have not got this kind of time and we cannot afford this kind of waste.

The speediest way in which an underdeveloped country's absorptive capacity can be increased is through its main industry of agriculture. This appallingly neglected field could absorb, as extension workers, community development workers, assistant agriculture officers, and the like, millions of young men and women who at present scorn it as a form of activity representing the backwardness they are attempting to escape from, and who see very slender rewards to be gained from it. (It takes 75 per cent of the working population of Asia to produce an inadequate 2,500 original calories per head per day for the inhabitants of the continent. In the U.S.A. 15 per cent of the working population produce 10,000 original calories per head per day. These figures illustrate the size and the urgency of the problem.) But if suitable training for different levels of scholastic attainment were devised and adequate possibilities of promotion established, the people might well be attracted to types of work which have an immediate impact on the economy, rather than to the normal favorite avocations of clerk or school teacher.

If agriculture can do most to absorb skilled and semi-skilled labor, industry comes second and can do more to increase a nation's wealth. However, the

¹¹ It is calculated that there are 50,000 unemployed graduates in India. In the Philippines there are 250,000 college and university students, most of whom are working for qualifications which are both academically worthless and useless for obtaining employment.

poorer a country is, the less it can sustain those factors which tend to strengthen the labor force and to increase production. Two of these factors, the amount of vocational training and the membership of labor unions, tend to vary proportionately with national wealth, as is shown by the following figures for underdeveloped areas.

TABLE 2¹²

Group of countries	Percentage of secondary school population (age 12-19) in vocational training, according to national per capita income			
	up to \$100	\$100-250	\$250-500	\$500-750
Africa	3.5	25.3	—*	—
Asia	2.4	14.6	20.9	48.8
Latin America	47.1	41.4	36.5	61.0

* Only the Republic of South Africa comes within this group.

TABLE 3¹³

Per capita gross national product	Percentage of population in labor unions
Up to \$100 (21 countries)	0.82
\$100-\$250 (20 countries)	2.59
Over \$250 (15 countries)	6.42

Note: The average for the lowest income group has been almost doubled by the figure for Bolivia of which 7.7 per cent of the population belongs to labor unions.

An entirely untrained and unadapted labor force drifting between agricultural under-employment and the alien life of the factory town is cheap and easily obtained labor in which management is not inclined to invest. Nor is it attractive to install new plant calling for skilled handling. So industry lacks efficiency and the labor force lacks the steady employment which would make it efficient. But these workers, by the very fact that they have shaken loose from the traditional life and sought industrial employment, are part of the nucleus of the new class which will transform society. Anything spent on their appropriate training or on efforts to organize them will have both a short-term productive and a long-term social effect.

A STRATEGY FOR EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION

If I seem to have strayed away from the field of education proper, it is because I wanted to stress that we have to use the term widely in relation to the underdeveloped countries. I also wish to show why educational planning and especially planning of the long-term investment in schools, universities, and

¹² Derived from Ginsburg, *op. cit.*, and from UNESCO, *Basic Facts and Figures* (1960) (cited in Note 1).

¹³ Derived from Ginsburg, *op. cit.*, and Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960).

technical colleges, has to be related in the widest sense to all other aspects of social and economic planning. A country's capacity to absorb persons of different educational levels and abilities; the factors which can be brought to affect this capacity; the relationship between the educational, social, and economic factors in productivity—all these and many other things have to be borne in mind when planning the rate of expansion of an educational system and the priorities to be assigned within that system to its several parts.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that every country presents its own problems, it is possible to suggest some of the broad lines of the strategy of educational expansion. Firstly, common sense would advocate an absolute maximum ratio of growth for primary education of 10 per cent per annum. But common sense is unlikely in this case, as in many others, to prevail against political expediency. We are forced to the next best thing, which is a series of measures designed to reduce the damage to standards caused by over-rapid expansion. This means emphasis on teacher training (including upgrading of existing teachers) and on such methods as will enable teachers both to deal with more children and help bad teachers to teach better. The growth of secondary education is far more significant to economic development, and it is on this that resources should be concentrated. Universities are, of course, also of great importance, but their expense is enormous and in any case the greatest shortage is of persons educated up to secondary level (particularly where there has been a considerable component of vocational or technical training).

The great problem is to determine the rate of growth. Harbison,¹⁴ in his calculations upon which the size of the Ashby Commission's recommendations were based, founded his estimates on the number of skilled persons who had contributed to Nigeria's rate of economic growth in the previous decade. He then made assumptions about the numbers who would be required to maintain this rate of growth over the next 10 years. Lewis¹⁵ has worked out a formula in which the key element is the existing number of jobs at the post-secondary (or post-university) level. But while both of these methods avoid the dangers of educational inflation, they may be somewhat too firmly based in the existing situation. Unless this is already a rapidly expanding one, there

¹⁴ Frederick Harbison contributed the chapter entitled "High Level Manpower for Nigeria's Future" in the Ashby Report: *Investment in Education*, Report of the Commission on Post-School Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria (Lagos, Nigeria: Federal Ministry of Education, 1960).

¹⁵ W. Arthur Lewis, *op. cit.* Lewis is of the opinion that it is possible to calculate the proportion of the age cohort who should receive secondary education by the following formula:

$$x = \frac{n(a + b + c)}{m}$$

where:

- x = proportion age cohort to be recruited.
- n = ratio of number of secondary type jobs to adult population.
- m = ratio of number in age cohort to adult population.
- a = normal wastage of nationals of the country.
- b = abnormal wastage due to replacement of expatriates.
- c = percentage rate of growth of the number of secondary type jobs.

is unlikely to be enough educational expansion to infuse real energy into the economy. On the other hand, it is of course even more damaging to overspend on education, impoverishing the country, producing people who cannot be employed, and making little contribution (since educational investments take many years to mature) to the nation's wealth. This is an almost universal dilemma: a country needs a considerable number of trained and educated persons to build up and consolidate its development, but until it is developed it has not the resources to educate the people.

What can be done, however, is to place heavy emphasis initially upon such activities as will without great cost bring about rapid improvements in the economy. Such activities would be training rather than education in the broadest sense; vocational rather than general. They would be directed towards key sectors of the economy. Agriculture and industry have already been mentioned in this connection: training for management is also extremely important. A further principle would be to make full use of existing potentialities, of the people already employed. Both public and private employers would be encouraged to provide in-service training to upgrade their staff.

To concentrate heavily upon this form of technological training is, of course, only a short-term expedient designed to strengthen the economy and to increase the absorptive capacity so that, in the next phase, the weight can be gradually transferred to the formal system of education. From this will come men and women who not only possess the necessary skills, but an outlook sufficiently broad to contend with the extreme problems of a society undergoing rapid change.

I would like to end by re-emphasizing my approach to the whole problem. To my mind, countries are underdeveloped because most of their people are underdeveloped, having had no opportunity of expanding their potential capacities in the service of society. The main reason for this lack of opportunity lies within the social structure and can only be remedied when there are enough people with a new attitude towards society. Education in its various forms is the chief vehicle for changing attitudes. I therefore hold that the emphasis should not so much be on using people to build the resources, but on using the resources to produce the people.

Deliberate Instruction and Household Structure: A Cross-Cultural Study¹

Do all societies strive with equal formality to transmit to their children cultural beliefs and norms? If not, what are some of the social and psychological conditions that determine whether such deliberate instruction is offered? These are two of the questions that direct the following inquiry.

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To test the cross-cultural hypotheses presented in this paper, Mr. Herzog will soon begin fieldwork in Barbados, B.W.I., where he will compare the school behavior of children from mother-child and nuclear households.

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INTRODUCTION

THIS IS A STUDY of the functions which different forms of "education" serve in different types of cultures. It departs considerably from the frame of reference in which education is usually discussed by educators, sociologists, and even anthropologists. Hopefully, the reader will not be distracted by this from thoughtful consideration of the data and of the interpretations offered.

Throughout this paper, the term "instruction" has been used in preference

¹ This research was initiated with the encouragement of John W. M. Whiting, who first recognized that "deliberate instruction" might be a fruitful cross-cultural variable. The author wishes to thank William R. Charleson, Roy G. D'Andrade, Robert L. Munroe, and Dr. Whiting for their many theoretical and methodological suggestions. Robert L. Munroe aided in the reliability check during a period when time was very precious to him; the author is much indebted. Finally, the author is appreciative of the encouragement and advice of his wife, Dorothy S. Herzog.

to "education". The former has been little used by anthropologists, and perhaps will connote roughly the same thing to most readers. But "education", as a concept and as a label, has been badly abused by anthropologists, who have meant different things by it at different times.

Early anthropologists, such as Hambly (1926), used the term to refer to virtually everything that happens to children. In a later period, psychoanalytically-oriented fieldworkers such as Erikson (1950) requisitioned it to cover the early socialization of the child in the household of his birth, a process which might be better subsumed under the categories "child training" and "child care". In addition, many anthropologists analyzing "education" for audiences of educators have used the occasion to discuss aspects of socialization which only very loosely might be considered educational. Herskovits' cogent discussion (1943) of Dahomean child training, under the title "Education and Cultural Dynamics", is an example.² This conceptual fuzziness has not forwarded anthropology's contribution to the understanding of education or of other aspects of socialization, nor has it convinced many educators that anthropology has much to say to them.

The present author wishes to steer clear of these shifting sands. Therefore, the term "instruction" has been used throughout, except in a few instances where variation of terminology seemed stylistically desirable.

By "deliberate instruction" we mean that process by which an adult, or at least a person of a senior age grade, takes a child or a group of children aside and attempts verbally to communicate to them certain ideas, skills, and facts. Such communication must take place on the initiative of the adult, and not be requested by the children, nor be the adult's response to a misdemeanor or omission by the child (which might be better called "scolding"). The motivation of the adult's behavior in such instances would seem to be the feeling that children need to be told certain things directly, or they will not learn them and thus not grow up to be culturally acceptable adults. Examples of deliberate instruction with which Western readers are familiar are the school, the catechism, and parental lectures to children.

By "cultural beliefs and norms" we refer to the ideas about "the good", "the true", and "the beautiful" which are explicitly or implicitly part of every culture, and which serve to regulate and integrate behavior in it. Examples are religious beliefs and practices, ideas of morality, obligatory etiquette, cosmology, ethics, genealogies, history and traditions, literature and mystical writings or sayings, poetry and songs. Such ideas are in theoretical opposition to the knowledge and techniques which are used to ensure physical survival and comfort, and which may be regarded as the *technical* knowledge of a society. It is clear that a society could not long survive without a

² Herskovits' subsequent discussion (1949, Chapter 19) of "enculturation" and its various aspects ("education", "schooling", "training", etc.) is, however, one of the clearest confrontations of the subject to be found in the anthropological literature.

well-developed and efficiently communicated technical apparatus; it is less clear (although probably no less true) that a society could not survive without a well-developed and efficiently communicated apparatus of beliefs and norms. It is with the communication of this latter body of beliefs and norms that this paper is exclusively concerned.

Finally, this study is concerned only with instruction which does *not* lead to occupational specialization, although, of course, the same instruction may lead to specialization in one society, but not in another. The only instruction with which we shall be dealing is that which ideally, at least, is available to all members of one or both sexes in a society; or if not generally available to all members, does not produce vocational or professional advancement for the "graduate". We are concerned, in other words, with "general education".

Admittedly, the distinction between technical knowledge (and communication of it) and beliefs and norms (and instruction in them) is an arbitrary one, although in making it, we follow Kluckhohn (1949). But the factors which probably influence the manner in which knowledge of both types is communicated seem quite different. Technical training might be best provided "on the job". Children could then watch, imitate, receive informal advice, and practice under the direct supervision of an experienced adult. Only if technical knowledge and skills are generally exercised beyond the ken of children—as in our American society and, for example, in many hunting and fishing economies—is deliberate instruction at some stage required. Thus, we should expect to find the presence and absence of technical instruction to be highly correlated with the settings, with respect to children, in which the predominant subsistence activities are carried out. Mead (1943) speaks to this same point. Unfortunately, this line of thought has not been tested in this paper.

Deliberate instruction in beliefs and norms, or "regulatory training" in Kluckhohn's terminology (1949:206), is intuitively not so simple to predict. Some readers may be surprised to learn that there are societies which do not make any deliberate attempt to instruct their children in beliefs and norms. The Lau of Fiji are a good example:

The people do not believe in educating children. Small children are said to be without minds. . . . Bigger children are watery souled. It is generally believed that it is useless to teach them anything, and that schools ought to be for big boys, almost young men. . . . The education of Fijian children therefore consists in picking things up as they go along by example. . . . Their ignorance is extraordinary. . . . The children pick up tales, but tell them most unintelligently. . . . On the other hand, children pick up practical knowledge very early, because they begin to help their parents—boys, their fathers; girls, their mothers—at an early age, through their own sweet will, more as a game at first. Gradually this develops into regular and

real work until at the age of fifteen or sixteen they are enrolled among the adults so far as work is concerned.³

Similarly, Du Bois reports that among the Alorese

... Children are not so much debarred from adult activity as given no role in it. This means that such learning as goes on is largely in terms of restrictive discipline and absorption, rather than permissive discipline or deliberate training. ... Neither sex has any ritually or socially recognized crisis rites to dramatize the passage from childhood to adulthood. It is basically an individual and personal transition that must be made.⁴

Neither of these authors means to imply that the children do not learn the beliefs and norms of their societies. They do learn, of course, but they do so through methods other than direct tuition: imitation, reward and punishment, and identification.

On the other hand, a culture may go to great pains to ensure that norms and beliefs are meticulously transferred. Our own elaborate school system attests to this. But the insistence on instruction may lead to the use of forms very different from those with which we are acquainted. Among the Papago, for example,

Young people were ceaselessly trained in the moral code. ... The moral code must be gone over and over. ... The father was generally the speaker, though the mother might take her turn, especially with the girls. The time was chosen when the family were all lying in the dark on their sleeping mats, ... often in the hours before dawn. There was a special method of speaking: a low, insistent monotone. ... These speeches have an effect that is almost hypnotic. ... This constant, though unaggressive repetition of principles must have had the effect of producing a unity of sentiment in the community as profound as it was unconscious.⁵

The Somali have developed another means by which deliberate instruction in beliefs and norms can be provided. Most Somali live in nomadic bands, but a few live in permanent settlements called *jama'a*, which are both agricultural and religious centers. The *jama'a*

act as training centres for the devout (*wadaad*), usually described as "bush teachers" or "bush preachers", who wander about from camp to camp through the bush, stopping now and then to hold classes where at least some rudimentary knowledge of theology is

³ Arthur M. Hocart: *Lau Islands, Fiji*; Bernice P. Bishop Museum, Bulletin 62 (Honolulu: 1929). P. 146. (In HRAF.)

⁴ Cora Du Bois: *The People of Alor* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1944). Pp. 47, 80. (In HRAF.)

⁵ Ruth M. Underhill: *Social Organization of the Papago Indians*; Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology, No. 30 (N.Y.: 1939). P. 163. (In HRAF.)

imparted. In these transitory bush schools children are taught prayers and verses from the Koran and generally acquire the ability to read and write Arabic. Children receive a thorough grounding in the Koran and their familiarity with Koranic texts remains with them throughout their lives.⁶

The main point here is that cultures vary widely in the extent to which norms and beliefs are taught by deliberate instruction. Some verbalize ideals infrequently, and encourage learning by other techniques. Some expect parents to do much lecturing; others utilize specialists of various sorts, to whom the children report for such purposes. Still others organize dramatic initiation ceremonies in which the emotional element greatly outweighs the intellectual. The objective of this paper is to suggest some of the social, structural, and psychological conditions under which deliberate instruction is, and is not, offered.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

"Deliberate instruction" has received little sustained attention from anthropologists. Two or three factors contribute to this situation. First, anthropologists have until recently concerned themselves mostly with "primitive" cultures in which specialized institutions of instruction usually do not exist. Firth, for example, in his highly regarded ethnography of the Pacific island of Tikopia, reports that

the observer is impressed almost immediately by the absence of any institutionalized education. The training of children is a private affair, and is very largely a function of the kinship situation, the parents of the child playing the most important part as instructors.⁷

Second, almost all anthropologists who have specialized in the study of socialization and personality development have been heavily influenced by Freudian ideas, and to a lesser extent, by general behavior (learning) theory. Neither theoretical orientation assigns to deliberate instruction a very significant role in the overall socialization of the child.

Finally, it is possible that anthropologists have steered away from consideration of deliberate instruction in part because of the grandiose claims regarding its importance made by early twentieth century social scientists and philosophers, and in the contemporary period by many educators, politicians, and social reformers. Durkheim, for example, felt that the social function of "education" (by which he meant "schooling") is to

⁶ I.M. Lewis: "Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal Islam—I and II"; *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*. Vol. 17, pp. 581-602; Vol. 18, pp. 145-160. P. 14, HRAF pagination.

⁷ Raymond Firth: *We, the Tikopia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1936). P. 147. (In HRAF.)

... arouse in the child (1) a certain number of physical and mental states that the society to which he belongs considers should not be lacking in any of its members; (2) certain physical and mental states that the particular social group (caste, class, family, profession) considers, equally, ought to be found among all those who make it up. [Without this education, society] would break down into an incoherent multitude of little fragments in conflict with one another. (1956: 70, 79)

Sentiments similar to Durkheim's can be found in almost every contemporary textbook on education, including those by comparative educators, who might be expected to be more cautious. Many anthropologists of the present generation may feel that their role is that of providing antidotes for such oversimplifications.

The general position of anthropology, at least until recently, is well represented by the following words of Linton:

The conscious training of the individual undoubtedly influences the content of his personality, making for the establishment of particular habits and attitudes. It also influences the more superficial aspects of personality organization by setting certain concrete goals for the individual's attainment and directing his energies toward these. However, its influence is too intermittent and forms too small a part of the total influences to which the individual is subjected for it to have much effect on the deeper organization of personality. To put it concretely, conscious training can develop almost anyone into a fairly successful businessman or craftsman, but it cannot make him an extrovert. . . . [Conscious] training always looms large in the minds of the society's members. Our own naive belief in universal education as a panacea is a case in point. However, this conscious training receives its high rating mainly because it is the only aspect of cultural conditioning of which the society is conscious (1936:475-6)

We do not mean to imply in any way that those subjects which the "psychological anthropologists" have studied do not deserve attention. We feel that it is time that learning and teaching of a more cognitive nature be scrutinized, also. Such study would have two purposes: the determination of the actual impact which "conscious training" does have on children, and the discovery of the conditions under which a society resorts to this technique of socialization.

It is encouraging that during the past decade increased attention has been paid by anthropologists to the first of these goals. The so-called "complex societies" have slowly fallen within the purview of anthropology, and a chapter on "education" is to be found in most books of the "community study" genre. (See, for example, Service and Service, 1954:227-238.) There is an increasing

tempo of anthropological writing on broadly conceived educational issues (Cf. Spindler, *et al*, 1955, and Mead, 1951), although much of this is impressionistic. Anthropologists have moved from their discovery of the psychiatric hospital as a "small society" (Cf. Caudill, 1958, and Rappoport, 1960) to a similar view of the American college (Cf. various articles in Sanford, ed., 1962). It would be only a short further step to a similar view of elementary and secondary schools. Finally, many ethnographers are nowadays sent to the field with instructions to report on the cognitive, as well as the emotional, training systems of their "tribes". (Cf. Whiting, *et al*, 1955)

But there is no emerging "tradition" of comparative anthropological study of deliberate instruction in the second sense mentioned above. It is therefore not surprising that one of the major cross-cultural generalizations tested in the present study was suggested by a historian, Bernard Bailyn, whose provocative ideas will be discussed under Theoretical Orientations and Results. Before discussing Bailyn's proposal, however, we will outline the methodological and theoretical antecedents of this study.

METHODOLOGY

The cross-cultural method employed in this paper is described in detail in several of the sources listed in the bibliography: Whiting, 1954; Whiting and Goethals, 1957; Whiting and Whiting, 1960; Moore, ed., 1961. The cross-cultural method has been developed to exploit ethnographic materials in the testing of generalizations about human behavior. The method supplements the controlled laboratory of the psychologist with the "natural laboratory" of man's numerous group solutions to the basic problems of living.

The cross-cultural method is *not* synonymous with what is frequently called the "comparative" approach. The cross-cultural method stipulates that all judgments about data be objective and operational; that societies to be studied be chosen so far as possible by criteria unrelated to the major foci of research; and that generalizations be stated, and samples selected, in such ways that they are amenable to simple statistical tests of significance. In such research, the single society, or a particular aspect of it, is the "unit". The typical comparative analysis does not meet these conditions, usually for good and valid reasons.

There are, of course, severe limitations to this kind of research. Certain areas of the globe are poorly covered in the anthropological literature. Excellent ethnographies abound with lacunae on topics which may be of interest to the researcher but which did not occur to the original fieldworker. The complications introduced by the diffusion of traits from society to society must be faced. Thus, one of the major problems of cross-cultural research is that of framing the "suitable" question, one for which answers are generally available in the anthropological literature.

The feasibility of cross-cultural research has been greatly increased in recent years by the continued expansion and widespread availability of the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF). These Files contain minutely cross-indexed ethnographic accounts of several hundred cultures, distributed systematically throughout the world, and chosen for inclusion by experts in the various geographical areas. Given a suitably phrased question, the Files will yield information in a fraction of the time required for library research.⁸

In carrying out this study, the writer went through the relevant portions of the files on individual cultures and typed out all statements dealing with the presence and absence of instruction in beliefs and norms. A total of 111 separate files (and, in a few cases, books) was consulted in this manner. Sixty-nine of the societies were chosen by a group of graduate students who did a preliminary survey of "religious education" long before the present hypotheses were developed. (Constantine, *et al*, 1961) Thirty-four societies were later added to complete a standard cross-cultural sample frequently used to test hypotheses at the Laboratory of Human Development, and for which numerous ratings on other subjects are available. A final eight societies were deliberately chosen at one point to increase geographical coverage and to add a few "complex" societies, which appeared to be few in number.

A rating sheet was then devised. This sheet divided deliberate instruction into three categories, for theoretical reasons which will later be evident. The divisions are as follows:

- Type I:* deliberate instruction by *kin*, with or without change of residence.
- Type II:* deliberate instruction by *non-kin*, without change of residence required.
- Type III:* deliberate instruction by *non-kin*, with change of residence required.

An example of Type I instruction is the Papago case previously quoted; of Type II, the Somali example, or our own schools; of Type III, the practice of the Mende of Sierra Leone, who traditionally required pubescent boys and girls to live and participate in separate "bush schools" for periods up to three or four years in duration. Type III instruction usually (but not always) takes place as a part of, or connected with, initiation ceremonies—of which more later.

The rater (i.e., the present writer) then made for each of the three categories a summary rating which combined his judgment of whether or not deliberate instruction in cultural beliefs and norms was practiced and his judgment as to its universality for all children of at least one sex. If he was

⁸ For a fuller discussion of the Files, see Moore, ed., 1961.

doubtful about either criterion, his summary judgment was marked as "inferred". The rater also judged whether change of residence was required to receive the instruction, and whether the instruction was provided by kin or non-kin. This second group of decisions obviously led to the placement of any recorded instruction in one of the three types; if the rater was doubtful about either of them, the summary judgment was again marked as "inferred". Later examination of the ratings showed that there were no important differences in the distribution of the "inferred" and the "stated" cases; they have therefore been combined in the analyses which follow. (They are discriminated in the Appendix list of ratings, however.) Thus, with respect to deliberate instruction of each of the three types, there are three possible ratings: Present, Absent, and Not Ascertainable.

It was possible to make ratings (i.e., Present or Absent) for at least one type of instruction for 96 of the 111 societies in the original sample. Specifically, 79 Present or Absent ratings were made for Type I, of which 47 were of instruction present; 90 ratings were made for Type II, of which 42 were of instruction present; 81 ratings were made for Type III, of which 27 were of instruction present.

The present study deals almost exclusively with Type II, deliberate instruction by non-kin without change of residence, and Type III, deliberate instruction by non-kin with change of residence required. Type I instruction seems to vary most closely with Type II instruction. However, the scoring of it was intuitively unsatisfactory, and discussion of it has been avoided throughout this paper. A separate study is indicated.

All of the ratings were made by the present writer. While this is not methodologically desirable, financial limitations precluded the hiring of a neutral coder. Most of the ratings were made in ignorance of the scores which the societies had obtained on the various independent variables; in fact, certain of these had not been selected when the ratings were being done. In addition, a reliability check was done on a sample of ten societies. The per cent agreement for Type I was 80 per cent; for Type II, 90 per cent; and 80 per cent for Type III. This level of agreement was judged sufficient for the present introductory effort. If there are errors of judgment in the ratings (and there probably are), they are probably not systematically biased. Random errors "tend usually to prevent a relationship from appearing in the data rather than to create a relationship where one does not exist." (McClelland, 1961:24; see also Ferguson, 1959: Chapter 18). The fact that we have achieved relatively high degrees of significance using our very gross measures provides added weight for the findings.

The geographical distribution of the societies in the final sample of 96 is shown in Table I. Also shown is the rating for presence and absence of Type II instruction.

TABLE I
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE, AND TYPE II INSTRUCTION

Geographical Area*	Type II Instruction		Total Number of Societies
	Present	Absent Not Ascertainable	
Africa (Sub-Sahara)	1	16	18
Circum-Mediterranean	12	1	13
East Eurasia	13	6	20
Oceania	5	10	16
North America	9	6	17
South America	2	9	12
Totals:	42	48	96

* These subdivisions correspond to those in the *World Sample*, *q.v.*, *infra*.

The 96 societies include representatives of 58 of the 60 culture areas into which Murdock has divided the world in his *World Ethnographic Sample*⁹; only Caucasia and Northwest Europe are unrepresented. Six of the 58 culture areas are represented by three societies each, the rest by one or two.

It is evident from Table 1 that Type II instruction is distinctly *not* a Sub-Saharan trait. Nor does it occur very frequently in South America, although the sample here is small. But it cannot be said that such instruction is a unique characteristic of any particular area. Almost all Circum-Mediterranean cultures have it, but so do 65 per cent of the East Eurasian, 58 per cent of the North American, and 31 per cent of the Oceanian. The distribution around the world is sufficiently widespread that the hypothesis of diffusion cannot account satisfactorily for all of it. The situation on the continent of Africa (in the table split into Sub-Saharan and Circum-Mediterranean regions) is revealing. South of the Sahara, only one of seventeen societies has Type II instruction; north of the Sahara, only one of six does not. This, despite the many centuries of intercourse between the two areas.

These considerations lead us to discard the diffusion hypothesis and encourage us to hope that by examining the structures of the societies which do and do not practice instruction, we will gain some notion as to the circumstances which lead to its presence.

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

The basic theoretical orientation of this study regards the institutions of a culture first as "maintenance systems", through which the culture makes its ecological adjustments; and second as "cultural solutions" to the psychologi-

⁹ The *World Sample* provides ratings on approximately 30 variables, such as household structure, form of marriage, type of subsistence economy, degree of political integration, etc., for some 565 societies distributed throughout the world. The *World Sample* is a basic tool of cross-cultural research. It was first published in Murdock, 1957; it is reprinted, with corrections, in Moore, ed., 1961.

cal problems which the maintenance arrangements produce. The maintenance systems of a society are the basic procedures through which its members obtain nourishment, shelter, and protection. These usually require that each member act in a prescribed manner on certain specific occasions, both for his own good and for that of the group. For example, if a man wishes protection from his enemies, he must know who among his fellows is bound to defend him, as well as the culturally-approved forms of argumentation, law, and physical combat. If he wishes food, he must follow the customary techniques by which it is produced, distributed, and consumed.

But the maintenance systems of a society also affect its techniques of child training, and thus the processes of socialization which its children experience. Different processes of socialization lead to the pre-eminence of different issues and problems for the growing child, as well as for adults. For example, maintenance arrangements which place a mother, a father, and their children out in the woods, in virtual isolation from other such households (the classic American frontier pattern), have obvious implications for personality development. The over-burdened father and mother will make strong demands on their children to learn to do things for themselves, and to help their parents, as soon as possible; the issues of independence and responsibility will loom large for the children, and presumably will continue to in later life.

Thus, maintenance systems and socialization practices interact to form the society's non-subsistence institutions, or "projective systems"¹⁰: those customs and beliefs which are *not* directly involved in the satisfaction of basic biological needs, but which often are as obligatory and unquestioned for members of the society as the maintenance practices, since they provide the approved means of satisfying psychological needs. Maintenance systems influence the nature of the projective institutions which a society may have; but the psychological outcomes of the society's child-training also strongly influence the nature of these institutions. Archetypical projective systems are religious beliefs and customs, group ceremonials, ethnotheories of disease, and the like. The basic assumption of this paper is that the various types of deliberate instruction are, at least in certain respects, projective solutions for certain of the psychological needs of the children from societies of different sorts.

The theoretical orientation which has just been presented is a very brief summary of views stated much more explicitly in Whiting and Child (1953), Whiting and Whiting (1960), and Whiting (1961), to which the reader is referred for further clarification. The orientation must be stated in more operational terms to admit of cross-cultural research, however, and it is to this task that we now turn.

¹⁰ The reader will note that this usage of the term "projective" does not completely parallel its more customary usages in psychology and education. See the explanation of this use in Whiting and Child, 1953: Chapter 6, and Whiting, 1961:356.

The formulation which led to the selection of many of the specific variables used in this study has been called the "status envy hypothesis". (Whiting and Burton, 1961) This is a theory of child development in which the central concept is the child's envy of persons who control resources which the child himself would like to control. The theory postulates that the child practices, in phantasy or play, the role or roles of those persons who control the resources (such as food, freedom from pain, warmth, and affection). The covert practice of the envied role provides the basis for the otherwise mysterious process of identification. When the child has matured sufficiently, and has been practicing a role ultimately open to him, he is able to enter it and perform up to cultural expectations relatively quickly.

The general theoretical orientation regarding maintenance and projective systems, and the status envy hypothesis, are brought together when we realize that different maintenance systems provide vastly different household personnel, from the point of view of the child, with whom to interact and identify. The situation in which the infant lives and sleeps exclusively with his mother in a hut all of their own contrasts strikingly with the situation in which the infant is raised as a co-inhabitant of a house with numerous grandparents, parents, uncles, aunts, and siblings. In the first instance, the mother is the controller of virtually all resources desired by the child; in the second, numerous persons mediate them and are available as objects for identification. Thus, different maintenance systems provide different constellations of "significant others" in the life of the child; these varied patterns lead to emphasis upon different psychological issues in the lives of both children and adults. These issues will be "solved", we predict, in characteristically different ways by societies with characteristically different maintenance systems. The various forms of deliberate instruction are one of the classes of solutions which societies may employ.

The status envy hypothesis, and the various empirical studies relating to it, have been discussed at length by its originator in a number of recent or forthcoming publications: Whiting (1960a), Whiting and Burton (1961), Whiting (1961), and especially Whiting, Fischer, *et al* (forthcoming). The theory places great, although not exclusive, emphasis on "early learning", suggesting that the identifications formed by the infant in his natal household have a profound influence on his later psychological development.

There are two empirical studies which also influenced the direction of this research. The first is a graduate seminar report (Constantine, *et al*, 1961) which showed, for a sample of 69 societies, a high correlation between the degree of political integration of a society and the presence and absence of what was called "religious education" (essentially, Type II instruction). This finding was replicated by the present author in an earlier paper (Herzog, 1961), and in Table 2 is reproduced using the enlarged sample and revised definitions of the present study.

TABLE 2
POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND TYPE II INSTRUCTION

Political Integration*	Instruction		
	Present	Absent	
States over 100,000 in population (S)	17	5	$\chi^2=14.16$ (d.f.=3)
States 1500-100,000 in population (L,M)	11	14	
Dependent societies and peace groups (D,P)	2	4	
Autonomous communities under 1500 population	9	25	p<.005
and absence of political integration (A,O)			

* Ratings of political integration are taken from Column 15 of the *World Sample*.
See Appendix: Code E.

A similarly strong relationship exists between Type II instruction and Murdock's measure of social stratification (Column 14): socially stratified societies tend to have instruction, while classless societies do not.

These are not startling conclusions, although they had not been previously documented. Table 2 is, as one frank colleague remarked, merely a "statistical verification of things we already know intuitively." The really interesting question remains both unasked and unanswered: what are the *reasons* for the strong correlation between instruction and cultural complexity? This paper provides some possible answers.

The second study to which this research is closely related is that of Bailyn (1960). Bailyn, a specialist in American history, was interested in tracing the historical origins of universal public elementary education in the United States. His examination of the social history of England and the American colonies during the period when the public schools (i.e., Type II institutions) were beginning led him to conclude that the most important cause of their establishment was change in the composition of, and functions discharged by, the household. "The family group familiar to the early colonists" in England, he says, "was a patrilineal group of extended kinship gathered into a single household. . . . It was these patriarchal communities that shouldered most of the burden of education." (1960:15-16) In the colonies, however, these traditional arrangements proved untenable. The prestige of the parents was diminished in the hostile and unfamiliar environment; the availability of free land encouraged youths to strike out on their own and to resist the teachings and advice of their parents. The nuclear household became the predominant household form of the society.

As early as 1640, Bailyn records, it was realized that this new form of household was "failing in its more obvious educational functions." (26) "The fear of brutish decline" affected colonists in all areas of America; their response to it, especially in New England, was "a rapid enhancement of the role of formal schooling." (27) What the family was no longer able to provide, a revitalized public teaching institution was given to do.

Bailyn's interpretation of the American experience is well-documented and persuasive. It seems reasonable that societies living in large family groups which include several mature generations will be able to use the personnel of the household to instruct their young, while societies with nuclear households might find this difficult and resort, when possible, to institutionalized instruction outside the home.¹¹ This proposition is relatively easy to test by cross-cultural methods and is the first hypothesis explored in the following section.

RESULTS

The Bailyn hypothesis specifies that societies with households with numerous adults do *not* have Type II instruction, and that societies with households with two or less adults *do* have instruction. The *World Sample* provides us with a workable estimate of household composition for the cultures in our sample. Murdock's categories (Column 7) can be conveniently grouped for our purposes into four major household types¹²:

- extended households* (Murdock's *s*, *e*, and *l*), in which three or more adults, customarily belonging to two or more generations of the same family, live under the same roof along with their children;
- nuclear households* (Murdock's *n*), in which a man and his wife customarily live in the same house, with their children;
- polygynous households* (Murdock's *p* and *q*), in which a polygynously married man and his two or more wives customarily live in the same house, with their children;
- mother-child households* (Murdock's *m*), in which a mother and her children occupy a house all their own, the father having his own separate house or residing in a communal men's house.

The results of the test of the association between these variables are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3
HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND TYPE II INSTRUCTION

Household Type	Instruction		
	Present	Absent	
Extended	20	8	$\chi^2=13.52$
Polygynous	5	7	
Mother-child	6	21	$p<.005$

¹¹ It should be emphasized, in fairness to Bailyn, that this formulation of the generalization is ours, and not his. It does appear to accord with his thinking, however.

¹² Communal household societies are ignored in this instance. Only one, the Siriono, who have neither Type II nor Type III instruction, occurs in the present sample.

The hypothesis is *not* confirmed. In fact, its opposite is supported, and at a high level of significance. The *number* of people in the household seems directly, rather than inversely, related to the presence of instruction outside of it.

It is conceivable that household structure and political integration are intercorrelated, and that we have discovered nothing new in the association shown in Table 3. This possibility is explored in Table 4.

TABLE 4
POLITICAL INTEGRATION, HOUSEHOLD TYPE, AND TYPE II INSTRUCTION

Political Integration	Household Type	Instruction	
		Present	Absent
High (S, L, M)	Extended	13	3
	Nuclear	9	1
	Polygynous	3	2
	Mother-child	3	13
Low (D, P, A, O)	Extended	6	5
	Nuclear	1	10
	Polygynous	2	5
	Mother-child	2	8

Putting the two maintenance system variables together shows clearly that they are *not* redundant. Only *mother-child* societies are relatively unaffected by political complexity: no matter how complex they may be, they rarely have Type II instruction.¹³ On the other hand, societies with *nuclear* households are greatly affected by political complexity, and this difference is significant beyond the .002 level, by Fisher's Exact Test. *Extended* and *polygynous* household societies are moderately affected by political integration, but the differences are not significant. A general conclusion which we can draw from this data is that with respect to Type II instruction, political integration affects the household groups dissimilarly.

Though Bailyn is borne out in his feeling that household composition is related to Type II instruction, the specific association which he appears to assert is not a common one, cross-culturally. A second look at his English and American data seems called for.

Bailyn's conclusion that the nuclearization of the family in America was associated with a "veritable frenzy" of interest in schools (28) is consonant with the cross-cultural evidence; in fact, the complex nuclear household colonies are exactly the type of society *most* likely to have such a child-training

¹³ They have Type III instruction when they are complex, however, and tend not to when they are simple, as shown in Table 5, *infra*. This relationship approaches, but does not quite reach, statistical significance (Fisher's Exact Test).

institution, according to Table 4.¹⁴ The public elementary school is, of course, only one of the several forms which such instruction may take; in our nine complex-nuclear societies with instruction, the most frequent form which such teaching assumes is the church-school. Actually, Bailyn notes that the motive of much early American schooling was religious, indeed sectarian; he declares that what gave education "its greatest importance and its characteristic form was its position in the emerging pattern of American denominationalism." (1960:39)

However, Bailyn's assertions about the lack of instruction in extended-household England are not consonant with the cross-cultural findings. Certainly the England of Elizabethan times was a complex "state"; certainly the household, as Bailyn describes it, was "extended". We would expect some sort of Type II instruction to have existed. And apparently a variety of Type II instruction did exist, although Bailyn (rightly, for his purposes) chooses to de-emphasize its importance in the overall socialization of the child. The church, he says, played "a role as formal educator exercised through institutions of pedagogy which it supported and staffed." (18) Bailyn is not explicit as to the nature and distribution of these institutions, but Curtis (1948), one of the sources upon whom Bailyn relies, states:

It is very difficult to assess the provision of primary education. . . . No systematic study . . . has yet been made, and such a research would be a stupendous task. However, there are clear indications that primary education was more widespread than was formerly believed. . . . We know that the Church included the instruction of the young as one of the duties of the incumbent of the parish and that the "school" was frequently held on the church porch or in a room above the porch. How far this instruction went beyond the teaching of religion and morals depended upon the individual clergyman. (pp. 101, 104)

There also seem to have been numerous schools preparing boys for the grammar schools; much of the curriculum of these was religious.

Clearly, this church-sponsored teaching meets the definition of Type II instruction which we originally proposed for our cross-cultural rating system. It would thus conform to the trend delineated in the sample. Probably the Bailyn hypothesis should be reformulated to refer only to the *relative* importance of Type II instruction in extended, and in complex-nuclear, societies. Perhaps the "tone" of Type II education is different in nuclear and extended households, and it is this difference which Bailyn has discovered.

¹⁴ The societies in this group are the Amhara, Balinese, Burmese, Bulgar, Lebanese, Malays, Makassarese, modern New Englanders, and Tuareg. The only complex, nuclear household society lacking Type II instruction is the Trobrianders. The Trobrianders are nominally mother-child households. Perhaps then, they are not genuine exceptions to the general association.

We shall return to this point some pages forward, but we shall not be able fully to clear it up; additional research is necessary.

Thus far, we have dealt only with Type II instruction: instruction by non-kin without change of residence. Certain types of societies characteristically do not employ this sort of child-training: the mother-child group stands out. Let us now take a look at these aberrant societies. What kind of instructional procedures, if any, do they use?

A consideration of the place of Type III instruction—instruction by non-kin with change of residence required—is obviously called for. Table 5 reports the relationship among political integration, household type, and Types II and III instruction.

TABLE 5
POLITICAL INTEGRATION, HOUSEHOLD TYPE, AND TYPES II AND III INSTRUCTION

Political Integration	Household Type	Instruction			
		Neither Present	Type II Only	Type III Only	Both Present
High (S, L, M)	Extended	3	12	1	1
	Nuclear	1	7	0	2
	Polygynous	2	2	0	1
	Mother-child	4	1	9	2
Low (D, P, A, O)	Extended	5	5	0	1
	Nuclear	11	1	1	0
	Polygynous	4	0	3	2
	Mother-child	6	0	2	2

TABLE 6
POLITICAL INTEGRATION, HOUSEHOLD TYPE, AND TYPES II AND III INSTRUCTION

Political Integration	Household Type	Instruction		
		Type II Only	Type III Only	
High	Extended and Nuclear	19	1	$p < .002$ (Fisher's)
	Polygynous and Mother-child	3	9	
Low	Extended and Nuclear	6	1	$p = .008$ (Fisher's)
	Polygynous and Mother-child	0	5	
All	Extended and Nuclear	25	2	$\chi^2 = 22.19$ $p < .001$
	Polygynous and Mother-child	3	14	

Table 5 is a complicated table, in which several statistically significant relationships exist. The most important, however, is the association among the various forms of household and the two types of instruction. Overwhelmingly, when *some* form of instruction is offered, Type II is employed by extended and nuclear societies, and Type III is favored by mother-child societies and, to a lesser extent, polygynous household societies. This generalization holds under conditions of both high and low political integration. Table 6 displays the relevant figures from the bigger table. (Those societies in which *both* Types II and III occur have been left out of Table 6, although the overall relationship is almost as strong [significant at the .005 level] when they are included as contradicting the general hypothesis.)

TABLE 7
HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND TYPES II AND III INSTRUCTION

Household Type	Instruction		
	Type II or III	Both Present	
Extended and Nuclear	27	4	$\chi^2=9.35$ $p \geq .05$
Polygynous and Mother-child	17	7	

TABLE 8
POLITICAL INTEGRATION, HOUSEHOLD TYPE, AND INSTRUCTION

Political Integration	Household Type	Instruction		
		None	Some (II, III, or Both)	
High	Extended and Nuclear	4	23	N.S.
	Polygynous and Mother-child	6	15	
Low	Extended and Nuclear	16	8	N.S.
	Polygynous and Mother-child	10	9	
All	High	10	38	$\chi^2=14.90$ $p < .001$
	Low	26	17	

Table 5 also shows that mother-child and polygynous societies are somewhat more likely to employ both types of instruction than are extended and nuclear societies, *if* instruction is employed at all. This relationship, which does not quite reach the .05 level of significance, is shown in Table 7.

A third interesting relationship is that between political integration and the presence and absence of *any* kind of instruction. As Table 8 shows, politically complex societies tend to have instruction, no matter what form of household is typical of them; simple societies do not.¹⁵ Furthermore, the mother-child-polygynous group is as likely to have *some* sort of instruction as the extended-nuclear:

TABLE 9
HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND INSTRUCTION

Household Type	Instruction		
	None	Some	
Extended and Nuclear	20	31	N.S.
Polygynous and Mother-child	16	24	

There are, then, four relatively clearcut conclusions to be drawn from inspection of the relations among household structure, political complexity, and types of instruction:

1. Politically complex societies, no matter their household type, tend to use deliberate instruction; politically simple societies get along without it.
2. When some form of instruction is offered, Type II is employed by extended and nuclear societies, and Type III is employed by mother-child societies. Polygynous societies are intermediate.
3. Mother-child and polygynous societies are somewhat more likely than nuclear and extended to employ concurrently both Type II and Type III instruction.
4. With regard to Type II instruction, societies with different household types are affected dissimilarly by political integration.

Other significant relationships exist in the data of Table 5: some of these will be discussed in the next section. But the preceding are our most straightforward results. They raise, for this writer, more vital questions than they answer. *Why* do complex societies require some sort of instruction? *Why* is household structure so strongly associated with the type of "education" employed by a society? Is it possible that Type II instruction "solves" a particular psychological problem for the children who experience it, and Type III another? If so, how do societies with neither type of instruction (notably,

¹⁵ The form of presentation of Table 8 disguises certain significant differences between extended and nuclear household societies of low political complexity. These have already been pointed out in the discussion following Table 4 and will be re-examined in the Interpretation.

the simple mother-child and nuclear ones) manage to cope with these psychological issues?

Given the present data, these are questions which can only be answered by interpretation and by citing relevant studies by other investigators. Nonetheless, some possible answers will be put forward in the following pages, with the full knowledge that they are highly speculative and that much additional research is called for.

INTERPRETATION

The question regarding the association between political complexity and instruction initially seems simple to answer. Complex societies require instruction in beliefs and norms to prevent their dissolution into Durkheim's "incoherent multitude of little fragments", or the "incipient savagery" (Bailyn, 1960:28) which the American colonists feared.

Parsons, in a sophisticated analysis of the functions of the school class in American society (1959), makes a similar point. One of the main functions which he lists is the "internalization of a level of societal values and norms that is a step higher than those [the child] can learn in his family alone." (309) This is not the only "outcome" of instruction which Parsons discusses, but it is a central one. The major "cultural" function of instruction, in Parsons' view, is the attainment of consensus on "values and norms".

The deficiency of this argument is that it converts a well-known correlation into an assertion of causality. All that we really know is that complexity and instruction are usually coincidental. Could we not as well argue that instruction "causes" complexity?

This last notion is unfamiliar but not difficult to present plausibly. Let us suppose that certain maintenance systems predispose a society to employ a version of deliberate instruction. In this event, two further developments are implied. First, the beliefs, norms, and "discoveries" of the society will be communicated more exactly and efficiently to younger generations than if less specific techniques were used. Second, instructional specialists may develop who are particularly adept at the communication of beliefs and norms. Under these circumstances, the "cultural heritage" of a society will grow, a greater command over the environment will ensue, and political and social development will at least become more probable.

It may be objected that this alternate formulation is undemonstrable. But we must insist that the complexity-leads-to-instruction argument is equally undemonstrable, or at least undemonstrated. If deliberate instruction is necessary for cultural continuity in complex societies, how do the ten complex societies without deliberate instruction (in Table 5) hang together? Why do as many as seventeen of the simple societies instruct their children, if "complexity" is the determining variable?

It might be argued also that instruction in *technical* knowledge might lead to the development of sociocultural complexity, but that instruction in beliefs and norms could hardly do so. This argument is not convincing. Far more basic for the long-range development of a culture than bits and pieces of technical knowledge is the attainment and communication of an appropriate "world view", or cosmology, from which specific "discoveries" can be generated and understood. The technological revolution of the Western world is traceable not to any specific technical or scientific "inventions", but to the development of scientific philosophy and method, which, in turn, led to specific advances in technology.

We are deliberately stating the case for the instruction-produces-complexity hypothesis in an extreme manner. We are trying to establish it as a reasonable alternative to the argument more frequently heard. We acknowledge that neither view can be regarded as "correct". In order to demonstrate the validity of one or the other, some third factor must be shown regularly to intervene between complexity and instruction. If such a factor could be found, the direction of the relationship between complexity and instruction might be grasped.

We furthermore agree that cultural complexity is "caused" by many factors in addition to, and probably more important than, instruction. We are quite unable to refute (and uninterested in doing so) those theories which trace cultural development to ecological adaptation (Steward, 1955); to the need, stemming from conquest or cultural amalgamation, for the transmission of an arcane "great tradition" (Redfield, 1953); to basic psychological needs, such as that for "achievement" (McClelland, 1961); or even to abstract cyclic processes (Toynbee, 1947). None of these (except perhaps the last) is antithetical to the point of view we wish to present.

We will try to show that the psychological resultants of child-rearing in societies with certain types of households predispose these societies, no matter their complexity, to employ deliberate instruction. Those societies which employ instruction to "solve" the psychological problems of their children have a head start, at least, on the road toward sociocultural complexity, and it is therefore not surprising to find that the majority of them are, indeed, complex.

To establish the reasonableness of this position, we shall try to do two things: 1) demonstrate that household structure affects patterns of child-training and/or the psychological development of the child; 2) show a relationship between these psychological issues and the use by cultures of the several forms of deliberate instruction.

Let us first examine the possible psychological needs of children in mother-child cultures. The characteristic instruction in such societies is Type III. Furthermore, such instruction is usually offered as a part of male or female

initiation ceremonies.¹⁰ Specifically, fifteen of the mother-child societies have Type III instruction, or both Type II and Type III instruction; in thirteen of them (Azande, Fang, Gusii, Hausa, Kikuyu, Lovedu, Moundu, Mende, Mossi, Thonga, Wolof, Yao, Yokuts), the instruction is provided in the course of male initiation ceremonies, or in both male and female initiation ceremonies. In one of them (Bemba) the instruction is provided only in a girls' initiation rite; and in the case of the Aztecs, it is provided in a form parallel to male rites and very similar to a Western boarding school. One can also say, after reading the descriptions of these rites, that in most cases the specifically instructional elements are only very minor parts of the ceremonies.

Of the twelve mother-child societies without Type III instruction, six (Ainu, Callinago, Nuer, Tallensi, Tanala, Tiv) have initiation ceremonies entirely lacking elements of instruction, as we have defined it; one (Somali) has both a male initiation ceremony and Type II instruction at another time and place; three (Ashanti, Chukchee, and Ganda) have no initiation ceremonies of any sort; and two (Lolo and Rajput) cannot be rated as to presence or absence of initiation rites, due to inadequate information. In other words, Type III instruction implies the presence of male or female rites, but rites need not always include Type III instruction.

The most common features of initiation ceremonies are seclusion from the opposite sex (usually requiring temporary change of residence to an initiation camp or "bush school"); ritual recognition of sexual identity and maturity; and the infliction of physical pain by the initiators (usually in the form of genital operations).

The function of male rites and analogous institutions has been discussed at length in Whiting, Kluckhohn, and Anthony (1958), Whiting and Burton (1961), and Whiting, Fischer, *et al* (in preparation). Whiting's view is that the rites are collective efforts to resolve the characteristic psychological problem of males in mother-child societies: sexual identity. Whiting notes that such ceremonies occur almost invariantly in societies in which 1) mother and child are each other's chief companions for the first two or three years of the child's life and, in particular, sleep together to the exclusion of the father, who sleeps in his own hut or in a communal men's hut; 2) the child grows up in a community controlled by his father's male relatives (patrilocal residence). Such conditions are quite characteristic of the fifteen mother-child household societies with Type III instruction: all but the Yokuts have mother-child sleeping (concerning the Aztecs, sleeping data are not available), and all are patrilocal except the Bemba (married couples live near the husband's mother's brother) and the Yao (matrilocal).¹⁷

¹⁰ Information about initiation ceremonies is taken from unpublished data at the Laboratory of Human Development.

¹⁷ Data regarding sleeping arrangements are taken from unpublished materials at the Laboratory of Human Development. Data regarding marital residence are taken from Column 8 of the *World Sample*.

Whiting's thesis, derived from the status envy formulation, is that in such societies the mother is virtually sole mediator of resources for her infant. Under such circumstances, the child's primary identification is made with her, or at least with the female role. But as boys, especially, grow up they learn that men also control resources significant to them, and that increasingly they themselves will be expected to "act like men". This later learning conflicts with their original identification; the initiation rite is an attempt to erase the primary identification and to substitute for it a more appropriate sex-role choice. The rites are, essentially, a period of concentrated manipulation of resources by the men, such that the boys come to envy and to identify with them.

If the status envy interpretation of the function of male initiation ceremonies is correct, we should not be surprised that their instruction components are often minimal or nonexistent. There are much more dramatic techniques available, such as circumcision and tests of endurance, through which to accomplish the "brain-washing". Yet certain societies demonstrate that instructional aspects are not necessarily minor. In the *Poro* (boys') and *Sande* (girls') ceremonies of the Mende, both technical and "regulatory" instruction were prominent. In the *telpuchcalli* schools of the Aztecs, boys of fifteen and older received instruction in religion and warfare. But both these examples are atypical.

Our main point—that mother-child household, patrilocal societies have initiation ceremonies and Type III instruction in order to cope with sex identity problems—is apparently threatened when we note that twelve societies having *other* household types also have Type III instruction. But it is significant that five of them, despite their household structure, have both mother-child sleeping and patrilocal residence (Aranda, Bulgarians, Gond, Riff, and Wogeo); probably the Murngin should also be included. Two of the others (Ojibwa and Pavasupai) have only female rites, much like the Bemba; and concerning two (Kung and Malay) sleeping arrangement data are not available. Thus, only the Thai and Papago rank as genuine exceptions.

There are also five mother-child societies which have neither male initiation ceremonies or Type III instruction. Concerning the Lolo, very little information of any sort is available; the judgment regarding Type III instruction is very tentative. Another, the Chukchee, is one of the mother-child sleeping, matri-biased societies which Munroe (1961) has shown rarely have initiation ceremonies. The Ashanti, Ganda, and Rajput are troublesome exceptions; but each has a pattern of change of residence for young boys, at various ages, which permanently takes the boy out of the household of his mother and thus may serve as a functional equivalent of an initiation ceremony and/or Type III instruction.

Thus, most of our "bush and boarding schools" (Type III instruction)

occur in mother-child household societies in which the residence pattern is patrilocal. It seems reasonable, drawing on our own evidence and that of the various Whiting papers, to conclude that their major function is that of resolving the cross-sex identity problems of the adolescents who participate in them.¹⁸

We have already discussed six of the polygynous household societies with Type III instruction (Aranda, Havasupai, Murngin, Ojibwa, Riff, and Wogeo) from the standpoint of their similarity and dissimilarity to mother-child societies. The small number of polygynous societies in the sample (14) and their widespread distribution throughout the cells of Table 5, make it very difficult to demonstrate the validity of any assertion which might be offered about them. In general, polygynous societies with a low degree of political integration seem to have many of the characteristics of mother-child societies and to employ Type III instruction; some of those with a high degree of integration have the attributes of nuclear or extended household societies, and Type II instruction. Beyond this inadequate statement we do not wish to go at present. Further study of the child-training customs of these fourteen societies is clearly needed.

In focusing attention on extended and nuclear households, and the type of instruction which they employ, we are opening up new territory. Rarely has "education" been regarded as a "projective institution". What possible psychological—as opposed to cultural, vocational, and allocational—needs can "schooling" possibly serve? Let us see if we can answer this question first with respect to extended households.

In the 1959 paper previously cited, Parsons suggests that "the system of formal education is the child's first major step out of primary involvement in his family of orientation." (300) In the classroom, the child becomes subject to "universalistic expectations", (303) increasingly similar to those which he will experience as an adult, and which contrast with the "particularistic" (303) treatment he experiences from his parents, especially his mother. The main goal toward which the school child works, and with respect to which he is judged, is "achievement", or "relative excellence in living up to the expectations imposed by the teacher as an agent of the adult society." (304) To the extent that the child is successful in replacing the personalized values and ideals of his home with the values and ideals of the larger community and school, he is judged "good".

Parsons goes on to say that the child learns achievement motivation by means of a "process of identification with the teacher," (306) a process through which the teacher's (society's) goals become the child's. Children differ, however, with regard to their ability to identify with the teacher and thus to achieve. They differ largely in the degree to which they have become

¹⁸ Whether or not they actually accomplish their aim, of course, is another question currently under study by members of the staff of the Laboratory of Human Development.

independent of their parents. The "independent" child has identified with his parents in learning things to please them; making the switch to the teacher, *in loco parentis*, is not a difficult feat. The "dependent" child, however, has identified with the "child-role" (307) in his household of orientation and in school aligns himself not with the teacher but with his peer group. He thus achieves a low degree of mastery over the universalistic role relationships of his society and is sorted by the machinery of the school into the less demanding curricula and walks of life.

What Parsons seems to be saying, in our terminology, is that the characteristic psychological problem of most American children is that of relative mastery of the behavior which will be appropriate for them as adults. "Sex role" has already been "psychologically stamped in" (300) by the time children reach school; what remains problematic is the issue of *growing up*. Children who have identified with the "child-role" may never grow up, psychologically.

Let us review now what is known about child training in extended households, especially with relation to its possible import for independence-dependence. Almost by definition, in such households one or several adults are constantly available to tend the child and to minister to his needs. By and large, husband and wife occupy the same house and eat and sleep together. But cross-cultural research has revealed certain specific socialization practices characteristic of extended households. Whiting (1961) found that societies of this type treat their infants significantly more indulgently than either nuclear or mother-child societies. Whiting (1959) had earlier reported that the same societies wean their infants and begin independence training relatively late. McClelland (1961) adds that societies with extended and nuclear households tend to have more achievement imagery in folktales than polygynous and mother-child societies, and suggests that children in them receive more "emphasis on independent achievement" (374) than children in societies with low *n* Achievement scores. Also, Whiting (1959) found that aggression training (i.e., training for impulse control) is significantly stricter in extended households than in the other types. Finally, "transition anxiety"—anxiety occurring in the child during the shift of status from infant to child—is significantly lower in extended households than in nuclear (Whiting, Chasdi, *et al.*, in press), as we might have expected from the foregoing.

Under such circumstances, we would *not* expect problems of cross-sex identification to arise. The child interacts with both men and women and can observe, in particular, that his father controls numerous resources, directly or through his mother, that the child himself desires. The initial identification of the child will be with "parent" or "adult", not merely with "mother" or "woman".

On the other hand, the role of the infant might seem highly desirable to the growing child, once infancy is left behind. The older he gets, the more disabilities he suffers: less indulgent care, weaning, pressure to act on his own,

demands that he control his aggressive impulses. If a younger brother or sister arrives, he can observe the latter enjoying all the prerogatives he himself used to enjoy. Status envy, we would predict, is directed toward this earlier state; it is as inappropriate a basis for learning adult role behavior as cross-sex identification.

However, the problem of altering this orientation does not seem so complex. The child's primary identification in infancy is with the adult role; the troublesome circumstances leading to the inappropriate age choice occur later, and can be affected by methods less extreme than those of the mother-child societies. We submit that one of the techniques employed by extended household societies to deal with this psychological problem is Type II instruction.

Schooling says to the extended household child, in a sense, "Your dreams of returning to infancy are nonsense. We are going to show you the way the world really operates, and you had better do as we say." It proceeds to do so by taking the child out of his indulgent household for a portion of the day and placing him in the hands of a task-oriented, relatively impersonal teacher. It is striking that most of the teachers in Type II instruction are men. Some twenty extended household societies have a total of 29 separate instances of Type II education; 21 of the 29 instances involve only male teachers. The function of these teachers, according to the status envy hypothesis, is to manipulate resources, such as freedom from pain, social prestige, and freedom of mobility, so that the child's fixation on his infancy is broken and an awareness of the power and privileges of adults, especially men, is produced.

Impressionistically at least, Type II instruction in extended household societies has a very different flavor from such instruction in nuclear societies. "Rote learning" is emphasized; the status differential between teacher and pupil is relatively larger; a variety of levels of achievement is not recognized, as a rule, all students striving to meet the same tradition-decreed goals.¹⁹ This is exactly what we would expect to find if, as Parsons indicates, "the

¹⁹ These comments are admittedly subjective. Perhaps some indication of their validity may be obtained from the following passages, describing Type II instruction in extended household societies:

"Generally speaking, education is a private affair and has been so considered from the first. Every village has its little room, always in a private house, where the boys sit on the floor with their large-print books of Chinese characters before them, and, as they sway back and forth with half-shut eyes, they drone out the sounds of the ideographs, not in unison, but each for himself." Homer B. Hulbert: *The Passing of Korea*. N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1906. (In HRAF.)

"Unless the parents are well-to-do and can employ a private tutor or guardian, their boys are sent to the village mosque schools, or to the house of some local citizen who has a private school. An enterprising teacher, who is almost always an attendant at a mosque and leads the prayers there, thus forms a fair-sized school. It is open to boys only. . . . I have never ceased wondering how fifty to sixty boys from five to fifteen, could learn their lessons. . . . Early attendance at the school is encouraged and the boy who has taken his lesson from his teacher immediately after the morning prayer, is the first to get off from class, sometimes before noonday prayer." 'Ali Shah Sirdar Ikbal: *Eastward to Persia*. London: Wright and Brown, 1930. (In HRAF.)

most important single predispositional factor with which the child enters the school is his level of *independence*." (300) If he is independent, he is able to "achieve"; if he is dependent, as should be most products of extended households, individual initiative along adult-approved lines will be slight and the child will depend either on the teacher for detailed instructions, or upon his peers who will join with him in resisting the efforts of the teacher to make them into adults.

Earlier, we suggested that Type II instruction is only *one* of the techniques by which extended household societies deal with their problem of dependence. Nerlove (1962) has recently shown that such societies also employ a type of initiation ceremony in dealing with this problem. Using a method similar to content analysis,²⁰ she found in a sample of 49 North and South American tribes that extended (and polygynous) societies hold initiations in which the theme is the breaking away of the adolescent boy from his household of origin and in which the boy acquires in turn a mystical guardian spirit. Furthermore, such rites are usually undertaken singly, rather than in groups as in mother-child societies; this is consonant with our finding that only three of 28 extended household societies have Type III instruction, which would be difficult to provide if the boy is at the same time to be isolated. Mother-child societies, Nerlove found, stress the recognition of gender identity, the acquisition of a tribal or ancestral totem, and the incorporation of boys in the male group, in their initiation ceremonies. The correspondence between the basic themes and techniques of the ceremonies of both groups, and the psychological problems which we have maintained are characteristic of the groups, is quite striking.

TABLE 10
HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND TYPE II INSTRUCTION*

Household Type	Instruction		
	Type II Present	No Instruction Present	
Extended	6	5	p=.024 (Fisher's Exact Test)
Nuclear	1	11	

* Societies of Low Political Integration.

Indirect evidence that Type II instruction is particularly "needed" by extended household societies is provided in Table 10. Among all societies with a low degree of political integration, only those with extended households tend to employ Type II instruction at least as often as they employ no instruction at all. It would be superfluous to compare extended house-

²⁰ This "content analysis" technique could also be applied to the material taught in Types II and III instruction. Unfortunately, this was not possible for the present paper. The author is indebted to Roy G. D'Andrade for this suggestion.

holds with mother-child or polygynous in this respect, but the comparison between extended and nuclear is of interest.

Once again, the societies which are apparent exceptions to the general rule are of interest. Among the politically simple societies, five extended household societies do not have instruction. Three of them employ change of residence techniques which seem to serve as substitutes: the Tlingit believe that "if a boy were brought up at home where he is apt to be petted and spoiled more than is good for him, he would not make a strong man,"²¹ so they send him at adolescence to his uncle's house; the Lepcha send some, but far from all, boys to the lamaseries for a period; and the Mundurucu formerly required boys of a young age to remain for two years in virtual confinement in the men's house. Araucanian parents and grandparents are among the most enthusiastic devotees of Type I instruction in the sample; also, the boy was traditionally sent to visit the cacique on set occasions to demonstrate his skill in etiquette and rhetoric. Only the Tupinamba seem to have employed no readily observable alternative to Type II instruction in this group.

Among the extended household societies of high political integration, four do not have Type II instruction, the Gond have already been discussed: while their household structure is extended, their sleeping arrangements and residence rules are similar to those of societies employing Type III instruction, which, in fact, they do also. The Samoans have elaborate youth organizations, one each for the boys and girls, which serve definite socialization, if not instructional, purposes. The Yoruba data on child-training are meager, and the rating for Type II instruction is actually "Not Ascertainable", not "Absent". Only the Lau Fijians seem genuine exceptions in this group.

These various items at least tend to support the view that the basic psychological issue of extended household societies is dependency, or "growing up", and that Type II instruction is one means by which this problem is handled. More conclusive evidence is not available.

The final group of societies is the nuclear. We have seen that these societies overwhelmingly employ Type II instruction when they are politically complex, and just as overwhelmingly do not employ it when they are simple. Why should this be?

Let us first review what is known about child-training in nuclear households. In the first place, mother and father normally sleep and eat together; according to our previous formulations, this should lead to an appropriate, or at least to a not inappropriate, primary identification by the child. Furthermore, nuclear household societies wean their infants earlier than societies of all other types, begin independence training at a significantly younger age, and are relatively lenient in permitting children to display aggressive be-

²¹ Florence Shotridge: "The Life of a Chilkat Indian Girl", *The Museum Journal*, Vol. 4. Philadelphia: The University Museum, 1913. P. 101. (In HRAF.)

havior. (Whiting, 1959) The "transition anxiety" of their children, perhaps as a consequence, is significantly higher than that of extended household children. (Whiting, Chasdi, *et al.*, in press) They stand relatively high in *n* Achievement scores, as reported earlier (McClelland, 1961); with respect to infant indulgence they are intermediate. (Whiting, 1961)

Under these conditions, we predict that adulthood is the envied role for the child. The adults of both sexes relatively early give and withhold resources which the child wishes, and consume them in his presence. The child does not bask in an idyllic childhood, nor has he a debilitating sexual identity problem with which to contend. Rather, his goal is to become an adult as quickly as possible and to gain for himself the advantages of this status. But society is constantly putting obstacles in his way, which he must progressively surmount if he is ever to be considered an adult. The characteristic problem of the nuclear boy and girl is, in a word, *achievement*.

Parsons suggests that in the United States the organizing principle of the classroom is achievement. The successful student is the one who identifies with his teacher as he has previously identified with his parents. In other words, a complex nuclear society such as ours "exploits" the natural proclivities of its children by setting before them a series of learning tasks of ever-increasing difficulty. The more of them the child accomplishes (i.e., graduates from high school, attends college, and so forth), the more privileges he will eventually enjoy. Clearly, the motivation of the children in a nuclear school is very different from that of the students in an extended household school; probably the difference in "atmosphere" which we earlier discussed may be traced to this contrast.

But we still have not explained the difference between simple and complex nuclear household societies in the use of instruction. On the one hand, it is obvious that "artificial" learning situations are not needed in *any* nuclear societies to the extent that they are in others, since nuclear children presumably have neither sex identity nor "generation" problems to resolve. Additionally, in a *simple* nuclear society, the boy or girl usually can accompany one or both parents into all social settings, and is probably pressed into economic service as soon as he or she is capable of being useful. Beliefs and norms can be taught by the parents themselves, either in context or during specially set aside intervals. Since these nuclear-raised children are eager to learn all attributes of adulthood as quickly as possible, and since all attributes are readily visible to them, no special Type II institutions are necessary.

This formulation is supported by the data in Table 11, which shows that nuclear societies of low political complexity are significantly less likely than other societies to employ either Type II or Type III instruction. In our basic terminology, they have no projective "need" for it.

TABLE 11
HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND INSTRUCTION*

Household Type	Instruction	
	Types II, III, or Both	None
All others	15	15
Nuclear	2	11

$\chi^2=4.55$
 $p<.05$

* Societies of Low Political Integration

Simple nuclear societies also tend to be less likely to employ Type I instruction—deliberate instruction by kin—than other types of societies. Our measure of Type I instruction is admittedly unsatisfactory, but the tendency shown in Table 12 further emphasizes a surprising fact: nuclear societies of low complexity fail to employ the socialization techniques for which they are uniquely fitted.

TABLE 12
HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND TYPE I INSTRUCTION*

Household Type	Instruction (Type I)	
	Present	Absent
All others	10	5
Nuclear	4	7

N.S. (Fisher's Exact Test)

* Societies of Low Political Integration

Why, then, do societies of this type so unanimously employ Type II instruction when they are politically complex? For a possible answer, we shall have to go far afield.

In 1951, Murdock and Whiting suggested that the role of women in the subsistence and ritual activities of a culture might have important implications for child care and personality development. They pointed out that the interactions of mother and child in a society in which women are largely responsible for a demanding field agriculture are likely to be very different, in quantity and quality, from those of mother and child in a society in which the women have few chores to perform beyond housework and in this are assisted by the numerous members of an extended family. They reported a small study which supported these views: in a sample of twenty societies, those in which the women participated minimally in "economic activities" were higher in "initial dependency and indulgence" (33) than those in which the women had a demanding economic role. Unfortunately, the authors do

not tell us if the observed differences were statistically significant, and the study was apparently not pursued further.

This item is extremely suggestive, however, in relation to our current problem. Is it possible that the economic role of women in complex societies with nuclear households is less demanding than the economic role of women in simple nuclear societies? If so, may not the increased "initial dependency and indulgence" which the stay-at-home mothers provide be the answer to the riddle?

Although there is no very satisfactory way of obtaining, quickly, measures of initial dependency and indulgence for each of the 21 nuclear household societies in our sample, there is now available a technique for measuring the role of women in the subsistence economy. This was originally devised by Heath (1958); it was later refined by Brown (1961). Involved is a quantification of the ratings in Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Murdock's *World Sample*, which contain information about the use of agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing, and hunting and gathering, and the extent to which women participate in these activities, for each of the 565 societies. Brown's formula permits the derivation of a single figure representative of women's role in subsistence pursuits.²²

Table 13 shows the interrelationship of political integration and role of women for the societies in the sample, divided by household type. Significance levels reported are calculated by Fisher's Exact Test.

TABLE 13
POLITICAL INTEGRATION, ROLE OF WOMEN, AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE

		Role of Women							
		High		Low		High		Low	
		High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Political Integration	High	9	9	2	8	1	4	9	7
	Low	3	8	11	2	7	2	4	6
		N.S.		p = .002		N.S.		N.S.	
		Extended		Nuclear		Polygynous		Mother-child	

The *only* household group for which there is a significant correlation is the nuclear, although the strong tendency in the same direction among the polygynous societies should not be overlooked. The reason for large effect among the nuclear household societies is not immediately clear: it is possible that in *complex* nuclear societies the division of labor along sex lines is more

²² For a detailed explanation of the formula, see Brown (1961). Heath (1958) is more generally available, but lacks certain refinements developed by Brown. Using the formula, Brown found an association between high role of women in subsistence and the presence of female initiation rites.

extreme than most anthropological investigators²³ have realized, and that the blurring of occupational boundaries (so far as sex is concerned) in Western industrial society is an altogether unique phenomenon. Certainly "occupational specialization" is characteristic of "developing" societies, according to sociologists and economists.

The relationship among political integration, role of women, and Type II instruction, for nuclear household societies, is shown in Table 14. Despite the crudeness of our measure of role of women, the association is clear.

TABLE 14
POLITICAL INTEGRATION, ROLE OF WOMEN, AND TYPE II INSTRUCTION*

Political Integration	Role of Women	Instruction (Type II)	
		Present	Absent
High	Low	8	0
	High	1	1
Low	Low	0	2
	High	1	10

$\chi^2=16.93$
(d.f.=3)
 $p<.001$

*Nuclear Household Only

The table shows that nuclear household societies with a high degree of complexity do not involve their women in subsistence pursuits, and at the same time employ Type II instruction; it shows the reverse for nuclear societies with low complexity. It seems highly probable that women who are not involved in subsistence work spend at least part of their "free" time with their children; at any rate, from Murdock and Whiting's report, we know that such women are more likely to indulge their children than are their chore-burdened opposites.

In other words, complex nuclear households have several of the attributes of extended households, and it is plausible that children from them possess the same or similar problems as children from genuine extended households. If the children possess the same problems, the culture might be forced to resort to the same type of solution for them: Type II instruction. Such instruction would, in turn, become enmeshed with two sets of issues for nuclear children: dependency and achievement. The role of the school in the lives of such children will be, we predict, correspondingly large.

The exceptions to the general pattern with respect to instruction are only three in number among the nuclear societies. The Trobrianders (complex nuclear without Type II instruction) have already been discussed: many of their children are raised in mother-child households, and the resulting sexual

²³ Barry, Bacon and Child (1957) argue that weak differentiation in sex-role training and sex-typed behavior is characteristic of nuclear household societies. Their large sample includes very few complex nuclear societies, however.

identity problem is apparently solved by the change of residence pattern for which Malinowski provided the classical description. The Karen are politically simple; they are recorded as having Type II instruction, but what they have is extremely unstructured, consisting of village elders who teach such boys as are interested something of the lore of the community. Finally, the Kung (a simple nuclear society) have Type III instruction rather than Type II; this exception is not easily explained.

We also note that our interpretation is consonant with Parsons' statement that dependence-independence is the single most important predispositional factor for success and failure in American schools. It reinforces our feeling that schools in extended household societies have an "atmosphere" different from schools in nuclear societies: nuclear children, despite the degree of indulgence and dependency which they probably have experienced, come to the classroom more eager to achieve, more interested in clearing away the barriers to adulthood, than their "pure" extended household peers.

Finally, this interpretation suggests a further reason for the flowering of universal public education in the United States, which we earlier discussed in relation to the Bailyn hypothesis. Certainly the *composition* is not the only aspect of household arrangements which has changed since Elizabethan times. In that period, and in frontier America, women were the economic equals of, or complements for, their husbands. But as the country prospered and became more complex, women were increasingly relieved of their subsistence tasks, and the home and children became their chief responsibility. Under these conditions, we suggest, the twin problems of achievement and dependency became salient, and America's response with Type II instruction was both quick and vigorous.*

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

At the end of the section on Results, we asked several complicated questions. We will now offer some tentative answers.

One of the questions had to do with possible problems which Types II and III instruction "solve" for children in different societies. We have theorized that these instructional forms *do* answer specific needs. We first reviewed Whiting's evidence that mother-child children experience *gender identity conflict*, and that Type III instruction and the other aspects of initiation ceremonies with which it is meshed are attempts to lessen this conflict. We next examined extended household societies and ventured that *dependence* is a major problem in them, and that Type II institutions serve in some way

* Since the above was written, the author has come upon additional remarks by Parsons which seem generally supportive of the present interpretation of the nuclear household in modern industrial society. In particular, Parsons claims that there has been "a trend within the family to *increase* the dependency of the young pre-oedipal child, particularly on the mother. . . ." (110) See Talcott Parsons: "Youth in the Context of American Society," *Daedalus*, XCI, 1 (Winter, 1962), pp. 97-123; especially pp. 110 and 114-15.

to wean the child from dysfunctional beliefs and values to universalistic norms more appropriate for the adult world. We concluded that nuclear household societies develop *achievement* needs in their children, and that special institutions of instruction are not ordinarily necessary for them; but that under certain conditions of cultural complexity, dependency also becomes an issue for nuclear household children, and Type II instruction is then widely utilized.

It must be admitted, however, that we have not adduced very convincing evidence as to why mother-child societies use Type III instruction to accomplish their ends, and other societies use Type II. Rather vaguely, we suggested that Type III instruction and initiation ceremonies deal with an inappropriate early identification, while Type II institutions have the somewhat "easier" job of altering an identification process which occurs at a later stage. The difference here is between what Whiting and Burton (1961) have labeled "identification" and "identity"; this is a complex issue, which we would like to avoid in the present paper.

A second question concerned those societies recorded as having no instruction. We suggested that simple nuclear societies do not need it because the children have a built-in motivation to learn adult behavior. We also pointed out that Type III instruction is a minor, perhaps dispensable, part of a powerful emotional experience for boys in mother-child societies, and that such societies without instruction far from ignore the training of their children. In passing, we also indicated that an occasional alternative to Type II or III instruction is a permanent change of residence, such as the Tlingit and the Trobrianders practice, in which the child is separated from his natal household.

The final question concerned the relationship between political integration and instruction. We argued that deliberate instruction might logically be regarded as a possible "cause" of complexity. Only with respect to nuclear household societies can this question be discussed interestingly. Among these, a low role of women is associated with both Type II instruction and cultural complexity. It is possible to argue that subsistence arrangements which permit mothers to stay at home with their children lead to the establishment of Type II instruction, which in a nuclear society might rapidly affect cultural development. However, the question is not really answered, and it is very doubtful that it can be.

With respect to educational practice, this study raises some basic issues. Beyond an inexact concern about children from "broken homes", it has not been customary to view the structure of the households from which students come as relevant to the practice of education. This study suggests that the constellation of household personnel may be a crucial factor in determining the success or failure of a child in various sorts of educational institutions. This study also sheds some light on the difficulties which many "slum"

children have in adjusting to the typical public school. It is well known that many such children come from homes in which the father is no longer present, or lacks status; in other words, from mother-child households. The basic problems of these children cannot be dealt with effectively in the regular program of the "day" school.²⁴ Proposals are frequently made to re-establish the Civilian Conservation Corps, or to set up boarding units as parts of public school systems. These seem quite realistic strategies, considering the cross-cultural evidence, for meeting both the emotional and intellectual needs of the relatively large mother-child minority in Western society.

There are also implications in this study for educators engaged in the ticklish work of aiding underdeveloped nations to build modern systems of education. If the findings herein presented are correct, the transplantation of Western forms of education to new soil is far more delicate a task than is usually realized, even by those who advocate "awareness" of cultural differences. For example, a progressive-minded educator who wishes to establish a "modern" school in an extended household, dependency-minded village in Afghanistan has very inappropriate raw material with which to carry out this venture. Similarly, those who would shut down the costly "English-model" boarding schools which exist in West Africa should ask themselves whether they can provide the mother-child students with substitutes which will serve both emotional and intellectual purposes as well as the originals do.

Throughout this paper, occasional reference has been made to further research which might well be carried out. There are four specific projects which seem particularly promising.

The first involves a series of *in-cultural* tests of the hypotheses developed in this cross-cultural survey. In almost every community in the United States and elsewhere several or all of the major household types exist where there are children who participate in various instructional activities. Their behavior in these activities can be observed and analyzed, and their personalities can be studied for evidence of the various "problems" which we have postulated. *In-cultural* replication and elaboration of cross-cultural studies are always desirable.

Second, the "content analysis" of the subjects taught in the various instructional institutions could be carried out. In this way, the alleged differences in "atmosphere" between the nuclear and extended Type II institutions might be demonstrated or disproved.

Third, Type I instruction should be restudied, employing a more sensitive, better calibrated rating system. Type I instruction would seem to be the variety involving the most people, and thus the most promising potential projective system. It is regrettable that the data regarding Type I were not available for this study.

Finally, efforts should be made to devise a rating system, or series of sys-

²⁴ In support of this, see Miller (1958) and Rohrer and Edmonson (1960).

tems, for the interaction of mother and child during the day. Quite crucial to many theories of child development are the quality and amount of contact which mother and child have; but the daylight hours are virtual blanks on the cross-cultural chart at present. Our success in using the role of women in the subsistence economy as an indirect measure of mother-child interaction suggests that a less circuitous rating might be even more productive.

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Gusii

Mixtecans (Juxtlahuaca)

Okinawans

Rajput (Khalapur)

Tarong (Ilocano)

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Albanians	Kachin	Samoyed
Andamanese	Kalmyck (Europ.)	Semang
Buryat	Koryak	Tapirape
Georgians	Läpps	Toda
Iban	Lur	Yakut

APPENDIX

CODES

- A. *Culture area*: numbers correspond to the 60 culture areas listed in Murdock's *World Sample*.
- B. *Type I instruction*:
 P—stated presence
 (P)—inferred presence
 A—stated absence
 (A)—inferred absence
 N—not ascertainable
- C. *Type II instruction*:
 Same code as B.
- D. *Type III instruction*:
 Same code as B.
- E. *Political integration*: (from Murdock's Column 15, *World Sample*)
 A—autonomous local communities, not over 1500 in population
 D—dependent societies lacking any political organization of their own
 L—little states, between 10,000 and 100,000 in population
 M—minimal states, between 1500 and 10,000 in population
 O—absence of any political integration, even at the local level
 P—peace groups transcending local community, where basis of unity is other than political
 S—states, over 100,000 in population

F. *Household: (from Murdock's Column 7, World Sample)*

- c—communal households
- e—extended family households
- l—lineal family households
- m—mother-child households
- n—nuclear family households
- p—polygynous family households
- q—qualified polygynous family households
- s—stem family households

Letters in parentheses indicate corrections of, or additions to, the *World Sample* ratings.

G. *Role of women in the subsistence economy:*

- | | | |
|-----------|---|------|
| 1—0-54 | } | Low |
| 2—55-74 | | |
| 3—75-94 | | |
| 4—95-104 | | |
| 5—105-114 | } | High |
| 6—115-139 | | |
| 7—140-169 | | |
| 8—170-194 | | |

RATINGS

Society	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Afghans	21	P	(P)	N	M	l	1
Ainu	23	P	(A)	(A)	D	m	4
Aleut	41	P	(P)	A	A	e	4
Alor	33	A	A	A	A	n	7
Americans	16	N	P	N	S	n	1
Amhara	11	(A)	P	(A)	S	n	4
Aranda	34	P	(P)	P	A	p	7
Araucanians	57	P	A	A	A	l	4
Ashanti	6	P	A	A	S	m	3
Atayal	31	(A)	N	(A)	O	n	6
Aymara	56	(A)	(A)	(A)	D	n	5
Azande	9	(A)	(A)	P	L	m	6
Aztec	50	P	(A)	P	S	m	2
Bali	32	(P)	(P)	(A)	L	n	2
Bemba	3	A	A	P	S	m	5
Bulgarians	18	N	P	(P)	S	n	5
Burmese	29	N	P	A	S	n	4
Caingang	60	(A)	(A)	N	O	p	6
Callinago	52	P	(A)	(A)	A	m	2
Carib	53	P	(A)	(A)	A	p	7
Chukchee	23	(A)	(A)	N	A	m	3
Comanche	45	P	N	(A)	P	p	5
Crow	45	P	(A)	A	M	q	5
Cuna	51	P	P	A	M	e	2
Fang	5	P	A	P	A	s	6
French	15	(A)	P	(A)	S	s	5
Ganda	5	P	(A)	A	S	m	5
Gond	27	(A)	(A)	P	M	e	6
Gusii	4	(A)	(A)	P	A	m	6
Hausa	12	A	(P)	P	S	(m)	2
Havasupai	44	P	(A)	P	A	P	2
Ifaluk	36	P	(A)	A	A	n	6
Ifugao	31	P	(A)	(A)	O	n	8
Iranians	21	N	P	N	S	l	4
Iroquois	47	(A)	P	(A)	L	e	8
Karen	29	N	(P)	N	A	n	5
Kaska	41	(A)	(A)	A	O	n	6
Kazak	22	N	(P)	(A)	S	l	7
Khasi	29	(P)	N	N	M	s	4
Kikuyu	4	P	P	P	A	m	7
Koreans	24	(P)	(P)	(A)	S	s	5
Kung	1	P	A	P	A	n	6
Kurd	20	N	(P)	N	M	p	3
Lau	38	A	A	A	M	l	3
Lebanese	20	N	P	N	S	n	1
Lepcha	25	P	(A)	(A)	D	l	5
Lolo	24	N	(A)	N	A	m	4
Lovedu	2	(P)	A	P	L		

RATINGS

Society	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Makassarese	33	N	(P)	N	L	n	2
Malays	30	(A)	(P)	(P)	S	n	3
Marquesans	40	(A)	(P)	(A)	M	(e)	1
Mataco	58	(A)	N	(A)	A	n	2
Mbundu	2	(A)	(A)	(P)	L	m	6
Mende	6	(A)	(A)	P	L	m	5
Mixtecans	50	(A)	(P)	(A)	-	(e)	-
Mosquito	51	(A)	(P)	(A)	M	e	7
Mossi	7	(A)	(A)	(P)	S	m	3
Mundurucu	54	(A)	(A)	(A)	A	e	4
Murngin	34	(A)	(A)	P	A	P	7
Nambicuara	59	P	(A)	A	A	n	6
Navajo	48	P	(A)	(A)	A	(n)	3
Nootka	42	P	(P)	A	M	e	4
Nuer	10	P	(A)	A	P	m	6
Ojibwa	46	P	(P)	(P)	A	p	6
Okinawa	24	(P)	P	N	D	s	4
Paiute	44	P	N	(A)	A	p	6
Papago	49	P	(P)	(P)	A	l	4
Pomo	43	P	(P)	A	A	l	5
Pukapuka	39	(A)	A	A	A	n	8
Rajput	26	A	(P)	(A)	-	m	-
Riff	14	N	(P)	P	M	p	1
Rwala	20	N	(A)	(A)	L	p	1
Samoans	39	(A)	(A)	(A)	M	p	7
Serbians	18	N	(P)	N	S	e	6
Siriono	55	P	(A)	A	A	l	2
Somali	11	N	P	N	L	c	5
Tallensi	7	(A)	(A)	A	A	m	2
Tanala	28	A	A	(A)	M	m	3
Tarong	31	N	P	(A)	-	n	-
Telugu	27	P	(P)	(A)	D	l	3
Thai	30	N	P	P	S	s	4
Thonga	2	(A)	(A)	P	L	m	7
Tibetans	25	P	(P)	(A)	S	p	4
Tikopia	39	(A)	A	A	A	n	7
Tiv	8	P	(A)	A	M	m	4
Tlingit	42	P	(A)	A	A	l	2
Trobriand	37	P	A	A	M	n	6
Tuareg	13	P	(P)	(A)	M	n	1
Tupinamba	60	(P)	(A)	(A)	A	e	8
Vietnamese	30	P	P	(A)	S	l	5
Wogeo	35	P	(A)	(P)	O	p	4
Wolof	12	N	(P)	P	S	m	7
Yao	3	P	(A)	P	M	(m)	6
Yokuts	43	P	(P)	P	A	m	2
Yurok	42	P	P	A	O	l	3
Yoruba	6	(P)	N	A	S	e	3

Book Reviews

New Horizons for the Teaching Profession. A report of the task force on New Horizons in Teacher Education and Professional Standards. Edited by Margaret Lindsey. National Education Association, Washington, D.C., 1961. \$3.00 (cloth), \$2.00 (paper).

This report is billed as a major document in the struggle to raise the level of American education. In line with the instructions given to the elaborate task force which wrote it, the approach is quite properly that of raising the "standards of the teaching profession" itself, or, "the complete professionalization of teaching." It is a report which, if only for two reasons, merits serious attention. First, it results from, and reflects, the most ambitious and extended study of the problem that has been made. Second, the task force which prepared it is representative of the groups which are today most active in regard to the problem: the NEA and its related organizations, the state departments of education, some of the larger schools of education, and the National Commission on Accreditation in Teacher Education.

First, the report offers a sort of utopia. It paints a picture of a profession composed of a marvelous collection of people. Everyone in it is to have "keen intellectual ability," "character, attitudes, and action worthy of emulation by pupils" (p. 171), a "high level of competence" (p. 71), and "advanced and technical knowledge" in his particular field (p. 28). Everyone is to be "liberally educated" (p. 6), "predisposed toward a pursuit of excellence," and "engaged in a continuing search for new knowledge and skill" (p. 6). Everyone is to have developed his own philosophy of life (p. 61) and is to be "an informed and interesting person" (p. 42), "a specialist in the teaching-learning process" (p. 28), and "a capable and active citizen" (p. 42). Possessing many, many other fine attributes, everyone in the profession is to practise it "on a full-time basis," placing "primary emphasis upon his service to society rather than upon his personal gain" (p. 6).

The professional community in which these paragons are to work is to be blissfully peaceful and egalitarian: there is to be "mutual understanding and respect" (p. 7) and there are to be no differences in "status, prestige, or quality of contribution to the central purpose" (p. 6). Where there is team teaching, it will be "on a horizontal basis," team members being peers with the same level of preparation (p. 63).

Finally, participation in this utopia is not to be restricted to only a small group. It is to include all professional persons working at any level from the elementary school through the graduate school, even "the research scientist who confines his teaching to tutoring two advanced doctoral students" (p. 7). It is also to include professional staff members in organizations, government offices of education, and private agencies with educational programs (p. 5).

So much for the goal. Most of the report is concerned with the question what machinery, what organizational structure can establish and preserve this dreamed-of utopia. The many explicit proposals made are essentially variations on a single theme: the profession is to assert its right to professional autonomy. Those who practise the profession are to close ranks and, keeping in view their common aim, co-ordinate and harmonize all aspects of their work,

even exercising the unpleasant but necessary duty of excluding or eliminating the incompetent. The only way in which a person is to be admitted to the profession is for him to be accepted into a teacher-preparing institution approved by NCATE and eventually be recommended by that institution as competent to teach. Certification is to be carried on not by the states but partly by the institution and partly by the professional association. Commissions established under the aegis of the NEA are to develop and enforce standards of competence and a code of ethics.

Since those who write utopias may make whatever assumptions they will, it is fruitless for one who appraises a utopia to argue the pros and cons of its managerial aspects. If all members of the profession are to be demi-gods, it is clear that they would use wisely and morally whatever machinery happened to be in effect.

But the authors of *New Horizons* not only recommend this machinery for installation in the eventual utopia, but prescribe it as a means of moving the teaching profession toward that goal, that is, as a remedy for our present ills. Perhaps Plato and Marx were wiser when they prescribed non-utopian ways of bringing about their respective golden ages. At any rate, as a prescription for present ills, the program seems to have two serious faults.

First, the appropriateness of any proposed remedy depends upon the nature of the case for which it is prescribed. Somewhere in such a volume as this one might properly expect to find a well-informed, specific, and thorough statement about the nature of the present situation. We are told explicitly that the teaching profession is lacking in an adequate self-image and in satisfactory "programs, procedures, and machinery through which to exercise their own expertness in the interests of the larger public welfare" (205). But beyond that we are well-nigh forced to read between the lines to find out in just what respects things are not as they ought to be.

Through some of the specific recommendations, for instance the recommendation that certain institutions ostensibly preparing teachers be forced out of the business, and the one to the effect that all academic departments of a college should be involved in the preparing of teachers, one catches glimmers of complaints. Indirectly we learn that more than "a sizeable number" of teachers "look upon their preparation primarily as 'insurance,' or 'use teaching primarily as a 'meal ticket,' a 'stepping-stone,' a 'time-marking' occupation, or an escape from boredom" (p. 165). Also indirectly we learn that on college campuses the departments of education do not have "parity of esteem" (p. 121).

But the disease is neither charted nor described, and no attention is paid to its causes, historical, sociological, political, or economic. Thus the reader is presented with no reason to believe that what is prescribed holds forth any hope of being a cure. This reader suspects, indeed, that the diagnosis on which the proposals are predicated is partly wrong, and that a careful analysis of the symptoms about which the authors are concerned would show this to be true.

It is quite possible that the primary reason for the American public's willingness to grant professional autonomy and status to doctors, lawyers, engineers, and architects, is the intellectual caliber of persons in those professions. This suggests, in reverse, that the state of our profession may be due primarily to the caliber of person it has attracted. The cure for the disease would then seem to be to bring into education large numbers of more able people, either while the profession is being given autonomy or possibly before that happens.

The report points out that more and better young people can be brought into teaching by making the profession more selective, but it gives no information about the caliber of person now in or preparing for teaching. It offers no analysis of the recruiting problem, and it makes no radical recommendations as to how to upgrade the quality of person entering the profession.

Perhaps, however, the particular diagnosis just suggested is wrong. It may be that the reason for education's low state is the fact that it is defined as a woman's profession. The 1080-hour-a-year married woman teacher in whose life the profession she practices is of secondary or tertiary importance has almost become the symbol of teaching today, as Ichabod Crane was of teaching a hundred and fifty years ago. If the clue to our problems as a profession lies along these lines, then the cure is either to get far more men into the profession or to change our society's—and our women's—definition of the place and role of the female. It is regrettable, and unfortunately significant, that nowhere in the whole volume here discussed is there even a mention of the facts that most teachers are women and that teaching is generally regarded as a woman's profession, let alone any consideration of their significance.

Possibly, though, the cause of the situation is the approach or atmosphere which tends to dominate our professional preparation programs. Prospective lawyers and doctors are given detailed knowledge and trained in the rigorous, intellectual analysis of cases. The study of practice is embedded in this context and subordinated to it. Perhaps prospective teachers, in contrast, are indoctrinated with an accepted "philosophy" or set of attitudes and the related "shoulds"—or, as they are often called, "best practice"—with knowledge and intellectual analysis bringing up the rear. This would be suggested by the contrast between books and courses in law and medicine, which tend to present information, theory, and cases, and books and courses in education, which tend to present principles and prescriptions deduced from them. If this is the basic disease, the remedy would seem to be the introduction into teacher education of a new mode of inquiry, to revolutionize it in the way Langdell's introduction of the case method revolutionized the preparation of lawyers. This is another issue to which the report unfortunately pays slight attention.

It would be improper to criticize the report for not subscribing to one or other of these diagnoses. But it is proper to criticize it for giving no description or diagnosis whatever of the disease for which it offers a cure.

The second fault of the report's prescription is more serious. What is proposed is essentially a monolith. The authors of the report might be pained to think that this is how their recommendations must be interpreted. But although over and over again what they say shows their concern for individuality, creativity, and experimentation, their emphasis is clear: down to very fine—and very controversial—details the authors wish the new machinery to enforce a standard of what is good teacher-preparation and what is a good teacher. NCATE is to tell the colleges what to do, though not how to do it (p. 136), the college is to have a "model" of the applicant it is looking for, "the person who is most likely to become the kind of student the college seeks to develop" (p. 181). Each professional association, affiliated, of course, with the NEA, likewise "must define its model" (p. 199) and license accordingly. College and even graduate students may not freely pursue their studies except with systematic guidance and constant evaluation under the aegis of the profession (pp. 234-5). Even when a teacher's professional performance is above reproach, the profession will concern itself that his personal behavior be

"exemplary" (p. 234), and he may be eliminated if "highly competent professional personnel," upon evaluating his *attitude*, adjudge it to be improper.

But, it may be argued, these are errors in emphasis. The basic design of the machinery may still be right. Co-ordination and standardization need not be exercised at such risks to freedom and diversity. Possibly so, but the weight of our American tradition holds the contrary, and the burden of argument surely rests upon those who would propose so radical a departure from it.

It has been part of our political tradition that the inevitable selfish interests in a society can be controlled only by machinery which balances the influence of one faction off against that of another. Hence our historical insistence on checks and balances. It may be symbolic that in this report the very phrase "checks and balances" is made to stand on its head and signify machinery devised "to ensure the co-ordination necessary . . . , to reduce the chances that any segment of the profession could hold veto power over any other segment. . . ." (p. 209, italics added)

A source of great strength not only in America's political life but also in its educational history has been, and continues to be, the pluralism of power groups. It is well that the Ivy League is balanced by the church-related colleges and the land grant universities, localities by states, the USOE by the Ford Foundation, and the AAU, the AAUP, the ACE, the ACLS, and the NEA by one another, and so on, so that no one policy has ever come to dominate American education. Indeed, wherever good will has been present in these different groups, the varieties of bias and concern have made for a more provocative and productive encounter. (It is incredible, by the way, that the New Horizons task force should have decided to apply its recommendations to the college and university with practically no involvement of persons whose concerns lie primarily at that level.)

If we need a case study of the tendency of monoliths to thwart progress, we need only look at the historical record of the organized medical profession. For over a century, even in a comparatively non-controversial field, it has officially fought one significant advance after another, including advances not only in regard to public health policy, but also in regard to medicine itself.

In the specifics of the report we can see some disturbing straws in the wind. A number of the practices which the authors would like to see universally enforced are at least controversial. It is proposed that most teachers should have five years' preparation, no more, no less. Is it clear that teachers' native gifts, their motivations, and the jobs they will do are homogeneous enough to justify this? It is proposed that no one should teach in a department of education who has not had school experience. Isn't it possible that the "impracticality" of a thinker of purely academic background might be especially stimulating? (In this connection, one wonders whether the law would have been better off if the Messrs. Frankfurter, Lasswell, and Northrop had been barred from preparing lawyers.) It is proposed that licensing of teachers should be contingent upon a college's certifying to an individual's teaching competence. Is it possible that the college might better serve the student's learning and the ideals of scholarship if it disavowed any responsibility for evaluating the student's artistry in teaching?

The authors of *New Horizons*, while not entirely optimistic about human nature, seem to have little fear that the monolithic structure they propose would, even during the transition to the Golden Age, be an instrument of evil. Only in the chapter on accreditation is serious attention given to the

possibility that controls may lead to a sterile conformity and that, although there is often agreement on what is bad, there may be legitimate disagreement about what is good. But the fact remains that closed ranks mean regimentation; required "commitment to common purpose," if it has practical meaning, is thought control; an autonomous group policing for "excellence" will insist on conformity; and, regardless of motive, co-ordination is the same as *Gleichschaltung*. That "responsibility has a sobering effect" is only part of the truth; it is equally true that "power corrupts."

If pluralism is to be retained, though, how are malpractice and incompetence, now so widespread, to be stopped? For certainly they must be. The answer seems to lie in the distinction which the report itself makes at one point between policies setting "only the threshold, the minimum criteria" (p. 135), and policies tending to hamper "valuable idiosyncratic features" and "appropriate experimental and research programs." (Note the expectation that someone will sit in judgment to decide which idiosyncratic features are valuable and which programs are appropriate.)

Wherever there is essential agreement among informed persons as to what is bad, it is important that steps be taken to put an end to it. There are, about our educational system today, many things which we all agree are bad. The proposal that the profession, however its limits be defined, band together into some sort of all-encompassing organization to root out the bad is a welcome one, and many of the specific measures to that end advocated in the report would move American education well ahead.

Wherever, though, there is disagreement among informed persons as to what is bad or good, pluralism must be maintained.

Whatever organizational structure is created—and this reviewer would far rather see it under democratic, political control—must be carefully hedged about with rigid restrictions, *real* checks and balances, so that its force can be exerted only against what is clearly bad, not in favor of what at any particular moment the profession regards as "good." If this is true in medicine—and some of its own members believe the AMA's powers should be curtailed—how much more is it true in education? For education is an area of practice in which the important policy questions have been illuminated to only a small extent by research; in short, a field about which we still know very little. And it is also a field which deeply involves our individual conceptions of what is true and what is good, so that it will always, let us hope, be practised controversially and freely.

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Education and the Common Good, A Moral Philosophy of the Curriculum,
Philip H. Phenix. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1961.

I am in such fundamental agreement with the basic tenets of Professor Phenix' new book that criticizing it would mean criticizing my own convictions. I must, therefore, be content to describe briefly its main purpose and ideas and add only a few comments.

His purpose is to devise a scheme of education that will help the younger generation to live a good life and to strive for the "common good," as it has been conceptually developed by the historical synthesis of the Platonic and

Christian philosophies and as, according to Phenix, it has been understood also by other great cultures and their religions.

There are a number of ideas and means by which man can achieve some approximation of the goal. First, he can use his intelligence and the mass media of communication with the aim of excellence. Second, man possesses the gift of creativity, expressing itself in esthetic sensitivity, in manners, work, and recreation. Third, man has conscience. He strives for the achievement of values in relation to nature, to himself, and to the human community, from the family up to the world at large. But all these activities and responsibilities can be perverted unless they are directed and permeated by an ultimately religious conscience. In other words, Mr. Phenix believes that man can understand himself and his history only to the extent to which he tries to comprehend his existence as an opportunity to participate consciously and conscientiously in the life of the logos or cosmos, perennial in nature, yet constantly developing.

It is the religiously inspired conscience that helps man to differentiate between the life of "desire" (which leads to self-defeat) and the life of "worth" or moral commitment (which unites men in the search for the perfect).

Pragmatism, from Professor Phenix' point of view, has failed to see the difference. Though he acknowledges the influence on him of John Dewey and other pragmatists, particularly because of "their belief in democracy as a comprehensive way of life, their confidence in the wide relevance of the scientific spirit and methods, and their commitment to education as a moral enterprise," he makes them more or less responsible for the confusion between the "democracy of desire" and the "democracy of worth." The pragmatists

hold that to be moral is to be social, and that the ideal of social life is democracy, in which the fullest possible harmony of interaction is realized. This position is most compatible with what is hereafter designated as the "democracy of desire," in which conduct is conceived as guided by reflection on the consequences of various courses of action. (p. 11)

With this identification of pragmatism with a philosophy of "desire"—whatever the word may mean—the pragmatists will violently disagree, and in this respect I would lean toward their side. Certainly, it makes a great difference, as I often told my students, whether you believe that ideas and actions are true and good because they are useful and satisfy your desire, or whether you believe that they are useful and satisfying—at least in the long run—because they are true and good. However, when I think of John Dewey, the word "desire" seems to me ill chosen. His concepts of intelligence and social responsibility involve the acceptance of hard work and sacrifice that may go very strongly against one's desire. He certainly was no advocate of the "quest for success and power," and his demand for "autonomy" does not mean that man give up his "dedication to the right and good." (pp. 8-9)

Man's tendency to have this thinking and doing directed by wish more often than by self-denial is as old as humanity itself; and though I am personally interested in the religious perspective of life (because it makes a man deeper and richer), I cannot honestly say that under the influence of churches and theologians men were so much more the masters of their appetites than a secularist and pragmatist of today need feel ethically inferior. As a matter of

fact, some of the pragmatists turned away from established religion because they saw in its history and present too much "adjustment to the natural and human environment." (p. 11) When they compared the superstitious and the traditional intolerance of Christendom with the patient devotion of the scientist (and, some of them, also with the tolerant wisdom of the East) they felt constrained to search for a new morality and believed to have found it in an ethics of self-correcting reason. To be sure, the pendulum of their intellectual clockwork swung toward an almost dogmatic empiricism. They became afraid of any venture into metaphysics and religion and therefore neglected to ask from which source man receives the reason on which they relied so much. Thus their philosophy remained incomplete, and against their own interests they interrupted the continuity of the *philosophia perennis*—to which they actually belonged.

If our present democracy is too much a "democracy of desire," it is not the result of serious philosophical pragmatism, but of the distortion of man's natural pragmatic spirit as a consequence of industrialization, competition, mass production, abundance on the side of the privileged, and the fear of oppression, unemployment, and hunger on the other side. Nevertheless, we are today more willing to help suffering people and peoples than were the rich and powerful in earlier times. During the Middle Ages many men made a good profit even from the crusades (which is the reason why I am suspicious of modern "crusaders.")

In view of Professor Phenix' opposition to pragmatism I cannot help wondering why he accepts so easily what I may call the pragmatists' idolization of "democracy." I also stand for it because I know what happens when it is destroyed. But it is nevertheless an institution, and even the best of all institutions should not be idolized. Instead of choosing "democracy" as his key word, it might have been better if the author had chosen to speak of the difference between a "life of worth" and a "life of desire." For the term "life" connotes the individual as well as the collectivist aspect, and according to Mr. Phenix' own philosophy the ultimate decisions as to what is good and evil should be made by the individual who believes that there works in his conscience an eternal principle which transcends any kind of organization; for even the best one is only relative before the ultimate.

In addition, in view of the present world situation, where Americans should be educated to look at other nations with firm conviction though without prejudice, it would be advisable to make clear that a good life and the striving for the common good might be possible also under other political forms. Making absolutes out of relatives is dangerous not only in the intellectual and moral realm but also in politics; politics, after all, should be governed by both reason and ethics. In view of our constant emphasis on the superiority of "democracy" (I myself may have been guilty in this respect) I sometimes wonder why Confucius, Plato, Erasmus of Rotterdam and Spinoza could have been men of such excellence, though they were not opposed to a hierarchical structure of society.

However, these differences of opinion, which are largely of terminological nature, do not lessen my admiration for a book that is comprehensive in scope, new in approach, and well written.

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American Higher Education: A Documentary History, Edited by Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith (2 vols.). The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961. 1016 pp. \$15.00.

These rich volumes are not too much laden for perusal by a busy college president, yet they contain enough to give a thesis-writing honors student a general control of the history of American higher education. Others will profit from this work also—citizens whose curiosity has been aroused rather than deadened by the usual vacuities published about our country's educational heritage; college teachers seeking to know more than oral tradition about their profession; and specialists in education and in history, who will not need to be told what a scandalous gap these volumes fill. Those who read the collection through (a course encouraged by generous format and handsome typography) will find themselves stirred by a sense of having created a usable past. But as the reader congratulates himself, he must also thank Professor Hofstadter and Professor Smith, who never forgot that it was a documentary *history* they were preparing. They have imaginatively edited and introduced, without intruding on the reader as he admires the republican foresight of Benjamin Rush or shakes his head over the academic atrocity stories by Charles A. Beard.

There are eleven divisions: "From the Beginnings to the Great Awakening," "The Collegiate System in the Eighteenth Century," "The Nation, the States, and the Sects," "The Quest for an Adequate Educational System," "Freedom and Repression in the Old-Time College," comprise volume one; "The Demand for a True University," "Organizing the Modern American University," "The Development of the Elective System," "University Faculties and University Control," "Academic Freedom in the University," "Higher Education for the Twentieth-Century World" are in volume two. Each division opens with a brief summary that includes quotations from some of the documents and references to others. Most of the documents have headnotes, succinctly identifying author, event, or institution, referring to related documents, and indicating sources of further information. Only the index disappoints. Its limitation to proper names, and only a portion of them, will hamper reference use.

The editors, properly deciding that at this point in the study of educational history two volumes, not ten, were needed, emphasize "the main stem"—the liberal arts college and the graduate faculty of philosophy. However, the reader can also learn a good deal about professional faculties, preparatory schools, athletics, and alumni. Similarly, the decision to omit direct portrayals of "student life"—overstressed in most college histories—has not kept students from coming alive in these pages. The merely quaint has been avoided. The reader is less likely to chuckle, "Boys have always been boys," than to realize forcefully how radical the change and how tortuous the path that has brought us from the rule-bound, orthodox colonial college, with its largely classical curriculum, to the heterogeneity of today's higher education.

The documents illuminate one another. The reader encounters enough of the reactions of Americans studying in German universities or of the hopes and efforts of Jefferson and his co-workers in the founding of the University of Virginia to form more than a narrow estimate of these phenomena. Julian M. Sturtevant's recollections of the inadequacies of teaching at Yale in the 1820's effectively precedes the Yale Report of 1828, a document more often maligned than read, in which the faculty justified its theory, method, and curriculum.

Many themes largely unexplored in existing secondary works are conspicuous in these pages. References to the alternating attraction and repulsion of European practices, the professionalization of college and university teaching, the curricular problems of the first two collegiate years (often in documents primarily concerning other subjects) could become the ground for important new understanding. But of the generalizations suggested none is more striking than this: American higher education has developed amid controversy. Conflict seems, in fact, to have been the very stuff of its growth. Whatever comfort it may offer today's besieged and besieging academics, the evidence of this tendency should interest American historians now questioning whether their predecessors may have exaggerated divisions in our society and underestimated its degree of consensus.

It was the forced resignation of Harvard's first president for antipaedobaptist tendencies that was prophetic, rather than the fact that he died in "harmony of affection with the good men, who had been the authors of his removal . . ." (p. 21). The next century at Harvard saw the opposition of legislators to President Leverett's religious liberalism, the unsuccessful attempt of Tutor Nicholas Sever to have resident tutors replace non-resident ministers as members of the Corporation, and the exchange of charges which George Whitefield began by repeating rumors heard in Boston: "Tutors neglect to pray with and examine the Hearts of the Pupils.—Discipline is at too low an Ebb: Bad Books are become fashionable. . . ." (p. 64). Questions of unorthodox belief and of lay control have been the longest sustained sources of controversy in American academic life. In somewhat different ways, each indicates a society which knew itself divided.

The tendency toward inter-denominational sponsorship in the late eighteenth century was often itself the fruit of protest and did not prevent disputes among the denominations involved. The Dartmouth College Case typified the related battle between advocates of state and private control, and the inviolability which the Supreme Court's decision guaranteed to chartered institutions encouraged a spate of denominational colleges in the West. These colleges operated chiefly in opposing "godless" state universities. The origin of one state university, Virginia, forecast new sorts of division, regional and economic. Jefferson hinted in 1821 that the new university would save young Virginians from Harvard with its "lessons of anti-Missourianism" and from Princeton with its "sacred principles of our Holy Alliance of Restrictionists" (p. 224).

After the Civil War, with the rise of science and the spread of Darwinian theories, religion continued to be a fruitful source of controversy. But by 1900, disputes centered more frequently on the problem of non-scholarly control. Both "tyrannical" presidents and "philistine" boards of trustees were accused of imposing the standards of business where only the standards of absolute truth should reign. The era's classic, Thorstein Veblen's *The Higher Learning in America* (of which a generous excerpt is given here), was but the wittiest example of a popular genre. Criticism gradually broadened to include most of the equalitarian and utilitarian impulses which those in control helped conduct from the society into the universities. The sharp words of Abraham Flexner, Robert M. Hutchins, Harry D. Gideonse, and John Dewey on the university's proper function stemmed from disagreements that are far from settled today; however, the post-sputnik era (not treated here) has brought an alliance of certain aspects of elitism and practicalism. Amid the hysteria over the num-

ber of Russian engineering students, Hutchins's recent attack on Michigan State's new major in "mobile homes" sounds comfortably nostalgic.

Dispute, of course, breeds more documents than co-operation, and a documentary collection which avowedly aims at readability requires especial allowance for exaggeration. It is possible also that the editors, who use the word "controversy" or variants thereof four times in their brief preface, may have been predisposed to reveal a controversial past. But after such allowances, the conclusion persists that our academic ancestors, like our academic selves, had a quarrelsome time of it.

In one matter controversy appears absent. The early Johns Hopkins University emerges here, despite asides about opposition to biology, as a quiet and trouble-free development. The selections from reminiscences of Daniel Coit Gilman and others tell of harmony among trustees, of faculty discussions that ended with a "sense of the meeting," and of a president who preserved a Quaker peace. The picture contrasts with the revelations in other documents of sectarian and localist attacks on Cornell, disputes into which Charles W. Eliot's advocacy of the free elective system led him, and of G. Stanley Hall's quarrels with Clark University's founder, its faculty, and the "raiding" president of the University of Chicago. But sources which the editors passed over reveal a Johns Hopkins with quite as much conflict involving trustees, faculty members, and other institutions. Even the founder, dead before the university opened, left seeds of controversy by his appointment as trustee of certain relatives and the domineering president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; his very silence on his definition of "university" led to arguments over whether he was more interested in helping worthy local youths than in lifting the level of American higher education. On the basis of this single test case, the only one which acquaintance with the sources permits me to make, I suggest that by presenting chiefly material already in print the editors have dropped a veil falsely roseate; I suspect that other struggles have been blurred.

What is indicated by this combative history of our colleges is in part, of course, the nature of "academic man." He is intelligent, articulate, critical, trained in disputation. There are meanings also about American life and character. The relative absence of the institutions of European civilization, a result of settlement in the wilderness, reinforced by political and technological revolutions, made new institutions a possibility and often a necessity. The fact that there was less of the old in America did not mean that the new could be instituted without division and struggle. Religious conviction, economic interest, localist pride, and a cocksure race of "new" men insured disputes in institution-building, especially in the case of consciously created institutions such as the college and the university.

If the distance of things European helped make controversies, the awareness of things European exacerbated the situation. The question of whether or not to imitate Europe started many a wrangle, as did the problem of choosing which part of Europe to imitate. Should a college follow the English mother country and avoid autocratic Prussian ways? Or should it turn its back on the island that had tried to rule a continent and learn from the *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit* of the German universities?

A satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon of controversy will be long in finding. Without far more careful comparative studies than we now possess, without fuller understanding of the nature of educational institutions and of

American society, any explanation will remain partial. This collection, I am happy to report, will carry us closer to such understanding. The preface notes the beginnings of a "minor boom" in the study of American educational history, a development to which the Spring, 1961, issue of this journal also testified. To this renaissance, the editors of these documents promise important contributions—Professor Hofstadter in studies of American anti-intellectualism and Professor Smith in an investigation of the control of Princeton in the early nineteenth century. Their careful editing of these volumes will do much to bring them readers and co-laborers.

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Curriculum Planning for the Gifted, edited by Louis A. Fliegler. Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961. 414 pp. Trade edition \$9.00; test edition for classroom \$6.75.

Gifted Children, Their Psychology and Education, Maurice F. Freehill. Macmillan, New York, 1961. 412 pp. \$5.50.

The atomic era has generated more than a little educational fallout across the land. Its particles are permeated by the same urgent sense of commitment to the cultivation of individual talent that typified the surge of progressivism in education after World War I. A disquieting difference for some is that, whereas in the movement to which Dewey gave impetus the dominant concern was with the *right* of the individual to fulfill himself within a democratic society, today's concern reflects preoccupation with the *duty* of the individual to use his talents to bolster our way of life. This emphasis comes close to exhibiting a mechanism often found in children and adults overwhelmed by tyrannical authority—namely, identification with the aggressor. Concerned as some are with Russian scientific accomplishments, imagining our ideological competitors to be ruthless, determined, fanatical, and absolutely loyal in their commitment to the values and purposes of a monolithic society, we would like to demand similar purposefulness, loyalty, and commitment of talents from our own children. There are some who react with intense anger and a sense of betrayal if the responses of pupils, teachers, and school systems are not immediate and total.

Fortunately, these volumes are dominated neither by a spirit of criticism nor by the demand that the schools respond with crash programs for the training of space age scientists. Both Maurice Freehill, who has written a comprehensive text on the psychology and education of children with IQ's over 120, and Louis Fliegler, who has gathered together a top notch series of papers on curriculum development for the gifted, intellectually able and talented children, are specialists in the education of exceptional children. In their respective institutions (Western Washington State College and University of Denver) they are responsible for the development of teachers capable of rising to the challenges posed by pupils with unusual intellectual endowments. They have joined the group of educators who have seized the opportunity afforded by cold war concerns to remind colleagues and public alike that individuals with superior intellects do exist, that they ought to be educated within the

framework of a differentiated curriculum, and that this can be done without sacrifice of basic equalitarian values.

Freehill and Fliegler agree that the nation's needs can be served best by special attention to the educational needs of children with high IQ's. However, they are aware of deep and widespread concerns about possible anti-democratic implications of such education. They realize that such concerns are not easily dispelled. Yet, committed as they are to the gifted child and his "uniqueness," they are not sufficiently prone to take the opposing position seriously or to hold open the possibility that it arises from a kernel of valid concern. Such resistance must be analyzed carefully. The importance of doing so is underscored by the fact that program after program, conceived in the optimism of the twenties, suffered, with some major exceptions, a quick demise in the depression era. Others which survived that debacle have lingered on only as appendages in educational systems beginning to adopt newer, more acceptable innovations. However irrational and ill-considered it may appear to proponents of special education for the gifted, serious opposition does exist in the minds of thoughtful people. It is founded on basic considerations of values and on inadequacies in our understanding of the nature of giftedness, unusual talents, or the rarer genius in our midst. Not taking into account such genuine doubts and concerns dilutes educational efforts founded upon individual differences and inhibits wholehearted adoption of programs committed to fullest possible intellectual development of bright children. If the sources of such potent resistance are not seriously studied in the future, one would expect that present enthusiasms, strengthened for the moment by post-sputnik jitters, will again wane.

The seminal research in the field of giftedness was done some years ago largely by Terman and Hollingworth. This work stimulated important innovations by educational authorities in the decades after World War I. Today other educational leaders, including the present authors, are plowing over virtually the same field and are in the main being stimulated by the same pioneer researches. It would be unfortunate indeed to find writers two or three decades from now again emphasizing the need for special education for those with high IQ's, bemoaning the life adjustment emphasis which tends to water down the curriculum, and decrying the false egalitarianism which continues to confuse equality of opportunity with lock-step education and equality of exposure.

Various examples can be found, in both volumes, of patient and scholarly discussion of principles and resulting practices long ago demonstrated and just as long ignored. Many years ago, for instance, Terman and his colleagues found that teachers often were unable to identify gifted children in their classrooms, even though such children could be identified by psychological tests and proved to be readily differentiable from children of normal intelligence by any but the most casual observer. Both Terman and Hollingworth then set about describing characteristics of giftedness in language appropriate to education. Thus it is noteworthy that Freehill today finds it necessary to devote an entire chapter to an exhaustive review of categories which teachers can use. Another perhaps more striking illustration is the reported widespread belief among educators that children may be harmed emotionally by rapid promotion. Terman's unequivocal research findings demonstrated that rapid promotion and early college entrance, far from resulting in a significantly large number of emotional or social disturbances, are attended by a high degree of

student satisfaction, excellent academic records, and unusually active participation in social and athletic activities, with a remarkably small proportion of dropouts from a four-year college program.

Neither author is being criticized for having to repeat well established findings. Both volumes, though quite different from each other in approach, are well-developed and quite comprehensive attempts to cover a complex and prejudice-laden field. Freehill's book is more detailed, thoroughly buttressed by footnotes and references, and organized in a way that would recommend it as a text in a course on the psychology and education of the gifted. After carrying the reader through an attempt to remove any preconceptions and biases he may have about the nature of giftedness and the validity of devoting special attention to talent in a democracy, it introduces him to some warmly human, bright children. It goes on to a most satisfactory discussion of the development of theories concerning the nature of intelligence and to a widely ranging comparison of rote and higher order learning. This latter section draws upon recent experience in those industries which have attempted to create working climates conducive to employees' abilities to meet changing conditions and needs through personal growth. There follows an excellent description of the divers approaches to education of gifted children which have evolved in school systems throughout the land. The concepts of grouping (variously called segregation, ability grouping, and congregation), acceleration, and enrichment are well clarified in terms of the actual practices to which they refer. After consideration of some social-psychological processes involved in the design of a specific system-wide program in a local community, Freehill turns to a series of chapters on curriculum areas, "parents and teachers," and such other matters as vocational planning, emotional problems of bright children, and character development. For this reviewer these latter sections proved to be least satisfying. The sections on curriculum could have been enlarged considerably to include much more of Freehill's obviously rich and varied acquaintance, as teacher and counselor, with children of all levels of intellectual development. The section on emotional and character development sets out to dissipate certain stereotypes regarding genius and physical or emotional deficiencies. However, by the time one reaches this chapter, the author, through his general approach to the subject, has already dispelled such misconceptions for all but the most rigid.

The papers which Fliegler presents dig in at the curriculum points which Freehill covers less thoroughly. The bulk of this book should be most useful to fairly experienced teachers seeking new ideas for work with bright achievers. It is taken up with discussions of nine curriculum areas: social studies, arithmetic and mathematics, science in the elementary and secondary schools, creative writing, reading, foreign language, art, music, and dramatics. These sections are written for the most part by well known professors of education who have used the opportunity to re-express basic ideas and convictions. These papers may be more useful guides to curriculum development in specific subject areas than are comparable chapters in Freehill's text. There is an introductory section devoted to problems and practices written by Joseph Leese (of the Albany Teachers College campus of the State University of New York) and Fliegler. In a little over thirty pages this chapter summarizes clearly and effectively what Freehill presents in more detailed fashion, and somewhat more turgidly, in over two-hundred pages. There is also a final chapter in which, among other things, Fliegler attempts to formulate a philosophical

justification for special education for the gifted; but this suffers from a tendency to attack the "obstructionists" who are, unhappily, content with old ways, suspicious of the new, fearful of failure, and unwilling to experiment.

It is striking that several of the authors suggest in passing that *their prescriptions for gifted children's education hold equally well for less highly endowed pupils*. This latter point deserves to be made more explicitly. Neither Freehill nor Fliegler and his several contributors make a convincing argument, in this reviewer's opinion, for a *qualitatively* different education (as differentiated from one that is expanded or accelerated) for bright as contrasted with normal children. Indeed, the recommendations for "higher order" learning made by Freehill would seem to hold equally well for the education of all but the most intellectually limited. He states:

Education for the gifted implies:

1. *A program organized around unit topics, projects or study themes*
2. *Lessons organized around a problem or a purpose.*
3. *Encouragement of side issues which develop incidental and concomitant learning.*
4. *Special emphasis on the tools of workshop learning.*
5. *Informal classrooms with reference works more frequently used than texts.*
6. *Increasing awareness of the learning process on the part of the learner.*
7. *Student involvement in planning or at least awareness of what the expected learnings are.*
8. *Participation in periodic evaluation.*
9. *Student summaries which require rearrangements and conclusions as differentiated from reiterations and repetitions.*

It may be the implication that gifted children should be singled out for such high calibre education which causes the so-called egalitarians to raise their hackles. Perhaps it would be possible to practice an education such as Freehill describes, designed to challenge *all* children and to stimulate them to realize their capacities for coping actively with their environment, whatever their level of intellect may be. No one would disagree that all children deserve capable teachers. This reviewer is among those who believe that such teachers are capable of establishing optimal conditions for (1) learner involvement, (2) self direction, and (3) self appraisal. Such teaching obviously presupposes a degree of sensitivity to group dynamics and capacity to share direction and control in the classroom with the learner with which many teachers are not equipped by personality or training. The difficult question is whether such excellent teachers should be reserved for the intellectually gifted, the intellectually limited or, perhaps, could be deployed in special "helping teacher" or consultant roles so as to bring the best possible teaching to all.

If we do not work towards such educational excellence across the board, there is real danger of widening the already existing gulf between those few deemed bright enough to manage, control, direct, think big, learn and behave on a higher level in the age of automation, and those many supposedly relegated to fact learning, repetitive activities, minimal responsibilities, and dependence upon the authority inherent in the superior knowledge and wisdom of others. Observers of the industrial scene, however, note that the lower intellects do not fully accept such status. They have a decided tendency to select

their own leaders in positions of union responsibility, for example. Less maturely perhaps, they sometimes indulge, possibly like so many underachieving children in our present day schools, in a game of passively resistant hostility towards authority.

It would seem that the challenge for educators in this rapidly changing technological age is that of finding ways to bring to all educable children the kind of educational orientation prescribed by these authors for the gifted. The ability of the individual to evaluate, to seek out and find relevance at his own level in new experience and new ideas, to work collaboratively with others so that group effort becomes truly creative and innovative, and above all to develop awareness of the learning process and the ways in which he approaches new experience—these are the capacities which humankind should develop at all levels of the society. What Freehill and Fliegler have done is to document the existence and implications of differences in intellect among gifted children. These differences, though perhaps largely quantitative ones of speed, scope, and intensity, are significant. Their existence is a most potent argument against lock-step education. They do not, on the other hand, justify a qualitatively different education devoted to development of creativity, initiative, and critical thinking solely for those of "higher" intellect.

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Generalization in Ethics, Marcus George Singer. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1961. 351 pp. \$6.00.

Few moves in moral argumentation are more common than "But what if everyone (no one) did that?". Thus if someone, perhaps struck by the insignificance of a single vote, announced that he was not going to vote in a coming election, it would be natural to ask, "But what if no one were to vote?". Someone considering evading some of his taxes may well ask himself what would happen if everyone evaded his taxes. Such questions are familiar to everyone.

But though the question "What if everyone did that?" is a familiar one, it is not unproblematic. Normally it is a rhetorical question: to ask, "What would happen if everyone did that?", is normally a way of saying that the consequences of everyone's doing that would be undesirable. Note, however, that this citation of consequences is not an ordinary one. Here the consequences referred to do not attach to my intended action but to everyone's acting in the way I intend. Furthermore it is not claimed that everyone probably will act in this way; nor is it claimed that my behavior will affect what others will do. Thus, if I am considering not voting, and in the course of my deliberations note what would happen if no one voted, two things will usually be clear. First, as a matter of fact many people *will* vote; the undesirable consequences being considered are not a real threat. Second, my voting or not voting will have no appreciable effect on what others do; even if the undesirable consequences were a real threat, I could not prevent them by voting. The point is that the consequences being considered would not be consequences of my voting, but consequences of something else happening, namely, no one's voting, which certainly will not happen and which, in any event, I can do nothing

about. When the question is viewed in this light, one may wonder how it can possibly be relevant to what an individual ought to do. However, before rejecting it out-of-hand, one should realize how odd it would be for this question never to be relevant to what an individual ought to do: this would mean, for instance, that no one would be able to find a reason for voting in the fact that the consequences of no one's voting would be undesirable.

The central topic of Professor Singer's book is the question: "What would happen if everyone did that?". (p. vii) He tries (among other things) to solve the main problem connected with this question: he tries to show how it comes to bear on what one ought to do, how it is relevant to what one ought to do. Underlying the question (let us refer to it as "the generalization question") is what we shall call the *principle of the generalization argument* (hereafter referred to by "GA"):

GA. If the consequences of everyone's doing x would be undesirable, then no one has the right to do x .¹ (p. 66)
Singer contends that the relevancy of the generalization argument can be demonstrated by deriving GA from two less disputable principles: *the principle of consequences* (hereafter referred to by "C"):

C. If the consequences of A's doing x would be undesirable, then A does not have the right to do x ; (p. 66)
and *the generalization principle* (hereafter referred to by "GP"):

GP. If not everyone similar to A and in similar circumstances has the right to do x , then no one similar to A and in similar circumstances has the right to do x .² (pp. 14, 66)
Given these two principles, Singer's derivation of GA proceeds in two steps. First, a "generalization" from C is derived (hereafter referred to by "GC"):

GC. If the consequences of everyone's doing x would be undesirable, then not everyone has the right to do x . (p. 66)

Second, from GC and GP we deduce GA, complete with restrictive phrases that until now have been left implicit: "If the consequences of everyone's doing x —everyone who is similar to A and in similar circumstances—would be undesirable, then no one similar to A and in similar circumstances has the right to do x ."

Thus Singer claims to show how the generalization question is relevant to what one ought to do; its relevancy is conceived of as mediated by the principle of consequences and the generalization principle. Since these two principles seem incontrovertible; if his derivation is in order it would seem that he has solved the main problem relating to the generalization question. But it is not clear that his derivation is in order. Specifically, the rationale of its first step is not transparent. Singer speaks of GC as "a generalization from C." (p. 66) The style of this generalization, however, is not of any familiar

¹ Singer uses the expressions "A does not have the right to do x ", and "A ought not to do x ", synonymously.

² "Everyone similar to A and in similar circumstances" means, roughly, everyone whose case is like A's, i.e., everyone who has as good reasons for doing x as A has.

form. He says that GC is *not* the "true logical generalization of the principle of consequences" (p. 66), which would be:

If the consequences of *each and every* performance of *x* would be undesirable, then no one has the right to do *x*.

But the sense in which GC is a "generalization" from C and thus follows from C is not explained. A person would think that GC followed from C (though perhaps not as a "generalization" on it), if he thought that,

- (1) The consequences of everyone's doing *x* would be undesirable.
entailed,
- (2) There is at least one person such that the consequence of *his* doing *x* would be undesirable.

But I doubt that this entailment holds,¹ and in any case it is unlikely that Singer was depending on it.² The derivation of GC from C thus remains unclear.

Perhaps Singer's derivation of GA (his solution to the main problem of the generalization question) can be defended. It is possible that my difficulties stem only from the brevity of its presentation. But considering the central position of this derivation in *Generalization in Ethics* this brevity, especially as it relates to the first step, is certainly regrettable.

Though the derivation of GA is crucial to *Generalization in Ethics*, it is accomplished in a very few pages (pp. 63-68). Most of the book is concerned with matters other than the direct establishment of the generalization argument. Two chapters are devoted primarily to the clarification of this argument and the meeting of common objections. Thus, Singer discusses the absurdity of "What if everyone ate at six o'clock?", and "What if everyone produced food?". He attempts to distinguish these silly questions from the initially plausible generalization questions. The irrelevancy of the response, "But not everyone will do that," also comes in for discussion, as do a number of other problems relating to the application of the generalization argument. And Singer is not concerned only with the problems of the generalization argument. He is also interested in its role in moral reasoning. Though Singer sees the generalization argument as "central and decisive in moral reasoning" and in fact "the fundamental principle of morality," he says that "it is not the only principle". (p. viii) A large part of the book is a discussion of what Singer considers to be the important moral principles (four in all, three of which have already been mentioned). The use of moral principles in the establishment of "moral rules" is detailed in one chapter. Another chapter concerns itself with the generalization principle, with special attention to the phrase "similar persons in similar circumstances." Two chapters are occupied with the fourth of the important principles, the Kantian "categorical imperative," which Singer distinguishes from and relates to the generalization argument. Singer presents

¹ A class of counter-examples will be indicated, thus showing that (1) definitely does not entail (2).

² He rejects entailments that look very similar to this one. (pp. 90-91, 93, 147, 196) But it is not entirely clear that he would reject precisely this entailment.

in his book not only a comprehensive study of the generalization argument, but "at least the rudiments of a system of moral philosophy" (page viii). The generalization argument is, however, fundamental in Singer's system, and so its discussion is "central to the book" and "the pivotal problem of the book" concerns its validity, as the emphasis of this review is intended to imply. (p. vii)

One special topic discussed is the use of generalization arguments in so-called "state of nature" situations. (pp. 152-161) This discussion yields additional reasons for doubting Singer's demonstration of the validity of these arguments. A "state of nature" situation can be defined as one in which the consequences of everyone's doing x would be undesirable; and everyone, or almost everyone, is doing, or is going to do, x . As an example, consider a situation in which almost everyone is violating certain necessary rationing restrictions: there is a flourishing blackmarket and, as a result, the approved and controlled market is often unsupplied. One feels that the question "What if everyone deals in the blackmarket?" can be effectively countered here since almost everyone is dealing in a blackmarket: the undesirable consequences are upon us. To hang back in such a case would be quixotic and one wants to say it is not required. Singer would like to endorse these feelings, but I believe that his approach to the generalization argument (via C and GP) precludes such an endorsement. He suggests that in a "state of nature" situation I can escape the generalization argument, if my conforming to it "would be obviously and dangerously imprudent". (p. 161) I may break the rules in such a case, since in such a case "it can be said that if everyone in circumstances similar to mine were to break the rules, the consequences would not be disastrous". (p. 161) Apparently Singer reasons that since the consequences of my breaking the rationing rules would *not* be undesirable; if everyone *whose case is like mine* were to break these rules, the consequences similarly would *not* be undesirable, i.e., there is no generalization argument against *my* breaking the rules. But there is an error here, for *everyone's case is like mine*—each and every person is faced with a situation in which almost everyone is dealing in the blackmarket—and we are assuming that the consequences of everyone's dealing in the blackmarket would be undesirable. The key fact here is that in "state of nature" situations my case can be hard without its being exceptional: at least in these situations it is possible for it to be undesirable for everyone whose case is like mine to do x even though it would *not* be undesirable for *me* (or any one like me) to do x .¹

Singer has not succeeded in providing special treatment for the "state of nature" cases; in fact, such treatment seems to be ruled out by his solution to the problem of the generalization argument, viz., his derivation of this argument from C and GP. Given his approach to the argument, if it would be undesirable for everyone whose case is like mine to break the rationing rules, then I ought not to break them, no matter what other persons are going to do and even if my keeping to the rules would be a great hardship. Since "state of nature" cases seem to call for special treatment, we have here another reason for thinking that Singer's solution is at least incomplete. Perhaps an entirely different approach to the generalization argument is called for: an approach

¹ At least in "state of nature" situations it is possible for the consequences of everyone's doing x to be undesirable even though there is not even one person such that the consequences of his doing x would be undesirable. Thus, "state of nature" cases supply a class of counter-examples showing that (1) does not entail (2).

which stressed the *unfairness* of doing what you are counting on others' not doing would lend itself to the exclusion of "state of nature" applications. Of course, it is also possible that the generalization argument is in the end indefensible. Perhaps it is simply a bad argument.

Generalization in Ethics is challenging in its detail and exhaustiveness. It is by far the most comprehensive and detailed study of the generalization argument in existence, and will undoubtedly occupy a central position in discussions of "What if everyone did that?" for some time to come. Even if his conclusions are not all as certain as he believes them to be, Singer has made a substantial contribution to an important investigation.

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New Thinking in School Mathematics, Office for Scientific and Technical Personnel of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. Washington, D. C., 1961. 246 pp. \$2.50 (paper).

The Organization for European Economic Co-operation consists of the following Member countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The United States and Canada participate in all the work of the Organization as Associate Members. Yugoslavia was originally represented by an observer but since 1957 has taken full part in the work of the OEEC. The Organization came into being with the signing of the Convention for European Economic Co-operation on April 16, 1948.

The Organization's Office for Scientific and Technical Personnel (OSTP), set up in 1958, was created for the purpose of promoting international action to increase the supply and improve the quality of scientists and engineers in OEEC countries. The main task of the OSTP is to improve the educational systems of the Member and Associated countries and to take special measures to strengthen their efforts for training specialized personnel in order to increase economic growth.

New Thinking in School Mathematics is a report of the first two activities of the OSTP, a survey and a seminar, which dealt with the improvement of mathematical education in the OEEC countries. The survey consists of a set of selected questions on current practices and trends in primary and secondary (pre-university and terminal) school mathematics. Its aim is to present information, not generally available, on the present mathematical program in each country surveyed and on the administration of the programs. The result of the survey forms a compact picture of present national trends for reforms in mathematics on three important levels: course content, pedagogy and administration. The seminar, held from November 23 to December 4, 1959, at Cercle Culturel de Royaumont, Asnieres-sur-Oise, France, presents a well-prepared exchange of views between those pioneering new ideas in the content and teaching of mathematics and those responsible for school policy and implementation of school programs. The Report on the survey and seminar was drawn up by Howard F. Fehr of Columbia University and Luke N. H. Bunt of Utrecht University.

Professional mathematicians who have been pioneering in curriculum reforms in mathematics will not find in the report any radically new views on

changes in mathematics for secondary and college levels. Proposals for the reform of mathematics in the elementary grades are interesting but apparently not so well coordinated with secondary school mathematics as the latter is with university mathematics. The report does give a systematic and well organized summary of most of the proposed changes in mathematics for the elementary, secondary and college groups.

The first paper in the report, "Reform in School Mathematics" by Marshall H. Stone, president of the seminar, provides an excellent historical analysis for the case of reform in mathematics. It treats briefly but incisively the main problems of the proposed reformation in course content for elementary, secondary and college programs; the problem of mass education; the recruiting, training and preparation of teachers; the coordination of mathematics and science; the available teaching materials for modern mathematics; and the task of continued research to keep abreast of progress in mathematics. This is the type of restrained factual reporting which should appeal to and convince even the most stubborn traditionalists.

The presentation of specific changes in the mathematics curriculum follows the introductory remarks of Marshall Stone. In each case, the original statements of the individual are supplemented by a summary of the opinions from the members of the seminar. The topics treated here are: "Geometry" by Jean Dieudonne and Otto Botsch, "Applications of Mathematics" by Albert Tucker, "Arithmetic" by Gustave Choquet, "Algebra" by W. Servais, "Analysis" by E. Maxwell and "Statistics" by Luke N. H. Bunt. The last section of the report contains a discussion of the problems of implementation of the suggested program changes in mathematics. The training and retraining of teachers is considered by Pierre Theron, the nature and type of text books for secondary school mathematics is discussed by Edward Begle, and finally W. D. Wall outlines a program of research in the learning of mathematics as an indispensable adjunct for future experimentations with changes in the content and teaching of mathematics.

The Report should be made required reading for each teacher in the elementary and secondary schools. It should, as recommended by the seminar participants, be the subject of immediate discussion and debate in meetings of national and local groups concerned with mathematical education. It is without doubt the best and most forceful presentation of arguments for the reform of present school mathematics curricula. Very few questions and problems that perplex teachers and administrators are left without practical comment and useful suggestions.

The Report should be given to every administrator, curriculum supervisor and school superintendent and used as a guide for gradual local changes in mathematics which will eventually reflect the international thinking on a program of modern mathematics.

The reviewer hopes that this Report will prove to be only the first of many cooperative studies to promote and direct on a national and international level the long overdue reform in school mathematics.

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Notes from Readers

Readers who have a special interest in topics discussed in articles, or in the treatment of controversial issues presented in the REVIEW, are welcome to submit notes for publication. Notes should be brief, not exceeding five typewritten, double-spaced pages.

THE EDITORS

Introduction

THIS SPECIAL ISSUE originated in the Editors' concern to subject the field of Guidance, as an important aspect of the educational process, to critical and scholarly review. A further objective was to involve scholars from related disciplines with authors from the field itself in such an examination. Guidance has progressed to a point where continuing review and contributions from meta-disciplines such as psychology, philosophy, and sociology are requisite.

Much of Guidance literature has focused on that which is pragmatic rather than on a search for theoretical models and substantiating empirical evidence. The present issue is not concerned with a number of common stereotypes of Guidance, i.e., matching man with job, life adjustment, college placement, or clinical provision for the atypical. Instead, this symposium presents differing views upon issues which range from the interaction in counseling to the professional development of this entire sector of the educational process.

As an introduction, Gordon W. Allport analyzes three psychological models of man and suggests that Guidance must recognize man's proactive future-oriented growth as basic to effective professional practice. By contrast, Jack Michael and Lee Meyerson contend that the behavioristic model, rejected by Allport, provides the only sound basis for the development of a scientific and ultimately effective guidance function. Subjective dynamics of the counselor and counselee interaction, dismissed by Michael and Meyerson, are seen by both Adrian van Kaam and Carl Rogers as crucial. Van Kaam examines the implications of the existential position of both counselor and client. Carl Rogers hypothesizes that the effectiveness of counseling depends not upon the counselor's training, theoretical orientation, or the severity of the client's problem, but on the quality of the interpersonal relationship. He presents important empirical evidence in support of this position.

Edward Joseph Shoben, Jr. provides a critical assessment of current Guidance assumptions and practices. His argument is for a transformed Guidance function which would sharpen the impact of the school and give it a greater cogency for the individual student. The importance of the social and cultural context for Guidance is further pursued by both C. Gilbert Wrenn and Dean K. Whitla. Wrenn, noting the accelerating rate of cultural change, suggests that the counselor's previous training and experience may often hinder

rather than facilitate effective counseling. Whitla, analyzing the college experience, stresses that Guidance personnel must be sensitive to the transaction between the student's feelings of competence and the qualities and values of the institution. Raymond C. Hummel, on the basis of a longitudinal study of high school underachievement, examines counseling objectives and constraints in the secondary school. David V. Tiedeman and Frank L. Field present a theory for the development of purposeful action on the part of the individual, the counselor, and the Guidance profession.

The editors recognize that the discussion herein initiated is necessarily incomplete and believe that it merits extension, particularly in the areas of philosophy and sociology. Nevertheless, we consider this issue a substantial realization of our original intention.

R. CARLE
C. KEHAS
R. MOSHER

Psychological Models for Guidance

GORDON W. ALLPORT

Harvard University

HOWEVER EXCELLENT his natural eyesight may be, a counselor always looks at his client through professional spectacles. It could not be otherwise. After all, he has invested time and money in his psychological training. Of what use is it unless it adds special prisms to his own unaided eyesight?

The lenses we wear are ground to the prescription of our textbooks and teachers. Even while we are undergraduates a certain image of the nature of man is fitted to our eyes. We grow accustomed to the image and when we become practitioners or teachers we may still take it for granted.

But every so often comes a time for optical re-examination. Perhaps the image we have is still the best fit we can get; perhaps it is not. We can tell only by examining alternative lenses. In particular I believe that three are worthy of special scrutiny:

1) *Man seen as a reactive being.* Under this rubric I would include outlooks known as naturalism, positivism, behaviorism, operationism, physicalism; these are also sometimes called—mistakenly, I think—"scientific psychology."

2) *Man seen as a reactive being in depth.* Here I include what is variously called psychoanalysis, psychodynamics, depth psychology.

3) *Man seen as a being-in-process-of-becoming.* This label covers recent trends known as holism, orthopsychology, personalistics, existential psychology.

These three images provide a focus not only for guidance practices, but for all other professional psychological activity whether it be teaching, research, counseling or therapy.

MAN: A REACTIVE BEING

One hundred years ago in his *Beiträge* Wilhelm Wundt mapped a program for the newly conceived science of psychology. His own view of the proper development of this science was broad and permissive, especially in the field of social psychology. But what has taken hold in the Anglo-American tradition is the experimental outlook of his *Physiologische Psychologie*. Fusing with Darwinism, Machian positivism, the quantitative outlook of Galton and his successors, as well as with techniques invented by Binet, Pavlov, Hull and

others—this experimental outlook prevailed and has ground the lens that is fitted to the eyes of almost all undergraduate students of psychology. Many of us who continue in the profession feel no need for further correction in this image of man.

Seen through this lens man is no different in kind from any other living reactor; and therefore, like the paramecium or pigeon, may be studied biologically, behaviorally, mathematically. To be sure a few special concepts need to be devised to take care of the vast complexity of human behavior, but all these concepts—among them habit hierarchy, secondary reinforcement, input and output of information, and the like—are consistent with the postulates of physicalism and naturalism.

If we ask, "What does it mean to be a human being?" this school of thought replies, "Man is one more creature of nature; his behavior though complex is predictable in principle. His present state is determined by his past state. A man's consciousness is unreliable and must be distrusted, preferably disregarded altogether. We seek the general laws of nature, not personal uniqueness. We study man, not men; objective reality, not subjective."

In principle this broad positive tradition, which we all know so well, puts a desirable end to psychological naïveté. It cautions us not to believe every verbal report that comes to our ears; it warns us to be skeptical of our own naked eyesight; and from it we learn to check ourselves for observer reliability. It teaches us to use precise and repeatable methods. Because of its stress on reliable methods this favored tradition in psychology has become known as "scientific psychology." Its methods are indeed scientific; but its primary postulate—that man is simply a reactive organism—is no more scientific than any other postulate.

It is here that the counselor encounters his first difficulty. Trained in tests, statistics, and experimental design, he may think, quite mistakenly, that to employ these useful aids he must also view his client as a reactive being—an exclusive product of stimulus impact, homeostasis, drive-reduction and reinforcement learning. The term "scientific" has spread like a grease spot from method to theory. Just because most of our methods evolved through the positivistic tradition does not mean that the postulates of this tradition concerning the nature of man are the only acceptable postulates for scientific psychology.

A counselor whose theoretical spectacles disclose a merely reactive being, is likely to think of his client in terms of past conditioning and potential re-conditioning; in terms of reinforcements, in terms of environmental determinism. He will assume that his client's basic motives are drive-reduction or second-order conditionings which in some shadowy way are supposed to account for all his adult interests and vocational ambitions.

The vocabulary emanating from this type of postulate is replete with terms like *reaction*, *response*, *reinforcement*, *reflex*, *respondent*, *reintegration*—all sorts of *re-compounds*. The reference is backward. What *has* been is more

important than what *will* be. Terms such as *proaction*, *progress*, *program*, *production*, *problem-solving*, or *proprieate* are characteristically lacking. One would think that the client seated opposite would *protest*, for the language of response negates the subject's immediate certainty that his life lies in the future.

The positivistic view of man as a reactor has performed a good service, shaking us out of common sense naïveté, endowing us with useful methods, and correctly informing us that man is, in *some* aspects of his being, a simple respondent to simple pressures. Its postulates are, however, questionable. It sees reality as ordered but not as personal; it sees consciousness as a nuisance; it looks at man as reactive, not proactive.

It is probably true that no counselor fully follows this creed in his daily practice. Indeed he could not do so. It is too impoverished a view of real life. When a convinced positivist attempts to fit his image of man to concrete human situations, as B. F. Skinner has done in *Walden Two*, the result strikes many of us as threadbare, even pitiable.

Probably for this reason many behaviorists (starting even as far back as E. B. Holt in *The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics*) attempt to combine stimulus-response with psychoanalysis. Neal Miller and John Dollard in their *Personality and Psychotherapy* offer a good example. Man as a reactive being is combined with man as a reactive being in depth.

MAN: A REACTIVE BEING IN DEPTH

So influential is this image of man that we find it everywhere: dominant in literature, in social work, in guidance, in therapeutic practice, and in the market place. There is no need today to describe this image to any educated, or even semi-educated, American adult. Freudianism, like positivism, is our daily dish.

What I should like to do is to make clear that Freudianism (in spite of its less reliable methods) is a close kin of traditional positivism. The only change in the image of man lies in adding the depth dimension. To the long psychological vocabulary of *re-compounds*, depth psychology adds *repression*, *regression*, *resistance*, *abreaction*, *reaction formation*, and many others.

Like other simple naturalistic views of man, psychoanalysis puts its chief weight upon the press of pleasure and pain. This pressure produces in the organism a tendency to seek an equilibrium between the force of his drives and the circumstances of reality. The fact that Freud maximizes the role of sex and locates the whole constellation of reactive forces chiefly in the unconscious does not alter the essential similarity.

For Freud causation lies in the past history of the individual just as it does for the conditioned-response theorist. Both have a dismaying disregard for the person's phenomenology of the future, for his sense of personhood and sense

of freedom. The ego is a reactive agent, having no energy of its own, but borrowing from the unsocialized Id.

Central to depth psychology, and important for guidance, is the doctrine of *recall* and *recovery* (two more *re-compounds*). Therapy, and presumably guidance, proceeds by disclosing to the client some buried motive, or a troublesome and repressed psychic trauma. The client's salvation, if indeed he has any, lies in this vital recall. A troublesome memory is brought to cognizable form. Presumably the result is helpful to the individual in solving his conflicts. The theory, however, does not allow for any interaction between the person and the recovered memory. Simple re-instatement is itself, as Freud says, the "pure gold" of psychoanalysis. What values a client should live by when once the re-instatement has taken place is not the "pure gold" of psychoanalysis. That all adult values are simply sublimated aim-inhibited wishes, is the central doctrine. Freud never allows for the individual's capacity to disregard his past or to reshape it freely. Indeed, since the structure of the Id never changes, the future can at best be a redirection, never a transformation, of one's purposes. What one becomes is essentially what one is, and what one was.

Among the valid portions of psychoanalysis of special use to all counselors, is the brilliant account given us by Freud and by his daughter Anna, of the defensive mechanisms of the ego. In dealing with our client we do well to follow the advice of psychoanalysis and watch for rationalizations, denials of reality through repression, and displacements of aggression. All these, and other, ego-defenses belong to the nature of man, and therefore must find a place in any theory of human personality.

But what perplexes me is why so many of the ego-processes described by psychoanalysis should be merely protective strategies. Are there no ego-processes that lead to a transformation of what is recovered? To a creative cognition? To a revised sense of personhood and a new phenomenology of the future? To Freud the person seems never to be truly proactive, seldom even active. Almost always he is seen as reactive to early fixations—perhaps to some castration threat that occurred years ago, or to some other unsocialized infant complex, especially to Oedipal fantasies. My difficulty with this image of man is summed up most tersely by the late satirist, Max Beerbohm, who said, "They were a tense and peculiar family—those Oedipuses."

There is, I am well aware, a large group of theories that derive from the psychodynamic tradition but at the same time deviate considerably from the orthodox view of reactivity-in-depth. All these theories, in my judgment, move in a desirable direction. Here I shall mention only some of the relevant authors: Adler, Jung, Hartmann, Horney, Erikson, Fromm. Still more deviant from Freud are Goldstein, Maslow, Rogers, and Robert White. These and other writers offer a type of theory that views man as a being in the process of becoming. Many of them ask the pivotal question differently from the

reactivist schools of thought. And it makes a good deal of difference just how a question is asked.

A story is told about two priests. They were arguing whether it was proper to smoke and to pray at the same time. One said "Yes," the other "No." To settle the matter they decided that both should write to the Holy Father for his opinion. Sometime later they met and compared notes. Each claimed that the Holy Father had supported his view. They were perplexed. Finally one asked, "How did you phrase your question?" The other replied: "I asked whether it was proper to smoke while one is praying; and the Pope answered, 'Certainly not, praying is serious business and permits no distractions.' And how did you phrase your question?" "Well," said the other, "I asked if it were proper to pray while smoking, and the Pope answered, 'Certainly, prayer is always in order.'"

Instead of asking Aristotle's question, "What is the place of man in Nature?" many authors today are asking St. Augustine's question, "Who am I?" This question, rephrased in the 20th Century, has opened the floodgates to a new theorizing of the broad type often labeled *existentialist*.

MAN: BEING IN THE PROCESS OF BECOMING

Seelye Bixler, former president of Colby College, tells of a student who recently remarked, "I can't tell you how much satisfaction I take in my existential despair." In some student circles despair has always been popular. To label it "existentialist" makes it doubly attractive, in fact irresistible.

But overlooking the fashionable flavor of existentialism it is surely necessary for the modern counselor to take seriously the present-day anxieties of the younger generation. No longer can youth contemplate its future under the protection of the great social stabilizers of the past. No longer can one counsel within the framework of Victorian decorum, theological certainties, or the Pax Britannica. It is obvious to us all that some sort of shattering transformation is under way. The comfortable stabilities of culture, caste, the gold standard, and military supremacy are no longer ours.

Nor are the comfortable stabilities of traditional psychology adequate. Of what use is it to invoke an impersonal theory of learning, a biological theory of motivation, and a late Victorian formula for the unconscious, when youth's problems today are acutely conscious, intensely personal, and propelling him like an unguided astronaut into an unknown future? A counselor is not equipped for his job unless he can share in some degree the apprehensions of modern youth, and sense the swampy underpinning on which youth treads. Over his desk the counselor might well tack the wisdom of the Spanish writer Unamuno, "Suffering is the life blood that runs through us all and binds us together." While not every youth who comes to the counselor is at that

moment a sufferer, it is a safe assumption that he comes for guidance that will fortify him for the inevitable suffering that he will encounter in his course of life.

TENTATIVENESS AND COMMITMENT

From the existential point of view the ideal counselor will strive to develop two attitudes in his client. Taken separately they seem antithetical; but fused into a world-view they provide strength for the future. One attitude is *tentativeness* of outlook. Since certainties are no longer certain, let all dogmas be fearlessly examined, especially those cultural idols that engender a false sense of security: dogmas of race supremacy, of naïve scientism, of unilinear evolutionary progress. Let one face the worst in oneself and in the world around him, so that one may correctly estimate the hazards.

Taken by itself such tentativeness, such insightfulness, might well lead to ontological despair. Yet acceptance of the worst does not prevent us from making the best of the worst. Up to now psychologists have not dealt with the remarkable ability of human beings to blend a tentative outlook with firm commitment to chosen values. The poet Tennyson perceived the point.

There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds.

A commitment is, as Pascal has said, a wager. One may lose it, but one may also win. Cardinal Newman warned us that our religion can never be a matter of certainty. It is at best a subjective condition of certitude which he defined as "probability supported by faith and love." Yet a mature religion, thus defined, can be infinitely sustaining and heroically motivating. Existentialism, whether theistic or atheistic, makes the same point. We have the freedom to commit ourselves to great causes with courage, even though we lack certainty. We can be at one and the same time half-sure and whole-hearted.

William James, probably America's greatest thinker, tried to teach us this lesson, but fifty years ago we were not ready for it. It is surely noteworthy that, writing as he did in a period of social stability, James saw clearly how ultimately uncertain are our foundations of value. Wealth, he saw was a false god, leading us into a national disease that has recently been called "galloping consumption." The more we build up our material resources, the more we fear poverty. In religion, James knew, there was no certainty; yet, like Cardinal Newman, he recognized the constructive power of a mature religious commitment. Whatever ideal leads to long-range constructive consequences is psychologically sound. It is also pragmatically true. And who is to say that we have a test for truth more absolute than our own commitment in so far as it is validated by fruitful consequences?

Neither positivistic nor psychodynamic schools of thought allow for the fact that our psychological constitution permits both total tentativeness and total commitment. Such a paradox reminds us of the electron that is able to go in two opposite directions at the same time. Taken by itself tentativeness is disintegrative; commitment is integrative. Yet the blend seems to occur in personalities that we admire for their soundness and perspective. Presumably through teaching and guidance we may develop both attitudes in our youth.

Whenever the two attitudes coexist in a life we find important desirable by-products from the fusion. One is a deep sense of compassion for the lot of the human race in general and in each separate social encounter that marks our daily life. The other by-product is likewise graceful; it is the sense of humor. Humor requires the perspective of tentativeness, but also an underlying system of values that prevents laughter from souring into cynicism. As Meredith said, humor is a capacity to laugh at the things you love and still to love them.

RATIONALISM VS. IRRATIONALISM

The chief criticism made of existentialism is that it leads away from reason and exalts irrationalism. While this charge may apply to certain literary and theological trends in the existential movement I doubt that it jeopardizes the future of scientific psychology. The attitudes of tentativeness and commitment of which I speak are perfectly sound concepts—call them “intervening variables” if you wish. Indeed in so far as they reflect important states in human personality, and thus lead to improvement in understanding, prediction, and direction of human behavior, they are sounder scientific concepts than many of those we have been using.

And just what is rationalism? We venerate the ancient Greeks for their exaltation of human reason; and as psychologists we venerate Aristotle for asking the question, “What is man’s place in nature.” But Greek rationalism was broader than the limited, method-centered, scientism into which it has degenerated. The Greeks themselves saw a place for tentativeness and commitment within the scope of reason. The case is beautifully stated in an ancient inscription found somewhere on the coast of Greece:

A shipwrecked sailor buried on this coast
Bids you set sail.
Full many a bark, when we were lost,
Weathered the gale.

The dead sailor urges us to make the wager, take the risk, although we cannot be sure of coming through to our destination.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

What does all this mean in terms of psychological theory, and in terms of guidance? First of all it means that in order to achieve a more realistic image of man and his potentialities, we need to revise our current theories of learning and growth, of motivation and personality structure. Elsewhere (in *Pattern and Growth in Personality*, 1961) I have discussed some of the needed changes in detail, and so shall say only a few words about each.

The trouble with our current theories of learning is not so much that they are wrong, but that they are partial. They fit best the learning of animals and young children. The concepts of conditioning, reinforcement, identification, seem a bit hollow when the counselor tries to apply them to his work. They are not very helpful, for example, in explaining how a youth may learn both tentativeness of outlook and firmness of commitment. Supplementary theories in terms of organizational, biographical, and propiate learning are needed.

Except in the sense of physical maturation the concept of *growth* scarcely exists in psychology at all. Nor will it have its proper place until we have agreed upon normative standards for the maturity of personality. Up to now normative problems, except in the sense of statistical norms, are much neglected.

As for motivation and personality structure psychologists are in a state of turmoil and disagreement. That the past stages of a life do not fully explain the motivational "go" of the present, I for one am firmly convinced. Therefore we need a concept (*functional autonomy*, I think will do) to represent that portion of a life that is oriented toward the future and not toward the past. Also we need a theory of personal structure (of *personal dispositions*) to represent the important cleavages and foci of a given, concrete personality. Such a theory will, I am convinced, carry us much further than a conception of uniform variables to which every client is forcibly ordered, whether we call these variables factors, needs, dimensions, or common traits.

Most of all we need to surrender the models that would compress human personality into the routine homeostatic situation that we find in quasi-closed systems. Human personality is a wide-open system, responsive to tangible and intangible culture, on the look-out for new ideas, and capable of asking an altogether new type of question—asked by no other creature in nature, viz., "Who am I?"

There are, I am glad to say, many psychologists who feel as strongly as I that these various types of improvement need to be made before the counselor will have a fully fashioned science of psychology to undergird his practice.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GUIDANCE

Guidance is not a matter of gimmicks, nor of rules of thumb. A guide, like a philosopher and friend, is a person who loves wisdom and loves his fellow

men. True, he has skills to mark him off from the professional philosopher or the untrained friend. To some extent the counselor's present-day skills are useful. Standard tests and measurements are helpful; so too achievement records and focused interviews. Most of our devices come from researches conducted under the positivistic outlook, or (in the case of projective techniques) under the psychodynamic. While many of them are serviceable I look forward to the invention of new instruments still better suited to the study of the central or propiariate aspects of single personalities.

Most important, of course, are the spectacles the counselor wears. The image should no longer be borrowed from the tradition of simple naïve reactivism. Just as centimeters, grams, seconds are outmoded in modern physics so too are simple stimulus-response connections in modern psychology. In psychology, even more than in physics, we need theory capable of dealing with fluid becoming.

The plain fact is that man is more than a reactive being, more even than a reactive being in depth. If he were comfortably fixed at these levels we could with confidence apply a uniform stencil in studying his nature. But the life process is no less paradoxical than the processes of modern physics. How can one deal with space that is both finite and unbounded, with light that is both wave and particle, with electrons that pass from orbit to orbit without traversing the space between? Similarly, a human person is both structure and process, a being both biological and noetic, a being who changes his identity even while he retains it. Small wonder that at the end of his life, the famous physicist, P. W. Bridgman, said, "The structure of nature may eventually be such that our processes of thought do not correspond to it sufficiently to permit us to think about it at all."

We need not, I think, be quite so pessimistic. Our first duty is to affirm a new and wider rationalism; that is to say, to redouble our efforts to find a more adequate image of man to guide us in fashioning a more suitable science of personality.

And what about our personal attitudes as guidance specialists or teachers? Should we not cultivate the same twin virtues that we recommend to client and student: tentativeness and commitment? We can hold our own present image of man on trial, reviewing our own past psychological training in critical perspective. At the same time we can embrace courageously our task of interpreting the wisdom of the past in such a way as to make it most available to the youthful personality who is facing an uncertain, but not uninviting, future. Tentativeness and commitment are twin ideals for both counselor and client. To my mind they lie at the heart and center of guidance, of teaching, and of living.

A Behavioral Approach to Counseling and Guidance

JACK MICHAEL and LEE MEYERSON
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IT IS TEMPTING to begin an article of this kind with attention-compelling references to some of the seemingly spectacular results that have been achieved by investigators who have employed procedures derived from what has come to be known as the experimental analysis of behavior. It is fascinating to learn how pigeons were taught to guide a missile (7), how speech was restored in a catatonic patient who had been mute for many years (4), and how some long standing undesirable behavior in mentally retarded and psychotic individuals was changed in a relatively short time (1). Not a great deal is accomplished, however, if the relevance of this work for the educator, the psychologist and the counselor is not perceived, and needless harm occurs if the results are dismissed as artificial, impractical experiments by laboratory scientists who "want to treat people like rats and pigeons."

A behavioral approach to counseling and guidance does not consist of a bag of tricks to be applied mechanically for the purpose of coercing unwilling people. It is part of a highly technical system, based on laboratory investigations of the phenomena of conditioning, for describing behavior and specifying the conditions under which it is acquired, maintained, and eliminated.

Much more knowledge of conditioning and its broad field of applicability to human behavior is available today than can be appreciated by those who have only vague recollections of the glandular and motor responses of the dogs studied by Pavlov.

It is the major purpose of this paper to describe, in a didactic way, a portion of the new knowledge that has been obtained. Starting from definitions of specialized concepts and terminology, mastery of which will permit further reading of the technical literature, an overview is given of a descriptive and explanatory system of behavior that has relevance for counseling and guidance. Although application to practical counseling problems is not made in the main body of the paper, no doubt many counselors will perceive the similarity to counseling situations of the behavior processes that are described. A briefer concluding section summarizes some of the theoretical and practical implications of the system for counseling and guidance.

It is necessary to understand at the outset that the familiar characteriza-

tion of behavior as a function of the interaction of hereditary and environmental variables is accepted, not with the lip service that is sometimes given before fleeing to hypothetical constructs of inner behavioral determiners that are neither heredity nor environment, but with utmost seriousness.

The consequences of this orientation should be made explicit: Inherited genetic and constitutional determiners are not under the control of, or subject to, direct experimentation by behavioral scientists. This means that the only channel open to counselors for influencing human behavior is through changes in the environment. Additionally, certain environmental manipulations, such as separating a person from his frontal lobes or administering drugs that have psychopharmacological effects, are not available to psychologists and educators. The phenomenon with which counselors deal, then, is behavior, and the independent variable which controls behavior must be the environment. A behavioral system attempts to specify, without reference to unobservable, hypothetical inner-determining agents, the conditions and the process by which the environment controls human behavior.

A BEHAVIORAL SYSTEM¹

Respondent Conditioning

Certain physical events in the environment are related to certain human muscular and glandular activities in a relatively invariable way. A light shined in the eye elicits a constriction of the pupil. An acid solution placed on the tongue elicits secretion by the salivary gland. Such physical events are called stimuli and the muscular and glandular activities are called responses. Some of these stimulus-response relationships or reflexes are present at birth, and in humans most of them are involved in maintaining the internal economy of the body or protecting it against harmful external conditions.

A stimulus which is not a part of a reflex relationship becomes a *conditioned stimulus* for the response by repeated, temporal pairing with an *unconditioned stimulus* which already elicits the response. This new relation-

¹ The principles of the system presented here are based on data reported by a great many people. Most studies within the last 5 years were reported in the *Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior*.

The statements about avoidance are based in large part on work done by Murray Sidman and his associates. Statements about punishment are based primarily on the work of N. H. Azrin and his associates. A more complete treatment of the material basic to this systematic presentation is available in J. G. Holland and B. F. Skinner, *The Analysis of Behavior* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961) and in B. F. Skinner's earlier work, *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1953). Similar material has been presented in several shorter papers, like the present one, addressed to some special audience. Two of these are especially valuable in their thoroughness and in their detailed discussion of practical applications of research findings. They are C. B. Ferster's "Reinforcement and punishment in the control of human behavior by social agencies," *Psychiatric Research Reports*, 1958, 10, 101-118; and M. Sidman's "Operant Techniques," in Arthur J. Bachrach (Ed.) *Experimental Foundations of Clinical Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1962).

ship is called a *conditioned reflex*; and the pairing procedure is called *respondent conditioning*.

In general, conditioning does not produce permanent effects. If the conditioned stimulus is presented frequently in the absence of the unconditioned stimulus, a procedure called *extinction*, it loses its eliciting properties.

The procedures for producing conditioning and extinction were first explored systematically by I. P. Pavlov, and respondent conditioning is an area of continued interest and active investigation.

However, if conditioning phenomena were limited in applicability to the transfer of eliciting effects from reflex stimuli to other stimuli, the field would be of little importance in understanding human behavior. Most of the behavior that is of interest to society does not fit the paradigm of the reflex. There is in general no identifiable eliciting stimulus for the broad class of "voluntary" activity called by B. F. Skinner *operant* behavior. The basic operation of respondent conditioning, however, the systematic temporal pairing of stimulus conditions, is of some significance since a portion of almost any kind of stimulus effect can be transferred to a new stimulus by the procedure of pairing the two stimuli.

Operant Conditioning

Whereas for reflexes and conditioned reflexes the event of critical explanatory importance is the eliciting stimulus preceding the response, for a large class of non-reflex behavior the critical events are the environmental consequences of the behavior. Such behavior can be said to "operate" on the environment, in contrast to behavior which is "respondent" to prior eliciting stimuli.

It is convenient to group the kinds of stimulus events which are consequences of acts into three major classes in terms of their effects on operant behavior.

Positive Reinforcers. These stimulus events are defined by the observation that the behavior which preceded them has a higher probability of occurrence under similar conditions in the future. Such events are often called rewards and described as pleasant. Some of these positive reinforcers are of biological significance to the organism such as food, water, sexual contact, and some are of acquired significance such as praise, affection, grades, money.

Negative Reinforcers or Aversive Stimuli. These events are defined by the observation that behavior which preceded their removal is more likely to occur under similar conditions in the future. The common aversive stimuli are those we call painful or unpleasant such as extreme heat or cold, blows on the surface of the body, distortions of certain inner organs as in a stomach ache, very loud sounds or very bright lights. Another class of aversive stimuli are those whose properties are acquired during our lifetimes such as social disapproval, criticism, nagging, threat.

The operation of presenting a positive reinforcer contingent upon a response is called *positive reinforcement*. The operation of removing an aversive stimulus contingent upon a response is called *negative reinforcement*.² Both operations are called *operant conditioning* and both increase the future frequency of the response which preceded them.

No Consequence and Neutral Stimuli. Responses continue to occur if they receive either positive or negative reinforcement. They cease if followed by no consequence or by neutral stimuli. The procedure of allowing behavior to occur without reinforcement is called *operant extinction*, and can be contrasted with *respondent extinction* which is the procedure of allowing a conditioned stimulus to occur without pairing it with an unconditioned stimulus.

It should be noted that none of the above statements constitutes postulates, axioms, assumptions or issues of theoretical controversy. The definitions are simply descriptions of observed relationships. Some events serve as reinforcers and some do not. The determination of what constitutes a reinforcer for a particular organism is an empirical problem, although of course, it is often very helpful to have studied biologically similar organisms or those inhabiting similar environments. In the case of humans, the reinforcers of biological significance are apparently very similar to those of other mammals and are fairly well known. On the other hand, the specification of the events of acquired reinforcing value for an individual human requires either a contemporary investigation or considerable knowledge of his environmental history.

Conditioned Reinforcers. Only a small proportion of the important consequences of human behavior are the unconditioned reinforcers attributable to biological characteristics. Other consequences, *conditioned reinforcers*, acquire their reinforcing properties as a function of experience. It appears that an event becomes a conditioned reinforcer in some degree simply by being paired with another reinforcer. However, most of the conditioned reinforcers that are important in human affairs are, in addition, stimuli in the presence of which further behavior is reinforced. In common sense terms, most conditioned reinforcers are means to an end which may be an unconditioned reinforcer or another conditioned reinforcer. For example, a match for a smoker will serve as a reinforcer for the behavior which procured it because it makes possible the further behavior of striking it and lighting the cigarette.

Some conditioned reinforcers are specific to particular unconditioned reinforcers as when signs regarding the serving of food, pictures of food, and menus, function as conditioned reinforcers for humans who are momentarily reinforceable with food. Some conditioned reinforcers, however, because they

² Negative reinforcement should not be confused with punishment which is the presentation of an aversive stimulus contingent on a response.

have been paired with many different unconditioned and conditioned reinforcers and because they have been means to many different ends almost become ends in themselves. Reinforcers that have this property, such as money, social approval, successful manipulation of the physical environment, affection, and others are called *generalized conditioned reinforcers*.

Common Sense, Automaticity, and Superstitious Behavior. It may seem that to emphasize the pleasant and unpleasant consequences of acts through "rewards and punishments" is nothing new. The effects described above have long been known and used in an intuitive way, but they also have long been misunderstood. The strengthening effect of a reward is commonly understood in terms of a rational process. It seems only natural that a person will repeat that which he can see will benefit him, and perform again those acts which he believes will terminate unpleasant conditions. However, the effect does not depend on a rational process at all. The foreseeing of consequences or the ability to state the relation between the consequence and the behavior which produced it is unnecessary. Any behavior which is followed by reinforcement—in all of the many species studied, and above all in man—is more likely to occur again in the same or a similar situation. This could be called the *automaticity* of the effect of reinforcement. To increase the occurrence of a particular class of behavior, it is necessary only to ensure that reinforcement occurs relatively soon after the behavior.

The automaticity effect is most dramatically demonstrated in what is called "superstitious behavior." When reinforcement follows behavior, even though the behavior did not produce or in any sense cause the reinforcement, it is called *accidental reinforcement*. Behavior which is developed as a function of accidental reinforcement was whimsically referred to as superstitious behavior in a study with pigeons (8) and the term has become a quasi-technical term in the behavioral field. Humans, probably because of their more complex environment, provide many more examples of superstitious behavior than lower animals. The verbalizations and unique motor activities of gamblers and the unnecessary postures and movements seen in sports activities are examples of the effects of accidental contingencies of reinforcement.

Shaping

Inasmuch as an operant response must first occur before it can be followed by reinforcement, one might suppose that operant conditioning cannot be used to produce new behavior. However, the detailed topography of a response—the particular muscle actions, including force and speed of various muscle components—varies from one occurrence to another. To produce new behavior then, or behavior that has not appeared in the response repertoire before, it is sufficient to selectively reinforce one of the variations in topography which resulted from the previous reinforcement, while allowing the other

variations to extinguish. This has the effect of producing a further class of variations from which one may again differentially reinforce some and allow others to extinguish, and so on.

For example, in teaching a child to talk, his efforts to pronounce a particular word will at first be reinforced rather uncritically. Eventually, some of the variations will resemble accepted pronunciation more than others and receive selective reinforcement while other variations are allowed to extinguish. These events have the effect of producing a class of responses which come ever closer to the correct pronunciation than the last reinforced response, and the selective reinforcement can be applied again. This procedure for producing new behavior is called *shaping*. It is essentially the differential reinforcement of successive approximations to some complex form of behavior. It is the technique which animal trainers use to produce unusual and entertaining behaviors in their subjects, and it is the technique whereby humans acquire the complex response topographies of speech, athletic abilities and other motor skills.

Stimulus Control of Operant Behavior

Although the emphasis in describing operant behavior has been on the reinforcement occurring subsequent to the response, stimulus control is implied in the phrase concluding the principle of operant conditioning—if an operant response is followed by reinforcement it is more likely to occur *under similar conditions* in the future. The simplest principle of stimulus control is that the future probability of response is highest when the stimulus conditions resemble most closely those existing at the moment of previous reinforcement. The expression “resemble most closely” must be analyzed in some detail, but first a description is needed of a typical experimental situation in which the effects of stimuli on operant behavior are studied. A lower animal rather than a human is described as the subject in this example because stimulus control in humans is confounded by their extensive training regarding the relevance of certain classes of stimuli (see “discrimination training” below). A food deprived monkey is placed in a small chamber containing a movable foot pedal, and reinforced with food for pressing the pedal. Suppose that the chamber is illuminated by a relatively bright overhead light, a moderately loud tone of 1000 cycles per second plays constantly, and a small translucent disc above the pedal, at eye level, is illuminated from behind with a bright green light. Although none of these stimulus conditions can be said to elicit the response, they all come to exert some control over its probability, for if any of them is changed, the tendency to respond will be temporarily lowered. Of course, if we continue to reinforce in the presence of the changed stimuli, responding will recover and the class of stimulus conditions controlling the response will be broadened. If, instead of changing only one of the stimulus conditions, we change all of them, the tendency to respond will

be very low. In brief, any change from the stimulus conditions that existed at the moment of reinforcement will reduce the tendency to respond, and the greater the change, the greater the reduction.

There is, however, a vagueness in this formulation. How can the extent to which a changed stimulus condition resembles the original one be evaluated? For example, can we predict for a specific monkey whether changing the tone will reduce his tendency to respond more than turning off the overhead light? We cannot. It is an empirical question. To some extent the similarity of different stimulus conditions will depend on the biological characteristics of the species. But in part, as in the case of reinforcers, the importance to the individual organism of the various aspects of the stimulus condition will depend on the previous history of that particular organism.

In the situation described above a change in color on the translucent disc would not be expected to change the tendency to respond very much because the disc color is only a small part of the total stimulus situation. By skilled use of the procedures of reinforcement and extinction, however, we can bring about the more precise type of stimulus control that is called *discrimination*. If we change the color from green to red, and in the presence of the red disc we do not reinforce the pedal response, it will become less frequent, i.e., extinguish. If we then restore the color and in its presence pedal pressing is again reinforced and so on, alternating the two conditions, the control of the disc color over the pedal response will become quite strong. This procedure is called *discrimination training*. If in the presence of a stimulus a response is reinforced, and in the absence of this stimulus it is extinguished, the stimulus will control the probability of the response in high degree. Such a stimulus is called a *discriminative stimulus*.

Almost all important human behavior is under the control of discriminative stimuli. Although part of the educational process involves extensive shaping, particularly for motor skills, the educator's major efforts are directed toward the development of *discriminative repertoires*, or in common terminology, knowledge. Many details regarding the building of discriminative repertoires have been discovered in the experimental laboratory, and these findings are now beginning to see systematic exploitation in the field of programmed instruction.

The development of effective discriminative repertoires for interpersonal behavior is also a topic of great importance for those dealing with the practical control of behavior, and although the principles of discrimination are the same when the stimuli to be discriminated are the behaviors of other people, the details of application remain to be worked out.

A beginning has been made in applying basic principles of discrimination to verbal behavior, language, and communication. This is presently seen to be a field composed of one discriminative repertoire under the control of the many features of the physical and social environment, with additional repertoires controlled by features of the first (9).

Schedules of Intermittent Reinforcement

Thus far discussion has centered on the role of reinforcement in simply making a response more likely to occur in the future, in shaping up novel topographies or forms of response, and in bringing a response under the control of a particular stimulus condition. But reinforcement does not lose its relevance once an adequate topography has been developed and the behavior is under proper stimulus control. It has additional effects that may be treated according to the schedule by which reinforcement is given.

An important characteristic of much behavior is that it is repeated, either because the appropriate stimulus conditions persist or because they recur. Having learned to ask a parent for a cookie a child can immediately ask for another, and another. This behavior must eventually cease because of temporary changes in the parent's disposition to provide the reinforcer, because the reinforcer loses its effectiveness by satiation, or for other reasons, but there will be other occasions for similar behavior to occur. If every occurrence of such a repeatable response is followed by reinforcement the behavior will continue until other variables exert control. On the other hand, if reinforcement is discontinued altogether the behavior will cease.

Between the extremes of *continuous reinforcement* where every relevant response is reinforced and *extinction* where there is no reinforcement there are many situations where responses are only occasionally reinforced. Such *intermittent reinforcement* might be expected to produce an effect intermediate between continuous reinforcement and extinction, but that is not the case. The situation is much more complex. A schedule of intermittent reinforcement is actually a way of arranging reinforcement contingencies regarding the passage of time, the number of responses, or both. The complexity arises from the varied and intricate ways in which these temporal and number contingencies can be combined and interrelated in natural and laboratory environments, and from the extreme sensitivity of the behavior of organisms to such conditions.

Ratio Reinforcement. There is a large class of schedules involving solely a number contingency, and this is usually specified in terms of the ratio of responses to reinforcements. Industrial piecework pay is an example of ratio reinforcement, as is the pay-off schedule provided by the "one-armed bandit" of the gambling house. The principal characteristic of such schedules is that the more rapidly one works the more frequently one is reinforced. Behavior conforms to this kind of requirement by occurring at a high rate. Another feature of this kind of schedule is that very large amounts of work per reinforcement can be tolerated, but to avoid premature extinction the organism must approach such conditions gradually by first being exposed to less stringent requirements. A third feature is that simple ratio reinforcement does not have self-corrective properties. Any temporary reduction in the tendency to respond simply delays the ultimate reinforcement. Vicious circles can easily

develop where the less one responds the less one gets, and therefore the less one responds in the future.

Interval Reinforcement. Another class of schedules involves only temporal contingencies. The most commonly studied arrangements are those where the probability of a response being reinforced increases as a simple function of the passage of time, and under these conditions the frequency of responding generally reflects the changing probability of reinforcement. An example from daily life is the behavior of telephoning someone who is not at home. One cannot hasten his return home by rapid re-dialing, as in ratio reinforcement, but the probability of making the connection and completing the call increases as time passes. If the interval varies randomly, response frequency is relatively constant over time. If the interval is constant, responding increases in frequency as the time for reinforcement approaches. In such schedules the rate of responding is directly related to the frequency of reinforcement. Only moderate response rates are generated by interval reinforcement but when the reinforcement is discontinued altogether, responding decreases in frequency very slowly compared with behavior which has been continuously reinforced. Resistance to extinction is high. In contrast to the ratio schedules described earlier, interval schedules in general are self-corrective. Any temporary reduction in response frequency is counteracted by receiving the next reinforcement after fewer unreinforced responses, and this restores the tendency to respond.

Much more complex arrangements of temporal and number contingencies occur in the human physical and social environment, and also in the behavior laboratory. Fortunately the field is somewhat systematized and it is becoming increasingly possible to predict the effects of new arrangements on the basis of what is known about their components.

Intermittent Reinforcement and Motivation. In addition to its general theoretical relevance in illuminating the effects of reinforcement contingencies, intermittent reinforcement is of considerable practical significance because of its relationship to the traditional field of motivation. The well motivated person is one who works at some activity with persistence, even though his reinforcement is long delayed. He is also a person who can put out a very large amount of work with only an occasional reward. It is not evident, however, that these properties are *in* the person or that the behavior cannot be produced by manipulating the environment. Variable interval schedules generate great persistence in the face of non-reinforcement, and ratio schedules produce large amounts of work for the minimum number of reinforcements. Not only good motivation but the pathologically "driven" behavior that is said to characterize the gambler can be generated in the laboratory by programming the same kind of variable ratio schedule that acts on the gambler. Similarly when a child cries and begs his parents with great persistence and intensity to

take him with them rather than leave him with a baby sitter, we are likely to say something like "he *wants* very much to go with them." The work on intermittent reinforcement tells us very clearly that just such a performance could be generated by acquiescing to the child's requests after only mildly intense and slightly persistent entreaties at first and then slowly raising the requirement. Whether any particular sample of behavior arose in this way is an empirical question.

Deprivation and Satiation

Not all motivational problems fit the paradigm described above. Deprivation and satiation have two major effects on behavior which cannot at present be reduced to the effects of any of the biological or environmental variables discussed previously.

Food, water, sexual activity, activity in general, and some other similar unconditioned reinforcers will serve as reinforcers only if the organism has been deprived of them. Satiation weakens and deprivation strengthens the effectiveness of these reinforcers. This is one major effect of this variable. In addition, deprivation with respect to a reinforcer results in an increased likelihood of occurrence of all the behavior that has in the past been reinforced with it.

Stated in terms of food, for example, the first effect is that as deprivation time increases, food becomes a more powerful reinforcer. As eating continues, food loses its reinforcing capacity. The second effect is seen in that food seeking behavior becomes more frequent as time since last eating increases, and less frequent as eating proceeds. This second effect cannot at present be reduced to the first, since the increase in food-seeking behavior can be observed even before reinforcement has been received.

The study of deprivation-satiation variables appears to come closest to the traditional field of motivation, but there are many cases where these variables are *not* relevant but it is common to infer them. For example, one man may show strong persistent behavior directed toward socio-sexual relations with women, and another may show very little such behavior. The customary explanation is in terms of sex drive, with the implication that equivalent periods of deprivation affect the two men differently or that one is more deprived than the other. It is more likely in our culture that differences of this magnitude are due largely to different histories of intermittent reinforcement although again this interpretation would require independent evidence in any particular case. Laboratory studies with lower animals indicate quite clearly that variables such as frequency of reinforcement and kind of schedule can cause variations in frequency and persistence of behavior that are greater than the variations generated by deprivation.

It would also be a mistake to infer a history of specific deprivation from the knowledge that a particular event will function as a reinforcer. In the case of ordinary conditioned reinforcers this mistake would not usually be made—

the fact that the sight of a telephone is reinforcing certainly doesn't suggest telephone deprivation, since a telephone is so obviously a means to an end. The generalized conditioned reinforcers, however, of affection, attention, money, because they are means to many different ends, erroneously might be assumed to be subject to the deprivation effect in themselves.

In summary then, deprivation and satiation are critical determiners of the momentary effectiveness of a number of reinforcers, and of the momentary strength of large classes of responses. But to pattern all "motivational" problems on this model would be to neglect other equally if not more important determiners.

Emotion

It is customary to consider emotion as respondent behavior, but operant aspects of emotion can also be specified. Like deprivation, emotional variables affect a large class of operant responses. For example, a person who is ordinarily described as fearful not only shows the respondent effects such as a more rapid heart rate, moist palms and dry throat, but also he shows an increased tendency to engage in all those operant behaviors which have in the past been reinforced by escape from current or similarly difficult situations. Further, those aspects of his repertoire which ordinarily receive positive reinforcement in this situation are weakened. His tendencies to run away, to hide, to seek help from other individuals, are all increased, whereas his tendencies to eat, play, and engage in normal social behaviors are decreased. These phenomena presently are not well understood.

The operations which produce behavioral changes in respondent and operant repertoires under emotion have not yielded to efforts to develop a simple classification scheme. Furthermore, the class of responses which are altered by any particular operation contain such a large component of acquired behaviors that the similarities between different individuals are of little systematic value. However, although an empirical description and ordering of the responses which change with emotion presently are limited, the principles whereby already developed repertoires can be transferred from one stimulus condition to another are somewhat better understood. The operation of temporal pairing is relevant. Any stimulus which is systematically present during an emotional condition will produce some of the respondents and some of the change in the operant repertoire that characterize the emotional condition when it is presented alone. Practical use of principles in this field has been under investigation in the U.S.S.R. ever since the earliest work of Pavlov. More recently, however, a group of British investigators have made very successful deliberate applications of emotional conditioning principles to the treatment of abnormal behavior (3).

Aversive Control

Escape and Avoidance. An environmental arrangement in which an organ-

ism's response can terminate an already present aversive stimulus is called an *escape* procedure. It is negative reinforcement, and operant conditioning of the response is the result. When behavior can prevent or delay the onset of the aversive stimulus the procedure is called *avoidance*, and this arrangement also will result in the development and maintenance of operant behavior. Avoidance cannot be considered as a simple case of negative reinforcement, however, since there is often no obvious stimulus termination immediately following the response. Turning off an alarm clock that has already begun to ring is an example of escape behavior, but pushing in the stop before it begins to ring is avoidance.

Examples of this kind of control are easily found in parent-child interactions. Children's cleanliness activities are often maintained as escape behavior where the aversive stimulus is the nagging verbal behavior of a parent. Sometimes these activities constitute avoidance behavior. Here the aversive stimulus is criticism, scolding, or being made to wash over again. Later, when children go to school their studying behavior is often maintained as avoidance behavior, where the aversive stimulus is again criticism, failing grades, or removal of privileges. The distinction between behavior for positive reinforcement and the avoidance paradigm is illustrated in the following not uncommon interchange between parent and child. The child is told to do something and asks "What will I get if I do?" whereupon the parent replies "You'll get something if you don't!"

Laboratory findings with avoidance behavior have indicated several characteristics of this kind of control which are closely related to behavior disorders of many kinds. In the first place, successful avoidance behavior will by its very nature prevent the discovery that the aversive stimulus has been discontinued, and when this is coupled with the extraordinary persistence of such behavior it suffices to explain many human activities that serve no current function.

Another finding relevant to behavior problems is the fact that occasional presentations of the aversive stimulus without respect to the organism's behavior will maintain the avoidance repertoire almost indefinitely. In this way, even though the bad thing that one is avoiding is no longer related to one's behavior, so long as it occurs once-in-a-while the avoidance repertoire may persist.

A final point concerns the conditions under which the escape or avoidance repertoire will occur. In escape behavior the presentation of the aversive stimulus produces immediate strength in the escape repertoire and the escape repertoire is not readily seen in the absence of the aversive stimulus. In avoidance, the presentation of stimuli which have in the past accompanied that or other aversive stimuli strengthen the avoidance repertoire, but an even stronger effect is seen when the aversive stimulus itself is presented momentarily. To maintain behavior in this manner it is necessary to maintain the threat of aversive stimulation.

Punishment. Technically, punishment refers to the operation of presenting an aversive stimulus contingent upon a response, or removing a positive reinforcer contingent upon a response.³ It is widely used in our culture to reduce the frequency of behavior, and according to "common sense" psychology is often described as opposite in effect from reward. As rewards strengthen behavior, so punishments are believed to weaken it. Considerable experimental evidence is now available regarding the effects of this operation, which turn out to be quite complex.

One kind of complexity arises because whereas the strengthening effects of reinforcement can be studied in isolation, the weakening effects of punishment can only be studied by superimposing them on preceding or ongoing strengthening effects. This is not only a methodological problem. In practical affairs the question of the efficacy of punishment seldom arises except with respect to behavior that has at least moderate probability of occurrence.

It is difficult to generalize about this competition between reinforcement and punishment since the parameters of the positive reinforcement and the aversive stimulus used are critical, as is the availability of alternative responses which are reinforced and/or punished to varying degrees. However, it is probably safe to say that when no other response but the punished one can obtain positive reinforcement, and with positive reinforcers like food, it takes very severe punishment to effectively reduce the frequency of the behavior.

Added to this complication is the fact that an aversive stimulus may have some effects because it is aversive, but it also has other stimulus effects. By the principle of stimulus control mentioned earlier an aversive stimulus can reduce the frequency of responding if the stimulus constitutes a change from the conditions which existed during previous reinforcement, regardless of its aversive characteristics. And since reinforcement often occurs in the same situation as punishment, an aversive stimulus, as a result of some systematic relation to the reinforcement, can acquire even more complex stimulus properties, such as those of a discriminative stimulus, or even a conditioned positive reinforcer.

Finally, there is a complication in interpreting the effects of punishment in human interactions that is brought about by the fact that a person who punishes may for a time be less disposed to provide any ordinary positive reinforcement. If this is the case, punishment systematically precedes a period of extinction. This arrangement results in a reduction in some behavior—but not due to the aversive effects of the punishment. On the other hand, punishers sometimes show a greater disposition to provide positive reinforcement shortly after they have administered punishment. This results in a tem-

³ Common sense usage often has punishment synonymous with what is referred to here as an aversive stimulus or, even more broadly, as aversive control.

porary increase in some kinds of behavior, and, under proper conditions, even a future increase in the punished behavior.

Any stimulus which is paired temporally with an aversive stimulus acquires some of its properties. Such stimuli are called *conditioned aversive stimuli* or conditioned negative reinforcers. Aversive stimuli and conditioned aversive stimuli, in addition to producing the effects described above are also classed as emotional variables, because of their respondent effects and their effects on large classes of operant responses. This emotional effect enters into and further complicates various kinds of aversive control. It also appears to be responsible for various deleterious changes in certain internal organs. Because of this, and for many other reasons, aversive control is in most cases socially undesirable although it is apparently not completely avoidable.

This concludes the presentation of the basic empirical principles of this behavior system. Of course, many details have been omitted, but the major relations have been covered. Further development of this system is proceeding along two lines: workers in experimental laboratories are constantly discovering new details, improving imprecise relations, and sometimes revealing new major principles; others working in applied settings are developing a behavioral technology based on these basic principles.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING AND GUIDANCE

General Implications

The behavior system described has the clear implication that observable behavior is the only variable of importance in the counseling and guidance process, and it is the only criterion against which the outcome of the process can be evaluated. Conceptual formulations such as ego-strength, inferiority feelings, or self-concept are not behavior but simply ways of organizing and interpreting observable behavior by referring it to an inner determiner. Such formulations may be incorrect, insufficient, or merely superfluous. They may be harmful or impeding when applied in the sense that they direct attention and effort to irrelevant variables, or they may be unessential "decorations" which do no harm but do not contribute to the counselor's efforts or the learner's behavior.

Almost all approaches to counseling and guidance are in agreement that the goal of counseling is to affect behavior and that behavior is lawful. "Pathological," self-defeating and disorganized behaviors as well as "healthy" behaviors are seen as lawful phenomena whose laws can be discovered. In addition, there appears to be general agreement that the crucial behavior of human beings is learned. Man is not at the mercy of his "unconscious" or his drives; for these entelechies, if they exist, can be expressed in many different ways. The critical questions in counseling and guidance, therefore, seem to relate to how behavior is learned and how it may be unlearned or altered.

It is here that a behavioral approach differs from other approaches in counseling and guidance practice. Present practice is to consider the sociological or psychological category to which a problem may be assigned. Is it an educational, vocational, or social problem, or is it a problem of dependency, self-conflict, or choice anxiety? Alternatively there may be some concern for the locus of the problem: Is it primarily a factual-reality problem whose locus is in the environment or is it primarily an emotional-irreality problem whose locus is in the patient? At least a portion of treatment procedures depends on the answers.

These questions and answers, however, to the extent that they reflect limited concern with the process by which the presenting behavior was learned and what must be done to deal with it, obscure rather than illuminate the problem to be solved. From a behavioral standpoint, the only relevant questions relate to behavior itself. What behavior must be created or maintained and what deficient or inadequate behaviors must be altered? Once these basic questions are answered—and an experienced counselor often can reach a diagnosis in a short time even when the client is unaware of the source of his distress—successful corrective procedures follow the behavioral principles and processes that have been described. Unquestionably, some efforts of guidance workers, counselors, and psychotherapists who use traditional approaches result in great success. They probably do so, however, because of the intuitive use of procedures that may be specified explicitly in behavioral terms.

The entire field of guidance, counseling, and psychotherapy might benefit considerably if all workers considered seriously just one behavioral principle and its corollary, namely, that behavior is controlled by its environmental consequences and that an effective procedure for producing behavioral change is the manipulation of the environment so as to create consequences that will produce the desired behavior. If then, it was desired to create, maintain, strengthen, weaken, alter, or eliminate a particular behavior or set of behaviors, attention would be directed toward the operation of the behavioral determiners outlined in the previous section. One advantage of this kind of formulation is that it is explicit, teachable, and testable. Another advantage is that it tells the counselor what has to be done and allows him to monitor progress within an objective rather than an intuitive framework.

At the beginning of behavioral counseling or psychotherapy, the counselor may have to manipulate the determinants so as to facilitate desired behavior coming under the control of "natural" behavioral consequences in the environment. Some professional workers perceive or create an ethical problem here by asking if it is moral for one person to attempt to control the behavior of another. This question has already been answered in our society and perhaps in all societies. Parents, educators, and guidance workers make no bones about their earnest intention to create and maintain the "good" behavior that is valued and approved of by the culture and to eliminate "bad" behavior

to the maximum degree of which they are capable. It is not clear that the task of the counselor is, or should be, different.

Advice giving, information giving, interpretation and clarification, training and reconditioning, persuasion, encouragement and moral support, subtle direction toward some things and away from others are all frequently mentioned as currently important tools of counseling and guidance. Even in psychotherapy, "growth-inducing" and uncovering techniques did not come to be preferred to directive and controlling procedures because the therapist could not readily perceive the ineffective behavior of his clients that had to change if better adjustment was to occur. The counseling fashion changed because the crude, directive procedures then available were relatively ineffective except in those fortuitous circumstances where the individual was already under the partial control of some appropriate environmental variable.

A return to inadequate directive procedures is not advocated. Behaviorally oriented counselors agree that telling people what is wrong and what they "should" do is an ineffective procedure. The heart of the behavioral approach in counseling is that the environment must be manipulated so as to allow strong reinforcing consequences to become attached to the behavior that is desired.

This implies, of course, that almost any behavior can be manipulated, and behavior principles do not specify what behavior should be fostered. Certainly the knowledge of how to shape behavior can be misused. However, the ethics of deliberately guiding human beings to personally and socially fulfilling lives may not be a problem for any except a relatively small group of counselors committed to an inner-directed philosophy and seemingly non-directive procedures. For most of those to whom society entrusts the guidance of others, influencing or inducing people to behave in ways that society says are "good" ways is an accepted goal, and the critical question is "How can we 'motivate' a person so that he does behave, 'wants to' behave and 'enjoys' behaving in good ways?"

The principles discovered by researchers in the experimental analysis of behavior offer some direct answers now and some procedures for discovering others.

Specific Implications

There are two major ways in which a behavioral approach to counseling may be useful. One is simply to improve the effectiveness of present counseling efforts. The other is to help build a better world.

Improving Counseling and Guidance. To some degree, behavioral principles, as descriptions of how behavior is created, maintained, altered, or placed under stimulus control are neutral principles. They permit, at least for a time, various theoretical or philosophical views of the *real* nature of the human condition. If, for example, one psychotherapist believes that catharsis is a necessary condition for amelioration or correction of neurotic behavior,

while another believes that healthy behavior is best achieved by "accentuating the positive," the same properly applied reinforcement principles will produce catharsis in one patient and healthy talk in the other, or a client can be led from one kind of talk to the other. To the extent that a therapist manipulates the environment so as to facilitate the expression of affect, reduce self-ideal discrepancies, or whatever behavior he believes is necessary for a patient's improvement, he is in control of a powerful tool. If he applies reinforcement principles successfully, it doesn't matter a great deal if the therapist originally believes that he is simply assisting in liberating a primordial, natural force within the person. To the extent that differential results are obtained when he deliberately uses or does not use behavioral techniques, the environmental consequences will shape his behavior also and may even change his theory.

This is not the place for a technical discussion of the origins and treatment of the grossly deviant behavior that is believed to require psychotherapy. It should be mentioned, however, that more than 30 years ago it was demonstrated that phobias, for example, could be induced, generalized, and removed by purely behavioral procedures (5, 12), and in these cases where the origin of the behavior was known, it was superfluous to look for the hidden forces or the "real" meanings which mediated the phobia. Bandura (2) gives an excellent survey of the large amount of more recent experimental and clinical studies using behavioristic psychotherapy. Many kinds of deviant behavior have been treated successfully by direct focusing on the behavior itself.

For problems traditionally assigned to counseling and guidance personnel, the relevance of a behavioral approach is even more clear cut. The great bulk of the problems here do not have disputed ethical implications. In schools, no one questions that it is better for children to learn school subject matter than not to learn it; that it is desirable to get along with other children and with adults without excessive conflicts; that more is to be gained by staying in school than by dropping out; that very early marriage of school children is unwise; that law abiding behavior is better than delinquent behavior. In brief, in great part, the behavior that children "should" engage in is known and agreed upon, and the task of the counselor is to facilitate and strengthen its emergence and maintenance. As in counseling with special populations such as the mentally retarded and the physically handicapped, the problems may be considered straightforward ones of behavioral engineering.

Although there has been little experience with these kinds of problems, it seems reasonable to believe that if a school counselor systematically learned to utilize only a small number of principles such as the behavior-influencing power of positive reinforcement, the undesirable long range consequences of aversive control and some of the details regarding shaping and the development of stimulus control, he could fulfill his job functions with greater efficiency. It is not so much that a behavioral approach would necessarily change

a great deal of what the counselor did, but he would know why certain activities such as the recognition of merit are good and other activities such as grading on the curve are not. Knowing the effects of these activities, he might come to manipulate them more effectively. He would also come to ask, in each case of deficient or mal-adaptive behavior, how the behavior was linked to consequences and, instead of measuring abilities or personality, attempt to alter the consequences so as to shape up more desirable behavior.

On the other hand, a counselor who accepted the complete behavioral system and worked within it would tend to ask more radical questions about some present school practices and to initiate more radical changes in counseling functions. For example, in connection with the critical school drop-out problem, he would be less concerned with specifying the characteristics of students who drop out than in studying the kind and frequency of the reinforcements that are available for school learning in comparison with other reinforcers and with the frequency of avoidance and punishing conditions that exist in the classroom. He would experiment with introducing token reinforcers in the classroom dispensable immediately upon the occurrence of a desired response. He would analyze the conditions under which a potential drop-out could be led to emit new responses in a tight, reinforcing feedback loop so as to shape behavior that would ultimately come under the control of the natural reinforcers of the environment. For example, a student might be paid in money for working a teaching machine program in bookkeeping or algebra, or he might be given tokens that would make him eligible for earning money or some other generalized reinforcer. "What!" someone may exclaim, "You propose to pay children for learning what is good for them?" Certainly. Industry does this regularly now. Colleges and universities pay out large amounts of cash to an extent undreamed of a generation ago. We are now paying thousands of students to go to school.

Human beings do not "naturally" like what the experience of the species indicates is necessary or good for them. Drop-out students by their behavior are saying that they are not receiving the "natural" reinforcers of the classroom that influence the school-going behavior of most children, or that these cannot compete in strength with other reinforcers. The task of the counselor is to discover what is reinforcing to potential drop-outs and to make these reinforcers contingent upon school learning. If the drop out problem is a serious one; if we really believe that our society and economy require an educated population; and if the monetary and social costs of large numbers of uneducated or undereducated persons are great; there should be no hesitancy in taking advantage of scientific principles of learning to apply effective extrinsic reinforcers to help shape desirable behavior. Some problems of juvenile delinquency and its behavioral treatment can be considered in the same way (11).

The social ramifications of this kind of approach are great, and many new

kinds of counselor behavior will be required. It is apparent that many aspects of counseling and guidance work that focus on behavior and behavioral change cannot be done effectively in the traditional verbal, face to face, office situation. To a far greater degree than is presently the case, the behavioral counselor must be able to influence the consequences of behavior, as it is emitted, by personal action, by machines, and by enlisting the aid of teachers, parents, and school administrators in creating healthy behavioral environments. The principles for doing this are simple, but the techniques for application are complex, and perhaps progress in appreciable degree may have to wait on the creation of experimental, school behavior laboratories.

Building a Better World. Much, perhaps most, of the present work of counseling and guidance personnel consists of giving information and advice based on the measured characteristics, capacities, interests, and attitudes of the client and helping to resolve the conflicts that arise when there are discrepancies among them, or between any of them and the requirements of the environment.

The recognition of "individual differences" and the development of a technology for measuring them was a tremendous advance in the guidance and control of human behavior at the time these developments occurred. There is danger, however, that the increased precision with which a person can be described at a given moment of time may lead us to neglect or minimize the fact that *what is* is not identical with *what must be*.

Educators and psychologists have always been in the vanguard of those who have striven to push back the boundaries of a personal destiny determined primarily by heredity. It is almost a cliché in the behavioral sciences that inherited genetic and constitutional variables may set limits on the behavior that is possible for a human being, but environmental variables determine the behavior that a person actually engages in. In addition, educational and social experiences have shown that the limiting effects of hereditary variables have always been far slighter than was believed to be true at an earlier time.

This knowledge, of course, has been tempered by the empirical observation that other things equal—in the absence of additional knowledge and a better technology for inducing change—the past is one of the best predictors of the future.

One crucial consequence of the research that has been oriented to a functional analysis of behavior is the explicit notice that other things are no longer equal. An improved understanding of how behavior is formed and maintained, and an improved technology for inducing behavioral change now exist; and we can use this knowledge for the deliberate building of a better world. Skinner (10) has sketched the larger social implications of this revolutionary gain in knowledge. Discussion here will be limited to effects on the concept of "individual differences."

From a behavioral standpoint, most of the variation in behavior that pres-

ently is assigned to individual differences reflects the influence of unmanipulated environmental variables. Within wide limits now and even wider limits in the future, as additional knowledge is gained, desired or desirable behavior can be acquired by everyone. A large scale, if brief, foretaste of things to come occurred during World War II when, under less than optimal conditions, Rosie the housewife easily became Rosie the riveter; adolescent college boys became commanders of destroyers; and farm boys became skilled electronic technicians.

Probably few counselors would object to the statement that individual differences arise from the interrelationships among capacity, motivation, and opportunity. The last has a firm footing in the environment, but the first two are often perceived as being somehow *in* the person. It should be evident from the description of principles that this notion is unacceptable in a behavioral system. On the contrary, differences in "intelligence," for example, are reflections of some of the performances that result from differential exposure to learning experiences in a relatively chaotic environment. If intelligence can be analyzed into the behavior that constitutes its component parts, it can be taught in an orderly environment so that almost everyone can reach the same high level of performance. Similarly, motivation can be considered not as an innate function of specific drives but as a function of environmental determiners of which one of the most important is positive reinforcement. Under appropriate environmental conditions, which man can create, almost anyone can be motivated to do anything.

Human beings no longer allow themselves to be pushed around by a chaotic physical environment. We heat cold environments and cool warm ones; we fly into space and dive into the ocean depths; and we rearrange many other features of the physical environment to suit our convenience. The psychological and social environments can be manipulated in similar ways. It is no longer necessary to accept without question what a chaotic "natural" environment offers or what chance provides, but with knowledge now available we can build a better world.

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Counseling from the Viewpoint of Existential Psychology

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COUNSELING IS ESSENTIALLY a process of making-free, a humanizing of the person who has lost his freedom in sectors of his existence where he can no longer transcend his life situation by freely giving meaning to it. He behaves there more or less as a lower form of being, as a dehumanized, determined existence. It is the aim of counseling to assist the person in regaining his freedom in these areas by creating insight into the meanings he attributes to these situations, by starting the extinction of the responses which the counselee—after gaining insight—no longer likes to retain, and by the conditioning of other responses corresponding to his new free evaluation of reality. In order to make the counselee free we have to make the counseling session an existential situation where he can be present with his whole being spontaneously and pre-reflexively.

We know the person from his phenomenal universe, not from his isolated and interior world. Therefore from the very beginning the attention of the client is oriented towards himself as moving in a vivid universe of events and encounters. He moves in the present, in the "here and now" of his actual world as a human existence—as "consciousness that is involved." The counselee is not encouraged to escape his present by a flight into a past, where there are no decisions to make and where there is no necessity to shape freely a world of "here and now," where existence seems determined and explained by inescapable needs. Instead of forcing the client to revise the fixed history of his past, the counselor invites him to face his situation today, not to excuse himself but to return to his world in a new mode of being, to accept its challenges.

The aim of existential counseling is to make the client feel at home in his real world by reshaping his phenomenal world, to make his real situation bearable by making it bearable phenomenologically. The counselee reconditions his behavior in his real world by reconditioning his behavior in his phenomenal universe.

The counselee who transcends his barriers and who learns to conquer the regions at the other side will know how to move with a new freedom in his world of everyday reality. Only he can cope with anxiety who calls the real world his dwelling place, the whole world from high to low and from right to

left, not only the bright side of the world but its shady side as well; the mature person says yes to the whole universe.

THE EMBODIMENT OF OBJECTIVES IN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

The counselor translates these objectives of existential counseling into attitudes which he in turn embodies in word, posture, facial expression and movement.

The attitudes of the counselor are determined not only by his purpose but also by the situation of his client. He must clarify the existence or modes of standing-out of the counselee who exists in a personal world, which has to be explored and expressed by means of the therapeutic relationship. In order thus to understand the attitudes in which we must embody our objectives we should first of all gain an insight into the existential world and into the kind of relationship which can induce the counselee to explore and express the realms of his existence. The insight gained in these considerations will enable us to describe some desirable attitudes which may embody the objectives so that they are communicated to the counselee within this relationship.

THE EXISTENTIAL WORLD OF THE CLIENT

The main characteristic of the human existent is that he exists, literally stands out in a world of meaning. Subject and world, self and world are cor-relatives. When we know the world in which a person lives we know *him*; the counselee is best understood from his personally lived and experienced universe. His feelings, desires, hopes and ideas are embedded in a world of meaning, and consequently every experience explored by him has somewhere a place in this system of meanings. This structure as a differentiated whole explains partly the meaning of every single experience which belongs to it. Each single experience in turn colors all meanings which make up the world of the counselee as a whole. When he is able gradually to express the main lines of his existential world, the counselee will be able to understand the precise meaning of his problem within this system.

RELATIONSHIP AND EXPRESSION OF EXISTENTIAL WORLD

Relationship is the principal means for bringing to expression the world of meaning in which the client lives. The quality of the relationship determines to what degree the personal existential world will find genuine expression. The first task of the counselor is, therefore, to establish a relationship which leads to optimal communication. People learn to hide the personal world in which they live in order to protect themselves from being misunderstood, humiliated, condemned or abused. To reveal my personal world is in a sense to surrender my very being, to expose my sensitivity, my project of life, and to

unveil my vulnerability when certain meanings which I cherish are at odds with the values appreciated by my environment. This fear of disapproval limits the free admission not only of base inclinations but also of sublime aspirations. It is difficult for many to verbalize their finer sentiments. They fear that the communication of refined feeling would sound ridiculous in the world of functional meaning which they share with contemporary man. This repression of the personal world under the pressure of the shared social world may be so effective that the client himself is not aware of the deepest meanings which constitute his personal existence. The counselor may make himself mistakenly the ally of this social world by lightly joking about noble sentiments in order to give the client the reassurance that counselors are regular fellows like the rest of the population. If he does so he can be sure that the personal world of experience of the counselee will remain a closed book. Some counselors may cherish the illusion that such "open-mindedness" may break barriers forgetting that an exclusive open-mindedness for the cultural-social scene may mean a closed-mindedness for the personal world of the individual in its unique, most revealing features.

THE IMPOSITION OF ONE'S OWN EXISTENCE

Every one of us has his own project of existence which implies among other things the style in which we embody our strivings in daily behavior. Such a style of existence has been formed in the light of individual experiences of the attitudes of the surrounding culture in which we are inserted by birth and education. This cultural component of our style of behavior and perception is mediated by the image of "ideal" behavior as held by the people of our home, neighborhood and society. This ideal style of life permeates our human relationships, being particularly pervasive in the meetings between us as counselors and the counselee who presents himself to us with his problems. The secret influence of this personal and cultural norm may be harmful. Existence as embodiment in space and time necessitates that we be present to others in some style of life. However, our personal embodiment of existence is not the only possible or desirable one for everybody else. The unconscious identification of our personal way of life with "the" way may limit our therapeutic relevance to that part of the population which is spontaneously in touch with our style of being while it averts others.

Therefore, the counselor should grow daily in the awareness of his pre-reflexive attitudes. Of course he cannot do away with a personal style of existence; as a human being he must embody his mode of being in concrete behavior, which is always limited in space and time and therefore necessarily one-sided. But he can increasingly free himself from the identification of existence as such with his personal-cultural style of being. This inner freedom will enable him to sense the unique potentialities in those counselees who differ from

him in expression and perception. When the counselor is deeply aware that his own modes are incidental and transient, he will distinguish what is essential from that which is accidental. This self-awareness will enable him to transcend the temporal to become aware of his cultural and subcultural stereotypes, of his antipathies and sympathies; his emotional blocks will become manifest to him in this maturity. He may discover, for instance, that he *a priori* does not like people with esthetic inclinations because the good farmers at home confused artistry with frivolity. Or he may realize that he one-sidedly prefers "regular guys" because as a high school or college student he disliked some pale companions who were delighted more by books than by baseball. Another may find that he is unconsciously enamored with scholarly types because he is fed up with his more pragmatic colleagues who make great fun of him. Or a counselor may discover during this process of growing up that he unconsciously favors a certain compulsiveness because he has identified the compulsive mode of being with sound strictness and consequently distrusts spontaneity in himself and others.

The counselee in turn may be tempted to identify the counselor with his parents, teachers, administrators, supervisors or school friends. These identifications may harm the effectiveness of counseling, for such daily relationships usually imply some withholding of one's personal world in order to function smoothly within the frame of daily life. The counselor is usually an unknown alien for the candidate. He seems different from the people in authority whom he meets in school, family and society. His function is vague and unusual; he comes from a strange, faraway world. This relative strangeness can be an advantage. If the counselor were identified with the authorities in the environment of the candidate, the client's daily mode of existence towards those people would be immediately adopted towards him. The interview would then structure itself in terms of this mode of existence; the formal, casual, dependent or superficially friendly features which characterize daily interactions would determine this new relationship and keep it on a level which may generate pleasantries, polite caution or formal respect but no experience in depth.

When the client, however, cannot experience the counselor as he does his daily associates, then no stereotyped mode of existence toward him is available. Moreover, the candidate faces this ambiguous situation alone and not in the company of his friends or classmates. Therefore he cannot fall back on a mode of existence which he could share with others towards this new person; he has to handle this interaction all by himself. Such a situation is conducive to responses which will reveal his unique way of being in the world and which are less contaminated by socially shared modes of existence.

On the other hand, if the ambiguity is too much to bear it will evoke too much anxiety in the client and paralyze communication. The effective counselor, therefore, should not make himself known too much by being too

friendly and jovial and by removing all social distance. For in that case he and the client will act out superficial social roles which usually prevent communication on a deeper and more personal level. Neither should he be so distant, alien and withdrawn that his counselee freezes in anxiety. The counselor should not maneuver himself into a situation in which he will be forced to do most of the talking; yet he must avoid sitting there like a sphinx which would prevent the possibility of spontaneous communication. This attitude of professional composure and serenity may be inspired by an unauthentic, false image of the "wise," "mature" man without emotion, which is a neurotic imitation of real wisdom and maturity.

Ideally the counselor should be experienced by the counselee as a deeply interested, wise friend whose only interest is to help me in finding myself in relation to my possible project of existence. However, the counselor may have his own unconscious needs which may make it difficult for him to establish such an interested and at the same time detached relationship. Therefore he should explore his motivations after every session. Does he need to sound like an oracle, is he in love with his sonorous voice or clever verbalizations, does he feel that he "knows" people already through and through, is he authoritarian, domineering, does he need to be popular, to be liked or exalted as a "nice chap" by his counselee, is he afraid of depth in himself and others, does he repress his own feelings and paralyze his spontaneity, is he afraid to verbalize or to hear the verbalization of certain experiences? This list could be expanded indefinitely. It is only after a period of growth and experience that a counselor is able to approximate the ideal attitude which makes the relationship itself his most efficient instrument. A mature and experienced counselor is indeed a precious gift for a community.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship itself which should be established by the counselor—from the first moment of the initial meeting—differs from the structure of other relationships. First it is different because of its objectives, which we have discussed earlier, and second, it is different from other relationships because of the specific attitudes of the counselor.

The attitudes of the counselor aim at the expression of the personal existential world of the counselee. At the base of these attitudes is a genuine unconditional acceptance of the client regardless of what world of meaning he will reveal. Any trace of explicit or implicit disapproval diminishes the ability of the counselee to unveil his personal existence. On the other hand, the expression of this personal world can also be arrested by too great a personal involvement of the counselor in one or another aspect mentioned by the client. Such emotional concentration on one aspect prevents the narration of other dimensions of the world of meaning which may be just as important for full under-

standing. The counselor must encourage the client by his patient and accepting attitude to express spontaneously all vague and confused feelings, attitudes and motives which he may have in regard to his project of existence.

The counselor should be emotionally involved to the extent necessary to keep the client interested and alive in the exploration of his world. But this interest should be tempered with a distance which enables him to accept all aspects of existence expressed by the counselee without reacting to them favorably or unfavorably. Either reaction may encourage a positive or negative concentration on some particular aspect of the counselee's world at the expense of the revelation of other ones. The counselor must be a participant in the existential world of the client while being at the same time its respectful observer.

ATTITUDES OF THE COUNSELOR IN THIS EXISTENTIAL RELATIONSHIP

The description of the counseling relationship implies the desirability of certain attitudes.

Creativity

The counselor should be creative. His counseling should not be a rigid application of rules which he has learned from books or formed for himself on the basis of experience with former clients. On the contrary, he should be convinced that every world of meaning is unique. Everything that the counselor says and does should be the creative outgrowth of his participation in this individual existence. This presupposes that the counselor is a mature person free from threat and therefore free from rigidity. Rigid behavior is a defense against the possible challenge of an unexpected world, a world which is communicated to us and which may expose us to our own repressed regions of being. The counselor who is not at home in his own existential world is unable to risk the full revelation of another world of meaning. There are two main forms of rigidity; one leading to a stiff formal attitude in order to escape communication in depth, the other leading to a compulsively "jolly good fellow" attitude which may be an even more effective defense against a truly existential encounter. Both defenses may be based on some neurotic insecurity in the counselor. Sometimes we find a curious combination of both defenses in the same insecure, anxious person; in the fulfillment of functional and administrative obligations he may be formal and rigid, while in his personal relations compulsively joking, gay, and funny. The mature person can be serious, gay, or detached according to the challenge of the situation. He adopts none of these attitudes compulsively; his behavior is not identical in different situations. Existential creativity implies flexibility of attitude, feeling, and behavior in authentic response to the real situation.

Acceptance

Another fundamental attitude in this relationship is acceptance, an attitude which generates in the counselee an experience of really feeling understood in his own existential world. The counselee feels that he really shares this personal world with the counselor, and this feeling enables him to explore this world further and to communicate the outcome of this exploration with less embarrassment. When the candidate perceives that the counselor co-experiences what things mean to him and still accepts him, he gradually feels a safe experiential communion with the counselor and with the world which the counselor represents.

That the counselor co-experiences what people and things mean to the client does not imply that he agrees with this meaning or that he approves of it. Acceptance of a person does not imply personal agreement with his thought or feeling as such. The co-experience and acceptance of the counselor implies only a non-judgmental attitude. His whole attitude communicates to the person: I do not judge at this moment whether or not your feelings and attitudes prove that you are personally guilty for maintaining them; I leave that to your own conscience for this moment. My special function here is not to judge how far you personally are responsible for those attitudes and feelings but to understand what region of your existence they reveal. Basically I respect and like you because deep down your nature is a gift of being; this gift is fundamentally good and, therefore, lovable no matter how it may be overgrown and veiled by attitudes, feelings, and opinions with which I could not agree personally.

The attitude of acceptance is so fundamental for effective counseling and at the same time so different from our usual mode of encounter that it may be fruitful to go somewhat deeper into this matter. The views, feelings, and behavior of the counselee can be accepted under various aspects. For example, the counselor might consider expressed views, feelings, and behavior as isolated abstract norms of human conduct, in which case he can accept or reject them as such. When a client mentions, for instance, that he thinks that certain races should be exterminated, the counselor cannot accept this personally as a highly commendable norm for human existence. Or, he might consider those views, feelings, and behavior under the aspect of their usefulness for the counselee himself. For instance, the counselor may personally dislike poetry and would not accept and cultivate this interest in his own life; he may sense, however, that the poetical mode of existence may be very important for this specific person and he may accept it under this aspect. At the same time, he would reject under this aspect a suicidal interest of the counselee. However, he does not openly express the acceptance or rejection of those judgments of those isolated judgments. For, regardless of his acceptance or rejection of those particular views, feelings, or behavior as isolated absolute expressions, the

counselor always accepts and respects the client himself as a worthwhile human person dynamically present in those communications. For the same attitudes are not only categories of socially or personally acceptable or rejectable behavior but are also manifestations of a fellow human being. They manifest that the client is not an animal or an inanimate being; their specific content reveals that this human being has adopted certain modes of existence in the world.

The counselor *as counselor* experiences primarily in all these views, feelings, and behavior a wrestling, suffering, sometimes victorious, sometimes defeated human being who tries desperately to find his existential position within this world. It is in this last way that the understanding counselor experiences and accepts the views, feelings, and behavior of the client, namely, under the aspect of their being manifestations of the coping human person, desperately looking for a meaningful project of existence. He shows, therefore, deep genuine interest in those communications. It is this acceptance which opens up the client who becomes actively involved in the process of self discovery and its expression when he senses that the counselor really cares about what he thinks and feels; a climate is created in which the flow of communication is not halted by the anxious expectation of disapproval, rejection, criticism or other negative responses which the counselee expects on the basis of his past experience in family, school or society. Acceptance lessens considerably defensiveness and therewith the compulsion to rationalize, deny, or distort existential attitudes and inclinations in order to prevent disapproval.

If the counselor himself has deeply buried in himself some aspects of his personal existence he should become aware of it. The same anxiety which made him bury the awareness of regions of his own existence may close him when he senses the slightest indication of the same threatening reality in another. The implicit communication of this anxiety will prevent the free exploration of this specific area of existence. This danger points to the necessity for the counselor to evaluate himself continuously and thoroughly. Every session with a candidate should be a source of self reflection. What did I say? How did I respond? What did I feel? How did this communication affect me? Was I uneasy, excited, threatened, at ease, uncomfortable? Why was I so? The personal existence of the counselor is his main tool. In order to keep it refined and sensitive he should work through his inhibitions, anxieties, and insecurities with a therapist whom he trusts. He should keep refining this instrument that he himself is. For, no amount of literature, study, or oratory can replace the crucial impact of his very being upon the relationship with the counselee.

Gentleness

The counselor should maintain mildness in his approach. We do not mean anything sentimental, effeminate, or soft. Gentleness reveals itself in sensitive, considerate, and tolerant modes of existence. The counselor should be able to manifest this amenity spontaneously; it will be difficult for the counselee to

express himself fully if this atmosphere of gentle consideration is absent. For some counselors it may seem nearly repulsive to be gentle. Sometimes a male counselor in a high school may believe that he should ideally give the boy he is counseling the impression that he himself is just another boy, one who is bigger, taller, heavier, and more muscular, yet a boy, an enlarged version of an adolescent who speaks and acts big, very big. This attitude was perhaps deeply rewarded by his friends in college or high school who looked up towards him as the real tough guy. For some it may take time to realize that the same behavior will be ineffective in their new adult role when they like to go beyond the peripheral and reach the core of human existence. Others may not have worked through their anxious concern about being a real man and the unconscious occupation with their manliness may paralyze their gentility. Others again have not worked through the loneliness of existence and remain unconsciously in search of a tenderness which fulfills sentimental needs. Their gentility lacks spine and strength; it has a sticky, slimy quality which repels certain people. Some counselors may develop unauthentic friendliness which does not originate in the depth of existence but is calculated and carefully added to behavior in those situations in which the good counselor should be pleasant. It is practiced as a tour de force, a feat of strength, a stunt of psychology. Such a forced gentility remains superficial and will not open up the deeper layers of existence.

Sincerity

Finally the attitude of the counselor should be straightforward, honest, and sincere. The counselor should be aware that he has been compelled in daily life to develop a social facade in order to protect himself against obliteration by the demands of the crowd. He cannot get involved in everyone's problems. He has had to develop a smooth, easy way of dealing with large numbers of people who accost the counselor with their questions, neuroses and veneration. Moreover, the population at large demands from him that he be "nice" regardless of his mood, his toothache or the troubles with his principal. The effective functioning and the serenity of the school community to which he belongs requires a smooth interaction between faculty and counselor which implies certain social niceties. How tempting it is to fall back on these habits when meeting the counselee. However, such habits, no matter how useful in the community at large, if introduced into the counseling session will prevent effectively that deeper communication which is the aim of this encounter.

EXISTENTIAL COUNSELING AND THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY

We described the openness of the existential counselor, and considered attitudes of his that foster optimal communication with the counselee. The final question to be dealt with is that of the relationship between existential coun-

selling and theories of psychology. Does the openness of the existential counselor imply that psychological theory is superfluous; if not, what is its role?

The Avoidance of a Premature Use of Theoretical Concepts

Existential counseling fosters a self-understanding in the counselee, which is free from subjectivistic influences; it attempts to uncover the real structures and meanings of experience; it means a purification of the naïve knowledge of self by a search for real self-experience beyond the subjectivistic explanations of everyday life. If the counselor, however, brings uncritically theoretical categories to naïvely experienced behavior he may be caught in another sophisticated form of subjectivism, which might distort the given phenomena. He may unwittingly substitute for the experience of daily life an artificially made up "scientific experience." He immediately "perceives," for example, in the counselee inferiority feelings, projections, archetypes, repressions, reinforcements, resistances, Oedipus-complexes, transferences, sublimations and the like. This artificial scientific *experience* is the abortive result of two sources: one is the naïve experience of everyday life, the other the immediate interpretation of this naïve natural experience by established scientific theories. Such an interpretation—when prematurely indulged in—prevents a respectful attention for the inner structure and meaning of experience itself in this unique situation. Consequently, established intersubjectivistic theoretical influences are substituted for or added to the subjectivistic distortions which are already present in the naïve experience itself. This impoverished, made-over experience is then considered as *the* full real experience, substituting for the experience in everyday life. This scientific experience is called fact and this fact is then hailed as the first primary original experience of the counselee. Out of the collection or enumeration of these facts one should come by induction to the establishment of laws which should govern the activities of counselors and clients alike. This process leads to a system of counseling autonomous and closed in itself, an empty game with splendid ideas irrelevant to real experience of people in vital situations, a mythology of behavior which claims to explain everything while it explains nothing.

Obviously much harm can be done by a counselor when his perception is distorted by the premature introduction of theoretical explanations. The existential counselor will penetrate first into behavior as it manifests itself and only then ponder how existing scientific theories may illuminate this behavior without distortion, or how scientific theories should be corrected, expanded, or renewed in order to keep in touch with behavior as given in reality today. Theories of personality and psychotherapy should supplement rather than supplant existential understanding. The existential counselor should draw on the rich fund of insight called science of psychology which is a collection of intellectual contributions by numerous enlightened theorists of behavior. But, his prudent selection from this treasure-trove of theoretical explanations should be illumined by real behavior as it manifests itself in his clients. His

primary commitment is to existence, not to a theory about existence, even an existential theory. His existential openness for the communications of his counselee will enable him not only to spot the relevant theoretical explanation but also to adapt it to the concrete situation or even to improve it on the basis of his observation. In the last case he may possibly enrich the treasury of psychology so that others after him may have more knowledge available. It should be his wish, however, that his successors will neither abuse his ideas for the distortion of data nor substitute his observation for their own existential perception. It should be his hope that they may be more sensitive to behavior than to his explanations about behavior, that their ears may not be deafened by the noise of theories, and that their eyes may not be blinded by expositions in journals, books, and papers, even if they happen to be his own.

Language Habit

Language habit in this context refers to the embodiment in our language of psychological theories. The language may be scientific or pre-scientific; likewise psychological theories embedded in the language may be scientific and pre-scientific. English, for instance, is a pre-scientific language; the psychoanalytic idiom is a scientific language. Language is not the experience itself of the counselee but an expression of this experience. Many words may communicate more than the pure experience of the client. They express, for example, also the pre-scientific view of his experience, which he has received from his culture in the package of his language. In that case the language habit implies not only the expression of experience but also the pre-scientific view which created this biased and selective expression. By the same token it conceals other real aspects of experience which fall outside the scope of the pre-scientific theory, which dominates the mood of his civilization, and therefore with the cast of its language.

An example of the influence of theory on language is the term "experience." The German word for experience is "Erlebnis"; the Dutch word is "beleving." The German "Erlebnis" is derived from "erleben" which literally means "to live an event," for, "erleben" connotes "leben" which means "to live." "Experience" denotes thus in both languages the actuality of a lively presence of the subject to a reality here and now. The term experience in the English language, however, has lost this meaning under the impact of empiricism. "Experience" instead of indicating an awareness in the present points to an awareness in the past. Consequently, this language habit may obscure or falsify the perception of the counselor and of the client. They may—misled by the language—overlook or misinterpret behavior which embodies an actual "lived" presence of the subject to reality without reflection. An open perception, however, that momentarily suspends the language habit may rediscover this reality of behavior which was lost in the language. The rediscovery of such a reality may force the counselor or counselee to enrich the language with a new expression which covers the forgotten phenomenon. They may speak, for

instance, of "lived" experience, or "lived" awareness. Language is thus the treasure-trove of accumulated theories, insights and observations uncovered by a people in the current of its history; the fascinating history of a-standing-out-together in certain ways towards reality. This shared ex-sistence towards reality reveals itself in peculiar ways to the cultural co-existents. The resulting insights are conserved in the constituted language of a people. This constituted language should be a help, not a hindrance, towards further discovery of reality; it should not suppress but support living language, not fossilize but foster vision, not limit but expand perception.

Constituted *scientific* language presents a similar problem. Psychoanalytic, behavioristic, or organismic terminology should not paralyze but nurture the openness of observation, should not limit but expand perception and vision. The counselor might profit fully from the treasure of scientific language if he frees himself temporarily from its influence on perception. For perception unadulterated by theoretical tenets prepares him for a new appreciation of what other theorists have seen before him. Yet, his previous open perception of "behavior-as-it-is" liberates him from the limitations inherent in the position of every theorist.

The existential openness with its attitudes of suspension and vigilance is fundamental in the counselor who should encounter people beyond theory and classification. Only afterwards may he see in what sense and to what degree he may characterize their behavior by constructs *about* behavior. Theoretical psychology becomes then a light that enlightens, not a veil that dims, the perception of the counselor.

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The Interpersonal Relationship: The Core of Guidance

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I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE with you in this paper a conclusion, a conviction, which has grown out of years of experience in dealing with individuals, a conclusion which finds some confirmation in a steadily growing body of empirical evidence. It is simply that in a wide variety of professional work involving relationships with people—whether as a psychotherapist, teacher, religious worker, guidance counselor, social worker, clinical psychologist—it is the *quality* of the interpersonal encounter with the client which is the most significant element in determining effectiveness.

Let me spell out a little more fully the basis of this statement in my personal experience. I have been primarily a counselor and psychotherapist. In the course of my professional life I have worked with troubled college students, with adults in difficulty, with "normal" individuals such as business executives, and more recently with hospitalized psychotic persons. I have endeavored to make use of the learnings from my therapeutic experience in my interactions with classes and seminars, in the training of teachers, in the administration of staff groups, in the clinical supervision of psychologists, psychiatrists, and guidance workers as they work with their clients or patients. Some of these relationships are long-continued and intensive, as in individual psychotherapy. Some are brief, as in experiences with workshop participants or in contacts with students who come for practical advice. They cover a wide range of depth. Gradually I have come to the conclusion that one learning which applies to all of these experiences is that it is the quality of the personal relationship which matters most. With some of these individuals I am in touch only briefly, with others I have the opportunity of knowing them intimately, but in either case the quality of the personal encounter is probably, in the long run, the element which determines the extent to which this is an experience which releases or promotes development and growth. I believe the quality of my encounter is more important in the long run than is my scholarly knowledge, my professional training, my counseling orientation, the techniques I use in the interview. In keeping with this line of thought, I suspect that for a guidance worker also the relationship he forms with each student—brief or continuing—is more important than his knowledge of tests and meas-

urements, the adequacy of his record keeping, the theories he holds, the accuracy with which he is able to predict academic success, or the school in which he received his training.

In recent years I have thought a great deal about this issue. I have tried to observe counselors and therapists whose orientations are very different from mine, in order to understand the basis of their effectiveness as well as my own. I have listened to recorded interviews from many different sources. Gradually I have developed some theoretical formulations (4, 5), some hypotheses as to the basis of effectiveness in relationships. As I have asked myself how individuals sharply different in personality, orientation and procedure can all be effective in a helping relationship, can each be successful in facilitating constructive change or development, I have concluded that it is because they bring to the helping relationship certain attitudinal ingredients. It is these that I hypothesize as making for effectiveness, whether we are speaking of a guidance counselor, a clinical psychologist, or a psychiatrist.

What are these attitudinal or experiential elements in the counselor which make a relationship a growth-promoting climate? I would like to describe them as carefully and accurately as I can, though I am well aware that words rarely capture or communicate the qualities of a personal encounter.

CONGRUENCE

In the first place, I hypothesize that personal growth is facilitated when the counselor is what he *is*, when in the relationship with his client he is genuine and without "front" or facade, openly being the feelings and attitudes which at that moment are flowing in him. We have used the term "congruence" to try to describe this condition. By this we mean that the feelings the counselor is experiencing are available to him, available to his awareness, that he is able to live these feelings, be them in the relationship, and able to communicate them if appropriate. It means that he comes into a direct personal encounter with his client, meeting him on a person-to-person basis. It means that he is *being* himself, not denying himself. No one fully achieves this condition, yet the more the therapist is able to listen acceptantly to what is going on within himself, and the more he is able to *be* the complexity of his feelings without fear, the higher the degree of his congruence.

I think that we readily sense this quality in our everyday life. We could each of us name persons whom we know who always seem to be operating from behind a front, who are playing a role, who tend to say things they do not feel. They are exhibiting incongruence. We do not reveal ourselves too deeply to such people. On the other hand each of us knows individuals whom we somehow trust, because we sense that they are being what they *are*, that we are dealing with the person himself, and not with a polite or professional facade. This is the quality of which we are speaking, and it is hypothesized that the

more genuine and congruent the therapist in the relationship, the more probability there is that change in personality in the client will occur.

I have received much clinical confirmation for this hypothesis in recent years in our work with randomly selected hospitalized schizophrenic patients. The individual therapists in our research program who seem to be most successful in dealing with these unmotivated, poorly educated, resistant, chronically hospitalized individuals, are those who are first of all real, who react in a genuine, human way as persons, and who exhibit their genuineness in the relationship.

But is it always helpful to be genuine? What about negative feelings? What about the times when the counselor's real feeling toward his client is one of annoyance, or boredom, or dislike? My tentative answer is that even with such feelings as these, which we all have from time to time, it is preferable for the counselor to be real than to put up a facade of interest and concern and liking which he does not feel.

But it is not a simple thing to achieve such reality. I am not saying that it is helpful to blurt out impulsively every passing feeling and accusation under the comfortable impression that one is being genuine. Being real involves the difficult task of being acquainted with the flow of experiencing going on within oneself, a flow marked especially by complexity and continuous change. So if I sense that I am feeling bored by my contacts with this student, and this feeling persists, I think I owe it to him and to our relationship to share this feeling with him. But here again I will want to be constantly in touch with what is going on in me. If I am, I will recognize that it is *my* feeling of being bored which I am expressing, and not some supposed fact about him as a boring person. If I voice it as my *own* reaction, it has the potentiality of leading to a deeper relationship. But this feeling exists in the context of a complex and changing flow, and this needs to be communicated too. I would like to share with him my distress at feeling bored, and the discomfort I feel in expressing this aspect of me. As I share these attitudes I find that my feeling of boredom arises from my sense of remoteness from him, and that I would like to be more in touch with him. And even as I try to express these feelings, they change. I am certainly not bored as I try to communicate myself to him in this way, and I am far from bored as I wait with eagerness and perhaps a bit of apprehension for his response. I also feel a new sensitivity to him, now that I have shared this feeling which has been a barrier between us. So I am very much more able to hear the surprise or perhaps the hurt in his voice as he now finds *himself* speaking more genuinely because I have dared to be real with him. I have let myself be a person—real, imperfect—in my relationship with him.

I have tried to describe this first element at some length because I regard it as highly important, perhaps the most crucial of the conditions I will describe, and because it is neither easy to grasp nor to achieve. Gendlin (2) has

done an excellent job of explaining the significance of the concept of experiencing and its relationship to counseling and therapy, and his presentation may supplement what I have tried to say.

I hope it is clear that I am talking about a realness in the counselor which is deep and true, not superficial. I have sometimes thought that the word transparency helps to describe this element of personal congruence. If everything going on in me which is relevant to the relationship can be seen by my client, if he can see "clear through me," and if I am *willing* for this realness to show through in the relationship, then I can be almost certain that this will be a meaningful encounter in which we both learn and develop.

I have sometimes wondered if this is the only quality which matters in a counseling relationship. The evidence seems to show that other qualities also make a profound difference and are perhaps easier to achieve. So I am going to describe these others. But I would stress that if, in a given moment of relationship, they are not genuinely a part of the experience of the counselor, then it is, I believe, better to be genuinely what one is, than to pretend to be feeling these other qualities.

EMPATHY

The second essential condition in the relationship, as I see it, is that the counselor is experiencing an accurate empathic understanding of his client's private world, and is able to communicate some of the significant fragments of that understanding. To sense the client's inner world of private personal meanings as if it were your own, but without ever losing the "as if" quality, this is empathy, and this seems essential to a growth-promoting relationship. To sense his confusion or his timidity or his anger or his feeling of being treated unfairly as if it were your own, yet without your own uncertainty or fear or anger or suspicion getting bound up in it, this is the condition I am endeavoring to describe. When the client's world is clear to the counselor and he can move about in it freely, then he can both communicate his understanding of what is vaguely known to the client, and he can also voice meanings in the client's experience of which the client is scarcely aware. It is this kind of highly sensitive empathy which seems important in making it possible for a person to get close to himself and to learn, to change and develop.

I suspect that each of us has discovered that this kind of understanding is extremely rare. We neither receive it nor offer it with any great frequency. Instead we offer another type of understanding which is very different, such as "I understand what is wrong with you" or "I understand what makes you act that way." These are the types of understanding which we usually offer and receive—an evaluative understanding from the outside. It is not surprising that we shy away from true understanding. If I am truly open to the way life is experienced by another person—if I can take his world into mine—then I run the risk of seeing life in his way, of being changed myself, and we all resist

change. So we tend to view this other person's world only in our terms, not in his. We analyze and evaluate it. We do not understand it. But when someone understands how it feels and seems to be me, without wanting to analyze me or judge me, then I can blossom and grow in that climate. I am sure I am not alone in that feeling. I believe that when the counselor can grasp the moment-to-moment experiencing occurring in the inner world of the client, as the client sees it and feels it, without losing the separateness of his own identity in this empathic process, then change is likely to occur.

Though the accuracy of such understanding is highly important, the communication of intent to understand is also helpful. Even in dealing with the confused or inarticulate or bizarre individual, if he perceives that I am *trying* to understand his meanings, this is helpful. It communicates the value I place on him as an individual. It gets across the fact that I perceive his feelings and meanings as being *worth* understanding.

None of us steadily achieves such a complete empathy as I have been trying to describe, any more than we achieve complete congruence, but there is no doubt that individuals can develop along this line. Suitable training experiences have been utilized in the training of counselors, and also in the "sensitivity training" of industrial management personnel. Such experiences enable the person to listen more sensitively, to receive more of the subtle meanings the other person is expressing in words, gesture, and posture, to resonate more deeply and freely within himself to the significance of those expressions.¹

POSITIVE REGARD

Now the third condition. I hypothesize that growth and change are more likely to occur the more that the counselor is experiencing a warm, positive, acceptant attitude toward what is in the client. It means that he prizes his client, as a person, with somewhat the same quality of feeling that a parent feels for his child, prizing him as a person regardless of his particular behavior at the moment. It means that he cares for his client in a non-possessive way, as a person with potentialities. It involves an open willingness for the client to be whatever feelings are real in him at the moment—hostility or tenderness, rebellion or submissiveness, assurance or self-depreciation. It means a kind of love for the client as he is, providing we understand the word love as equivalent to the theologian's term "agape," and not in its usual romantic and possessor sentimental, nor superficially social and agreeable. It respects the other person as a separate individual, and does not possess him. It is a kind of liking which has strength, and which is not demanding. We have termed it positive regard.

¹ I hope the above account of an empathic attitude will make it abundantly clear that I am not advocating a wooden technique of pseudo-understanding in which the counselor "reflects back what the client has just said." I have been more than a little horrified at the interpretation of my approach which has sometimes crept into the teaching and training of counselors.

UNCONDITIONALITY OF REGARD

There is one aspect of this attitude of which I am somewhat less sure. I advance tentatively the hypothesis that the relationship will be more effective the more the positive regard is unconditional. By this I mean that the counselor prizes the client in a total, rather than a conditional way. He does not accept certain feelings in the client and disapprove others. He feels an *unconditional* positive regard for this person. This is an outgoing, positive feeling without reservations and without evaluations. It means *not* making judgments. I believe that when this nonevaluative prizing is present in the encounter between the counselor and his client, constructive change and development in the client is more likely to occur.

Certainly one does not need to be a professional to experience this attitude. The best of parents show this in abundance, while others do not. A friend of mine, a therapist in private practice on the east coast, illustrates this very well in a letter in which he tells me what he is learning about parents. He says:

I am beginning to feel that the key to the human being is the attitudes with which the parents have regarded him. If the child was lucky enough to have parents who have felt proud of him, wanted him, wanted him just as he was, exactly as he was, this child grows into adulthood with self-confidence, self-esteem; he goes forth in life feeling sure of himself, strong, able to lick what confronts him. Franklin Delano Roosevelt is an example . . . "my friends . . ." He couldn't imagine anyone thinking otherwise. He had two adoring parents. He was like the pampered dog who runs up at you, frisking his tail, eager to love you, for this dog has never known rejection or harshness. Even if you should kick him, he'll come right back to you, his tail friskier than ever, thinking you're playing a game with him and wanting more. This animal cannot imagine anyone disapproving or disliking him. Just as unconditional regard and love was poured into him, he has it now to give out. If a child is lucky enough to grow up in this unconditionally accepting atmosphere, he emerges as strong and sure and he can approach life and its vicissitudes with courage and confidence, with zest and joy of expectation.

But the parents who like their children—if. They would like them if they were changed, altered, different; if they were smarter or if they were better, or if, if, if. The offspring of these parents have trouble because they never had the feeling of acceptance. These parents don't really like these children; they would like them if they were like someone else. When you come down to the basic fundamental, the parent feels: "I don't like *this* child, this child before me." They don't say that. I am beginning to believe that it would be better for all concerned if parents did. It wouldn't leave such horrible ravages on these unaccepted children. It's never done that crudely. "If you were a nice boy and did this, that and the other thing, then we would all love you."

I am coming to believe that children brought up by parents who would like them "if" are never quite right. They grow up assuming that their parents are right and that they are wrong; that somehow or other they are at fault; and even worse, very frequently they feel they are stupid, inadequate, inferior.

This is an excellent contrast between an unconditional positive regard and a conditional regard. I believe it holds as true for counselors as for parents.

THE CLIENT'S PERCEPTION

Thus far all my hypotheses regarding the possibility of constructive growth have rested upon the experiencing of these elements by the counselor. There is, however, one condition which must exist in the client. Unless the attitudes I have been describing have been to some degree communicated to the client, and perceived by him, they do not exist in his perceptual world and thus cannot be effective. Consequently it is necessary to add one more condition to the equation which I have been building up regarding personal growth through counseling. It is that when the client perceives, to a minimal degree, the genuineness of the counselor and the acceptance and empathy which the counselor experiences for him, then development in personality and change in behavior are predicted.

This has implications for me as a counselor. I need to be sensitive not only to what is going on in me, and sensitive to the flow of feelings in my client. I must also be sensitive to the way he is receiving my communications. I have learned, especially in working with more disturbed persons, that empathy can be perceived as lack of involvement; that an unconditional regard on my part can be perceived as indifference; that warmth can be perceived as a threatening closeness, that real feelings of mine can be perceived as false. I would like to behave in ways, and communicate in ways which have clarity for this specific person, so that what I am experiencing in relationship to him would be perceived unambiguously by him. Like the other conditions I have proposed the principle is easy to grasp; the achievement of it is difficult and complex.

THE ESSENTIAL HYPOTHESIS

Let me restate very briefly the essentially simple but somewhat radical hypothesis I have set forth. I have said that constructive personality growth and change comes about only when the client perceives and experiences a certain psychological climate in the relationship. The conditions which constitute this climate do not consist of knowledge, intellectual training, orientation in some school of thought, or techniques. They are feelings or attitudes which must be experienced by the counselor and perceived by the client if they are to be effective. Those I have singled out as being essential are: a realness, genuineness, or congruence in the therapist; a sensitive, empathic understand-

ing of the client's feelings and personal meanings; a warm, acceptant prizing of the client; and an unconditionality in this positive regard.

SOME LIMITATIONS

I would like to stress that these are hypotheses. In a later section I will comment on the way these hypotheses are faring when put to empirical test. But they are beginning hypotheses, not the final word.

I regard it as entirely possible that there are other conditions which I have not described, which are also essential. Recently I had occasion to listen to some recorded interviews by a young counselor of elementary school children. She was very warm and positive in her attitude toward her clients, yet she was definitely ineffective. She seemed to be responding warmly only to the superficial aspects of each child and so the contacts were chatty, social and friendly, but it was clear she was not reaching the real person of the child. Yet in a number of ways she rated reasonably high on each of the conditions I have described. So perhaps there are still elements missing which I have not captured in my formulation.

I am also aware of the possibility that different kinds of helping relationships may be effective with different kinds of people. Some of our therapists working with schizophrenics are effective when they appear to be highly conditional, when they do *not* accept some of the bizarre behavior of the psychotic. This can be interpreted in two ways. Perhaps a conditional set is more helpful with these individuals. Or perhaps—and this seems to me to fit the facts better—these psychotic individuals perceive a conditional attitude as meaning that the therapist *really* cares, where an unconditional attitude may be interpreted as apathetic noncaring. In any event, I do want to make it clear that what I have given are beginning formulations which surely will be modified and corrected from further learnings.

THE PHILOSOPHY WHICH IS IMPLICIT

It is evident that the kind of attitudes I have described are not likely to be experienced by a counselor unless he holds a philosophy regarding people in which such attitudes are congenial. The attitudes pictured make no sense except in a context of great respect for the person and his potentialities. Unless the primary element in the counselor's value system is the worth of the individual, he is not apt to find himself experiencing a real caring, or a desire to understand, and perhaps he will not respect himself enough to be real. Certainly the professional person who holds the view that individuals are essentially objects to be manipulated for the welfare of the state, or the good of the educational institution, or "for their own good," or to satisfy his own need for power and control, would not experience the attitudinal elements I have

described as constituting growth-promoting relationships. So these conditions are congenial and natural in certain philosophical contexts but not in others.

EMPIRICAL STUDIES

This raises some questions which I have asked myself, and which you too must be asking. Are these characteristics which I have described as essential to a helping relationship simply my personal opinion, preference, and bias? Or do they represent simply a bias growing out of a generally democratic philosophy? Or do they in *fact* promote constructive change and development?

Five years ago I could not have answered these questions. Now there are at least a dozen well-designed research investigations which, approaching the matter in a variety of ways, throw light on the issues (1, 3, 6a through 6j). To report each of these studies would be confusing rather than helpful. Let me try to describe their methods in general terms and then report on the findings.

The studies deal with two rather different classes of clients: students and community members who voluntarily come to counselors for help; and on the other hand, schizophrenic individuals in a state hospital who have been there for periods ranging from a few months to many years. The first group is above the socio-educational average, the second below. The first group is motivated to gain help, the second is not only unmotivated but resistant. The over-all range in adjustment is from well-functioning individuals through varying degrees of maladjustment and disturbance, to those who are completely unable to cope with life, and who are out of contact with reality.

In the different studies there have been three ways of measuring the attitudinal elements I have described. The first method is based on brief segmental elements, usually four minutes in length, taken in a randomized way from the tape-recorded interviews. Raters, listening to these segments, judge the degree to which the counselor is, for example, being accurately empathic, and make a rating on a carefully defined scale. The raters have no knowledge of whether the segment is from an early or late interview, or whether it is a more or less successful case. In most of the studies several raters have made ratings on each of the qualities involved.

A second method of measurement is through the use of the Relationship Inventory (1), filled out by the client at different points in time. The inventory contains statements regarding the degree to which the counselor is acceptant, empathic, and congruent, and the client responds by evaluating the statement on a six point scale from "strongly true" to "definitely untrue." Examples concerning empathy are: "He generally senses or realizes how I am feeling"; "He understands my words but does not realize how I feel." In relationship to congruence some items are: "He behaves just the way that he is in our relationship"; "He pretends that he likes me or understands me more than he really does." The Inventory is scored for each of the four attitudinal elements, and there is also a total score.

The third method is also based on the Relationship Inventory, but this time filled out by the therapist or counselor. The items are identical except for a suitable change in pronouns.

In the various studies different criteria are used for assessing the degree of constructive personality change which has taken place over the course of the interviews. In all cases the criteria of change are independent of the measurement of attitudinal conditions in the relationship. Some of the measures of change are: changes in various Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory scales and indices; changes in projective tests as analyzed "blind" by clinicians having no knowledge of the research; changes in Q-sort adjustment score; changes on a measure of anxiety; therapist's ratings of change in personality and in adjustment.

THE FINDINGS

Let me now give some of the general findings from these studies:

The counselor is the most significant factor in setting the level of conditions in the relationship, though the client, too, has some influence on the quality of the relationship.

Clients who will later show more change perceive more of these attitudinal conditions early in the relationship with their counselor or therapist.

The more disturbed the client the less he is likely to (or able to?) perceive these attitudes in the counselor.

Counselors or therapists tend to be quite consistent in the level of the attitudinal conditions which they offer to each client.

The major finding from all of the studies is that those clients in relationships marked by a high level of counselor congruence, empathy and unconditional positive regard, show constructive personality change and development. These high levels of conditions are associated with: positive change on MMPI scales and indices, including ego-strength; positive change from the pre- to post-test battery as rated by clinicians working "blind"; decrease in anxiety scores and in a self-consciousness score; a higher level on Process Scales designed to measure process in therapy; and positive change in counselor's ratings.

Clients in relationships characterized by a low level of these attitudinal conditions show significantly less positive change on these same indices.

In studies of clinic clients the correlation between the client's perception of the conditions offered early in the relationship and the degree of change at the conclusion of the interviews is somewhat higher than that between the counselor's perception of the conditions offered and the degree of change. The client's perception is, in other words, the better predictor of change.

This finding does not hold for the schizophrenic client, whose inner disturbance makes it difficult for him accurately to perceive the conditions of-

ferred by the therapist. With our schizophrenics, the rating of the conditions made by unbiased raters is the best predictor of change.

An unexpected finding with the schizophrenic clients is that low conditions in the relationship are associated with *negative* change in several respects. The clients not only fail to show constructive change but become worse in the judgment of clinicians rating their pre- and post-test batteries; show an increase in anxiety; are worse off than their matched no-therapy controls. Whether this finding holds for clinic clients who come for help has not yet been determined.

A finding which seems to lend validity to the studies is that, as might be expected, more experienced counselors, when compared with inexperienced counselors, offer a higher level of these conditions, and are more successful in communicating these to their clients. Thus they are perceived as offering higher conditions, and their clients show more change over the course of the interviews.

IMPLICATIONS

What are some of the implications of these hypotheses and of these findings for the field of counseling psychology and guidance? I would like to mention four which occur to me.

In the first place, these studies indicate that perhaps it is possible to study cause and effect in counseling and psychotherapy. They are actually, so far as I know, the first studies to endeavor to isolate and measure the primary change-producing influences in counseling. Whether they are still further confirmed by later research, or whether they are contradicted or modified by future studies, they represent pioneering investigations of the question, "What really makes the difference in counseling and psychotherapy?" And the answer they give is that it is the attitudes provided by the counselor, the psychological climate largely created by him, which *really* makes the difference, which *really* induces change.

There is another highly practical significance to these studies. They indicate quite clearly that, by assessing a relationship early in its existence, we can to some degree predict the probability of its being a relationship which makes for growth. It seems to be quite within the range of possibility that in the not too distant future we will acquire an increasingly accurate knowledge of the elements which make for constructive psychological development, just as we have in the realm of nutrition acquired an increasingly accurate knowledge of the elements which promote physical growth. As this knowledge accumulates, and as our instruments grow sharper, then there is the exciting possibility that we may be able, relatively early in the game, to predict whether a given relationship will actually promote or inhibit individual psychological growth and development, just as we can assess the diet of a child and predict the extent to which this diet will promote or inhibit physical growth.

In this connection the disturbing finding that an inadequate interpersonal relationship can have a negative effect on personal development, at least in the case of highly disturbed individuals, makes such early assessment of a relationship an even more challenging possibility and responsibility.

Another significant meaning for the counseling field is that we now have the beginnings of a theory, and some empirical facts supporting the theory, as to the specific elements in an interpersonal relationship which facilitate positive change. Thus we can now say with some assurance and factual backing that a relationship characterized by a high degree of congruence or genuineness in the counselor, by sensitive and accurate empathy on the part of the counselor, by a high degree of regard, respect and liking for the client by the counselor, and by an absence of conditionality in this regard, will have a high probability of being an effective, growth-promoting relationship. This statement holds, whether we are speaking of maladjusted individuals who come of their own initiative seeking help, or whether we are speaking of chronically schizophrenic persons, with no conscious desire for help. This statement also holds whether these attitudinal elements are rated by impartial observers who listen to samples of the recorded interviews, or whether they are measured in terms of the counselor's perception of the qualities he has offered in the relationship, or whether they are measured by the client's perception of the relationship, at least in the case of the nonhospitalized client. To me it seems to be quite a forward stride to be able to make statements such as these in an area as complex and subtle as the field of helping relationships.

Finally, these studies would, if confirmed by further work, have significant implications for the training of counselors and therapists. To the extent that the counselor is seen as being involved in interpersonal relationships, and to the extent that the goal of those relationships is to promote healthy development, then certain conclusions would seem to follow. It would mean that we would endeavor to select individuals for such training who already possess, in their ordinary relationships with other people, a high degree of the qualities I have described. We would want people who were warm, spontaneous, real, understanding, and non-judgmental. We would also endeavor so to plan the educational program for these individuals that they would come increasingly to *experience* empathy and liking for others, and that they would find it increasingly easier to be themselves, to be real. By feeling understood and accepted in their training experiences, by being in contact with genuineness and absence of facade in their instructors, they would grow into more and more competent counselors. There would be as much focus in such training on the interpersonal experience as on the intellectual learning. It would be recognized that no amount of knowledge of tests and measures, or of counseling theories, or of diagnostic procedures could make the trainee more effective in his personal encounter with his clients. There would be a heavy stress upon the actual experience of working with clients, and the thoughtful and self-critical assessment of the relationships formed.

When I ask myself whether the training programs I know, in guidance, in clinical psychology, in psychiatry, approach this goal, I come up with a strong negative. It seems to me that most of our professional training programs make it *more* difficult for the individual to be himself, and more likely that he will play a professional role. Often he becomes so burdened with theoretical and diagnostic baggage that he becomes *less* able to understand the inner world of another person as it seems to that person. Also, as his professional training continues, it all too often occurs that his initial warm liking for other persons is submerged in a sea of diagnostic and psycho-dynamic evaluation.

Thus to take the findings of these studies seriously would mean some sharp changes in the very nature of professional training, as well as in its curriculum.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude with a series of statements which for me follow logically one upon the other.

The purpose of most of the helping professions, including guidance counseling, is to enhance the personal development, the psychological growth toward a socialized maturity, of its clients.

The effectiveness of any member of the profession is most adequately measured in terms of the degree to which, in his work with his clients, he achieves this goal.

Our knowledge of the elements which bring about constructive change in personal growth is in its infant stages.

Such factual knowledge as we currently possess indicates that a primary change-producing influence is the degree to which the client experiences certain qualities in his relationship with his counselor.

In a variety of clients—normal, maladjusted, and psychotic—with many different counselors and therapists, and studying the relationship from the vantage point of the client, the therapist, or the uninvolved observer, certain qualities in the relationship are quite uniformly found to be associated with personal growth and change.

These elements are not constituted of technical knowledge or ideological sophistication. They are personal human qualities—something the counselor *experiences*, not something he *knows*. Constructive personal growth is associated with the counselor's realness, with his genuine and unconditional liking for his client, with his sensitive understanding of his client's private world, and with his ability to communicate these qualities in himself to his client.

These findings have some far-reaching implications for the theory and practice of guidance counseling and psychotherapy, and for the training of workers in these fields.

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Guidance: Remedial Function or Social Reconstruction?

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THE CURRENT PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL STATUS OF GUIDANCE

THERE IS A SENSE in which guidance services as a part of the American educational enterprise are in their heyday. The major policy statement about educational matters that fails to assign a prominent place to guidance is a rarity, and as an explicit beneficiary of the National Defense Education Act, along with only a tiny cluster of the currently most valued subject-matter fields, guidance has enjoyed strong financial support. According to the U.S. Office of Education, for example, nearly 8,000 people have been enrolled under N.D.E.A. auspices for short-term guidance training institutes, and more than 1,700 have been supported in regular-session institutes. In 1960, 30,000 persons were concerned with "scheduled guidance activities" in secondary schools across the nation, although only about one-third of them were functioning as full-time guidance personnel. Similarly, in the same year, the number of students studying for advanced degrees in guidance and counseling exceeded the combined total in physical education, business education, industrial arts education, and music education, and the figure closely approximated the numbers majoring in such standard programs as administration and curriculum. The American Personnel and Guidance Association has a dues-paying membership of well over 13,000, owns its own building in Washington, operates the highly successful *Personnel and Guidance Journal*, and exercises a not inconsiderable influence in the governmental and private circles where issues of policy and finance for education are decided.

At the same time, however, the pattern of ebullient expansiveness is drawn taut by tensions, criticisms, and ambiguities. Wrenn (19), in examining the field in 1958, noted three disturbing signs of the times that still persist: (1) Among psychologists, counseling psychology enjoys the lowest prestige of all the specialties requiring the doctorate; (2) no one has yet developed an adequate theory of vocational choice and development; and (3) various lines

of research into the learning process, including Skinner's (13, 14), make it hard to ignore the possibility that the counseling process may be so conceived as to reinforce the least integrative of the behaviors displayed by its clients. Banesh Hoffmann's recent attack (7) is only the most recent of a long series of assaults on the psychometric arsenal of guidance, and *The Brain Watchers* (5, 6) has only made highly articulate the troubled objections of many to what they regard as an invasion of the personalities and psychodynamics of the children in the school's charge. In much the same vein, Barry and Wolf (2) have documented the extent to which "myths"—assumptions and undemonstrated principles—are shot through the literature of guidance, making it less than either a firmly based discipline or a logically coherent profession.

At the very time, then, that guidance commands the greatest public favor, it is also under public fire. At the moment of its greatest expansion, it can show little in the way of solid research to demonstrate its merits or its achievements. At a peak of its influence, its basic techniques of testing and counseling evoke a marked degree of mistrust. With the best of intentions, generally if rather dimly perceived by the public and the rest of the educational fraternity, guidance is animated neither by a clear philosophy of why people should be given its special kind of service as a part of their school experience nor by a demonstrably effective core of methods by which such help can be provided.

To make this charge is by no means tantamount to a condemnation of particular guidance practices. Rather, it is a way of underscoring the place of guidance among the practical arts—in this case, the practical arts of human relationships. Pragmatically, guidance workers are undoubtedly each day doing much to assist large numbers of youngsters to cope more effectively with the business of growing up in a complex and often mystifying world. Such, at least, seems to be a reasonable article of faith, quite consonant with the common experience of those whose fate it is to visit schools and to talk frequently with the counselors and personnel officers who ply their trade there. But guidance aspires to professional status and lays claim to systematic and specialized membership within the complex educational family of occupations and disciplines. Presumably, therefore, guidance has its roots in the behavioral sciences and is watered by the springs of philosophy from which come the constant redefinitions of the role of the school in the total process of socialization. It is on this basis—the ground of its own understandable ambitions—that it is vulnerable and exposed. The gap between successes and pretensions, when one looks hard, is not only apparent; it is wide.

Nor, on reflection, is this state of affairs especially puzzling. One of the primary tensions within the guidance movement is simply a reflection of a fundamental tension in Western social thought. The societies of the West have been built essentially on the conviction that persons are free and re-

sponsible—see, for example, the whole tradition of Anglo-Saxon law.¹ Increasingly, however, the technique used for the investigation and reconstruction of those societies and the men who compose them has been that of science; and science carries the implication that human conduct, like any other proper object of scientific inquiry, is predictable and determined. Since this contradiction in basic assumptions has rarely been dealt with in any persuasive fashion anywhere, one cannot fairly blame guidance workers for not resolving it, but it has, for them, consequences of considerable moment. Not the least of these entailments is that of making guidance the unwitting smuggler of certain values that are not entirely explicit.

THE SMUGGLING OF VALUES

This proposition is worth examining for several reasons, one of which is its demonstration of the complexity of the guidance worker's job. In general, he supplies (or is supposed to supply) a highly individualized dimension to the pupil's experience of mass education. In contrast to the teacher, who is responsible for drawing students into the traditions of society and inviting their membership in it, the guidance worker furnishes the information, the recommendations, and the impetus that are likely to move *particular* children in *distinctive* directions on the basis of their *special* characteristics and potentialities. The business of influencing another human being is almost always touchy and edged with uneasiness, and it certainly requires justification. In the case of school guidance work, it requires justification to parents and the community at large as well as to administrators and school board members. That justification comes most readily from science—the corpus of knowledge about tests, psychological development, and the prediction of performance in college or on a job from previous experience, including academic experience. One may grant, however, the cogency and power of science in this connection and still remain impressed by two stubborn facts: (1) Guidance remains an effort to influence particular youngsters in particular directions, and (2) those directions are not given by whatever scientific data or principles that may in other ways be relevant to the enterprise.

To put the case more concretely, if a guidance counselor is attempting to help a child develop a greater sense of personal responsibility, that aim does not emerge directly from whatever psychological knowledge the counselor may have available. Behavioral science may in some fashion indicate how the goal may be achieved; it neither defines it nor establishes its desirability.

¹ Two instructive references here are Felix S. Cohen's *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959) and the popular British paperback, *Justice at Work*, by James Avery Joyce (London: Pan Books, 1957). Two books also of particular interest to educators are those by Judge Jerome Frank, *Fate and Freedom* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945) and *Courts on Trial* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949).

Because "responsibility" in this context is a word that carries rich positive connotations, this kind of statement of objectives is likely to evoke little opposition. But we come rapidly to more troubled waters when we discuss other such common desiderata as "spontaneity" or a "trust of one's own feelings." It seems quite probable that spontaneity and a trust of their own feelings would entail for Negro adolescents, for example, a powerful tendency to hate one's parents, to damn the school as irrelevant, and to attack society for its inequities. Despite the fact that such attitudes are by no means incomprehensible on scientific grounds, they are not likely to be encouraged by guidance workers. Even the matter of vocational choice may involve some pronounced restrictions on grounds other than those provided by psychological or sociological knowledge. Barry and Wolf (2, pp. 92-93) give an example: In Las Vegas and other gambling resorts, there is a pressing need for dealers at the gaming tables; there is even a school to train them. Pay is good, hours are short, and the working environment is, from at least one point of view, quite comfortable. For a youngster with a taste for probabilities, a suitable temperament, and an interest in games of chance, such a career may be a thoroughly "realistic" one. Yet there is ample room to doubt that any guidance counselor would condone this kind of preference, let alone raise it as an appropriate possibility.

The examples could easily be multiplied, but the point is that guidance workers, as smugglers of values, are in a position almost the reverse of that which Szasz (16) has recently described as the lot of psychiatrists. Taking the issue of legal abortion for therapeutic purposes as his test case, Szasz is more widely concerned with the question of how self-determined are the controls exercised over one's body. Abortions are illegal, of course, unless certain conditions obtain. While there is some variation from state to state in the nature of these conditions, mental illness is usually one of them. As a matter of fact, wherever such therapeutic abortions are legally performed in large numbers, justification is given most frequently on psychiatric grounds. At the Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York, for example, 39 per cent of legal abortions since 1952 have been done on the basis of psychiatric judgment as against only 10 per cent because of malignancies and only 11 per cent because of cardio-renal disease. But for Szasz, himself a psychiatrist of some prominence, mental illnesses are not diseases at all. Far from being entities like tuberculosis or hypertension, they are simply strategies for coping with life that have consequences which include quite genuine misery (17). The misery, however, is not like that of medically defined pain; it is the suffering associated with anxiety and interpersonal ineptness. In short, it is a *moral* suffering. In consequence, the psychiatric justification for therapeutic abortion is a moral justification, used to circumvent a legal restriction on the right of the individual to exercise whatever controls he wishes over his own body. In this sense, the psychiatrist is the bootlegger of certain moral values (mercy and

self-determination) under the guise of a medical diagnosis in order to circumvent the limits set on these values under the social sanctions of law. While the psychiatric judgment here may have the appearance of science, it is in reality a camouflaged vehicle for the implementing of an inarticulate moral choice at variance with the codified rules.

In the case of the guidance worker, the appeal to science is equally in evidence, but the smuggled values are those of the dominant middle class, those that tend to reduce individual variability and autonomy rather than increase it. Viewed from one angle of regard, this state of affairs is not at all shocking. The school is, after all, a social agency, charged with the preservation of society through the transmission of the culture. Certain of its ends, therefore, are inherently and necessarily conservative, and conservatism—even in a pluralistic social context—always puts a premium on a degree of homogenization, a fitting of particular cases to the modal pattern. Perhaps the most straightforward pronouncement on this score is that of Robert Maynard Hutchins:

I do not ignore [the argument that the most important thing about men is that they are different]; I deny it. I do not deny the fact of individual differences; I deny that it is the most important fact about men or the one on which an education system should be erected.²

One need not be a subscriber to Hutchins's doctrines to find a certain descriptive accuracy in his statement. Whatever else it does, the school—of which guidance activities are an integral part—must as a societal institution build commonalities among people. It must lead them into a common tradition, equip them with common skills, and disseminate among them a core of common standards. While the construction of commonality is not all that the school does, this task is one that it cannot neglect. Indeed, in the eyes of acute foreign observers like Denis Brogan (4), the effectiveness of the school at turning a huge and diverse population—the children of immigrants, children from strikingly different regions, children of divergent familial backgrounds, etc.—into recognizable Americans is one of the chief glories of our educational system. It would be immensely difficult and possibly immensely disruptive for guidance *not* to participate in this fundamentally conservative responsibility which schools in the United States must carry.

But there is another factor somewhat more covertly at work here. School personnel are overwhelmingly middle class in their status. If they do not derive from middle-class origins, they have achieved middle-class membership through upward mobility and are vigorous in the consolidation of their new social position.³ There is strong evidence that such teachers—and guidance

² John Maynard Hutchins. *The Conflict in Education* (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 89.

³ On such scales as the Warner Index of Status Characteristics, teachers are almost without exception and, indeed, almost by definition members of the American middle class. For an interesting example of studies of teacher-pupil perceptions, see Hilde T. Himmelweit, "Socioeconomic Background and Personality," *Internatl. Soc. Sci. Bull.*, 1955, 7, 29-35.

workers have almost universally come out of the classroom—perceive youngsters of lower-class status as sullen, defiant, dirty, aggressive, given to the erotic and the overtly sexual in their language and manner, intellectually inferior, and inadequately and improperly oriented to books and study. Children so perceived are unrewarding to work with, and the probability of their being rejected is high. Hollingshead (8) and Opstad⁴ have even shown that the distribution of low and failing grades among lower class youth is substantially greater than would be predicted from indices of intelligence.

Perhaps a significant kind of light is cast on these observations by still another finding. A great deal of attention has been paid recently to the notion of "creativity," a term endowed with highly positive connotations. Surely, there can be no argument about the degree to which we want our youngsters to be creative! Yet Torrance (18) is not the only investigator to document the fact that creative children are by no means well liked by teachers and other school officials. By definition, creative pupils challenge some of the basic rules, resist the pressure toward commonality, and behave in unpredictable and idiosyncratic ways. Such a pattern of response not only puts a strain on the corporate structure of the school; it frustrates in some degree one of its fundamental purposes. In consequence, even though the notion of increased creativity as an educational objective is an appealing one, it is not without its own sources of conflict and disturbance.

What all this means is that the school provides a setting which necessarily defines a significant part of the frame of reference within which guidance workers must operate. If the tendency is less now than it was in former years for school people to regard nonconformity, aggression, and individual self-assertiveness as "the most serious behavior problem a child can have" (3), they still view with mistrust and irritation any youngster or any event that departs from the orderly, the "nice," or the "healthy" as one segment of society defines the healthy. To the extent that a guidance worker accepts as referrals those children who are perceived by teachers as disruptive, disorderly, or discordant with the classroom group, he accepts in some degree the definition of his job as that of fitting children to the dominant patterns of the school. This task may be an essential one, and on occasion, it may be quite harmonious with that of aiding an individual child to actualize his distinctive potentialities. The fact remains that there are other times when the two enterprises are certainly different and may be in opposition to each other. Even more important is the institutional derivation of the guidance counselor's objectives; they come less from a particular corpus of knowledge or from the independent point of view of an autonomous profession than from the particularities and immediacies of the school in which he works. To make this observation is not necessarily to utter a negative criticism; it is simply

⁴ Quoted in Boyd R. McCandless, *Children and Adolescents* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 469.

to underscore a state of affairs which is usually quite inexplicit and which could productively be made the direct focus of more articulate discussion and study.

FACILITATING THE EXAMINED LIFE—THE FAILURE OF SCHOOL AND GUIDANCE

One of the problems on which discussion and study of this sort could usefully concentrate is that of specialization in education generally and in guidance particularly. The present growth of knowledge is, as we have now been often reminded, no less than awesome. In the natural sciences, knowledge doubles in slightly more than a decade; in the behavioral sciences, it doubles about every thirty years. The mass of information and the complexities of its application to modern society force specialization and therefore a narrowness that is incompatible with the basic educational aim of producing an informed and responsibly participant citizen in a democratic community. In education, teachers must specialize in one or another domain of subject matter. In guidance, most workers are inclined to think of themselves as specialists of one type or another—in testing, in counseling, in the development and utilization of occupational information, etc. Yet there is a sense in which the guidance movement arose as an effort to combat the tendency of mass education, interacting with the inevitable demands of specialization, to become impersonal and confining, to lose sight of the individual and his significant role in the free state. The result is the paradox of guidance workers' becoming specialists in the overcoming of specialization's undesirable effects.

Paradoxical or not, this emphasis on individual growth and on helping individual students to find socially appropriate ways for the expression of their distinctiveness is one of the primary wellsprings of the guidance enterprise. One way to conceptualize this aspect of things is an attempt to facilitate an active search for values among students. So conceived, guidance is the systematic encouragement of students to live what Socrates called the examined life. The examined life is one in which values are constantly being made articulate, subjected to criticism, and revised in the light of experience and thought. At one level, this process is sophisticated and intellectual; at another, it may be naive and both unenlightened and unencumbered by a tradition of ideas. At all levels, however, it can be authentic. The constant defining and redefining of one's self in relation to one's work and one's family, for example, entails nothing less than an on-going appraisal of one's aspirations and obligations, of the progress made by one human being in the human search for contentment and self-esteem. So presented, the examined life is as serious and as possible—even as necessary—for the plumber or the gardener as for the physicist or philosopher. Knowledge is deeply relevant to it, but

a clarity about values and an ability to think of oneself in valuational terms is still more so.

To what extent does the school, including its guidance services, contribute to the cultivation of the examined life? There is a wealth of evidence⁵ that suggests the somewhat wry and grim answer of "Not much" to be the appropriate one. Leaving aside the happy exceptions, the main conclusion that offers itself is that our schools and colleges serve, first, to consolidate middle-class students in their middle-class ways and, second, to provide a route to the acceptance of middle-class norms for about one-fourth of the lower-class children who originally enroll. About 75 per cent of lower-class pupils in the first grade, including those whose class membership is related to ethnic status, drop out before finishing high school, most of them before beginning their eleventh year. Aside from these observations, there is little in the way of a systematic or persuasive demonstration that education in the United States concerns itself methodically and effectively with the development of values in its charges.

THE CONCEPT OF INSTITUTIONAL POTENCY

This state of affairs is a strange one in the light of our strong consensus that the schools, at least through the secondary years, *should* be occupied with such matters as citizenship, character, moral development, and social growth. While there may be dissent, often of a heated kind, over the priorities to be given to such objectives in relation to more intellectual and academic ones, there is little doubt about their appropriateness. The teaching of plastic bits of protoplasm to become contributory and integral members of a viable community *requires* a concern for values and the non-intellective side of the child's progress toward adulthood.

But the over-all lack of evidence of success in studies of the school and college as agents of attitudinal and characterological change is relieved occasionally by signs that particular institutions seem to possess what Philip Jacob (9) has called a "peculiar potency" on this score. Although the directions of change vary from school to school, attendance at these "potent" institutions seems to matter, to result in graduates who are different people from what they were at the time of their first enrollment, to entail some jarring of original values and some re-examination and reformulation of them during one's time in residence.

The nature of institutional potency, however, has proved elusive and hard to identify. Yet it is possible that some insight into its basic dimensions can be obtained by looking freshly at an educational tradition somewhat different

⁵ I have reviewed a good deal of this material in a chapter on "Education and Personality Change" to appear in a volume edited by Philip Worchel and Donn Byrne under the title of *Personality Change* that is now in preparation.—EJS

from our own. In the process, we may win some helpful collateral perspectives on the American system and on the potentialities of guidance within it.

To begin with, we would expect the American "whole-child" outlook in education, reflecting the humanitarian and egalitarian themes in our history (which, incidentally, provide undergirding for the guidance movement itself), to contrast sharply with, for example, the ideas bound up with such institutions as the select and elite "public" schools of Britain. It is quite true, of course, that the English public schools were and are primarily concerned with the development of leaders, not with providing a universal pattern of education. It is equally true that their curricula were and are centered on subject matter—predominantly the classics and mathematics—rather than on children. But so observant and critical an interpreter of British life as J. D. Scott puts it this way: "The *real* object of the English public school is not to teach you Latin and Greek, but to turn you . . . into a true-blue Church-of-England country gentleman."⁶ The point is underscored by the famous passage in Thomas Hughes's insightful old novel where Squire Brown is musing on sending his son Tom to Thomas Arnold's Rugby:

"Shall I tell him to mind his work and say he's sent to school to make himself a good scholar? Well, but he isn't sent to school for that. . . . I don't care a straw for Greek particles or the digamma, no more does his mother. . . . If he'll only turn out a brave, helpful, truth-telling Englishman, and a gentleman and a Christian, that's all I want," thought the Squire.⁷

Let us acknowledge at once that this conception of how the school may develop leaders through dealing with the whole personality had a corrupt and brutal side. The harshness of bullying, flogging, cold dormitories, bad food, and a compulsory indiscriminate participation in games has often been documented, perhaps most dramatically in George Orwell's essay, "Such, Such Were the Joys" (11). But as the oft criticized educators of the United States have only too much reason to know, one can hardly judge a total enterprise by its perverted examples. The rational, sensible element in the British system included and still includes, in Scott's words,

the setting of spoilt, rich mothers' darlings to make tea and clean football boots for their fag masters, and the idea that for the average boy to be hounded out to run for a few miles, even on a sleety winter afternoon, was fortifying. And one of the things which made public schoolboys easier to work for . . . than the products of most ruling-class systems of education was the fact that they had at least had a glimpse of hardship, a menial position, and "unfairness."

⁶ J. D. Scott. *Life in Britain* (New York: William Morrow, 1956), p. 171.

⁷ Thomas Hughes. *Tom Brown's School-Days* (London: Macmillan, 1857), p. 141.

The value set upon the public school system is that it produces leaders, but *leaders who are responsible and humane* [italics added]. . . . And there is a great deal in this. The Victorian and Edwardian public schools *did* produce out of their material a reasonable proportion of young men of character and principles, accustomed to the idea of leadership and so taking it unfussily, fair-minded, not too painfully serious, but with an idea about serving their country and a contempt for money-grubbing and pot-hunting. Commonly, they had high-spirited good manners which pleased most people who were capable of being pleased.⁸

There is more than ample room here, of course, for those of a systematic and empirical turn of mind to wonder about the adequacy of this evaluation. Nevertheless, strong suggestions have recently appeared in the research literature⁹ that those American independent schools that are cut from English cloth in their purposes and program have more of an impact on the personalities of their students—possess more “potency”—than do the majority of our public schools. In what does that potency consist?

One can only raise hypotheses here, but it seems quite possible that two broad factors account for much of an institution's power to evoke change of a valuational sort in youngsters. The first has to do with the frequency and intimacy of contacts that pupils enjoy with both older students and with teachers whom they perceive as “omnicompetent” in Fritz Redl's (12) terms. School children, as Allin Smith and Goethals (1) have shown, are active in their search for character models, and there is every reason to suspect that this kind of quest, like most other forms of behavior, is strengthened by reinforcement and weakened by neglect or non-reward. What is proposed here is that the child who, regarding a particular adult as able and admirable, not only encounters him in the classroom, but also on the tennis or basketball court, at tea in the older person's home, and in the relatively frequent context of informal talks on a campus bench, is being much more intensively exposed to a model than when the relationship is limited to the classroom or counselor's office.

Similarly, if he must deal with older youngsters, more senior than he in the school's status system, then he forms a clearer sense of just what behavior patterns, attitudes and values are expected of him as he develops under the school's tuition. Obviously, this arrangement need not imply any form of coercion into a fully predetermined and restrictive mould. Self-reliance, critical thought, and initiative can be authentic objectives in this context just as readily as other-direction or the acceptance of definite and imposed norms. The central point is that the process of self-exploration and the cultivation

⁸ Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

⁹ This material is well reviewed in an unpublished research report by David Winter, Richard Alpert, and David McClelland of the Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, under the title of “The Classic Personal Style.”

of the examined life are likely to be facilitated by the child's relatively intimate exposure to a variety of models; the opportunity, provided by the school, to identify with several relatively diverse persons, or with some composite that he may create from their diversity, may have much to do with the flexible development of a distinctive life-style.

The second large factor that may contribute to a school's potency may be its character as a community. Assume that teachers, administrators, and guidance workers share common educational aims which are genuinely operative in their work, and that they represent differences in other domains like politics and aesthetics—differences that can be openly discussed with enjoyment in the presence of and with students. Then it is probable that the child, holding a membership proper to his age and development in the community, will be responsive to its values, will interiorize its ideals, and will form the habit of reflecting on the relevance and importance of diversity among people who still participate in the attainment of other broad goals that they pursue in concert. The main question is one of whether a school has a distinctive climate within which a boy or girl virtually breathes healthful expectancies.

To the extent that these two sets of variables, the accessibility of suitable models and the degree of actual community represented by a school, account for educational potency, it is clear that the effectiveness of the educational enterprise is based bluntly in the quality of the adults participating in it and in the character of a school's or college's *de facto* social organization. In the worry about present-day priorities in education and in the discussion of changing curricular structures and a newly developing educational technology, it may be well to keep these possibilities in mind. Lip-service and teaching machines will hardly be sufficient if it truly turns out that potency is dependent, after all, on these fundamental human elements in the educational adventure.¹⁰

MORE POWERFUL FUNCTIONS FOR GUIDANCE

And what place does guidance distinctively occupy in this conception of the potent school? The position taken here suggests a radically different and more important one than the traditional role of the counselor of the obstreperous, the adviser on college selection and vocational matters, and the purveyor of tests and occupational information. It is not that these functions are irrelevant or lacking in vital merit. It is only that they are subordinate to something else. That something else is twofold in its nature: First, it is a human feedback mechanism by which the impact of the school is assessed and made available for the consideration of its official personnel; second, it is a catalyst for the clarification of the character of the school as a community

¹⁰ In this discussion of educational potency, I have drawn heavily on my editorial on "Potency in the Schools" in the *Teachers College Record* for April, 1962, 63, 548-550.—EJS

and as a source of appropriate models for developing youngsters. The task may be a delicate one; it is not one to be avoided lightly.

With respect to the feedback function of the guidance worker as it is envisioned here, it must be noted that counselors, far more than either teachers or administrators, have an opportunity to hear from children themselves the extent to which their schools are disappointing or lack cogency for them. Obviously, youngsters rarely possess the fluency and insight to state their cases in terms that are immediately useful to those responsible for a school's program. But by virtue of their special training, guidance officers know, at least in some significant degree, how to elicit and to interpret the necessary material to form relevant hypotheses. If they so structure their jobs as to see a relatively large number of reasonably representative children, they have an opportunity to evaluate if not to test those hypotheses. What is important is that the hypotheses be less concerned with the personalities of the pupils and more concerned with the functioning realities of the school. Are sufficient opportunities being provided for students to identify with an adequate range of useful adult models? Are children developing any sense of what it means to be a person as a result of their acquaintance with their teachers? Are they getting any conception of an ego-ideal from the curriculum?¹¹ Do they have any awareness of the diversity within the faculty or of the way that individuality of a responsible sort is prized in the adult society? Are they evolving any such concept through their contact with student leaders and the exemplars in their peer group? Have they any sense of participant membership in a community that is valuable to them and that is supportive of them even while it makes demands on them?

If the guidance worker's hypotheses are pertinent to questions of this kind, and if they are based on the poignant realities of interviews and supplemented by the inventive use of analogues to the industrial morale survey and sociometric assessments, then he can feed his information helpfully into the school's over-all operations and provide a vigorous leadership in promoting the kinds of functioning that contribute to increased potency. In other words, the guidance counselor functions less as a remedial resource than as a prime agent in the continuous reconstruction of the school culture. Basic to this notion is a lesson recently learned from the administration of mental hospitals (10, 15).

When mental hospitals are examined as microcosmic cultures, they frequently are found to operate as social structures that are all but explicitly designed to reinforce pathological behavior. Professional personnel are rela-

¹¹ One of the major justifications of the classical curriculum was the degree to which it held up to the student a model of desirable and commendable manhood. The same idea animates the study of literature today and the introduction of much of the biographical and historical material that enters the school program in other disciplines. A striking oddity of our educational life is that this plausible assumption has neither been systematically exploited nor intensively studied!

tively inaccessible; the day-to-day emphasis in management, exercised primarily through nurses and attendants, is on docility and the avoidance of behavior that would be disruptive of routines. Opportunities for privacy are curtailed at the same time that much of intramural living—meals, recreation, occupational therapy, etc.—is stringently regimented and dominated by the group. Because expectancies are low, few chances are provided for achievement and fewer still for the evolution of a distinctive life-style that could be generalized to the world outside the institution. The "good patient" is essentially one who adapts to this milieu, becoming a chronic but bland and unobtrusive psychotic. If the hospital is to fulfill its rehabilitative purpose, however, it is less important for it to provide more psychotherapeutic hours (although this provision is far from of no consequence) than to restructure itself as a community. In such a restructuring, a prime consideration is that of making available relatively enduring and intimate relationships. In their context, the patients can generate functional new concepts of what it means to be "normal"; they can be confronted with expectancies which they are encouraged to meet with courageous efforts and confidence in their ultimate success, and they can examine their lives productively in a quest for new meaning and new directions for the future. There is no reason to anticipate miracles, of course, and the cost of this kind of cultural revision is occasionally high. Patients at times test their new freedom in destructive ways, abuse their physical environment in a fashion that can be expensive, and put heavy strains on the people who serve them. Nevertheless, these tendencies have their positive aspects as efforts toward the rediscovery and reassertion of meaningful selfhood, and they are worth tolerating for the gains that can be registered in humane terms when the mental hospital reconceives itself as a therapeutic culture.

The problems of the school, of course, are quite different from those of the psychiatric hospital, but there are important areas of overlap. Some basic principles—the fundamental utility of the human model, the developmental value of diverse relationships of some intimacy and intensity, the stimulus to growth of membership in a genuine community, and the facilitation of the examined life through explicit forms of encouragement and example—apply in common to both. Willy-nilly, the school represents a society-in-little. The challenge before it is whether it can transform itself into a developmentally productive one on an articulate and informed basis and, by a regular and planful process of self-appraisal, maintain itself as a true growth-enhancing community. In such an effort to sharpen the impact of the school and to give it greater cogency for individual students, guidance workers can play a key role, forging, in the course of it, a genuine new profession for themselves. To reconstruct the school as an integrated and humanly significant little culture requires that creative consideration be given to a number of topics—the grouping of pupils, the contributions of the academic curricu-

lum to the encouragement of the examined life, the diversification of teacher load, the ways in which student government can be meaningfully related to the specific objectives of the school, and a host of others—but leadership can properly be expected from guidance workers. Because of their grounding in behavioral science, their familiarity with the techniques of testing and counseling as ways of identifying human needs, and their orientation toward the individual pupil, they have the opportunity to define new horizons in our educational aspirations and to explore novel ways of approaching them. The task, attempted in a setting of universal education and the widest possible range of individual differences, will hardly be an easy one. But part of the American educational tradition has entailed finding ways to do for the many what other nations have done only for the few.

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The Culturally Encapsulated Counselor

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THE REPORT of the Commission on Guidance in American Schools¹ projected developments in school counseling against a backdrop of projected changes in our culture. Since what we speak of as the guidance function in American schools² has grown out of certain values in our culture, presumably changes in that culture will affect the role of counselors in the school. It will also affect the nature of their education for the task. This is what the book is about. The last chapters analyze the anticipated tasks of the counselors in the school but the first half, on the projected changes in our culture, is the only excuse for the book having been written.

ANTICIPATED CHANGES

Change has always been the one thing of which we could be sure. What then is different about the changes of the next decade? Two things only but these are awesome enough—the rapidity and the extensiveness of the changes anticipated. “Space flight” is near reality but its reaches are infinite when comprehended in relation to the projected size of our universe of intelligence. The astronomer Shapley has estimated that of the 100 quintillion stars available to our telescopes, perhaps 100 million of them have planets favorably constituted and located for the support of life. Many of these solar systems are billions of years older than our own and may be assumed to have developed some form of intelligence and culture far more complex than our own. We are now actively seeking to receive radio signals from these systems but some of them may have been seeking in a similar (or radically different) manner for millions of years. Contact will be made during this century—or it may be next year. When this happens our present perception of life and its unique significance will be sharply challenged. This is one illustration of the extensiveness of change.

Our own small world is becoming smaller by the moment—and more

¹ C. Gilbert Wrenn, *The Counselor in a Changing World* (Washington, D.C.: The American Personnel and Guidance Association, 1962).

² Specifically “guidance” is a point of view which influences curriculum and teacher attitudes as well as resulting in the employment of school counselors and other pupil personnel workers, i.e. school psychologists, school social workers, etc.

densely populated. America is no longer an island—lands no longer have significance. Our economy of abundance must rub elbows with many economies of scarcity—with peoples who have only a fraction of what we have and yet who are well aware of what America has and is. They want some of the same and want it urgently.

People increasingly cluster in cities and America has become a constellation of urban galaxies. Metropolitan boundaries are coming to mean more than state and county lines. The family pattern of the early part of this century is no longer apparent, it is gone to appear no more. New patterns of family life are realities to be accepted and dealt with. An economy of increasing affluence is projected—how wisely will we spend our income? The Federal government must become increasingly concerned with education and social health at state and local levels. It *must* do so for such dimensions of our society are most critical factors in any modern consideration of national welfare. Will we gerry-build this development, allow it to overcome us, or control it wisely as we accept its inevitability?

Occupations will disappear and new ones appear with a speed that has little regard for the information about occupations that is now provided in printed form. Occupations with the same label will bear little resemblance to those occupations of a few years ago. (The term "school counselor" as used two decades ago meant only a fraction of what is meant by that term in current usage.)

Kinds of post-high school education, the meaning of "college," procedures used in our schools, the growth of continuation education opportunities that are available over a lifetime—these are symptomatic of marked alterations that are appearing in our educational system. The science of behavior called psychology can be projected only a few years hence for, like all sciences, new knowledge appears apace and supersedes the old.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENSES AGAINST CHANGE

Like Job of old we protest the inevitable, we argue about it. Even better than Job we protect ourselves from the disturbing reality of change by surrounding ourselves with a cocoon of *pretended* reality—a reality which is based upon the past and the known, upon seeing that which is as though it would always be. This is "cultural encapsulation," an encapsulation within our world, within our culture and sub-culture, within a pretense that the present is enduring. Some of this evasion of reality is defensible for one can absorb the new at only a limited rate. More than this, we move more freely when we know the limits within which we can safely operate. But the *rate* of change is another thing. The rate of change in science, in technology, and in the interacting complex of pressures in our society pays little heed to what we see within our cocoon. The walls of our cocoon must be permeable so that pres-

sure does not build up between the "reality" within the cocoon and the reality without.

The Commission Report makes certain recommendations regarding the counselor's role with students, teachers, and parents, the counselor's place in the total school program, and the professional education of the school counselor.³ These are argued from the projected changes in our culture. The specific recommendations may be in error as inferences from cultural change or the culture changes themselves may be of a different order. But the most rapid change of our country's history will occur during the next decade or two, whatever its precise nature may be. What will keep these changes from being applied to the role, education, and life of the counselor—what indeed but the counselor's resistance to change?

It is certain that counselors are as subject as any to cocoon maintenance and reality evasion. Perhaps they have particular cocoon patterns of their own because of their sensitiveness to others and their desire to help. In his enthusiasm for helping a counselor builds upon his own securities—he communicates concepts and values which have given him security and which are actually appropriate to his past—perhaps even his present. Even if the counselor tries to work from his *present* to the client's present, a hard enough task, this is not enough. Counselors frequently must work to the client's *future* as well. To deal with two presents and one future is enough to disturb the bravest of men.

Here then, are some of the cultural encapsulations which the counselor must examine. They may not all be distinctive for the counselor. What happens is that the counselor faces them with more urgency because of the critical nature of his relationship to the growing personality of the student.

SOME CULTURAL ENCAPSULATIONS

The tendency to be surprised or even unbelieving regarding changes in truth.

It is comforting to believe that at least some of what I regard as truth is ultimate truth, or is at least true for my lifetime. This cocoon is a hard one to leave. Of course we recall that at one time it was true that "the earth is flat," that "matter is matter and energy is energy," that "man's major motivations arise from instincts." What we forget is that our awareness of truth is so very young because *we are so young a race of man*. If we assume that man has been on earth for perhaps one million years (it may have been ten) this is a small part indeed of the total time in which man may exist and learn. One recent study suggested that whereas earth's future might be a matter of five or six billion years in terms of the normal processes of shrinkage and erosion, the expansion of the sun and its increasing radiation will mean that in something like two billion years the seas will be boiling and all life will

³ Wrenn, *op. cit.*, chaps. 5, 6, 7.

be extinguished. There still is a striking difference between the one million years we have existed and the two thousand million years we have yet to go. One to two thousand is a ratio that suggests a shocking infancy of man and his knowledge. Who then is to think that what we now consider truth is always to be truth, indeed, any part of it?

This might be the situation for empirically determined truth, but what if we also accept revealed truth? This is where I am safe! But am I? Why must we assume that revelation has ceased? Would it not be strange indeed if all inspired truth had been revealed to the very young, to the infant who has lived only 1/2000 of his possible lifetime? Why can we not assume that inspired truth is being continually experienced—through artists, poets, and sages if not through prophets?

Certainly the values that I hold—convictions of the worth of things and of people—are culture bound. They are also time bound. The virtue of “work for its own sake,” of “being mature before you marry,” of “knowing what you want to do and then hewing closely to the line” may be far less significant values for our children than for us. If the youth of tomorrow see work, marriage, and vocational decision in different perspective than do the youth of yesterday (us) who is to say that we are nearer the truth than they will be? They are reared for different worlds and for different values associated with these worlds. So if I rest secure in the cocoon that what I know is an ultimate truth or what I believe is an ageless value, that cocoon will betray me. My values are for *now* and for *me*—not for all time or for all people.

The cushioning of the counselor in some academic cocoons which have little reference to our total culture.

Nor may there be much evidence of an empirical sort. Some of these beliefs (academic folklore) are that grades are the most important thing in a student's life; that tests should be given to everyone; that learning is primarily from books; that having a vocational choice helps each person in his academic life; that students who fit in and express themselves well should be rewarded, etc. We are academic people and our academic cocoons may be most unrealistic in terms of either the future scope of human behavior or the reality of the world outside the school.

Similar to the above is the tentativeness of our knowledge of human behavior. Whatever we “firmly” know now may be firm as a principle but not as a law—perhaps we have no laws of behavior as yet. Because *man* changes with knowledge of man, we may never have laws. We must proceed upon the principles we now have but we operate within such large areas of uncertainty that we should be humble indeed. Above all, let us avoid dogmatism and encapsulation where the evidence is conflicting. For example, we do not now know how to resolve the antithesis between Skinner and Rogers. We are certain they cannot both be right, at least right to the extent that each thinks himself now to be. Operant conditioning with its sure movement of the per-

son in the direction of that behavior which is reinforced by the experimenter cannot be the complete explanation of behavior if Rogers' concept of the subjective self as a reality is also true. Who is to say that we now have any more than a small glimmer of light on the resolution of this crucial problem?

The assumption that the counselor may safely draw upon his own educational and vocational experience in counseling the student.

The danger in so doing is that the counselor is drawing upon his yesterday to help the student with his today and tomorrow. The world in which the counselor went to school and had his early job experiences is no longer in existence. The more rapid the rate of change, the greater the gap between yesterday and tomorrow. It is most human indeed to "draw upon our experience" but of this the counselor must beware. Some of what we have learned may be for tomorrow but most of it remains for yesterday. Dare we generalize from our past to the student's future?

SOME PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES

What can the counselor do to avoid these encapsulations? How can he become more accessible to today and to tomorrow?

We should persist in a regime of unlearning something each day.

Each day we should take some fact which is no longer a fact and persuade ourselves that this should be dropped from our vocabulary and from our cumulative store of presumed knowledge. Each day we should examine some situation which seems very familiar to us but which no longer may be present in our society. Each day we should question some social relationship which was not present when we were a child but is very present now—such things as the new African nations, the Communist nation less than an hour away from us, the fact that our childhood family and its pattern no longer exists.

Each day we should question something that we believe but that other people of integrity may reject. This is to remind ourselves that there is a difference between our culture and the culture of the parent, the culture of the teacher, and the culture of the child. The thing that we believe in deeply may be something that someone else has every right not to believe in.

We should check items of information to be given to students in terms of the direction and rate of change, not just the accuracy of the information for now.

The *what* is only part of the story. How stable is the information? The counselor must continually tell himself "What I say is for now only. What I must do in whatever I communicate to the student is to suggest the direction in which change in the information may be anticipated."

We should accept as an obligation the encouragement of students who think differently from us.

These may be uncomfortable people to live with, but is comfort our gauge?

Students who think differently are never popular, but they may be the hope of the world. Who is to recognize these differences and encourage them, if not the counselor? The counselor's task is to help a person with whom he does not agree to become his own man rather than someone made in the image of the counselor. Peter Vierick has suggested that the "hero of the day" is the man who is adjusted to the ages but unadjusted to this age. How can we help a student to respect his own differences rather than to deprecate them? How indeed unless we respect them first? We can help a student develop his own integrity even though it is a different integrity.

Finally, we must batter down our tendency to be self-righteous.

What is "right" is right for me only, and I should not be smug about its being right for anybody else. It is true that I believe in some things that are beyond fact, but these beliefs must be in Man's creativeness and resiliency and (for this writer) in the Creative Love back of man. Can we believe in something bigger than ourselves without feeling superior to those poor mortals who do not have such faiths and such beliefs? It is important that we believe if we can believe without feeling superior about it. There can be a snobbishness about faith as there is about fancy.

If we return now to the need for security, I must remember that it is security in *principles* and security in *faith* that I seek for myself, not security in facts. There is security in my faith of what man *may* know and become. There is security too in a kind of giving to life as well as a getting. We seek purpose constantly and there may be purpose in how I relate myself to others as well as how I come to understand myself.

And so the counselor⁴ must face change with trepidation and fight encapsulation with vigor. He must, it seems to me, have humility in the face of ignorance, have compassion for those who want to be loved, have courage as he struggles for the assurance that he may always seek but never find. Two men, many hundreds of years apart have said it well: "For whoso seeks the truth will find in nowise peace of heart" (Boethius); "You may seek either truth or repose. You must choose, for you cannot have both" (Emerson).

It will not be easy to be a counselor. Only the strong need apply.

⁴ This paragraph should perhaps have been written in the first person. Perhaps it is presumptuous to tell the counselor what he can do. All I really have a right to do is to tell myself. This is a personal kind of document throughout and all of my admonitions are addressed first of all to me.

Guidance in the University Setting

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GUIDANCE PERSONNEL IN HIGHER EDUCATION need to be especially perceptive about the environment in which they are working as well as about the special problems faced by individuals in this environment. Theory, however, has not emphasized the relationship between the intra-personal stages of development, and the distinctive institutional qualities of the environment in which an individual is located during a particular period in his life. In this article, I would like to focus on two important problems that arise from this relationship. One is the effect on student development of having a certain status in the social system of the university-college; in this instance, the status of academic averageness. The other is the basis of decision making, which here involves the choice of a major field. In this discussion the major ideas will be documented with quotations taken from interviews with graduates of Harvard College.

In every institution, there are values that provide general standards against which the student rebels or to which he tries to conform. Individual freedom and intellectual excellence are values basic to educational environments such as Harvard's. This college proclaims to its students: "Think as you will, but think. Hold to your own opinion; just be sure you have reasons for it." Such words exert an undeniable charm, and not only on the seventeen or eighteen year old. Harvard is successful in bringing its student population to an acceptance of the validity of its ethic because its demands are such that few men could resist them—be independent, be an individual, be free, think for yourself. Such an ethic has a basic appeal that only the rare adolescent would want to reject. These are values that in essence are most championed by young people, and would most enlist the sympathies of young men at the brink of adulthood, embarking on lives of their own, and ready to reduce their dependence upon the emotional and physical sustenance of their families.

We know that students bring varying degrees of readiness for meeting and resolving successfully what can often seem to be the brutal demands of an independence which has been thrust upon them. If a man were asked whether or not he would *accept* such responsibilities, can we doubt his reply? The student with any pride and personal integrity would feel forced to choose

independence over dependence, freedom over restriction. As abstract standards, such values appeal to youth more than do most others.

As I describe the effects of an academically average status, I think it will become clear that the prevailing values at Harvard are accepted by the undergraduate population. Students who did not accept a value system encompassing excellence and achievement, would not feel so acutely the pressures of the environment and would not express as pointedly as they do the impact of an average position. This is an important point, for the more academically able student populations become, the greater will be the students' desire to conform to such expectations, and in round-robin fashion the more able the student body, the more the institution will stress freedom and independence.

Yet it can be very difficult for the freshman in the modern university-college to abstract personal resourcefulness from such an ethic. This the ethic is supposed to create, by forcing the man to realize his own possibilities, and what one graduate called "realization that one may do with oneself what one will." Such resourcefulness is often difficult during the period when isolation and independence are most threatening and most difficult to control. Coupling with this what I found to be the most serious deterrent to the student's satisfactory acclimatization into the college community—the academic ranking he achieved in an environment stressing excellence of scholarly achievement—we begin to recognize the dilemmas created for all but the ablest of students. Further, the academic press of educational climates is not going to ease off in the decade ahead. It is, rather, increasing rapidly in this era of selectivity in college admissions and of serious and concerted emphasis on academic programs.

This past summer I spent a good deal of time mulling over the problem of selectivity with admissions officers from as diverse a set of colleges as exist in the spectrum of higher education. These men and women, attending the Harvard Summer Institute on College Admissions which I was directing, seemed, when speaking of the problem of selectivity, consistently to be referring to their college's attempts to up-grade the bottom half of the student population to the ability level of the top half. In other words, colleges would like to be selective in the sense of excluding those students who now fill the bottom half of their classes. When we think of selectivity we seem universally to focus on only one criterion, the criterion of academic ability. This, of course, reflects the emphasis in American higher education at this point in our history.

As colleges and universities emphasize academic excellence they become obliged to recognize the special psycho-social problems of an academically oriented student population and especially, as I am stressing here, the concomitants of academic averageness. Such problems arise out of student attitudes, affecting their interaction with the college environment. We know that with the increased academic ability and orientation of our students,

there is more of a student attempt actually to meet and master the kinds of course material with which they are presented.

Because a student population is more able does not mean that the faculty markedly increases the number of high grades. Thus, competition becomes stiffer, and pressures increase on students who accept more seriously the goals of academic success and take mediocrity and failure more to heart. An extreme example of this was found in a study done at MIT.¹ In this institution, where the main value of the environment is academic excellence and where this is about the only area for achievement and outstanding performance, students below the top decile in grade ranking feel they are failures. Adding to the increased competitiveness of such environments as Harvard's and MIT's, is the fact that far more students now feel they have to maintain high grade averages in view of the later competition they will meet in seeking admission to graduate schools.

Just what kind of reaction to their academic status do we find in men who were finding themselves "average," often for the first time in their school careers? To what degree was this something of concern to the student himself? In an environment as competitive intellectually as Harvard, averageness can consign the student to his own sense of mediocrity, and sometimes to a status where he can justify his anonymity by looking at the other hundreds like him who are just "numbers on an examination paper." To quote directly from the interview material:

I'm afraid I didn't encourage contact (with the tutors). I did not try to seek out people to talk with very much, perhaps scared away because they were usually surrounded with some people who appeared to me to be better than I and I didn't want to appear . . . second rate to (the House Master) or some other (tutors) in the House.

I think I was a little afraid of (faculty) and a little unsure of my own ability. I think I had the feeling during a good part of my education . . . that I was intellectually inadequate as compared with many of the students among my fellow classmates. . . .

My interview samples came from two Harvard classes. It is interesting that the class which had been away from the college environment for five years showed less vehemence in their remarks about the average status than did the more recent class. Their increasingly higher secondary school ranking, as a group, when they entered Harvard, caused our more recent graduates to find this transition to average ranking even more jolting than did classes of several years ago. They were appalled to discover half the class more able than they.

I think that one of the shocking things is having to realize . . . there are at least 500 people better than I am. . . . I knew they were pretty

¹ *MIT Observer*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (October 1961), pp. 1-4.

good, but I didn't know that they were that good. . . . I took the coward's way out. I decided I can't get A's, there is no disgrace in getting B's. Do the best I can and not worry about what the other guy is doing. . . . During my sophomore and junior years, I went into sort of a depression, not feeling myself adequate for the university . . . it wasn't until about the middle of my junior year . . . that I realized well, gee, I'm not such a clod after all.

The shock of averageness was brought up spontaneously by graduates in the interview covering the college years, for it was their reaction to a high-powered environment. The impact of averageness (and its ramifications) emerged as the most significant deterrent to greater participation of this group in the intellectual life of a college. It accounted in large part for their feeling of inability either to overcome the perceived impersonality of a large university-college environment or to achieve recognition as individuals.

Any student confronting a college setting such as Harvard's is indeed being dunked into the "cold bath" of intellectual reality and forced to "sink or swim." We can talk all we like about the reinforcement to personal effort that a college environment, as a fairly controlled and discrete society, affords the student. But when the very values esteemed by that society are freedom, independence, and excellence, the society itself provides rewards and bulwarks at a rather abstract level, not at the functioning day-to-day level where comfort is needed, but not usually found.

Here are the words of an academically average man from a recent graduating class. Just before his graduation he expressed his feelings about his college experience: in them we have a particularly good resumé of a student's impressions of the passage through college; here is a man who pinpoints for us a whole constellation of thoughts, feelings, and attitudes.

Looking back on the freshman year, it seems like a nightmare. It was really very difficult. . . . Another thing that I found particularly difficult at that time, the fact that I couldn't find any adequate advice. . . . When I got in here, I was rather hostile. . . . Just coming out of high school [it] is strictly your family life which I feel pervades your particular outlook. Someone would possibly advise you from now till doomsday, unless you learn these things on your own, you would not take his advice . . . possibly you could have the student accept the advice if it were explained to him and also some understanding of himself as an individual . . . of course, it is a function of your education to get a better understanding of yourself. But after two years have gone by, it is a shame to waste those first two years. . . . I realize that it does sound rather difficult even as I speak about it—understanding in an individual, especially in his freshman year. But I feel something should be started then, and that it is at that point that a person needs his strongest advice. . . . You bring the students that we have here at the college and stick them together. There is such a vast difference that you begin to feel your way and find where you belong and this can really throw you about

in here. You see that your way of life isn't the only one . . . when you come here you find different ways of doing (things) and it can really bat you about for a while and as you pick up an understanding of it, you can see. But if you never pick up this understanding and you never realize that there are other things and how they came about, then it can completely destroy you.

For some students such as this man, the difficulty, the traumatic aspects of the freshman year, are fully as frightful as a "nightmare." Attributes of the large university-college environment are defined as coldness, independence, being thrown on individual resources. Then he goes on to reveal to us that he has learned, in the four-year interim, to accept the independence and self-reliance that Harvard College expects of him: "Someone could advise you from now to doomsday, unless you learn these things on your own you would not take his advice." Unless—and here the student is voicing the kind of hopes he has assimilated as a liberally educated man—unless someone tried to explain a personal position from an intellectual, rational angle. But again he goes back to the fact that education should lead to understanding of oneself, and therefore, that the ultimate responsibility for self-realization can rest only on the individual.

This man beautifully expresses the process of education that is unquestionably dependent upon (but also, unquestionably more important than) specific course content, field of concentration, and the situations by which the college expressly attempts to educate. What he defines is the larger effect of education that will pervade the life style of the individual.

When we consider the impact of a university-college environment of freedom that must be tempered by personal discipline, we should keep in mind the extreme impressionability of the college student. In trying to understand what happens to the man in the college environment, this should never be far from our thoughts. It helps to explain just about every kind of reaction we encounter; and especially this reaction against the impersonality of an environment.

. . . flashes of insight . . . new revelations . . . maybe this was what I was looking for. . . .

This could well be the universal cry of the adolescent on the brink of adulthood. Much has been written on the search for role, for identity, and for meaning in life by the college age group. One cannot search without some kind of open attitude, without a degree of vulnerability, without accompanying confusion. This search is not accountable to the formal situational learning process, but ultimately influences it and must be brought to some kind of culmination in goal-direction and in assimilation into the college culture. If not, the student will suffer so acutely from alienation and anomie that he

will never be able to become sufficiently involved in his academic work to find valid meaning there.

I did find that contact with professor, tutor, and House Master was an important factor to these academically average men in developing a sense of personal direction. Yet the very status of "averageness" kept many of them, as students, from entering situations where such contact would be possible, and thus, kept them from finding the kind of guidance they were seeking.

In addition, the degree of impersonality they encounter in the environment can become an excuse in explaining to themselves why they are not "successes" in the terms most accepted by the college society—academic achievement. Since they are not receiving the rewards of the academic successes, they can say that it is this lack of direction and lack of personal understanding from authority figures that are in large part responsible for their position.

Certain programs and goals do assist in focussing undergraduate energy, however. Many of these men, for example, found that their senior year thesis—which is independent work supervised by a tutor, and which culminates in an honors degree—was the most challenging and rewarding experience of their college years.

In other words, the first step a college must make is to recognize that special problems exist for such students, and then to try to cope with these problems by tailoring programs to individuals, by stressing seminars, by setting up tutorials and by trying to bring the honors program to more and more of the undergraduates. These are ways Harvard has tried to make each student feel the college is concerned with the course of his education and with his status as an individual.

There is a real problem of personal identity for the "average" man. His is the struggle to emerge as an individual from the mass of students: he needs to become, in his own eyes, more than "a number on an examination paper." The struggle is the more pronounced because he is being subjected to the anxieties created by an education emphasizing a pluralistic view of the world.

Perhaps this also helps to explain why "average" students emphasize personal qualities. For one thing, the student in today's university learns that the world of intellectual endeavor is grounded in constantly shifting sands. Wholeness and permanence of idea are not the attributes of the modern world: to be able to withstand these assaults on stability, the student seeks integrity of personality.

If a student accepts the fact that he will seldom, if ever, arrive at an answer that cannot be modified he must then be able to trust in man's human nature. This is a major reason why the academically average student, forced to settle for a mediocre position in academic standing at a time in university history when there has never been a stronger emphasis on academic and intellectual

excellence and achievement, looks so intently for faculty leadership in areas of personal quality and concern.²

Much of the theory and study in the clinical area adds to the insight we can gain from college students themselves. For example, Robert W. White has discussed the concept of competence in a manner that illuminates the psychological effects of the academically average status.

In discussing the limitations of the Freudian models of psycho-sexual stages of development and his concept of competence, he has stated:

Since the adolescent is reaching adult size, strength, and mental development, the behavior in question lies in the realm of serious accomplishment—serious in the terms either of the youth culture or of adult society. I am referring to the adolescent equivalent of what Erikson calls a *sense of industry* in the latency period, and I see this problem as continuing rather more strongly after puberty than seems to be implied in Erikson's account. No doubt I bring to this judgment an occupational bias different from that of a therapist. My professional life is spent among late adolescents whose sexual problems and social relations have for the most part not overwhelmed them. We talk together about their plans for study, their abilities and limitations, their struggles with materials to be learned and skills to be attained, their occupational leanings, career plans, and concerns about modern society as the scene of their future endeavors. We talk, in other words, mostly about their competence, and I do not believe that understanding is fostered by interpreting these concerns too much as displacements of instinctual drives, defense mechanisms, or interpersonal relations. They are real.³

Few students come to Harvard without a sense of their own competence to perform well in an academic setting, but for a large portion of the population, this feeling of competence soon becomes qualified in the sense that the student cannot excel. Thus the sequence of development toward adult competence is retarded or, perhaps more accurately, blocked. If a student does not develop a sense of competence in meeting the expectations of the institution, he obviously has added to his problems of resolving the search for identity in the adult, work-oriented world.

In much the same manner, choice of a college major, when not made from strength (as reflected in competence) emphasizes all the difficulties of the academically average position, since this is one of the crucial decisions the student must make.

The great hope in this area of concentration choice has long been differential prediction: through statistical analysis of aptitude and interest test scores, information would be provided to students and guidance personnel that

² The role of the faculty as seen by the average student was the subject of my article, "Encounters with Learning," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Fall 1960), 331-349.

³ Robert W. White, "Competence and the Psychosexual Stages of Development," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, 1960, p. 142.

would result in the most realistic and satisfying choice of major. Yet differential prediction has not really lived up to its billing. Is this perhaps because the real bases for making satisfying decisions are as dependent upon the personal experiences and encounters in the college setting that affect the psychosocial development of the student, as they are upon the predictions resulting from more objective measures of aptitude and interest?⁴

Hopefully, the college student develops not only interest in many fields of knowledge but also the ability to use his capacities in depth. This latter capability is put to the test in the mastering of a particular discipline. At many colleges, the program is set up so that late in the freshman year students elect a major field of study. They then go on to take a prescribed number of courses in this and, sometimes, related fields, completing their programs by satisfying distribution requirements or personal interest. It sounds straightforward and relatively uncomplicated on the surface, a rather clear progression from general studies to specialization. The student finds a field that attracts him and settles down to mastering it as best he can in three years of study.

Yet like all the decisions the "average" student must make in the large university-college, this is typically influenced by traces of disturbing or satisfying encounters, and by the necessity of reconciling what one can best do with what one most wishes to do.

Well, I didn't intend to choose history. As I said, I started here . . . with the idea that I'd like to go into medicine, and that was fortunately taken out of my mind. . . . And so I don't know if that chemistry upset was my fault entirely or the Chemistry Department's fault, I have the feeling it's both. . . . I wanted to go into something that was, great admission, reasonably comfortable and not too hard and not too specialized so that you'd have to narrow yourself down into a field, where you would concentrate. . . . And history puts you in contact with all sorts of philosophies and fields and when you go into business or something . . . you don't say, I am majoring in geological engineering and you are obviously a geological engineer. You can keep as diverse as possible.

A majority of the men I interviewed chose a particular concentration for one of two reasons—as vocational preparation, or as a relatively safe an-

⁴ Lee Cronbach in discussing differential aptitude tests pinpoints one of the major problems inherent in differential prediction when he states that "no ability save verbal or numerical affects many courses." [Lee J. Cronbach, *Essentials of Psychological Testing* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 279.] So much of the ability necessary to be successful in an academic area is common to all academic work that success, consequently, can be as effectively predicted by the G(eneral) factor measures, such as verbal and quantitative, as by differential aptitude measures. For example, the correlations between grades in a field of study and aptitude test scores on corresponding tests, seldom exceed those between these grades and general measures of verbal and mathematical aptitude. While interest tests to date have offered more differential predictive effectiveness than aptitude tests, even these are more effective in predicting satisfaction with vocational choice than with college major.

choosing place for the college years (courses in other fields having proven disastrous experiences). Where vocational goals were not an influencing factor, specific decisions often seemed the result of such random factors as having friends in the concentration, the chance encounter with a particular course, the influence of a professor who made a subject mean enough to merit further effort. Because the average student is not a star performer who earns high professional respect from the faculty, he is especially apt to stress the personal qualities of professors as the determiners of choice.

I began as a history and science major. . . . In the middle of sophomore year I had Professor — in the Chemistry department who I thought was a very fine scientist, but also a real humanitarian person, humanitarian type person. He was very kind. . . . I switched to chemistry then. I thought, well, the department has these kinds of men, well, I'll be very happy to stay in it.

Choice of concentration—one of the decisions that gives focus to college study—may be made by chance, or because it is a relatively safe or easy choice, or because the personality of the teacher is charismatic. In such cases where the impetus toward that discipline is essentially external rather than a commitment to the field as a body of knowledge, it is more natural (and helps us to understand) that the student continues to look for a stimulant extraneous to the material.

I didn't start out with any concepts of what I wanted to do except to . . . possibly get my pre-med credits but then that fell by the wayside in my second year. I just didn't have enough drive to do it. I didn't give that much of a damn. I only entered into it because of my old man. But then I floundered for, ah, from the latter half of my second year . . . but by the third year I started to generate quite a bit of interest in European history. . . . I don't know how I got into it. . . . Maybe through Professor —, maybe listening to him throw the baloney around about it . . . and he livened it up for me.

We all, of course, have known what it is to be pricked by a number of goads. Natural curiosity and desire to find solutions and answers to problems are among our least selfish motives. The promise of personal recognition or rewards offer more extraneous, and yet more self-centered, motivations. By educating, we are ideally reducing the predominance of external motive in a student's desire to master his work, and promoting an involvement in learning that no longer depends upon external goads. This is among the most difficult of the aims of education.

What does it mean to a man to be forced to choose concentration as much from weakness as from strength? Reinforcing the effects of the competitive climate, the averageness, and the sense of anonymity in the academic community, would be failure to handle successfully the courses in one's concen-

tration. The necessity to admit a defeat here, would be visible evidence of the student's lack of ability to maneuver his own way through this perilous field of learning. The most frequent reason given for changing concentration was the impact of the college, "the cold bath of intellectual reality." I know not only from academic records but from the remarks of men themselves, that people in this average group tend to move out of a field because they cannot perform to their satisfaction there.

In the freshman and sophomore years, there seems to be a good deal of confusion and anxiety about concentration that is never satisfactorily resolved. Several men stressed the difficulties of finding what they called "adequate advice." This seems to be the eternal complaint of undergraduates and must be taken for what it is worth. What they seem to be revealing is that since they themselves often have vague ideas about what they want to or should do, they are looking around for suggestions. These should not be merely general but should provide them with specific clues to the content and approaches of the different fields. The departments at Harvard do provide special opportunities for students to learn about courses and content, and students are also urged to audit classes to become familiar with work in various departments. The average student, however, often lacks a certain assertiveness in personal contacts. To get him to take advantage of the many opportunities *offered* is the problem. The student often looks to his adviser for information and some guidance, but because of the size of the university-college, very often an adviser has little knowledge of offerings other than in his own area or field.

I wanted to go into science. I have always been inclined to the sciences. Perhaps [a] constructive criticism that I could offer the university as far as their freshman adviser program goes . . . when it came time to choose a major, my adviser was totally unfamiliar at least as far as I could determine, with the sciences period. . . . I still had the idea of attending medical school afterwards and whether it would be a good idea to, say, be a non-science concentrator which would be better for me because I realize that my major is not pre-graduate training. . . . I was originally a [Social Relations] major when I first signed up and I changed to biochemical sciences at the very beginning of sophomore year. In other words, I essentially never did get into the social relations field because I realized that much of my decision was not my decision but just the strong impression that my adviser had made. . . . [He] sort of looked down his nose at the sciences, and discouraged me from going into them, as being a narrowing process.

Since few of our average men were thinking of an academic profession, academic subject matter could hold only as much interest as the essentially "amateur" scholar—the student—could bring to it. He could not, by definition, feel the same deep commitment to a field as the scholar or teacher whose life work it is. He has a limited investment, and this necessarily affects his

openness toward areas of concentration that are not directly pre-professional (as, for example, are bio-chemical sciences in preparation for medical school).

On the other hand, Richard Hughes' statement in *The Fox in the Attic* cannot be ignored when we think about the meaning of student life.

After all, it is only grown men ever who think of school as a microcosm, a preparation for adult life: to most boys at any time school is life, is itself the cosmos: a rope in the air you will climb, higher and higher, and—then, quite vanish into somewhere incomprehensible anyhow.⁵

College is a world to the student, *even* if he sees that world leading to some future role. For this reason he must be, truly, a student, or the college as an institution of learning falls short of its function in serving him. Extracurricular, athletic, social service activities—none of these can compensate for academic apathy, and lack of involvement. These extracurricular pursuits can be fine and important activities, but they are, by the nature of a university, peripheral. They cannot be justified as foci of student concern. It is important that the student make a choice of concentration from a real interest in the subject matter, from a willingness to become immersed in the scholarship and discipline of the field. Without this interest, the natural approach is that of the dilettante. The college curriculum is not a game, and the values of the university-college make gamesmanship morally indefensible.

It is when the student makes a concentration choice out of enthusiasm and "need to know," out of a desire to learn and to follow his field as deeply as his four-year program will allow, that he is usually happiest with his education. Of course, the student who is thus involved and fascinated with his area in turn arouses the interest and admiration of his professors, and in turn becomes eligible for their attention and the individual concern he craves. He also becomes eligible, at Harvard, for the college programs that provide occasions for the type of education that seems to work best for him—the individual attention of a tutor, the satisfaction of producing one's own large piece of creative work in the thesis. It is extremely important to a man's development at the college that he find a field that is right for him.

While choosing an area of concentration did seem to pose special problems for many of our academically average students, these problems in most cases sprang from the college climate itself and that strongly supported attribute of individual freedom which is a main component of Harvard and of similar college environments. But the freedom to choose also involves the burden of choosing. Adults can forget that it is more often their point of view than the students' that this freedom is easy and friendly and encouraging. Although

⁵ Richard Hughes, *The Fox in the Attic* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 110.

the student might never admit to not knowing quite what to do with this freedom, he does resort in fact to tying his bewilderment into the institutional chain, and sharing the responsibility for making decisions.

I resent advisers because they [are] always too ambitious, because they always want you to take these terrifically difficult courses, just because they are interesting. Well, you go in there and have a horrible time and get completely disillusioned and I think I was too ambitious as a freshman. . . . I have found that generally advisers want you to be ambitious. Well, they expect everyone to be brilliant and of course, some people are. . . . Of course, [departmental advisers] want you to take everything in the department.

Yet the student would not, in the true sense, be a student if he attained professional focus and interest. These graduates made clear that as undergraduates they wanted to arrive at the point where they would feel a pull from the future—a lure toward a direction that had taken on an intrinsic value and vivacity. Some fields of concentration achieved this intrinsic value simply by merit of their ultimate purpose—preparation for a vocation that had already sparked the young man's imagination.

I think if medicine holds an interest for a person throughout his life, there is no boundary in medicine. It seems fascinating, and I, of course, have respect for all the doctors I meet. I haven't had the opportunity to meet a bad doctor yet or in my eyes a bad doctor.

In this sense, vocational goals can serve a purpose that liberal educators sometimes refuse to recognize as important: such goals help the student to make a choice from a sense of direction. I interviewed men who gave me the feeling that without these goals, college would have been a dazed encounter—with the student unable to grasp meanings in the work required, and with the academic environment essentially futile for him.

Summarizing, I would suggest that many problems of guidance in the modern university require an understanding of two points of view: the student's subjective interpretation of his experiences, and the institutional values and expectations that create the unique environment of a school. I have tried to illustrate by examples that where the climate is intellectually high-powered and where academic achievement is greatly valued, such a status as average ranking can affect a student's attitude toward learning. He feels unknown to faculty, yet because feelings of mediocrity plague him, he turns away from opportunities for contact because he might "run into something" he "might not be able to cope with." His choice of field is often influenced by these same timidities. It is clear that guidance of students such as these who are academically average hinges upon our helping them strengthen their sense of confi-

dence and vigor. We find wise perspective on our modern profession in the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson, who wrote in *The Conduct of Life*:

Although this garrulity of advising is born with us, I confess that life is rather a subject of wonder, than of didactics. . . . We accompany the youth with sympathy, and manifold old sayings of the wise, to the gate of the arena, but 'tis certain that not by strength of ours, or of the old sayings, but only on strength of his own, unknown to us or to any, he must stand or fall. That by which a man conquers in any passage, is a profound secret to every other being in the world, and it is only as he turns his back on us and on all men, and draws on this most private wisdom, that any good can come to him.⁶

This, after all, is the goal of our attempts to understand and guide the young toward adulthood, the worthy goal of helping each person to come into his own strength, into the "profound secret" of his unique resources.

⁶ Ralph Waldo Emerson, *The Conduct of Life*, in *The Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson: Four Volumes in One* (New York: Tudor Publishing Co.), pp. 161-162.

Ego-Counseling in Guidance: Concept and Method

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EGO-COUNSELING is uncomfortably elusive to define, i.e., to distinguish from generic conceptions of counseling and psychotherapy. Then why, it may be asked, imply in a label a distinctiveness which has not been established? Besides, is the hyphenated term not redundant? Could not any counselor who accepts psychoanalytic conventions claim a primary attention to ego process? Answer to such reservations will be deferred, in the expectation that they will be satisfied in the ensuing presentation. It is also hoped that ego-counseling will be seen as a distillation of method and theory with a distinctive spirit and with special promise for the practice of guidance.

We might linger on a problem of definition. The problem concerns whether we can ever formulate adequate scientific theory of counseling—or of teaching, or administrative decision-making—or of any process of interaction between two or more *intelligent* beings; can we adequately comprehend their interaction and its outcome without considering certain conditions in the larger environment which may guide their use of intelligence during the interaction? Can we construct a theory of teaching apart from the conditions and purposes of the system of education within which the teaching function is exercised? Can we derive a useful theory of counseling in abstraction from the principles of guidance, of rehabilitation, or of other educative disciplines which counseling might implement?

More pointedly, can the process of counseling be sufficiently explained in a theory which limits its focus to the events of the interview and to such phenomenological criteria as self-awareness and self-acceptance? Or, to be sufficient, does counseling theory need to include, intrinsically not peripherally, propositions about self-in-situation—propositions which specify the (normative) network and staging of environmental opportunities, tasks and dilemmas to which the counselee in the course of his development is expected to learn to make increasingly realistic and rational response?

My biased phrasing has betrayed a preference. Such a position is neither novel nor lonely. It has been anticipated, in part, in viewpoints such as that of Bordin (3), when he emphasizes the primary concern of the psychological counselor to further growth and integration as against his only secondary

effort to resolve immediate situations. With Bronfenbrenner (4) and with others who have made contributions to a dynamic theory of personality, a dominant place in the hierarchy of each individual's dispositions to act, is given to the concept of ego. It is with the quality of ego as *organization*—with ego strength—with the increasing capacity of the growing individual to perceive reality in more accurate terms, to differentiate and impose more complex meanings on reality and on his own fantasy (and to comprehend the difference)—yet to control impulse in the light of anticipated consequences, to mediate conflicting dispositions, to employ rational considerations in solving problems, to pursue more remote goals in a dependable way, to achieve (if you will excuse the piling on of metaphor) a dynamic balance among psychic dispositions—it is to foster aspects of ego organization such as these that the ego-counselor participates in the life of the counselee.

The essential point is that an adequate theory *for* counseling requires a framework of concepts and propositions to comprehend: (1) the sequence of roles, situations, and dilemmas (crises, in Erikson's [7] sense)—that the counselee typically meets in the course of his development; and (2) the characteristic ways any one individual might have learned to organize his dispositions, perceptions and actions with regard to environmental demands. What an expansive notion! A theory of socialization packaged with a theory of personality—a theory of action in Talcott Parsons' (11) most complex image—accompanied by directions for the counselor's convenience! Can the modest events of a counseling interview sustain such conceptual riches? Yet the mockery is only momentary. Why should not a viable discipline whose sanctions embrace both psychological science and humane interest aspire to such complexity?

Note the change of preposition—I had said a theory *for* counseling. A theory of counseling—embodying principles of relationship, of communication, of consultation—derived from the events of the interview and from principles of self-organization, might prove adequate if related to a conceptual framework of a kind that I have suggested. For school and college practice, at least, and perhaps for a considerably wider spectrum of services, the larger framework might appropriately be called a theory of guidance. An ideal theory of guidance in the context of ego-counseling would combine a theory of ego development with propositions to govern the guidance practitioner's participation in the life of the counselee at any developmental stage to foster what Erikson (7) might call a sense of ego-integrity. I shall not try to specify here what ego integrity might mean operationally; and for obvious reasons, I shall beg the question of what values, if any, such a guidance process should implement. I personally look to a confluence of ego psychology, existential philosophy and the liberal tradition as a source of wisdom in this regard. But a treatment of philosophical issues at this point would be an intolerable distraction.

In its typical aspect, guidance subsumes a loose set of principles and techniques intended to assist an individual's decisions and actions with regard to such concerns as education and vocation. To reconstrue guidance in terms of a scientifically-oriented guidance psychology may require a radical switch in perspective and a simple-minded faith that institutions really do change in response to ideas. Yet I persist in proposing that the purposes and functions of the guidance and personnel movements provide an appropriate beginning for the development of an important applied behavioral science. Such persistence is related to a vision of a guidance profession, rooted in education, but with its own career line, whose functions, counseling included, are rationalized by an applied science of guidance psychology. It is from an applied science of guidance (ego) psychology and from the work of a guidance profession whose attention is directed to the process of ego development, that counseling, as perhaps the most important of the guidance functions, would derive its rationale. Were such a framework to become real, then the process I am discussing could be called simply *guidance counseling*.

EGO-COUNSELING AS METHOD—SOME IMPLICATIONS

The realist may object justifiably to a vision which, whatever its merits, leaves counseling to be rationalized by a science as yet undeveloped, and to be practiced by a profession as yet uncommitted. Easing around this enigma, let us shift our attention to the method of ego-counseling as I currently comprehend it. I shall outline research in which the method is being studied; certain theoretical and practical implications will also be considered. My very loose construction of the term method implies, not a set of prescriptions, but a complex of preferred counselor attitudes and strategies to be implemented flexibly and with utter respect for the counselee's ultimate freedom—and responsibility—to be himself. Where the counselee has reason to perceive a counselor's approach as coercion, we would attribute this to tactical error, not to a denial of the counselee's freedom.

A most obvious setting in which to study an ego-counseling approach is a secondary school guidance program. The counselees with whom the method has been given an initial trial were selected among a population of "bright but underachieving" high school boys. Essentially, using regression measures of grade point average on the School and College Aptitude Test, we carved out three groups: (1) an experimental sample of 50 bright underachievers as counselees; (2) a control sample (about 65) with similar characteristics; and (3) an additional control sample of bright boys whom the regression scores classify as overachievers (25) and expected achievers (25). All the boys originally selected (220 in number—55 were screened out) were assessed with a test battery including, among others, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, a Q-Sort and a tape-recorded Thematic Apperception Test; they were also administered an assessment interview, tape-recorded. A partial battery and

another assessment interview were administered toward the close of the school year and at the close of the following school year. All interview tapes were typed.

All the subjects in the study had usual access to their guidance counselors in a school system that maintains an excellent guidance program. Ideally, the only difference in the year of school experience by the subjects was that the boys in the experimental sample were counseled by one of the four research counselors (including the author) on the project staff. There is inadequate space to specify all the considerations in the design. It is hoped to find significant differences between the groups in academic motivation and performance and on certain additional variables to be measured by the tests and by coding the assessment interviews. Moreover, out of respect for the idiosyncrasy with which counseling is inevitably involved, we are attempting to study process and outcome for each case taken as a miniature experiment.

The underachiever variable was employed mainly to provide for a common presenting problem among all the counselees in the research; it also enabled the use of school performance as an additional measure of counseling outcome; besides, the phenomenon of underachievement has an obvious importance of its own. An additional selection factor was the screening out of boys who manifested gross impairments of academic skill or symptoms of pervasive personality disturbance. The boys who were selected were told simply that they were being seen as part of an effort to find out how to improve the guidance services in the school. They were all cognizant without prompting, however, that the quality of their academic performance constituted a relevant topic to discuss. The counselees were thus not self-referred; only two out of 220 boys who were screened, however, declined to cooperate.

The counseling approach with the research subjects was guided by three additional conditions: First, the counseling series was to be short-term; five interviews were to be considered modal. The staging was generally on a once-a-week basis—beginning about the middle of the academic year. The decision to limit the number of contacts is a condition imposed by the economics of school practice; one can only agree with Bordin (3) that institutions are unlikely ever to support even five-interview counseling for more than a small percent of the case load. Apart from economic grounds, it seems foreign to the concept of a counseling process intended to further normal (ego) development, to commit this process to extensive efforts at personality reorganization.

A second condition bears on the efforts by the counselor to abridge the counselee's investment in their relationship. Such phenomena as identification and transference, inevitable aspects (by definition) of any extended human interaction, are surely heightened in counseling. Responsive and understanding, yet ambiguous¹ about his own attitudes, the counselor is likely

¹ Bordin (3) has given considerable attention to the function of "ambiguity" as a therapeutic variable.

to be attributed qualities and motives which are not objectively "real". The counselee, for example, may redintegrate from the counselor's empathic responsiveness toward him the pattern of an earlier primary relationship; he may then reincarnate in the counselor stereotyped fragments, distorted in recall, of qualities he had perceived to be salient in the other party to the original relationship. Responding in accord with these distorted perceptions, he may display exaggerated feelings of love, of dependence, of hostility, toward the counselor.

In psychoanalytic practice, such perceptual distortion is heightened not merely by the ambiguity in the analyst's role but by his efforts to interpret to the patient the meaning of his repressed conflicts.² The patient may attempt to ward off painful awareness by misperceiving the therapist's intentions; he may develop a "transference neurosis" within the treatment relationship, coming to perceive the therapist as an agent in his neurotic conflicts. In classical psychoanalytic practice the therapist permits a transference neurosis to run its course. As treatment progresses, he "interprets the transference", attempting to help the patient to differentiate neurotic recrudescences of earlier behavioral patterns from those responses which are appropriate within their relationship and in other current situations in the patient's life.

Whatever its worth under the conditions of psychoanalytic therapy, the deliberate utilization of the transference relationship has no present analog in ego-counseling. Apart from its subtle and hazardous aspects, such a tactic seems inappropriate to the conditions of treatment, usually short-term, with persons who are assessed to be relatively free of crippling neurotic defenses. In the typical ego-counseling relationship the counselor assumes that the counselee is willing and capable to analyze and to cope with those concerns which brought him into counseling; gradually and implicitly (in the ideal case!) he offers his collaboration³ in the analysis.⁴ Whenever resistance to his collaboration or to the strain of self-analysis heightens in the client, the counselor may respond to it on an immediate, experiential level, for example, "You probably find it difficult to talk about these things."

In his relationship with a counselee, an ego-counselor is characteristically unassuming. His main attention, unless the counselee's feelings about him and about the conditions of their relationship become a distraction to either of them, is directed as early as possible in their interviews to the counselee as "investigator", as potential analyst of certain aspects of his personal con-

² In their treatment of psychosis, Rosen (15) and Whitaker and Malone (17) use treatment strategies so radical that they may be said to "provoke" transference reactions. Alexander and French (2) on the other hand, represent probably a growing minority of psychoanalysts who question the efficacy of transference manipulation as a standard unexceptionable treatment activity. Perhaps the issue splits primarily in terms of the strength of the ego and the particular symptomatology as assessed in each case.

³ Perry and Estes (12) propose the concept of collaboration in a most evocative discussion of the counseling relationship.

⁴ "Analysis" is used here in a general rather than in its special psychoanalytic sense. The term is employed deliberately to suggest an important place for cognitive processes in the conceptual framework for ego-counseling.

dition. An ego-counselor is "unassuming" about the personal relationship in that he initially approaches the counselee as if the latter is ready to examine some of the circumstances which underlie his presence in the interview. He offers to collaborate with the counselee, to deliberate with him about the "meaning" of these circumstances and to attempt to help him to reconstrue them in ways that might lead the counselee to their more effective control. Whether a counselee in pain and bewilderment eagerly requests help, or whether he is referred against his will for behavior which is recognized as a problem only by someone else, or whether he is scheduled as part of a school or college counselor's effort to become acquainted with students who are assigned routinely to his case load, this general approach would be, I believe, still appropriate. A creative practitioner, of course, whatever his reliance on "method", meets each new person to some degree in unique, spontaneous ways.

An ego-counselor respects the power and the subtlety in the counseling relationship; his love for the counselee is implicit. He and the counselee may come to feel deeply for one another; and purely from their affiliation, the counselee may derive substantial comfort and strength. Yet in an ego-counselor's philosophy of practice, love is not enough. Beyond the counseling hour are circumstances in the counselee's life which require examination and resolution. There are facts to be surveyed, feelings to be clarified, alternatives to be considered, decisions to be made and acted upon. One decision may be more appropriate than another; some actions promise consequences more desirable to a counselee than their alternatives.

Out of fearfulness or shame, or loneliness, or other powerful feelings, a counselee may postpone or avoid self-examination, finding sufficient value in the counselor's permissiveness and affinity. The counselor has, of course, no prerogative to stipulate how the counselee ought to construe and to feel about their relationship. He does not, like a Balinese mother, deliberately thwart a counselee's feelings. He will not "correct" a counselee nor will he respond with disappointment or disaffection should the counselee refuse his offer of collaboration. He cannot know whether the counselee really loses anything by construing the counseling process differently from him. To the degree that he is guided by the method of ego-counseling, however, a counselor will himself construe the counseling relationship primarily as a means or a vehicle. Although he respects the counselee's sentiments, he is likely to give more pronounced attention to the counselee's questions and choices than to his satisfaction in their relationship.⁵

⁵ I hope not to seem to slight the enormous subtlety and importance of personal relationship, especially of its complex affective elements, in all psychological treatment processes. Can we not develop more fruitful theories of counseling, however, by striving to include in our models some better balance between concepts of cognition and of affect? Bordin (3) makes some beginning effort to consider a "cognitive-conative balance" as an aspect of counselor focus and skill. The attempt to comprehend counselee behavior partly as "analysis" or "thinking activity" may seem alien to some counseling practitioners. They might worry,

The knowledge that the counseling contacts are to be restricted in number deters many counsees from overinvesting in the relationship. The counselor reinforces this sense of limits in several ways: He may make structuring statements which emphasize the counselee's responsibility in the process; his reflections and interpretations may convey the same theme; he may change the topic when the counselee seems to be moving toward a too intense involvement; or he may ignore important thematic material. Of all possible techniques, structuring, i.e., explicit description to the counselee of the conditions for counseling, would seem to be least effective. Whether one in fact asks either how a counseling relationship is fostered or how it is limited, the answer is less in terms of explicit technique than in subtleties of phrasing or timing, and of change of attention and of mood on the part of the counselor. Ideally, the counselor is aware of many more elements in the counselee's behavior than he chooses to articulate. Theoretically, there are infinitely more elements in the counseling relationship than both parties ever become aware of. The concern to limit the intensity and scope of the relationship in ego-counseling stems from an appreciation of this complexity as much as from an effort to meet institutional requirements that the counseling contacts be time-limited.

The third of the additional conditions which guide the ego-counselor's approach is concerned with limits in a different way. Here the limits concern the scope of the topics which are to be considered. In this sense, the notion of *sector* coined by Felix Deutsch (6) seems to be useful: the term refers to Deutsch's mode of approach in his attempts at brief psychoanalytic therapy; in this approach, Deutsch focuses on the underlying meaning of a psychosomatic symptom for a patient and on the particular meaning of words used by a patient to describe his symptoms. In ego-counseling usage, the term *sector* is somewhat modified. It means that the counselor influences the counseling deliberations as early as his assessment of a counselee warrants, so that a gradual focus is made on a set of counselee construct with relation to some (significant) role or relationship in reality. The likely sector is initially determined by the setting (here the secondary school guidance program), by situational problems such as the reason for referral, e.g., vocational concerns (here underachievement), and increasingly as the counseling progresses, by idiosyncratic features of the counselee's life situation. The gradual centering on a sector is fostered by an often implicit transaction in which the counselor

with reason, that such a theoretical focus would lead to oversimplification and pseudo-objectification by the counselor in relating himself to his counsees. But there is too much fruitful promise for counseling theorists in the work of Piaget, Bruner, Rapaport, George Kelly, and of others who have inquired into the nature of thinking. In addition to the vital realm of impulse and affect, can our perspective on the counselee also comprehend the rational pathways which he might pursue to achieve personal control and an enhanced sense of personal responsibility? Can we have our cognitive processes and relationship too? Still only a vague promise in the present paper is a framework for ego-counseling which will offer open hospitality to both kinds of constructions.

reflects, questions, and interprets in such a way that examination, with the counselor's collaboration, of the meaning of certain events and attitudes seems to the counselee to be a natural course of action.

Hopefully, the definition of a sector, the examination of alternative modes of thought and action, the making of choices—hopefully, such steps lead to mastery by the counselee of a particular situation. The sector may be defined broadly, e.g., the purposes and values of the counselee to be served by attending college; or it may be particular, e.g., his inability to do work for a certain teacher; it may center on a concrete incident, e.g., the commitment by a shy boy to appear in a school play; or it may be relatively abstract, e.g., whether one can trust the future—and adult values—enough to justify hard work on school subjects which seem to have no utility. As isolated instances, these examples may sound pedestrian; yet any one could be of transcendent importance to a single case.

A COUNSELEE'S PERSPECTIVE

Let us look at a description by a counselee of his experience with the process we are attempting to explicate. The excerpts below are not offered as evidence that the process works, for self-reports of "satisfied clients" are as suspect as they might be useful. The boy's observations, however, may give us a view of how both the counselor's role and the experience of examining and reconstruing his own behavior may appear to the counselee. The following excerpts were taken from a final assessment interview with S.X.B., an eighteen year old subject. His comments were made during an assessment interview which followed the counseling (the interviewer was not the counselor). The boy's comments bear mostly on his heightened motivation to improve his work in school. Note in particular:

- (1) Counselee's perception of the counselor's ambiguity:
 "... I mean, he wouldn't, he never told me to do anything; and I don't know, he just, he never had, he never said anything . . ."
- (2) Counselee's sense of being challenged (to examine the consequences of his behavior):
 "... He didn't make it a challenge to me to try and not just get by, I mean he didn't make the challenge to me, he made me make it a challenge to myself."
- (3) Counselee's "ingratitude":
 "... It did help me a little, I didn't think I would have, it probably would have been about two weeks ago that I would have decided that I had to study . . ."

Whether in evaluating this case an investigator would agree or not with the counselee's claim that he would have improved anyway, it is significant

that the counselee can acknowledge being helped, yet still credit his own capacity to help himself. A counselor might be well-pleased by the counselee's effort here to preserve his sense of personal responsibility.

(4) Counselee's feeling that he was "pushed", but not coerced:

"... If he hadn't pushed me on, and actually he wasn't doing any at all, but he was, I know he was pushing me, he knew he was pushing me, but I, but he wouldn't admit it; he was doing it, I mean, he was making me do it, but in a way he wasn't even telling me to do it, he wasn't even asking me to do it and he wasn't even suggesting that I do it...."

(5) The counselee perceived that he was influenced to consider alternate modes of action:

"... He was just saying two things: You do this, or you do this."

(6) Note counselee's perception that, as he examined alternatives, he had been influenced to consider the consequences of his behavior:

"... He'd say, where do you go when you do this, where do you go when you do that. Of course, then I'd tell him and then he'd say 'eh'...."

(7) Counselee perceived that the counselor was fostering something in him:

"... The seed was planted; he planted the seed, he kept working on it and so— it *did* help me; I'm sure."

(8) Prior to counseling, S.X.B. both disliked and failed to carry out academic tasks:

"... I was bound to have to wake up, not wake up that I had to study, but wake up that I had to study stuff that I didn't want to study."

"... Yeah! I haven't actually changed my attitude but I've just changed my (C. sure!)—my method."

The counselee has not been influenced to change his opinion about studying; he still dislikes it. He has changed, however, his method—his behavior in relation to tasks that he knows must get done if he wants to realize larger aims.

(9) S.X.B. has not really liked his part-time jobs, but he has done the work anyway. Since counseling, he has come to see a parallel which had not been apparent to him before.

"... There were things *I did that I didn't want to do*, such as work! But I never felt that way about studying. Actually, I still don't feel that way, but...."

"... It's really a funny thing; it never occurred to me, but things I didn't like to do at work... If you can't beat it, you've got to do it, so I did it...."

He implies that the counselor has helped him to generalize from his approach toward paid work to academic study.

counselees who are assessed to be sufficiently mobile and autonomous to make and to implement decisions within significant sectors of their life-space during the relatively early future. Should the counselor find early or late in the counseling series that his counselee does not meet these criteria, he will modify his approach accordingly. Aichorn (1) suggests, for example, that positive transference to the worker is a critical feature of therapeutic treatment with delinquents. Assuming Aichorn's view to be valid, the counselor would be ready in such cases to modify such aspects as the number and scheduling of treatment sessions, the settings in which he meets his client and the kind of relationship he encourages. We need not be presently concerned about modifications which might "violate" the method of ego-counseling. The main features of the method, I believe, have an integrity which will survive a variety of modifications.

The counselor-counselee collaboration in ego-counseling assumes a helping relationship; collaboration can be maintained, I believe, with no necessary contradiction to the client-centered principles which have been enunciated so eloquently by Carl Rogers (14). An ego-counselor accepts a counselee non-evaluatively, i.e., he offers his collaboration, initially at least, without conditions; the counselee is free to reject the offer, without hazard of the counselor's disaffection. It is a premise of the method that he can, in Tyler's (16) sense, "accept" the counselee unconditionally as a person and convey his acceptance, while still making judgments concerning the counselee's readiness to use his collaboration within such limits as time and the counselor's competence. Concomitant with his communication of acceptance, the counselor makes an unremitting effort to understand the counselee and to impart back his understanding. How does the counselor communicate his efforts at understanding?

In the present context, I choose to deal with the question of how the counselor communicates understanding by referring to a classification of counselor statements. At this (semantic) level of analysis, a most powerful technique for communicating understanding is that of "reflection"; the counselor actively tries to restate the meanings he perceives to be implicit in the utterances of the counselee. In so doing he seems to be fostering the counseling process in several ways at once: the very linguistic form of his restatements communicates, in addition to whatever truth the counselee perceives in his remarks, and without the counselor needing to express his attitude directly, that what the counselee has to say is of first importance; that the thoughts and feelings of the counselee are to constitute the main object of their deliberations; and that he respects the capacity of the counselee to carry on the process of self-inquiry.

In a study employing data derived from content analysis of assessment interview protocols, this writer (8) demonstrated that interviews characterized by a high ratio of interviewer reflection statements were also those in which

the interviewee was more responsive throughout the interview conversation; reflection statements seemed to act in these interviews as a catalyst to encourage interviewee participation. Yet in most counseling dialogues, reflection alone may be an insufficient stimulant to the counselee to conduct as comprehensive and as candid an inquiry as that for which he may, with encouragement, be ready. Important potential meanings—hunches only vaguely perceived—may not be brought into counselee awareness in deliberations where the counselor remains unyieldingly reflective. To argue from the premise that the counselee is ready to deal with only that which he introduces himself or to which he responds in the reflections of the counselor, assumes, I believe, too confining a model of how one person learns about himself when in relationship with another person; more broadly, it also seems to slight the capacity of a human being both to overcome inherent anxiety associated with new awareness and to employ a variety of media and strategies to attain new concepts of self and non-self.

It would thus be a mistake, I believe, to discourage the use of such counselor techniques as interpretation and confrontation on the premise that they violate the counselee's sense of personal responsibility. Conversations in which the counselor's style embodies reflection, questioning, interpretation and confrontation may actually make the counselor's part in the dialogue seem to the counselee less artificial than a style which is characteristically reflective. There are clinical indications, for example, that adolescent delinquents tend to construe reflective, permissive, ambiguous behavior by a therapist to be either naive or dangerously seductive. In any counseling relationship, of course, it is crucial that interpretations be perceived by the counselee as emanating from a well-intentioned collaborator, not from a mere critic; the counselor introduces new meanings into their discourse as one who is trying not to convert the counselee but to join him in a mutual effort at comprehension.⁷

Apart from criticizing the counselor who uses techniques of interpretation and confrontation for his adoption of an "evaluative" attitude (13), some may question even whether it is important that the counselor "understand" the counselee. Such critics might claim that the counselor's effort to share the counselee's way of looking at meaningful events in his life-space would be sufficient to further the process of self-inquiry. They might remind us of the limited use that is often made of formal clinical diagnoses and of the obstacles to a sound counseling relationship which may arise from extensive initial diagnosis and from a manifest diagnostic attitude on the part of a

⁷ *Interpretation* is used to refer to counselor statements which propose a construction of events in the experience of the counselee which the latter has not already himself formulated. Interpretation does not refer here to its technical psychoanalytic usage, in which the datum is given meaning by an already formulated general theory.

Confrontation is a particular form of interpretation in which the counselor proposes that contradiction exists between two aspects of client thinking or overt behavior.

counselor. But such pitfalls alone seem insufficient to justify a radical phenomenological position in counseling theory (the position might be justified in more searching philosophical argument). In any event, observing the continuing disagreement among philosophers over the question of how we come to know anything, for example, the argument of phenomenology vs. physicalism, a psychologist would seem in no danger of heresy or of indigestion if he retains a place for both phenomenological and objective viewpoints in the same methodological system.

At a pragmatic level, one can argue that the counselor ought to strive for objective understanding in order to function as a genuine collaborator, that is, to enable him to contribute to a dialogue which is cumulative and which explores and pursues solutions in relation to "real" conditions as well as in relation to the meanings experienced by the counselee. A counselor who considers the phenomenon of school underachievement only as it appears to the counselee may frequently miss the opportunity to help his counselee become aware of consequences and alternatives to his present behavior. As indicated before, an ego-counselor will accept a counselee's preference to avoid examination and solution of his "real" problems. But he will attempt, at least initially in their interviews, to bring to the counselee's attention those expectations for choice and for action which confront the counselee in his "real" environment.

A counselee may be unable to use the counselor's collaboration effectively. In part, this may derive from a considered defense of his privacy—from an inherent resistance to reveal personally significant aspects about himself to another person. It may also derive from the counselee's reluctance, which all human beings evidence at some moments in their lives, to take responsibility for solving his own problems.

The counselee is free to construe the counselor's offer of collaboration in any terms he wishes. He may perceive the counselor as snoop or as repairman; as menace or as deliverer; or in some combination of archetypes such as these. A counselor would estimate to what degree such apperceptions are an obstacle to the counseling process. If he believes them to be serious barriers, he may then choose to discuss more explicitly with the counselee the conditions which might guide their collaboration. In cases of firm counselee resistance, he may conclude that termination or referral to another kind of treatment service is the only appropriate procedure; naturally, the counselor will be alert to refer for reasons other than resistance.

Analysis

There seems to be, unfortunately, no term not already preempted and given special meaning in dynamic psychology to comprehend the notion of analysis in counseling. In the sense of perceptual learning, the process might

be subsumed by the term differentiation; but this would slight the complex cycle of separation and combination of constructs in which the counselee seems to be actively engaged as he makes new sense out of his experience. Earlier sections of this paper have alluded to the special usage for ego-counseling of the term analysis. More rigorous explications must await additional time and thought. We can suggest the idea of analysis once again by posing the kinds of questions with which a counselee might confront himself in this phase of ego-counseling. As a sector emerges from the deliberations between counselor and counselee, for example, concern about qualifying for college, the latter may ask: "What's expected of me? Do I have sufficient capacity to meet these expectations? What do I myself want? Am I really interested (in this or that idea, object or activity)? How do I compare with others? What am I really like? What am I doing, denying, distorting, avoiding? What are the consequences? What are alternative ways to regard . . .? What goals make sense as my own? In what respects do my present efforts promise to realize or to fail them?"

In the research project to which this paper is related, the counsees were selected initially because their academic performance failed to meet the expectations implicit in the criteria used by the investigators. These investigators later found that, in most instances, the counsees were also aware, painfully in many cases, that they were failing to satisfy their own standards. Thus, a natural sector in counseling with high school boys who are classified by academic authorities and by themselves as "underachievers", concerns the counselee's capacities and interests, decisions and actions (and their consequences and alternatives) with relation to the demands and opportunities of academic study. The questions raised above would then take more specific form as the counselor and counselee focused on the sector of academic study.

The following are a series of steps which a counselor and counselee might pursue in analyzing academic study as a sector:

1. As he comprehends the setting and finds in the counseling relationship that the responsibility for analysis and solution is to be his, the counselee begins to describe and to examine the manner in which he construes his school life, his role as a student, his current academic performance, the extent of his mastery over school tasks, etc.
2. The counselee is encouraged to project himself into the future, to discuss his conception of career and his general life aims, to portray his image of self and of ideal. Where these are poorly differentiated, he is encouraged to consider the implications of being vague and planless about such matters. The counselor refrains from "promoting" planfulness; he attempts to couch his observations to the counselee in terms of probable consequences as he—imperfectly—perceives them. (Does the emphasis on consequences in itself "promote" a value for planfulness? Maybe, but the connotation is not the

same). The counselee is encouraged to consider the connection between means and ends, the relation of his present actions to the realization of his personal aims.

3. Both parties consider obstacles to the counselee's aims and aspirations and the ways in which these obstacles might be resolved. The obstacles may be both personal and external: They may reside in the counselee's current attitudes and actions and in the form of limits to capacity and to skill. Obstacles may also be perceived in certain of the counselee's primary relationships, for example, with a demanding, rejecting parent, or with a rigid, punitive teacher; or obstacles may exist in the form of practical limits to financial support.

4. As obstacles are considered, the counselee will be encouraged to engage in systematic appraisal of self and of external circumstance. The counselor, from his observations during the interviews, and from other information, has been making inferences continually about the counselee's capacities, dispositions and ego qualities. Using care and discretion, the counselor conveys certain of his inferences in the form of hunches and tentative hypotheses. As in traditional vocational counseling, the counselor may report the counselee's test scores themselves, together with background information to enable the counselee to make useful comparisons of his performance with his peers; and the counselor may, as "expert" on certain sources of information for the counselee's use, relate his hypotheses to "facts" about education and the occupational world.

5. In his conversation, the counselee will have been conveying such qualities as the degree to which he feels independent, competent, personally responsible, with reference to the requirements of academic study. An ego-counselor is likely to hypothecate about such qualities, about their "connectedness" with other aspects of the counselee's problems in the sector of academic study. He may offer to the counselee his interpretation that the counselee is denying or postponing or projecting certain implications or consequences in his actions. In analyzing his underachievement, for example, the counselee may deny the value of school, accompanying his denial with unrealistic images of success which he might obtain without continuing his education; or the counselee may merely promise himself that things will be different next semester without attempting to make explicit what he will do to create a difference; or he may project blame for his difficulties on teachers and on others without analyzing the part he may be playing in what are often vicious cycles of retribution in his relationships with others. A counselee may reject the counselor's interpretations; but he is encouraged first to weigh their relevance and then to reject them on considered grounds.

In a dialogue which develops as I have hypothecated, the counselor must be alert to the signs of what Bordin (3) has called "an undulating curve of resistance." Even when he readily agrees with the validity of the counselor's

observations, the counselee may feel threatened and indignant at the "intervention" of the counselor in his world of meaning and belief. Perry and Estes (12) observe that "... the central technical problem of education and re-education, is the problem of *resistance*" (p. 100). The counselor remains alert to resistance, to the counselee's pain in self-analysis, even while encouraging his pursuit of understanding.

Reorganization and Synthesis

The notions of reorganization and synthesis are intimately joined with that of analysis. The thought processes of a counselee might be depicted in terms of endless cycles of analysis and synthesis. Efforts to develop appropriate terms to represent these processes have been painfully frustrating. Not only is the psychology of thought, like most other areas of psychology, still poorly mapped; but each investigator employs different labels and different-size units. Klein (10) suggests that in studying cognitive attitudes, one may slice the behavior to be observed "... into any segment, gross or minute, of long or of short duration, which shows the boundaries of an intention on one side and a behavioral change *experienced* as attaining the intention on the other" (p. 96). One who would conceptualize thought processes is thus confronted with the task of defining *de novo* his units and classes.

In cognitive terms, ego-counseling may be said to help the counselee to *attain* a revised set of intentions, of "concepts" (5), of "personal constructs" (9) with reference to a defined sector. It should be noted that in the term "cognitive attitudes", Klein (10) is referring to "organizing principles" which guide both action and the actor's decision that the result he achieves is "adequate". Ego-counseling is intended to achieve change not merely in specific behavior, e.g., increased time spent in study, higher grades, or increased cooperation with teachers, but in the complex of meanings and organizing principles which guide the counselee in his transactions within the sector of academic study. In addition, the ego-counselor encourages the counselee to generalize these meanings to requirements and opportunities in other potential sectors of his life. It is hoped that, from the experience of analyzing his own dispositions and actions in particular sectors, he will have learned a "problem solving" process of important general utility.

Action

In long-term psychotherapy, the client has opportunity to test the relevance of emerging insights, to determine whether in direct confrontation he can control his anger or his fearfulness, to engage in tasks in which he can judge whether his efficiency has improved. In treatment which is characteristically short-term, such between-interview experimentation by the counselee is necessarily limited. It is possible that school counselors, who can remain in contact with their cases over a long span of time may be able to stage these con-

tacts so that the counselee would have had opportunity between interviews to test by action, decisions made in the course of counseling. In the interest of systematizing counseling practice, the concept of the academic year as a time grid over which a half dozen counseling interviews might be spread planfully, merits a tryout. Such scheduling would have been done in the research related to this paper had not practical considerations interfered. In any event, the opportunity to transplant and to develop newborn intentions and constructs as they emerge is typically denied the counselee in short-term treatments.

The term "rehearsal"—for action—might be more appropriate for this aspect of ego-counseling. The counselor attempts to help the counselee envision how he will act, given particular situations, for example, how he might plan his study schedule, or how he might respond when he confronts a nagging parent or a demanding teacher, or how he might obtain certain information critical to his plans. The concern with action—the practical decisions and solutions—has been a natural one in counseling, a function which to this day is often confused with direct, concrete help. Interviews with school counselors often become overly concerned with the details of planning programs, with the transmission of information about colleges, with the "tracking" of a student's academic performance in an effort to keep him on the road to graduation. Counseling may be said to occur in such interviews only to the extent that the interviewee is helped to clarify his own bases for judgment and to see the implications and consequences of his actions.

Ego-counseling includes rehearsal and action, in part, because the institutional settings in which counseling has typically been practiced—high school guidance services, college centers, rehabilitation services—are concerned with practical effects. Educational institutions have a palpable interest in academic performance, vocational planning, valid admissions decisions, and the mature use by students of their extra-curricular time. They might reasonably expect their counselors to assist students to act more effectively in such matters. Essentially, however, action and rehearsal are included in a paradigm for ego-counseling, in order to establish a sufficient conception of counseling as an education function. A resolve during the counseling interview to repair a failing grade, may become another mere New Year's resolution when the counselee confronts, one evening after another, the lonely vigil of study. We need not give as large a place in education as did John Dewey to concepts of activity and of experience, to recommend that the learner be helped to experience a connection between what he intends and construes during the interview and what he experiences in "natural" circumstances.

The entire paradigm set forth in the preceding pages is, of course, notional—a crude representation of the great variety of conversations which take place in counseling interviews. The concepts of setting, relationship, analysis, reorganization and action may separate out and fall in sequence

to a small degree in certain cases. For the most part, however, all these concepts may be relevant to any excerpt of a counseling dialogue. They have been discussed separately in an effort to stimulate study and understanding of a process whose strength, paradoxically, may lie in part in its resistance to the systematic abstractions of a scientist.

REVIEW AND PREVIEW

Adequate definition eludes us still. Ambiguity and incompleteness may be inevitable accompaniments to labor in "applied fields". A method for educating intelligent beings can never be fully specified. The burden of doubt is common to educators, physicians, politicians and others who would apply behavioral principles to human problems. Yet one must continue to gnaw at ambiguity.

Still to be clarified are the distinctions between ego-counseling and generic conceptions of counseling and psychotherapy. Also problematic is the relation of ego-counseling to the classic image of instruction: Is this not how a teacher in the liberal tradition typically approaches a learner? We also have a fenced only sketchily with the outcome problem: What is construed to happen as a product of successful ego-counseling? Finally, the relation of ego-counseling in guidance to the larger traditions of educational thought and practice remains only suggestive. A fuller analysis of guidance and of ego-counseling (as ideal but not unrealizable processes) will reveal, I believe, that they are concerned fundamentally and not at all naively with human freedom. They ought thus to be considered integral, not merely adjunctive, to the thought and practice of education.

Such questions will guide further empirical and conceptual study of ego-counseling. There are research findings to probe and new tryouts of the method to plan. As we accumulate experience in experimental situations and under conditions of actual practice, we plan to test our belief that ego-counseling is not only a feasible educational method, but that it comprehends a process which is of potentially deep significance in the lives of counselees.

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Guidance: The Science of Purposeful Action Applied Through Education

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FROM CONDITIONING TO LIBERATION THROUGH GUIDANCE-IN-EDUCATION

IT IS OUR BELIEF that, in general, people would like education to be liberating rather than conditioning. We believe that this expectation is held for education in all of its forms: in schools, in colleges and universities, and in industries. Admittedly this is a generalization; throughout history there are frequent instances in which education has been used consciously to condition students, to make them capable of achieving ends chosen for them in advance. However, despite hot and cold wars and the very real requirements they impose upon us, our present culture has advanced to a state where *overt* conditioning is incompatible with our expressed goals. Science has convinced us that conditioning, to be most effective, must be so overt, so obviously undertaken, that our particular American goals become travesties when pursued in such fashion.

Does this mean, then, that education in our schools, colleges, and industrial training programs is already designed solely to liberate, to make the student more capable of choosing and achieving his own ends? If not, what has all this to do with guidance?

Our answer to these questions is that current educational policies do not reflect an objective consideration of the liberating-conditioning issue, and that guidance has begun to focus educators' attention upon this great lack of objective consideration. Furthermore, Guidance¹—as we define it, at least—can contribute to the identification of this problem, and perhaps to its better solution as well. Consequently, we choose to base our argument for a more operationally defined and more powerful Guidance function upon a clearer understanding both of the setting in which such a function must take place, and of the specific educational goals derived from such understanding. Hopefully, it will become clear that our procedure for achieving this goal,

¹The term "Guidance" (capitalized) will denote the professional use of a science of purposeful action within a specific structure of education. Other relevant, but not identical, connotations of guidance will be denoted, whenever grammatically possible, without capitalization of the word.

condition which would be more generally desirable. We observe, thirdly, that the resulting diffusion of ends prevents the development of criteria for determining the relevance of available knowledge. It is difficult, if not impossible, to choose the best means to an end when the end is not reasonably well defined. Finally, the various applied disciplines have been granted separate mandates, which vary considerably with regard to limits. Compare, for example, the mandate given the medical practitioner with that given the educator or the psychologist—let alone the guidance practitioner. But compare, also, their training and supervision—their gradual assumption of responsibility. What would you say to the potential suicide teetering on a ledge?

RECENT EFFORTS TO MAKE GUIDANCE A PROFESSION

The issue of professionalization in guidance became central during the 1950's. Statements have developed from concern on the part of two major occupational associations, Federal and local government, various foundations, and individual scholars and/or practitioners. For example:

A. *The Associational View.*

1. The American Psychological Association has attempted to establish and maintain certain distinctions between the professions of psychiatry and psychology. Within the Association itself, professional psychologists have examined and discussed distinctions among clinical, counseling, industrial, and school psychologies (5, 6).
2. The American Personnel and Guidance Association has recently made it more possible to distinguish members according to training/experience, since membership is often held in two or more Divisions of the Association. Several members are now engaged in ascertaining the meaning, consequences, and possibilities of professionalization (8). The officers of the Association and its divisions are also trying to improve the education of counselors (2, 11, 18).

B. *The Influence of Money and of Law.*

1. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 reflected considerable governmental concern with the nature and purpose of guidance. However, the most immediate result of the Act was really a threat to then-emerging attempts to make guidance a profession; underlying generally desirable but undefined goals such as "individual freedom," the *operational* goal of the legislation was to develop and support a technology designed to implement governmental interests. Fortunately, the increased level of support made possible by the Act has still served to improve practice. Indirectly through conferences, wider consultation, and subsidized training programs and institutes, guid-

ance practice has been provided with a firmer basis with regard to training—and retraining.

2. Departments of Education in several states also seem to be discussing new modifications in the certification of counselors. Foundations and government agencies have supported several conferences (1, 14). Generally, however, foundations also tar guidance with the brush of "technology" and seem to make little effort to support the development of a profession. Fellowships and other such support for training programs are not readily available. Guidance still has to clarify its own goals if it is to escape public and foundation distrust of "pupil adjustment," "mental health," and the like.

C. *The View of Our Theorists.*

Since 1950 many individuals have written of professionalization in guidance. We shall point specifically to only Professors Robert H. Mathewson, Donald E. Super, and C. Gilbert Wrenn, however.

1. Mathewson was one of the first to struggle with matters of theory and practice in an introductory text (7). He has also chaired several committees and informal discussion groups which examined various theories from the behavioral sciences in a search for ideas relevant to guidance practice. He is one, at least, who has shown a desire to grow in response to the need, to keep his theory alive.
2. Super has simultaneously been developing theory in vocational development (13), and a goal for counseling psychology (12). He has used several associational offices and professional appointments to advance the cause of a profession of counseling psychology. He has been instrumental in gaining support for a conference on vocational development theory (14), for a monograph on theories in career development, and he is now seeking support for a conference on training for counseling psychology.
3. Wrenn is one of the very few who has struggled with *philosophical* issues in the practice of guidance (17). He is also one of several now concerned with clarification of a long-standing problem in the practice of counseling, *i.e.*, the danger of imposing the counselors' values upon the student. Furthermore, he has gone beyond the "mere" identification of this issue—and of several others as well. He was singled out by the American Personnel and Guidance Association to conduct the American Guidance Inquiry (18). This report recommends training for guidance practice which would represent great improvement, but even this training would not make possible the assumption of responsibility necessary to achieve the goal we propose..

These men have been singled out with reluctance because there are many deserving of mention. The statements heretofore noted do attest to the con-

cern for the present "vitality" of guidance, however. Those interested in a history of the many controversies can readily catch their spirit in the pages of *The American Psychologist*, *Counselor Education and Supervision* (particularly the issue for Spring, 1962), *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, and the *Personnel and Guidance Journal*.

DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT VIEWS OF GUIDANCE

As we reflect upon these and other efforts to define the problems involved in creating a profession to meet a recognized need, it is clear that each has fallen short—far short—of its mark. Even though the need is for a broad design, we observe that the broader the proposed theories of guidance, the farther short of the mark they fall; current theories expand upon some singular point of view (usually technical), and therefore cannot become comprehensive as well as broad. The particular orientation of each writer has constricted his proposal; personal, occupational, or theoretical—nearly all statements about guidance reflect firm (though rarely overt) commitment to maintain a *status quo*.

We must confess to a degree of puzzlement on this score, because most introductions and prefaces within the guidance literature contain frequent reference to "crises," "turning points," and the need for "drastic revisions." We cannot understand why conditions conjuring up such fearful images should at the same time command such strong vested interest, or be approached with such profound conservatism. Consider, for example, the following premises for definition, all common in the literature:

- 1) "Guidance is what I (am required to) do, because I was hired as a guidance counselor."
- 2) "Guidance is what I (am able to) do, because I was trained in a guidance program."
- 3) "Guidance involves the practice of non-directive (or analytic, ego, eclectic) counseling because. . . ."
- 4) "Guidance is psychotherapy (or preventive mental health, or counseling psychology, or etc.)."

Although the problems underlying many of these issues have been evident, they have not been clearly presented to those now engaged in the practice of guidance. There is a relative lack of literature in guidance which *simultaneously* considers the matters of setting, of purpose, of developing theory, and of perfecting technique. The few broad studies available do not reflect consideration to a depth sufficient for identifying issues in professionalization, or to offer a basis for preference which can be examined, criticized, and gradually refined. Such an opinion has been offered by Barry and Wolf (3, 4), Scanlan (10) and Tiedeman (16).

It is our primary thesis that *simultaneous* examination of setting, purpose, theory, and technique in guidance will clarify issues not present in the debates we have cited. Furthermore, we believe that such simultaneous examination will substantiate our two other contentions:

- 1) that Guidance as a professional practice must exist within the total framework of education; and,
- 2) that the authority of educational administrators for Guidance must be modified.

We therefore turn next to our consideration of setting, purpose, theory, and technique.

A PROPOSED SETTING FOR GUIDANCE PRACTICE

Guidance, as we define it, can exist only within a process of *liberating* education. This means a process in which the student is free from overt conditioning or indoctrination, and, as much as possible, from ignorance or bias of which the teacher is unaware. Guidance is an integral part of, and also dependent upon, such education. Education, in other words, is not synonymous with either teaching or learning. Nor is education only the interaction of teacher and learner. Rather it involves the full transaction resulting from a mutual pursuit of something desired by students and teachers alike. Teaching, learning, guidance—all are *necessary* to such education, but none is *sufficient* by itself or in partial combination.

TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PURPOSE THROUGH GUIDANCE

We believe that to establish purpose in Guidance, ends must come into existence before, or simultaneously with, means. This premise does not involve the issue of teleology, as might be argued. A goal, if defined as "a desired future state," certainly cannot exist prior to the means for its achievement. But a *concept* of this desired future state can exist in the present. Thus it is quite possible to compare the present state of X with the concept of a future state of X, to note the difference, and to choose, develop, modify and perform a series of actions designed to reduce this difference.

This process is what we mean by the term "purposeful action." It describes:

- 1) the behavior we hope to encourage on the part of individual students;
- 2) the behavior we hope to make more practicable for individual Guidance professionals in education; and,
- 3) the behavior we hope to make more operational in training such professionals through the mutual development of professional theory. Thus "purposeful" means "not random," *i.e.*, "more likely to achieve the currently desired by acting contingently upon the currently observed." It is

our current observation that contemporary activity in education is undesirably random in general and undesirably constricted in particular instances.

THE ORIGINS OF OUR GOAL

That which we desire to make generally possible can already be observed in many particular cases. There are numerous individuals who manage, on their own, to pass successfully through the processes we are about to describe. Their success, if not perfect or complete, is certainly substantial enough to elicit our desire to make it more operational. Let us now develop our notion of *discontinuity*, and follow one youth through a period of such discontinuity imposed upon him by society.

We observe that people constantly change. They grow older, larger, stronger, more capable—and eventually they begin to grow weaker again. They learn, ignore, forget and/or apply the results of their own and others' experience. All these processes have their "inside" effects, not all of which enter the individual's awareness.

We also observe that peoples' environments change. The environment can be described as a series of states or conditions, a series of situations. As such, it can be seen to change when the individual moves from one situation to another, and also, because each situation is dynamic, while the individual is present "within" it. Just as the individual is not fully aware of his "inside" changes, so is he partially unaware of those taking place "outside."

The individual who provides our example is a youth in junior high school—for him, a situation. During a period of several years our youth grows older, stronger, larger. He encounters considerable information, he retains somewhat less, and he uses still less with purpose—his purpose. (Recall our definition.) Our youth changes, nevertheless, far more than he can realize at any one time.

During this same period the school gradually changes, too. Such changes may include structure, organization, actual personnel, and the competence of personnel. In other words, the youth's younger brother will encounter quite a different situation as he "passes through" several years later. By this time, however, *our* youth will have passed on to high school. In so doing, he will have experienced one *major discontinuity* in his environment.

Our observation of this *imposed* discontinuity is the key to our whole argument. It provides a basis for structuring:

- 1) some of what we know to be relevant from the behavioral sciences;
- 2) an analysis of our youth's current situation (in this case, that of a high school student);
- 3) our concept of an "ideal"—more desirable—state for him; and,

- 4) our theory for a "science of the purposeful, integrated application of various basic and applied behavioral sciences," *i.e.*, for structuring our theory for Guidance.

Let us very briefly consider these tasks in order.

A. *What do we know from behavioral science?*

We know that our youth is changing physically, in obvious, readily observable fashion and also in a more subtle, pervasive fashion. Our youth has adolescent problems to handle, together with increased and quite different academic and social demands, plus increased amounts of acquired information to integrate with his personal functioning. These are observed facts requiring no further comment.

B. *What is his present state?*

We know that our high school youth has experienced a major external discontinuity, as well as the internal changes resulting from his physical-emotional development. He has, in other words, become a functioning new member of a substantively different system. He will find it necessary to learn new ways of experiencing new things; a point of view once appropriate for junior high school is suddenly obsolete. He will also find that he is no longer the same person who held these obsolete points of view. In brief, then, our observation of his current stage suggests that he *definitely* needs:

- 1) information about his new situation;
- 2) revised criteria for evaluating this new information in order to use it for his own developing purposes; and,
- 3) knowledge regarding available sources of assistance.

In addition to this "introduction" to his new state, our youth *may* need:

- 1) help in establishing or modifying purposes of his own;
- 2) help in increasing his awareness of the internal and/or external changes that have taken and are taking place;
- 3) help in acquiring "academic content"; and/or
- 4) extensive psychotherapy.

Note that one or more of these last four needs may or may not exist; the problems are certainly real for most students, but not everyone requires *individualized* help with them.

There is yet another aspect of our high school youth's current state, one that is less noticeable in the transition from junior to senior high school, but one which would immediately attract our attention if the transition were to college, work, or military service. This is the less introductory, more *evaluative* consideration regarding whether or not, for our youth, the new situation:

- 1) Is an appropriate step beyond the previous state; *e.g.*, *should* our youth be a new member (yet or ever)—is he able or prepared to pass through it?

- 2) Is it an appropriate step toward our youth's goal, or toward what we hope will remain possible for him; *e.g.*, does our youth *need* to pass through this state?
- 3) Is this a state containing a "choice point" or a "point of no return," regarding which we feel constrained closely to watch, if not to intervene, in his youthful decisions?

In general, then, an analysis of the current state of our high school freshman, structured as above, results in the conclusion that the best teaching in the world will not, by itself, lead to what we desire for him. Nor will the most refined teaching or subject matter. Consequently, we can profit from the formation of a concept regarding an "ideal"²—*i.e.*, more desirable—state for our youth to experience; in short, a goal for education.

C. *What would constitute an "ideal" new state for our youth to enter? And how would the ideal differ from the current state we have just analyzed?*

As long as we are being idealistic, we can say that an ideal state would be one in which the awareness of discontinuity in individual experience would *contribute* to independent individual development. "Onward and upward" would describe the process perfectly. However, in addition to being idealistic we aspire to be scientific; our concept must be operationally defined, emphasizing the difference between what we want to create and what currently exists.

At this point it might be well to justify (and limit) our idealism to some extent. Thus there are some individuals who experience what we describe as discontinuity, and who nevertheless manage to seek out, recognize, and use the information necessary for their development. As we stated earlier, if their development isn't perfect, it is certainly good enough to make us wish we could guarantee it to everyone. So we don't expect miracles or perfection; we hope instead to enable *more* people to realize as much of their potential as *some* do already.

Analyzing the current state of our high school youth leads to a conclusion that discontinuity in experience is a partial (and wholly natural) result of individual development "inside" and individual progress "outside"—actually transition from one "outside" to another. In other words, the individual's experience changes, and so does that which is available for him to experience.

Discontinuity is also a partial result of the frequently step-by-step nature of the experiencing process. Thus the oft-cited "aha experience" results in a jump from one point of view to another, a partial resolution of discontinuity. From this point it is possible to begin forming a concept of the desired

² The "ideal" is a desired state, of course. However, not all desired states are "ideal" either to the person seeking passage into the desired state or to another person reflecting upon the first person's attainment of the desired state. Furthermore, person and observer may differ in the construction of the desired state and of the bases for seeking it. We use the term to emphasize the "yet to be achieved" nature of the goals.

future state: it is one containing elements which increase the individual's chances to achieve his own moments of sudden new awareness, and conversely, one that does not contain elements to inhibit such achievement. The task of guidance, then, is to control these elements. A structured description of how this task might be achieved becomes—lo and behold—a theory for Guidance.

D. What theoretical structure would suggest an integrated, scientific application of knowledge from various behavioral sciences to adaptive individual resolutions of discontinuity?

In essence, we see the answer in a structure requiring the presence of a person equipped to represent to students the particular system of which they have just become parts. In one sense such a person would serve to *introduce* the new environment to the student, to provide information about it, to help the student become aware of the important differences in his new surroundings. Freshman orientation—in some colleges—is an example of this function. It goes beyond the provision of simple facts, as implied by the term "orientation"; "reorientation" might be more descriptive of the purpose underlying such programs.

As suggested previously, in discussing the present state of our particular youth, there are other problems facing new members of any educational system. The previously proposed representative must *evaluate* or *assess* as well as *introduce*. The evaluation should include, for example:

- 1) Should the student be a member yet?
- 2) Does he need to "pass through" this system at all?
- 3) How can the process contribute to his movement toward an appropriate subsequent system?
- 4) Does the student require any specialized assistance?

Each of the behavioral sciences, whether basic or applied, consists of many individuals' reports concerning their experiences with behavior. These reports contain, or can be used to establish, bases for predicting and controlling aspects of human behavior. Some such sciences produce these bases, others produce practitioners. But despite current opinions or claims, none produces practitioners of guidance per se. Each can produce information, rules, or individuals that can contribute to the achievement of our goal for Guidance, but none embodies that goal—as is right and proper. Guidance, as we define it, does not exist in the various outgrowths of this or that science, practice, or art. If it does come to exist, it will consist of a flexible but *purposeful* integration of various skilled, individual functions.

Let us hasten to add that we do not envisage either a "Renaissance Man" or a "Jack of all Trades" who would necessarily be "Master of None." Rather, we envision a master of *creatively administering the application* of many

"trades" to the familiar problems encountered in passing through an equally familiar system. Our ideal Guidance practitioner would serve to bring together student and information, pupil and teacher, client and counselor, patient and therapist. He would hold a general conceptual model of the "ideal student making ideal progress through or within an ideal system." He would possess the ability to see where an individual fell short of this ideal concept. And finally, he would possess the knowledge necessary to marshal the special skills and/or information most relevant to an individual's idiosyncratic problems.

It becomes obvious that such a practitioner would also be practicing a profession, even in terms of our rather stringent definition. It becomes equally obvious that our ideal practitioner does not have very many currently existing counterparts.

SOME QUALIFICATIONS

We have implied that the basic interest to be served by Guidance is that of the individual. On this we stand. We offer the following qualifying statements in the hope that they will prevent unnecessary objections based upon preconceptions, specifically hasty conclusions that we represent certain "whipping boys" of the past. Thus:

- 1) We are not preaching any known form of "life adjustment"; the term suggests many desirable ends, but fails to define any specific, operational means. Good is better than evil, but this knowledge hardly specifies the next step.
- 2) We are not proposing any form of coddling, spoon-feeding, or so-called progressive measures. In fact, rather than helping students avoid the frequently unpleasant realities encountered during their development, we hope to provide a structure, and suggest a function, that would make such avoidance difficult (at least for those individuals who do not display marked pathology).
- 3) In a similar vein, we do not mean to suggest any form of social engineering, or brainwashing, aimed at providing a "good set of middle-class values" for our youth. We envision no homogeneous goal for the socialization process, no need to destroy sub-cultures. High aspiration, religion—even patriotism—are, in reality, matters for individual choice. It is irrational to pretend that an *educational* system can alter this fundamental fact.

A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TEACHING AND GUIDANCE

We have argued:

- 1) that education should serve the interests of students;
- 2) that Guidance is a function within the process of education; and,

- 3) that Guidance should be granted a mandate distinct from that of the teacher.

It now becomes possible to establish a basis for differentiating the two complementary functions. In terms of our argument, teaching involves a communication of *others'* experiences—data and conclusions. Guidance, on the other hand, involves primarily an examination of the individual student's experiences—data and the *process of forming* conclusions about them. Teaching continually creates useful discontinuity by saying, "Here are things you do not know, or know how to do." Guidance, on the other hand, deals with the individualized reduction of discontinuity:

- 1) by pointing out where discontinuity has (or has not yet!) come to exist;
- 2) by making it *not* seem undesirable or overwhelming, but useful; and,
- 3) by making it more possible for the individual to choose actions designed to reduce (or establish and *then* reduce) such discontinuity.

It becomes clear that Guidance involves behavioral change, a change quite different from that necessarily induced by teaching. Consequently, quite different aspects of behavioral science become relevant to the practice of Guidance. As suggested previously, the basic difference involves a consideration of purpose, *i.e.*, of action patterns chosen and established to create desired states from observed states. Unfortunately there is no ready-made body of relevant basic theory. Although much of the necessary data may well exist, it has not been integrated by scholars and scientists concerned with *both* behavioral change *and* independence on the part of the individual who is changing. This is why teaching in and of itself is not education. This is why both teaching and Guidance are necessary for the kind of education we claim as our goal. This is why current guidance must be developed into a profession.

We have proposed the beginnings of a goal for Guidance, a goal based upon current observation, current aspiration, and the difference between the two. However, we have not yet suggested what immediate actions might begin to establish our purpose.

THE FUTURE IN GUIDANCE: PROFESSION, NOT TECHNOLOGY?

We have implied the existence of basic obstacles to further progress toward professionalization, obstacles which can now be clearly specified. First, the current organization of education places *both* teaching and administration in positions superior to that of guidance, even though the very nature of professional practice requires autonomy. Consequently this situation must be altered *in the schools* before the professional practice of Guidance can become possible.

Second, there is as yet no "science of applying the behavioral sciences" on which the profession of Guidance can be based. *Such a science must come*

from a scholarly orientation that does not yet exist as a basis for training; it requires the employment of multidisciplinary means for metadisciplinary ends. In other words, there is no existing facility for training even the scholars needed to develop the profession of Guidance, not "even" at Harvard. Or is there?

It is difficult to justify our conclusion that we have no facility for training the personnel needed to develop Guidance as a profession. At this time we can do no more than show that this is true within Harvard, the situation we know best. Should exceptions to our observations exist, we are confident that the *Review* would provide space for refuting our conclusion. This is why we have dared to be assertive.

As we engage in proving our point for Harvard, however, we urge you to consider our example in a larger frame. We have done two things as we have written: (1) used a model, (2) to specify a model. We are using a theoretical model to suggest a parallel among several types of purposeful action—by the individual, by the professional, by the profession itself, and by the science underlying the profession—action designed to reduce the discrepancy between the currently experienced and the currently desired. Such an analysis would be incomplete without considering, operationally, *how* the transition can be accomplished. We have already noted many needed modifications in school organization and in the practice of guidance. We must now turn to the university, the second link requiring modification if the now desired goal is to be reached. The facilities necessary for training will continue to be subjects for *debate* (cf. "Recent Efforts to Make Guidance a Profession") until a university *acts*. In all likelihood the debate will continue thereafter, too, but at least it will be based upon some empirical roots. It is for this reason that we turn now to our report on the educational experiment undertaken at Harvard.

AN EXPERIMENT IN TRAINING FOR GUIDANCE

What of the "currently observed" at Harvard? The program in guidance at Harvard has a capacity it did not have a short decade ago. Some of the hopes Tiedeman outlined in 1957 (15) have now materialized. The Faculty in guidance enjoys support from members of several other Faculties within the University as well as from the Faculty of the Graduate School of Education. The entry of the Graduate School of Education into the School-University Program for Research and Development (SUPRAD) has created for us an unprecedented opportunity for supervised laboratory experience, in both teaching and guidance, in the school systems of Concord, Lexington, and Newton, Massachusetts (9). Members of the Faculty in guidance have research underway in career development, counseling, and psychodiagnosis. Support is being sought for a Center for Research in Careers. Several members of staffs in the training facilities are involved in guidance research and development

activities, the School having made several joint appointments with other organizations—schools, colleges and clinics.

The scope of these diverse opportunities provides the guidance student with much of the *background* necessary for the practice of Guidance; our next task is to provide an integrating theoretical framework. Thus the student is exposed to concepts advanced (1) through teaching at the University, and (2) through specialized professional practice in a natural setting—a great improvement over the situation where professors teach what they have never attempted to practice, or where busy practitioners pass on their experience to only a few internes or disciples. However the emerging educator-practitioner is still not a representative of Guidance—as we have defined it. Therefore, we next consider the “currently desired.” We do so in terms of two of its operational aspects, function and organization.

A. *Function.*

In terms of function, our present goals are as follows:

- 1) We need to establish a basis for determining what aspects of any existing science or practice are relevant to future practice by *our students*. For example, the teacher-clinical psychologist is not appointed here to train clinical psychologists, to teach clinical psychology as such, or even to “teach about” clinical psychology. But it remains difficult to establish just what such diverse individual specialists *are* to teach. It seems clear to us that the needed science, and hence the needed teaching, must deal with both the continual modification of a current state *and* of a currently desired goal. In our consideration, the two aspects of this problem must be kept wedded as they are studied, because they are co-functional; we must recognize that we are dealing with a process of investigation, of practice, *and of revision*. We obviously lack much of the needed science. Unfortunately, we even lack general understanding of the need for such a science. This is why we consider this first, essentially scholarly, task, so important for our goal.
- 2) We need to establish a basis for guaranteeing the responsibility of our students, for determining their professional adequacy, and for communicating to them a *valid* sense of professional identity. In other words we need standards, and this, too, requires criteria derived from a common purpose. Consider once more the experiences of the medical interne, and compare them with those of guidance internes!
- 3) We need to develop for our Faculty not only *teacher-practitioners* who understand and accept our more comprehensive goals, but professional *supervisors* as well. Such individuals must oversee student practice in a constantly changing profession, and they must do so without sacrificing standards, falling back upon their own *original* (and diverse) professional identities, or losing sight of our basic goal for Guidance.

- 4) We need to formulate and to gain acceptance of a charter for the practice of a common profession of Guidance in school and college, and in the educational endeavors organized within governmental agencies and industries. We must assume responsibility for providing professional opportunity—not merely employment—for our graduates. It therefore appears that the primary need in this area will be:
 - a) to specify the authority needed for practice in a particular sphere; and
 - b) to specify means for resolving truly professional differences between teacher and counselor on issues not clearly within the sphere of one professional or the other.

It seems intuitively clear that the differences noted in (b), above, must be resolved by the superior officer of the two professionals, namely the principal or the superintendent (and to do so, he, too, must be a creative professional).

B. Organization.

These four general needs will require revision of the present organizational pattern in our Guidance program. The needed pattern requires augmentation of resources and, undoubtedly, an operational reassessment of responsibility and authority. Since such reorganization depends upon the augmentation of resources, little can be said of the latter until the former become specific. We shall trouble to portray a guideline or two, however, because those guides may further clarify our "research proposal" and the progress of our "pilot study."

Our resources need augmentation in several ways. First, with regard to our faculty, we need greater depth and a wider range. The advantages of the latter are obvious; the advantage of depth, on the other hand, is derived largely from the need for a continual revision of ends and means. Such progress requires both creative and careful change, which in turn requires educator-experimenters of established responsibility and appropriate academic/professional stature. Here depth is essential.

Second, we need to be able to guarantee and to specify the initial jobs of our graduates for a limited time, say two years. This desired expansion in our relations with schools and colleges is needed for recruitment, for training, and for placement. For several years we have attracted very capable students who have had no teaching experience.³ Greater certainty of initial placement in Guidance is needed for these graduates, or else our sources for students of such quality will quickly become depleted. More importantly, however, *we need these places in order to complete the training of our graduates.* In the year or so that students in guidance are with us we can offer them only

³ The absence of prerequisite teaching experience is in keeping with our belief regarding the need for autonomous authority for the counselor in his own sphere. *The counselor need not necessarily be a former teacher. He is not to teach any more.*

an apprenticeship as a counselor. Before assuming responsibilities as master counselors, however, students should serve a two-year¹ stint as journeymen. This stint should be designed so that it will enhance the graduate's knowledge, increase his confidence, provide him with a comfortable sense of professional identity, and complete his qualifications for later independence. We feel that *personal* independence must precede professional independence, i.e., that the practitioner must *feel qualified* as well as be certified.

What, now, of academic responsibility and authority? Must our goals be largely achieved before a school of education dares consider such issues, or are such issues the real bases underlying our proposal? The purpose we seek to establish is that leading to a center for training in the professional application of a science of behavioral change, a science which does not, as yet, exist. And as we stated earlier, it cannot be built *solely* from bits and pieces of other scholarly, scientific, and professional areas. While it is true that the profession we envisage has scholarly and scientific roots in universities as a whole (a fact which has economic as well as scientific advantages), the roots are more deeply imbedded in professional schools of education.

Universities are institutionalized to provide both education and research. However the nature of each process and the degree to which they are kept functionally related varies among universities; and, within universities, between professional faculties and faculties of arts and sciences.

Some research is based upon curiosity and conducted according to the "rules of simon-pure science and scholarship." Another kind of research is based upon curiosity *about* something. When this "something" is man's development, research involves purpose and responsibility as well as creativity and discovery.

Rather than trying to keep the experimenter "out of" the experiment (which is never possible anyway), the new science must *include* the experimenter together with all his hopes and dreams. The vested interest is not in rigorous objectivity as *opposed* to subjectivity, but in the unique class of data containing *both* objectivity and subjectivity—i.e., in man. This is science for man, not man for science.

Returning to the issues of academic responsibility and authority, we find that they do in fact underlie our proposal. We have really called for a new *type* of science, not merely a new science forged from traditional elements available in the arts and sciences. The basic departure lies in the *overt* introduction of desire into the pursuit of scientific results. Like the medical researcher, we would know what we want for man, not just what we want to *find out about* him. To train personnel for this type of investigation, without sacrificing either subjectivity or the equally necessary rigor and objectivity,

¹ Those who stay for the doctorate with us may not need to serve so long as a journeyman; however, even the student qualified for the doctorate in Guidance can benefit from effective supervision.

requires a training facility such as that we have described. This is our belief, and it provides the basis for both our proposal and "our" experiment.

THE ESSENCE OF GUIDANCE-IN-EDUCATION

We began with a brief overview of current guidance practice which emphasized a need for change; guidance and education are not now achieving our purposes. However, the survey revealed still another fact, *i.e.*, that current guidance is not by itself an adequate base upon which to build a profession of Guidance. We therefore proposed that the basis must lie in the total process of education, offering the following principal arguments:

- 1) Liberating education requires an addition to the process of teaching and learning, an addition in the form of a professional practice complementary, not supplementary, to those of administration and teaching.
- 2) The bases for such a profession lie in an entirely new science, that of applying existing behavioral sciences to achieve a chosen goal.
- 3) The basis for this science—the goal—must be established by scholarship, by basic research in the area of behavioral change.
- 4) A new type of training is required to produce the needed scholars, experimenters, educator-professionals, and practitioners—a type suggested by the preliminary results of the "Harvard experiment," but a type, also, which the Harvard Graduate School of Education is not yet truly prepared to train.

We conclude on an optimistic note, however, because we feel that the application of purpose will complete our preparation, and make it practicable to begin training for the profession of Guidance.

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Book Reviews

Creativity and Intelligence: Explorations with Gifted Students, Jacob W. Getzels and Philip W. Jackson. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1962. 293 pp. \$5.95.

One doesn't need a highly sensitive ear to hear the strong rumblings in the educational landscape concerning suspicions that perhaps we are generally rewarding only certain types of intellectual performance. The discontent and misgivings particularly concern our use of IQ measures and related types of tests as a critical standard by which students are assessed and found deserving of our scholarship and placement rewards or not. There is increasing awareness that many intellectual processes are being underemphasized and inadequately sampled by our tests of general mental abilities, and that certain types of cognitive functions, creative thinking in particular, might be only moderately related to these measures of intelligence. We have certainly come a long way since 1950 when in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association, J. P. Guilford¹ reported that after examining the index of the *Psychological Abstracts* in the twenty-five years preceding 1950, only 186 of 121,000 titles bore on the subject of creativity. The term creativity no longer seems to make more "tough-minded" psychologists and educators cringe in the way they did not too long ago. It now has become firmly entrenched in our jargon. The appearance of Jacob W. Getzels and Philip W. Jackson's *Creativity and Intelligence: Explorations with Gifted Students* should go a long way in helping us revise our rigid conceptions of the structure of intellect.

The authors began their study with the aim of investigating various types of giftedness, not only cognitive excellence. They were attempting, they say, to broaden the base for examining intellectual and social excellence in children and to "free the concept of giftedness from its one-sided attachment to the IQ metric."

Consequently, the book reports a study of four groups of gifted students. Two groups are those exhibiting a different type of cognitive excellence—the one high in intelligence but not concomitantly high in creativity, the other high in creativity but not concomitantly high in intelligence. The two other groups studied each exhibited as its salient characteristic a different type of psycho-social excellence—the one high in morality or moral character but not concomitantly high in social adjustment, and the other high in social adjustment but not concomitantly high in morality. The major portion of the book, however, is devoted to the two cognitive excellence groups, and we shall concentrate on them with only passing reference to the others.

Drawing upon Guilford's work on the structure of intellect, the authors distinguish two basic cognitive or intellectual modes. Their description of the modes is so lucid and well articulated that it is best to hear them present the distinction:

... The one mode tends toward retaining the known, learning the predetermined, and conserving what is. The second mode tends toward revising the known, exploring the undetermined, and con-

¹ Guilford, J. P., "Creativity." *American Psychologist*. 1950, 5, 444-454.

structuring what might be. A person for whom the first mode or process is primary tends toward the *usual and expected*. A person for whom the second mode is primary tends toward the *novel and speculative*. The one favors certainty, the other risk. Both processes are found in all persons, but in varying proportions. The issue is not one of better or worse, or of more useful or less useful. Both have their place in the individual's psychic economy.

Various terms have been used to describe the two processes. Guilford has suggested 'convergent thinking' and 'divergent thinking' Whatever terms are used, it is clear that one process represents intellectual acquisitiveness and conformity, the other, intellectual inventiveness and innovation. One focuses on knowing what is already discovered, the other focuses on discovering what is yet to be known.

. . . The conventional IQ test tends toward the evaluation of those cognitive processes that have been called convergent, retentive, conservative, more than those processes that have been called divergent, innovative, constructive. . . . (pp. 13-14)

With this conceptual distinction as their framework, the authors moved to differentiate two groups of individuals manifesting these characteristics. The population from which these groups came consisted of 500 students in a private school in the Chicago area. The students ranged from the sixth grade through the senior year of high school representing a select sample on several criteria, one of which, for example, was that the mean IQ for the school was 132. They all participated in the major testing phase of the study, from which the two experimental groups were formed. A high IQ group was selected consisting of 28 subjects in the top 20% on standard intelligence tests when compared with students of the same age and sex but *below* the top 20% on the creativity measures the authors devised for the study. A high creativity group was selected consisting of 26 subjects in the top 20% of the creativity measures when compared with students of the same age and sex but *below* the top 20% in IQ.

Using a variety of achievement tests, projective personality materials, and questionnaire and interview data, these adolescents were examined as: (1) *students*—their school performance, how their teachers perceived them, their achievement motivation; (2) *individuals*—their personal values and attitudes, their fantasy-life, their career aspirations; (3) *members of their family group*—the character of their home environments. There were so many tantalizing findings in this study that the reviewer hardly knows on which to focus. We must remain content to present just the highlights.

One of the most striking findings is that although there was a difference of 23 points in mean IQ between the two groups, the scores of *both* high Creatives and high IQ's on standardized achievement tests were equally superior to the achievement scores of the school population as a whole. The educational implications of these findings are enormous and force us to take a good look at the usual concept of "over-achievement." The high Creatives would, by conventional criteria, be considered "over-achievers", a state of affairs which led the authors to present a perceptive analysis of the logical dilemma on which this concept rests.

The typical measure of intelligence, they point out, is generally considered

to reflect a person's "potential or capacity." Getzels and Jackson find it difficult, as do many other students of measurement theory, to see how an individual's performance can exceed his potential to perform. A commonly held alternative is to assume that academic performance is a function of intellectual capacity plus some motivational variables. Another alternative, only too infrequently assumed, is to question the meaning of the concept of capacity and the instruments used to assess it. These comments reflect the whole tenor of Getzels and Jackson's book which is to expand our definition and understanding of cognitive processes, and to raise the general question of how much or how little of a person's intellectual resources are being tapped by present measures of intellectual functioning.

This is one of the few points of similarity for the two cognitive groups, as they differ markedly on most of the remaining material. Their values and attitudes, for example, are strikingly different in that although the two groups agree almost exactly on what qualities are necessary for success in adult life, and on what qualities teachers would like in their students, they disagree considerably on what qualities they prefer for themselves. One quality, in particular, stands out above all others and, interestingly, seems to be a persistent theme running throughout much of the other data. This quality is a sense of humor and it is prominent in the ideals which the high creative adolescents value.

This sense of playfulness, this sense of humor, also pervades the imaginative productions tapping the fantasy-life of these high creative adolescents. They have a certain mocking attitude toward conformity and "conventional" success. Even more illuminating to this reviewer was that these high creative adolescents expressed more violence along with the humor in their verbal and non-verbal imaginative productions. They were apparently manifesting the kind of behavior Ernst Kris was describing in his discussion of the concept "regression in the service of the ego" and its place in the creative process. They were, that is, more in touch with impulses from within that are often denied. Their more experimental attitude toward conventional ideas, furthermore, reminds one of the type of cognitive approach that is hopefully being fostered in the various curriculum projects which have been started in the last few years represented by the Physical Science Study Committee and the University of Illinois Committee on School Mathematics.

Another finding of importance to educators and psychologists concerns how these students are perceived by their classroom teachers. The data indicate that whereas the high IQ group are seen as more desirable than the average student, the high Creative are not. With respect to the previous findings on school achievement, the high achievers who are high IQ's are favored, but not high achievers who are high Creative. The authors astutely indicate that in view of the criteria for college entrance based on teachers' evaluations of students' characteristics, the high Creative student is penalized in favor of the high IQ student. Here, perhaps, is some documentation of the process underlying the lack of utilization of talent that we hear all around us. There may be an unwitting selective process going on throughout the educational world.

The authors present some tentative findings on the family environments of their subjects which they gleaned from parent interviews and questionnaires. The findings here illuminate and are consonant with the qualities

which these two groups of students have acquired. The impression is gained that the family environments of the high IQ group stress the given, the conventional, the codes of our society. These parents tend to be critical of their children and of the education that the schools are providing. They are more concerned with the "studiousness, cleanliness, and good manners" of the friends that they would like their children to have. The parents of high Creative subjects, in contrast, are concerned with such less conventional qualities as "openness to experience and enthusiasm for life."

The reader is then presented with a most interesting chapter on various theoretical speculations on the nature of creative thinking, drawing on the formulations of Freud, Kris, Kubie, and Schachtel. The authors weave in their own findings very adroitly throughout this very intriguing chapter. The reviewer would most heartily recommend the last section of this chapter entitled "Creativity and the Student" in which a set of ten distinctions is presented which are well worth savoring.

It is at this point, following the preceding chapter, that I find fault with the book. Everything up to this point had coherence, with the reader being led through the logic and arguments, through the methodology and the data, and through a very neatly woven picture of the place of the findings in a larger theoretical context. But from this rich analysis of the intelligence-creativity distinction in cognitive behavior, we are now presented with an exploratory chapter in the identification of psycho-social excellence, which the authors admit to be brief and tentative. To my mind, though, it impedes the flow of the book because the reader, who has been thinking about cognitive variables all this while is forced to abruptly shift gears. A less analytic and less careful reader, it seems to me, would be readily confused by this chapter on psycho-social excellence. Having carried over the distinctions that he had to keep in mind from the two cognitive groups, he would unwittingly assume that the Creative group was synonymous with either the Moral or the Adjusted, and the IQ group with the other. In view of the title of the book itself and the relative weight given to cognitive excellence rather than to psycho-social excellence, I wonder about the efficacy of including this material in the book. This is not to say that this material is unimportant; I devoutly wish that the authors had expanded this chapter into another book called "Morality and Adjustment: Explorations with Gifted Students."

Just a fleeting comment on what they do and do not present in this chapter. They first differentiate between those students who are outstanding in moral character and those who are outstanding in social adjustment using test batteries which included instruments developed by themselves explicitly for this study, as well as standardized personality tests. These two groups, in essence, represent Getzels and Jackson's exemplification of the "inner-directed" and the "other-directed" person. They then present the differences between their performance in school and their family environment. The reviewer looked for and did not find differences in creative performance between these two groups. He wonders, in view of the general thoroughness of the authors, why these data were not included. This omission is particularly to be noted since the authors make a point of commenting on the provocative similarities between the high Moral and the high Creative individuals. Both seem to be fringe members of their social structure; both stand in opposition to the immediately approved and fashionable. It seemed to me,

though, that the similarities might be more apparent than real, particularly when one considers how bound by repression of impulse are the highly Moral and how repression-free the highly Creative.

These remarks about the flow of the book being impeded by this chapter are supported by the fact that the authors go back to a concern with the intelligence-creativity material in next presenting illustrative clinical studies. They finish the book with a complete appendix of their instruments and procedures which does not help the less analytic reader make the distinction between groups mentioned above, in that there is just a serial listing of instruments used.

Far from derogating the appendix, however, the reviewer would like to praise its completeness. The reader who is not a researcher is given a concrete grasp of the fascinating instruments used in this study, especially those utilized to tap creativity. The reader interested in the research use of these instruments can easily adapt them for his own purposes because of the full descriptions presented. Needless to say, this is a rare occurrence in our highly touted era of "communication."

A final note which is really more a function of my desires rather than the authors' failings. They have done what they set out to do, namely, to differentiate adolescents manifesting certain cognitive or social characteristics to a high degree, but not its concomitant. They have obviously felt that, for purposes of clearly demonstrating their point, only the two groups of high IQ and high Creative (and, incidentally, high Moral and high Adjusted) were to be studied. It seems to me that they could have so easily included a third group in their selection procedure—a group which is in some ways more interesting than these other groups in having a high degree of *both* variables—a group high in IQ *and* high in Creativity. How do teachers perceive these students? How do their parents see them? How do they see themselves? Paul Torrance and his co-workers at the Bureau of Educational Research, University of Minnesota, who themselves replicated the Getzels and Jackson study several times, are now concerned with a gradient of creativity, a point on the IQ distribution when a higher IQ makes little difference, and the creative thinking abilities become important. This reflects their and others' persistent and present concern for this optimal balance of divergent and convergent modes of thought within the same individual. The point I am making is that perhaps those high IQ *and* high Creative adolescents not included for study by Getzels and Jackson would present findings strikingly different from the other two groups. The authors state in several places that they do not want to give the impression that the divergent thinkers, the high Creatives, are the "good guys" and the convergent thinkers, the high IQs, are the "bad guys". For this reason, the ease with which one slips into this way of thinking, having this third group would have been most informative.

But this is to find fault with what they did not present. What we have is well worth examination by a variety of disciplines—students of measurement, guidance, personality development, educational psychology. The book has aroused much interest and justifiably so. It is a highly readable and rewarding book which I would like to see reach as wide an educational audience as possible.

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Students Under Stress, David Mechanic. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962. 231 pp. \$5.00.

This monograph reports some interesting data gathered by David Mechanic pertaining to the behavior of graduate students in the stress situation of taking qualifying examinations for the Ph.D. degree. The author identifies his work, and, I feel, accurately, as a descriptive study (p. 218). The author reveals to us how the students handle this situation insofar as coping and adaptation are concerned. The three chapters dealing with what Mechanic calls "modes of adaptation" are extremely provocative and will be useful to anyone who is interested in doing research on stress. Mechanic's treatment of faculty-student interaction in this situation, the reaction of the students' families to the examination procedure, and the general discussion of examinations per se, while competent, are not as stimulating. Generally, insofar as this is a study within the limits Mechanic himself sets (p. 218), it is a thoroughly professional undertaking. My criticisms are anything but novel. They pertain to issues which are endemic to much research which is being carried out presently. They have to do, one way or another, with taking a perfectly competent but limited investigation and both overgeneralizing from it and denying to the reader the basic criteria of criticism. Both of these points require elaboration.

Let us start with the second point: denying the reader criteria for criticism. On page 18 the author outlines his method of study. The reader is told that the students were interviewed a number of times, were given questionnaires, and generally the idea is gotten across that there has been an extensive data collecting operation. However, we are never permitted to view a complete questionnaire or an interview schedule. While this certainly would be awkward within the body of the book, why these materials were not included in an Appendix is never clear. Thus, the reader can come to the conclusion that Mechanic has presented only those data that prove his case rather than the whole picture. My remarks will be misconstrued if they are interpreted as reflecting on the integrity of the investigator. Any research person has the right to present edited and selected findings, but edited and selected from what? Without the opportunity to see the interviews or the questionnaires, we have no basis either of criticism or of true evaluation of the work.

Further, it seems to me that Mechanic has overgeneralized his findings and oversimplified his theoretical position. This leads him to some indefensible positions. For example, at the beginning of his book he states the following:

Further it will be argued that it is the person's socially relevant groups that train the individual for legitimate and proper modes of adaptation. . . . Personal adaptation is socially formed and is related closely to the defined patterns of group activity.

In a more general sense this study is concerned not with why an individual's functioning may become disrupted but rather with the forces that enable him to continue functioning. In short, we are concerned with the components of mental health, rather than with mental illness. (p. vi)

Two points immediately become obvious. The first is that Mechanic is claiming that mastery of stress is socially learned and socially resolved. This completely overlooks the whole issue of idiosyncratic solutions to stress. No

one will argue that a great deal of stress management occurs in group situations, but many, including this critic, will take issue with the idea that this is the only way. Mechanic also, and this seems to me to be the fault of an enthusiasm, goes from what he himself admits is a limited study to injudicious statements about stress as a concept. Here, I feel, he shows himself to be somewhat naive.

Because of its simplistic language, this book is a peculiar combination of scientific conservatism—often carried to the point of the ridiculous—and unguarded overstatement carried to the point of incredulity.

To summarize, the point is not whether this is an interesting research—it is; not whether it makes a valuable contribution—it does; nor whether we in the academic community are better off with its knowledge—we are. The issue instead is that we are never clear of the limits Mechanic places on his own investigation. At times his discussion is cogently related to what he candidly describes as a "descriptive study"; at others the unfortunate impression grows that Mechanic sees his particular theoretical formulation as the only way to go about understanding not only students under stress but the issues of mental health generally. We can sympathize with the author's infectious involvement which cannot be hidden under that most hideous of all academic forms of gamesmanship, "operational prose"; but we cannot at the same time excuse his peculiarities of inclusion and omission.

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The Counselor in a Changing World, C. Gilbert Wrenn. American Personnel & Guidance Association, Washington, 1962. 195 pp. \$2.50 (paper).

This is an important book which should be required reading for all counselors and school administrators. Not that it is a profound book in the sense of exhibiting scholarship in great depth and subtlety; for indeed it could not be and still accomplish its mission. The tasks assigned Professor Wrenn are clearly defined in the preface. He was asked by the American Personnel and Guidance Association "to look into the future of society, of education, and of the role and preparation of the counselor" with the intent, it may be assumed, of providing some guidelines, or at least a basis for discussion, for the growth and development of the profession of counseling. The school counselors were to be considered as the basic audience who must come to grips with the questions: "How can counseling be most constructive?" and "What education is necessary for a fully qualified counselor?" (p. ii) But the answers will require wide support and therefore it was decided to write also to teachers, school administrators, school board members, and interested parents and citizens. Thus Professor Wrenn had to write for a most diversified audience both within and without the profession of counseling. For the well-informed and sophisticated reader, the book may appear in parts to be obvious or even superficial; it will not appear so to the vast majority of the audience to whom it is addressed.

Even for those counselors who may regard themselves as well informed about educational, social, and economic changes and patterns in the world of today and who are also well informed in their specialty of counseling, the book provides a challenge and a perspective—a challenge to stop and ask

some necessary questions and to search for answers, and a perspective on the nature of counseling in the world of today and what it ought to be in the world of tomorrow.

Professor Wrenn devotes the first four chapters to a description of the changing patterns within society, psychology, and the school and to an interpretation of their effect upon counseling philosophy and practice. Dr. Wrenn then devotes the remaining three chapters to a development of what the first four chapters, in his judgment, make apparent; what *must* be done by counselors rather than what *should* be done as derived from armchair reasoning. (This reviewer would humbly suggest that there is a good deal of armchair reasoning by Wrenn in developing his "musts" for counselors. Armchair reasoning often provides clarity and logic occasionally missing from a too simplistic and direct interpretation from what is assumed to be a true representation of the current and future scene.) The last three chapters are concerned, also, with what ought to be the nature of the total guidance program within which the counselor works and the kind of training and personality traits which he should bring to his task.

Thus in logical and orderly fashion, Wrenn seeks to provide answers to the questions stated early in this review by first examining our contemporary culture and the influences bearing upon it in order to demonstrate the need for a guidance program and to identify the factors which should influence its nature. He next examines human behavior and the culture of the school to get some additional bases upon which to determine what counselors must do. And finally he offers some answers, in the form of recommendations, as to what the counselor's goals and tasks ought to be as well as the kind of training he should have in order to accomplish his objective.

The most serious issue which can be raised about what Dr. Wrenn has said is the implication, which is implicit throughout the book, and occasionally made explicit that counselors should abandon what has come to be an accepted value of the role of the counselor and which is often defended on technological as well as philosophical grounds. It is that the counselor should not be an agent of anyone or of society in attempting to steer, guide, indoctrinate, or influence the pupil whom he is counseling. Granted that this value has not been consistently and universally and even generally followed. This is no reason to abandon it. What if society 10 or 20 years hence no longer needs talent the way it does today? Does that mean the counselor then should give less attention to the talented? Who could have predicted or did predict 15 years ago what our needs are today? But the chief reason for the counselor's unwillingness in the past to be an agent of the state in influencing youth's aspirations has not been because of a fear that his predictions would fail. It was because a philosophy of counseling had arisen, perhaps Wrenn would label it as being of the arm chair variety, which stated that the individual himself should determine his destiny. Within this philosophy the counselor's role was to help free the individual so that he could assess himself rationally and skillfully and thus arrive at an adequate self-concept which was in harmony with both inner and outer reality. Wrenn argues that in any event the counselor unconsciously influences the pupil. Granted he may have some unconscious influence. Does this mean the counselor should become the tool of whatever seem to be the immediate needs or does he have a larger, more over-riding responsibility only to help the pupil to become free, to become true to himself? It is interesting that Wrenn singles out Skinner's oper-

ant conditioning theory of learning to elaborate upon as his illustration of a current trend in psychology affecting counseling.

Another issue, although for less serious, is the implicit assumption that one can anticipate and predict the trends and needs of the future. Wrenn says the counselor ". . . must develop a sensitivity to the societal and vocational needs of the decade ahead and discharge his obligations to the student's welfare in the light of the projected social change." (p. 74) This position, of course, naturally follows up the reasoning that the counselor has a responsibility to steer pupils to the advantage of society. In all fairness it should be pointed out that Wrenn stresses steering for the pupil's own sake also—but it still is steering. It is extremely doubtful whether we can expect even well trained counselors to be highly efficient at predicting social change. Is it necessary to point out that very wise and well informed people have often made incorrect predictions about social and economic change?

A third issue, probably less serious than the first two, has to do with Wrenn's recommendation that the counselor ally himself with the "primary and most unique function of the school—that of the development and use of the intellect; that he ally himself with this intellectual core effort as he works with both students and staff." (p. 109) Here it seems to me that Professor Wrenn falls into the very trap, of an either-or position, against which he warns us. Surely any well informed counselor or teacher knows that the dichotomy between the intellectual and emotional is an artificial one; that to truly understand and help the individual, whether it be toward greater intellectual power or emotional stability, both the cognitive and emotional processes must be dealt with. Many counselors would argue that the counselor should not identify with any current ideology as to what the school should be like. They would argue that much of the present discussion, in which the argument is advanced that the central and unique role of the school is the development of the intellect, is only a function of what some people believe to be current societal needs. It could well be that ten years from now there will be an equally strong drive for the schools to have the primary function of sponsoring a preventive mental health program. These cycles have happened before in American education and the tradition that the schools are a place for character building is a long and honorable one.

Although these very important parts of Wrenn's over-all argument may rest upon a foundation rooted only in the shifting sands of time, certainly none can quarrel with his sound insistence upon the value of looking at pupils developmentally and of counseling in that framework. Neither can there be much dispute with his advice as to the general nature of the counselor's training, with his insistence upon broad general education as well as professional training, and with his insistence upon practicum as well as theory. Neither, does it seem, can one quarrel with his concerns for the total guidance program and the place of the counselor within it.

There will be some who will raise a question as to the distributive function (that is, the matching of a pupil with the right class or teacher), which Wrenn assigns to the counselor, feeling that this is a function which can be done as well by teachers and administrators and that counselors should concern themselves with their unique and central function—counseling. This is an issue which often causes much dispute in a specific school, but it does not seem terribly important which way it is resolved.

Wrenn's recognition of the present uncertain status of elementary school

counseling plus his call for a continuing study in order to chart a course for its proper development should be commended. Too much fuzzy thinking and talking about this aspect of counseling has gone on already. Perhaps the study recently started by the American School Counselors' Association will provide us with some answers.

Probably one of the more controversial issues raised is Dr. Wrenn's position regarding the kinds of pupils and problems with which the counselor should work. His insistence that the school counselor should be concerned with the normal growth of developmental problems of normal pupils rather than with the pathological is certainly welcome. Too often, counselors have spent too much of their time with a few very disturbed pupils. School counselors should be well enough trained to be able to identify these pupils and to gain their consent for referral but they simply do not have the time to engage in psychotherapy with them even if they had the skill. This issue still remains a confusing one; witness Wrenn's own statement of a principle which is designed to cover this point. He says the counselor should "... work with those students whose developmental needs are greatest, who have the most difficulty in achieving a sense of personal identity and achievement, rather than devoting major time to crisis situations in the lives of the relatively few." (p. 73) One may indeed raise the question as to exactly what is the difference. However, as Wrenn himself points out later in the book, there is a difference in degree if not in kind. Certainly the school counselor should not be tied up with a few very disturbed pupils. They should be served by other pupil personnel workers such as school psychologists and school social workers, or referred to child guidance clinics or family social agencies.

Although one may find important matters of disagreement with points advanced, nevertheless this is one of the most important books to have appeared in the guidance field in many years. It clearly defines the issues, discusses them with clarity and cogency, and takes positive, clear-cut positions without ducking. It will have an important impact on the growth and development of counseling in this country.

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***Psychological and Educational Bases of Academic Performance*, C. Sanders.
 Australian Council for Educational Research, 1961. 165 pp. 42s. (Aust.)**

This slim volume reports in condensed form the results of an investigation of some variables influencing the academic success and failure of students entering the University of Western Australia in 1947. A large part of the book is devoted to providing, *in respect of that intake of students*, information concerning graduation and wastage rates, broken down into comparisons between civilian and ex-service students, between men and women, faculty groups and sub-groups, younger and older students, full-time and part-time students, levels of ability, different types of schools and different entrance qualifications. Detailed comparisons, based on a selected group of 313 out of 489 full-time students, are set out in 30 tables. These are accompanied principally by a listing (sic) of the main points of information contained in each table; relatively rarely does the author permit himself discursive liberties.

Since so many actuarial comparisons were made it is a pity that they could not have been extended by replications carried out in other states of Australia and in years other than 1947.

The reviewer was surprised to discover that the chapter entitled "The Psychology of Academic Performance" was restricted to outlining a host of relationships between variables such as age at entrance, examination scores, subjects studied, and intelligence. In view of the comprehensive title of the chapter the absence of any extended discussion of motivational, personality or socio-economic variables (to mention but a few omissions) is a major weakness. That the author is aware of the importance of such variables is made clear from his occasional fleeting references to them; nevertheless, in the whole book, personality has only four insignificant index entries and motivation but two brief mentions. Socio-economic factors are infelicitously dubbed by the author as "parapsychological", though in a footnote he explains this is not to be confused with E.S.P. (!)

In a later chapter called "Psychology Factors in Academic Performance" the author argues that he has produced evidence for four factors associated with academic success: a General Scholastic Aptitude factor, a Vocabulary and Verbal Reasoning factor, a Quantitative and Mathematical Reasoning factor, and a Scholastic Performance factor (which varies as between the humanities and the sciences as well as between individuals). These four factors form the background to much of his discussion in the second half of the book.

The reporting is lucid, but flat. Notwithstanding the limitations noted, the book forms a useful documentary account of an important phase in Australian research on academic performance and is one of the few substantial studies investigating the relation of abilities to university achievement in that country.

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Professional School Psychology, Edited by Monroe G. Gottsegen and Gloria B. Gottsegen. Grune & Stratton, New York, 1960. 292 pp. \$7.75.

School psychology as a profession was probably born in 1915 with the appointment of Dr. Arnold Gesell as school psychologist for the Connecticut State Board of Education. His task: to test retarded and deviate children and make recommendations concerning their education in the public schools. The baby grew slowly. By 1948 there were only 88 school psychologists in the Division of School Psychologists of the American Psychological Association.

Puberty was perhaps reached in 1954, when the Thayer Conference was held at West Point. This was the first significant stocktaking by the profession, which addressed itself to such questions as: Who are we? What makes us different from other psychologists? What should our proper functions and roles be? What constitutes a good training program? The results of that conference are summarized in *School Psychologists At Mid-Century* (American Psychological Association, 1955).

School psychology is certainly in adolescence at present, wrestling with the classical conflict of no longer being a child, yet not having quite reached maturity. There are advantages to this. Adolescence is a dynamic, vibrant

stage of development. True, adolescents can be stubborn, defiant, convinced that their square elders have little to contribute. Yet, though it seems contradictory, adolescent minds are not closed, which fate often befalls their elders, who supposedly have reached maturity and should know better. Thus, school psychology is in a unique position, troubled and perplexed by many problems to be sure, but at an age which is forever questioning and soul-searching.

But what of its present frame, or frames, of reference? Preceding the Thayer Conference a questionnaire was sent to school psychologists asking that their functions be ranked in order of importance, then re-ranked in terms of how they thought school psychologists should operate. Individual testing and interviews came up first and second respectively *on both lists*, with special education programs, group testing, clerical duties, in-service training further down the column, and research bringing up the rear. Several dimensions had been added to Gesell's role, but testing had not been dispossessed from its lofty position.

In 1962, individual testing might well continue to rank first on any survey of functions; however, if the reviewer assesses correctly what is taking place in the profession, that same function would no longer be considered the most desirable or crucial one. Perhaps research would be ranked higher, if most school psychologists were not caught in a web of daily activities which preclude research. Administrators continue to view the school psychologist's role in terms of service functions. It is unlikely this view will change, unless school psychologists assume more interest, initiative, and aggressiveness towards research activities.

One way out of this dilemma is the recent trend toward cooperative research studies involving universities and local school systems working together, the university assisting with research designs, providing personnel to gather data (e.g. graduate students working towards degrees), and handling the data processing and analysis.

Surveys indicate that administrators do not consider testing of intelligence and educational achievement the most pressing responsibilities of school psychologists; rather, they have consistently emphasized direct contact with teachers and students as the primary means of *preventing* problems.

The profession is glutted with issues, other than the place of testing and research, demanding resolution: Whither therapy in schools? What relationship should the school psychologist have to special education, group testing programs and public relation activities? Where is the time for classroom observation and teacher conferences? What about consultation with administrators; and, is there value in working with parent groups? The list grows long. Why so many different frames of reference? We have to look at educational background, experience, the school psychologist's individual needs and emotional attachments, and to particular methodologies which "work," in order to answer this question. Do different communities require different approaches and emphases, or are there general principles which would hold up in any given setting?

The editors of *Professional School Psychology* faced the insuperable task of trying to answer these and many other questions. In attempting to cover a field having such tremendously wide ramifications they came away guilty of serious omissions as well as careless organization. This need not have been the case had they delimited their problem; however, they promised too much. The preface advises us that "the volume is addressed primarily to school

psychologists in current practice . . . as well as those graduate students who are interested in acquiring some familiarity with the *concerns* and *problems* of this profession relative to their own future roles within it." (p. vii, my italics) Later, we read that it is also "intended to provide the school psychologist with a comprehensive survey not only of his problems and responsibilities but of current techniques for their management as well." (p. ix) This was a pretty big bite to take; understandably, the teeth barely scratched the surface.

For example, Part III, "Adjustment Problems of the Major Deviant Groups of Children", considers mentally retarded and slow learners in one chapter, followed by discussions of gifted, neurotic, delinquent and borderline (ego-disturbed, psychotic) children. A "comprehensive survey" would have to include material on all varieties of physically handicapped, the blind, partially sighted, deaf, hard-of-hearing, speech handicapped, brain damaged, perceptually handicapped—and this does not yet cover the field.

Eight chapters deal directly with, or allude to, therapy. This issue must still be faced more directly than it has been in past deliberations of Division 16 (school psychologists). Should the school psychologist take children into a therapeutic relationship? Dr. Gottsegen, in "Role of the School Psychologist," states emphatically that, "When a disturbed child is not eligible for suspension and community help is not available, it is the legitimate function of the school psychologist trained in psychotherapy to undertake treatment of the child, in the interest of both child and school." (p. 6)

Spranger, in a most provocative chapter, "Psychodynamic Structure of the Teaching Faculty," encourages therapeutic work in schools because of the "compensations . . . the positive reactions" from teachers, administrators, parents, and children. (p. 62) However, he spends considerable time pointing up the pitfalls and dangers in terms of interpersonal relationships within the school setting.

Farnham's excellent chapter, "Psychotherapy with the Adolescent," is a lucid analysis of the problems encountered in treating adolescents. At the same time, he sounds warnings, similar to those implied by Spranger, to school psychologists eager to involve themselves in therapeutic relationships with youngsters of junior and senior high school age. If therapy is a long-range process with regularly scheduled sessions, then we had better call individual work with children in schools by another name, which might, in time, smell as sweet. Does the school psychologist have the administration's blessing to schedule children for from two to three years, if necessary? What of the three month summer break (closer to four months when we consider the psychologist's activities at the opening and closing weeks of the school year), Christmas and spring vacations, special meetings and other interruptions of sessions? Clearly, agreement and clarification is long overdue not merely on definition of terms, but more importantly, on the countless implications surrounding psychotherapeutic treatment in the school setting.

Baker's chapter, "Group Intelligence Examinations," and to some extent Halpern's on "The Individual Psychological Examination," seem entirely inappropriate for the intended audience, especially "school psychologists in current practice." Rather than the oversimplified, how-to-do-it approach, the editors might have set Baker's and Halpern's wide talents the task of probing, in depth, the *problems* involved in selection, analysis, and interpretation of group and individual tests. It is to be hoped that school psychologists are

gradually moving away from the administration of group tests of intelligence and achievement. Guidance counselors and well-trained teachers are capable of this function. In fact, the guidance counselor today is acquiring testing know-how which was formerly thought to be the sole province of the psychologist. Further, the guidance counselor is being trained in interviewing and counseling techniques, as well as other areas which overlap the psychologist's training. This is creating a need to define the differential functions of these two professional groups in order that a more efficient job be done by both when working together in the same school system.

The reviewer is unable to determine what relationship Wylie and Sills' chapter, "Psychodynamically Oriented Procedures in School Consultation," has to school psychological services. The discussion appears aimed at educators who have no school-centered psychological help available.

Opportunities abound in this volume for constructive controversy. For example, many would take exception to Lantz' statement that the "school psychologist is primarily a clinical psychologist specializing in diagnosing and suggesting remedial techniques through which to help the deviate child in school." (p. 47) The senior editor himself has a different outlook: "The role of the school psychologist varies in scope and character with the specific governing philosophy established within the specific school, and to some degree, although more indirectly, with the philosophy of the community." (p. 2) Mullen says, "The basic functions of a psychologist in a middle-class urban school are those of any school psychologist." (p. 41)

These frames of reference do have different implications, though the three authors of the above statements would probably politely agree they are "really saying the same thing." This should not disturb us. So long as it is realized that school psychology is still searching, questioning, even fumbling, the profession can find itself. As this is being written, it is learned the editors are about to launch volume two. It is our hope that their approach will be one of more rigorous editing with "concerns and problems" of the profession their major point of departure.

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***The Role of Schools in Mental Health*, Wesley Allinsmith and George W. Goethals. Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, Monograph Series No. 7. Basic Books, New York, 1962. 332 pp. \$7.50.**

This is a comprehensive evaluation and survey of the evolving roles of the school, educators, and developmental and educational theorists, in the promotion of mental health and the detection and treatment of mental illness in the United States. In it, Drs. Goethals and Allinsmith have made a profound contribution to the understanding and clarification of the fundamental issue of relationships between two major forces (education and mental hygiene) which shape the social, economic, and even political scene in the middle of this century.

One is impressed with the vast breadth of information that has been skillfully condensed into this volume. Indeed, if it were only on the basis of supplying the need for a clear statement of what has been thought and done by

workers in both fields, this report would have fulfilled an admirable purpose. However, the authors have systematically attempted to provide a synthesis of this material, and to delineate the direction along which new approaches to the relationship between education and mental health can evolve. This statement has the additional scientific virtue of being grounded in highly creative and challenging research based upon the introduction of clinical principles and personality theory into the understanding and study of a broad area of function viewed in its natural habitat and operating with respect to focal issues of performance. Finally, from the discussion of the research findings there emerges the crucial issue of the role of the citizen in his relationship to education, and what more comprehensive tasks the educator in turn can perform with respect to mental health and mental illness. From this overview of the nature of the report, one can turn to a closer scrutiny of the problems approached by the authors and their modes of dealing with them.

Although this volume is divided into two parts, the tempo of its presentation suggests three major subdivisions. The first of these is concerned with the problems of the relationship between the curriculum and mental health; the second has to do with the problems centered around the management of emotional disturbance in the schools and the preparation of teachers; and the third section, formally designated as Part II, covers the field study research conducted by Dr. Goethals and W. Cody Wilson. For purposes of review each of these will be treated separately.

In the opening chapter, on the relationship between curriculum and mental health, there is opened an exciting panorama of controversies in the educational field, which highlights the interaction between cultural and social processes and the demands which society has made on the educator to meet the needs of an evolving social system. The traditionalist conviction that allegiance to subject matter is of primary importance is set into focus against the expectations made of the individual for the fulfillment of a specialized role based on efficiency and skill mastery, in which a practical contribution is demanded and social and psychological factors are underplayed. Against this point of view are ranged a whole gamut of theories and beliefs which demand that educators provide a curriculum in which basic skills and techniques are secondary to the preparation of the individual for his social role, for his self-realization, for his mastery of those internal processes which can give rise to major social ills including prejudice and extreme political views. The authors present the entire spectrum of these adjustment-centered viewpoints down to the "neo-fundamentalists" for whom the teaching of skills is justified not on pragmatic grounds, but in terms of its intrinsic value in promoting the development of healthy psychological and social processes in the child. In a refreshingly objective and clear-cut style the proponents of the varying approaches are given an opportunity to state their case, documented in many instances, in their own words. For the reader this can be an enlightening if not at times surprising experience.

Perhaps the most telling point which emerges from this chapter is the increasing pressure put on the school to adopt an ever widening responsibility for surrogate functions best served by other agencies in the community, from the family outward. The impression emerges that Redl's term quoted here, "omnicompetence," is exerting itself as a felt demand in the school systems. Some thought to the changes in family structure, deriving from technological advance and the increased dispersion of family members, may point up again

the influences which compel the school to adopt its more variegated responsibilities. Indeed, it could almost seem that the school itself becomes the one fixed and stable experience that the child has and which could serve as the logical vehicle for his learning the broad ethical, moral, and social lessons which a now fragmented family structure may not have the consistency to provide him with effectively. It is clear in this report however, that goals have a way of turning to both philosophical and practical extremes, and a strong stand for moderation is taken by the authors; a moderation in which the ultimate "noble aim of improving society through increasing individual maturity" can be attained through synthesis of both instructionally oriented viewpoints and mental health principles. One completes reading this first chapter with the feeling of having been led through a scene where cosmic forces meet and clash; where vast political, social, and educational issues, having implications for the almost Utopian restructuring and reorganizing of our entire society, are aired and debated; and with an invigorating feeling that the field of education is not nearly as bland as one might have anticipated.

At this point, however, the report turns away from these vital issues and assumes an entirely new emphasis. It moves, namely, from the role of the school to that of the teacher, and moreover from the goal of the school as an instrument of "positive mental health" to the range of interventions available to the teacher and others for dealing with emotional problems, latent or manifest, in the pupil.

This reviewer must confess to a certain feeling of disappointment at this turn of direction, since one was perhaps left with the expectation that more of a search for a resolution to the controversies would be forthcoming. However, there begins instead a detailed résumé of virtually all the known and accepted, as well as the relatively new and more challenging, approaches to the basic tasks of detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of emotional difficulties in the early years and up through adolescence. Indeed, one might almost be able to extract these chapters and bind them separately as a slim volume of techniques in mental hygiene for use as a handbook by teachers. The account is accurate, objective, and eminently sensible insofar as a careful effort is made to point out, at virtually every juncture, the pitfalls which a teacher must avoid.

Examples and suggestions abound in these chapters. They convey the wide repertoire of responses which are available to the teacher for helping a child, and which can occur in the normal give and take between them. The concept of "first aid" is particularly well spelled out. It enables a teacher to react to a pupil without the feeling or fear that a therapeutic function is being unrealistically assumed, and can serve the additional purpose of broadening the teacher's understanding of the child and his particular stage of development. Implicit in this concept is the teacher's willingness to reach out to a child beyond the instructional role he fulfills, and the rationale for such contact is put in terms of the comprehension that the teacher can be helped to have of the child's "language of behavior." The significance of first aid (when skillfully applied) as a therapeutic process cannot be overestimated. One wonders how many rapid "transference cures" or "flights into health" are actually positive responses to the first aid character of beginning therapy, which only then engage those problems which had made the child vulnerable in the first place, where this was something more than a normally anxious response to a crisis situation.

The discussion of treatment and its various forms, in this report, covers virtually all of the areas usually considered to be of importance, including psychological testing, communication with the parent, the role of advice, the function of various professions, and the mental health consultant. Very little that is controversial enters into these discussions, since the authors carefully, even meticulously, point out the uses, misuses, advantages and disadvantages accruing to the implementation of one technique, individual, method, etc. as opposed to another. The way in which the teacher can undertake "treatment" is handled by the usual device of broadly defining treatment activities as any preconceived and objectively formulated response to a pupil's clearly observable discomfort, involving an explicit notion of what one's goals and limitations might be. A sensible admonition to teachers which recurs throughout these chapters is summarized in this quotation:

Clearly, the engagement of teachers in mental health activities must be kept fairly limited, quite aside from the necessity of completely avoiding certain types of behavior. . . . They can engage with justification in efforts to detect and refer, in helping a student who seeks advice to reason about his problem, and in those practices of psychological first aid which are within the accepted range of behavior toward children of a sympathetic and insightful adult in our society and in helping a student who seeks advice to reason about his problem. Other approaches to treatment and intervention . . . ought to depend upon consultation with a professional specialist. (p. 124)

In subsequent chapters of this section the authors report on teacher selection and training. Contrasts are defined here in terms of child-centered vs. teacher-centered training (the work of Prescott exemplifying the former, and of Biber the latter). There is a plea for improvement in the curriculum of education courses and a revitalizing of the courses offered in psychological growth and child development.

In the final section of this book, the authors present carefully designed and executed research aimed at demonstrating the specific role which discrepancies between goals or values, and norms or practices, can play in producing conflict: a concept set up as the basic prerequisite for the potential development of mental illness. Comparisons of basic dimensions of teacher functions were studied. Contrasts were drawn between elementary and secondary schools in different communities and in the same community and, as nearly as was methodologically possible, comparisons were made with high school pupils' responses to a questionnaire submitted to them. A third study dealt with the attitudes of college graduates toward the professions of elementary and secondary school teaching.

Of all the myriad results reported two will be commented upon here. The first deals with the discrepancy between the high school students' and the teachers' values. What seems to emerge is not simply lack of consensus or agreement between student and teacher but a graphic portrayal of the divergence of generations, of the varying ways in which each tentatively reaches out and values the other, but cannot somehow come together in a mutuality of understanding. The results portray in neat mathematical form the basic gulf that separates teacher and pupil, adolescent and adult, and which appears to imply so much for mental health programming. Discrepancies be-

tween student values and teacher values are designated as a source of conflict which lessens the potential for communication and for the effective utilization of the teacher's role in promoting health.

Finally, the results on the attitudes of that group which is described as the future middle class citizenry, on whose shoulders will fall the responsibility of guiding and supporting the educational process in various school systems, indicate again a division of interests and an inconsistency in values: "the individuals who will someday occupy positions of prestige and power within individual communities leave their university experience with an extremely low opinion of teaching and of those who chose it as an occupation." (p. 277)

This report then is a valuable inquiry into the forces that shape the educational process and which attempt to systematize the multitude of ideas, interests, philosophies, and programs in education and mental health. It is a significant contribution to the understanding of the problems and to the formulation of well developed plans toward the resolution of these difficulties. No panaceas are offered, nor do the authors presume to propound a unilaterally effective answer to problems. It is perhaps trite, but nonetheless important, to stress the value of this book for all groups and individuals concerned with both teaching and mental health at all levels.

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Harvard Educational Review

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